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INTRODUCTION

The mid-eighteenth century was a period of confusion in India. It witnessed a clash of three interests, the Mughal, the Maratha and the European. The Mughal power was on the decline, that of the Marathas at the peak, and that of the Europeans just rising. The period offered a fine opportunity for ambitious persons to carve out almost independent kingdoms. Ali Vardi Khan in Bengal, Nizam-ul-Mulk in the Deccan and Shuja-ud-daula in Oudh were independent in all except in name. Likewise, the Maratha chieftains owed no allegiance to their central government at Poona. Another feature of the age was the divorce of the *de facto* power from *de jure*. Both in the Mughal and the Maratha courts the ministers were all powerful, and the sovereigns were mere figure heads. Shah Alam was almost an instrument in the hands of Najaf Khan. The Peshwas usurped power from Shivaji's descendants only to be treated likewise by their ministers. No other state offered a better example of both these features, namely that of the rise of ambitious persons to the highest ranks of power, and that of reducing the legitimate rulers to a non-entity, than Mysore where Haidar Ali Khan rose into prominence.

[Haidar was born in 1721. Being the son of a soldier, he possessed neither the privilege of birth nor of wealth.¹ With difficulty he managed to enter into the service of Nanjaraj, the Mysore minister. Haidar conducted himself with such prudence that "neither in business nor in pleasure did Nandi Raj ever separate himself from him."² Haidar first witnessed the European warfare at Trichinopoly in the Carnatic War, in which

¹ Haidar rose from the rank of a Naik, a designation given to the lowest rank of non-commissioned officers in the Company's service. Later he disliked this term, and adopted the more dignified title of "Bahadur."

² Hussain Ali Kirmani, *Nishan-i-Haidari* (Trans.) Miles, p. 23,

Nanjaraj first participated on the English side, and then on the French side. This participation so much exhausted his resources that Haidar was enabled within a short period to supplant him. A few more difficulties, particularly the opposition of his own minister, Khande Rao, prevented Haidar's rise to power until 1761, when both by his military and political abilities he removed all his rivals.

The factors that affected English relations with Haidar were diverse and conflicting. Chief among them were the peculiar situation of Mysore, the Maratha expansion in the south, the delicate relations of the Madras Government with their Nawab, the border disputes between Mysore and Madras, Haidar's relations with the French, and his own abilities which made him different from other chiefs.

First, Mysore was so situated that all the southern powers desired its existence as an independent and powerful state in their midst. The Madras Government did not want the Marathas to conquer Mysore, and come nearer to their borders. Likewise, the Marathas were anxious to confine the Europeans to the coast. The Nizam of Hyderabad was eager that neither the Company nor the Marathas should subjugate Mysore. This helped Haidar to preserve the integrity of Mysore by playing one power against the other. The affairs of these powers were themselves in confusion which further helped him in reducing the smaller principalities that surrounded Mysore on all sides. The idea of a barrier to Maratha expansion was too attractive for the Company to check Haidar's growing influence.

Secondly, the Marathas were the most powerful of the Indian powers. After the third battle of Panipat they took more interest in the affairs of the south under their able leader, Madhava Rao I. The southern states, in particular Mysore, were much agitated by their periodic invasions. The Maratha incursions were brought about by two factors, by their policy of plunder and by their desire to check Haidar's growing power. Consequently, he was much disturbed. Robert Orme, a member of the Madras Government, rightly observed, "Like the French Kings during the Norman incursions, the Mysoreans every time they buy the Retreat of the Morattoes who are now Normans

of India, only pay them to return, and by the Imbecility discovered by these measures have laid a certain Plan for the Destruction of their Country, which will in a few years be reduced into a province subject to the Morattoes."¹ Haidar desired the English support against the Marathas. From 1762 to 1778 he consistently tried to conclude a defensive alliance with the Madras Government. The Marathas brought Haidar and the Company nearer even at times when they were gulf apart. He would dictate a treaty at the gates of Madras, but would ask no more than their aid against the Marathas. The Madras Government would rather suffer their allies, like Murar Rao and Malabar chiefs, to be reduced than break with Haidar, lest a power capable of resisting the Marathas should be removed. They would rather reject the Maratha offers, ignore the Nawab's persuasions, and disregard the Crown Representative's pressure, than join the Marathas. Both Haidar and the Madras Government agreed that the Marathas should never be allowed to extend their powers south of the Krishna. Only in the execution of this policy there was some difference. Haidar desired the active support of the English, either at Madras or Bombay, or at both, in order to solve the Maratha problem once and for all, but the English were not in favour of such a radical remedy. They adopted a cautious policy of making one Indian power defeat another. However, the Marathas formed a major factor in English relations with Haidar.

✓ Thirdly, the complicated and delicate relations of the Madras Government with Muhammad Ali Khan, the Nawab of the Carnatic, formed an important factor that influenced their policy towards Haidar. The Nawab was an ally of the Company, as also of the British Crown. But his relations with either were never clearly defined. He resided at the seat of the Madras Government, who had put him in peaceful possession of the Carnatic, but they had no direct share, at least in theory, either in his internal or external affairs. He was an independent prince with large territories, with his separate civil admi-

¹ Orme to Payne (Deputy Chairman of the Company) 4 July 1757, Orme Mss. o. v. Vol. 28, p. 158.

nistration, and with his own military establishments. Unlike in Bengal where the Company had acquired the *Diwani*, the Nawab in the Carnatic had retained some effective power, particularly over finance and revenues. Yet he was not the absolute master of his dominions. Three factors restrained his power. First, the defence of his territories was in the hands of the Madras Government, whom he paid 400,000 pagodas a year for 10 battalions in the total Madras army of 21 battalions, and all his forts were garrisoned by their troops.¹ Secondly, he had ceded them jagirs in 1763 and 1765 yielding an annual revenue of 400,494 pagodas.² These lands were leased to him. In other words his commitments both in the civil and military departments had depleted his treasury. As much as 40 per cent of the Madras Government's income depended on the Nawab.³ Thirdly, he owed large debts both to the Company and individuals. By 1780 these debts had increased to £ 3,340,000.⁴ He incurred them in order to meet the cost of war, of ambitious schemes, and of his own pomp and luxury. He assigned districts for the payment of these debts to individuals some of whom were members of the government. Thus in 1767 John Pybus, John Call and James Bouchier were trustees of his creditors, to whom he had assigned 15 districts with an annual value of £ 320,000.⁵ In November 1777 further assignments were made for the total consolidation of 58 lakhs of pagodas, and among the trustees were two persons, Dawson Drake and Quintin Crawford, who were Government members.⁶ Another disturbing feature of the private debt was that certain interested persons attempted, not without success, to convince the Nawab that they commanded great influence in England to over-rule

¹ *First Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, 1781, p. 49.

² *Minutes of Evidence in Rumbold's Case*, p. 10.

³ H. Dodwell, 'Warren Hastings and the Assignment of the Carnatic', *Eng. Hist. Rev.*, 1925, Vol. XL, p. 377.

⁴ *Burke's Speeches*, Vol. III, p. 83.

⁵ Court to Madras, 17 March 1769, *Desp. to Madras*, Vol. 4, paras 14-15.

⁶ Sundry Articles agreed on between the Nawab and the Creditors of the Debt to be consolidated, 26 Nov. 1777, *Add. Mss.*, 29,139, pp. 461-3.

the Court of Directors. This belief had led to the despatch of secret missions to England by the Nawab, and in his maintenance there of private agents to influence official circles.

Thus the absence of a clearly defined constitution or even of a treaty between the Nawab and the Madras Government caused confusion. His presence in the capital was both advantageous and disadvantageous; advantageous because he was ready at hand for immediate policy decisions, and disadvantageous because an eastern court offered limitless scope for intrigue. Although in theory both the Government and the Nawab were quite independent of each other, in practice they were complementary. No state could exist without defence and no defence was possible without finance. They controlled the defence, and he, the finance, with the result that their army depended on his supplies, and on his finances. Although the Nawab's opinion was sought, it was never binding on them. The majority decision in the Council alone was final. They did not take his advice unless it suited their policy. Although their legal jurisdiction was only over Madras and a few adjoining villages of the jagir, their right by convention and practice to decide the Nawab's defence and foreign affairs gave them a major share in the administration of the Carnatic.

Although the three factors of defence, jagir and debt had reduced the Nawab to a dependant of the Madras Government, he asserted his independence in policy where he felt strongly. Relations with Haidar were one such field. The rivalry between Haidar and the Nawab was irreconcilable. The cause of rivalry was ambition in both. After the fall of Siraj-ud-daula of Bengal the Nawab wrote to Clive, "By the favour of God and Your Bravery I hope to get Possession of Bengal."¹ So ambitious a man could hardly resist the temptation of extending the Carnatic frontiers towards Mysore, certain parts of which once belonged to his nawabship. Hardly a year passed when the Nawab did not press the Madras Government to reduce Haidar. The Nawab consistently attempted to involve the English on the Maratha side to gain his object. Just as Haidar considered

¹ Quoted in H. D. Love, *Vestiges of Old Madras*, Vol. II p. 481.

the English as his mainstay against the Marathas, the Nawab considered the Marathas in the same light against Haidar. Haidar was also ambitious; but for the English support of the Nawab, he would have seized many parts of the Carnatic. But there was some difference between the ambitions of these two chiefs. Whereas the Nawab contemplated impracticable schemes, such as influencing official circles in England to shake off his dependence on the Company, to borrow huge amounts in order to maintain a large army, to reduce Tanjore, and to conquer Mysore, Haidar's ambitions manifested themselves in more practicable fields, and exhibited a greater consciousness of his limitations. He would not allow his prejudice to colour his judgment. His predecessor, Nanjaraj, struggled for eight years to obtain Trichinopoly, but Haidar assigned its principal parts, Madura and Tinnevely, to the French in his treaty with them in 1760. Despite his rivalry with the Nawab, Haidar sought an interview with him after the Madras treaty of 1769, sent his vakils to him in 1773, made several advances for a peaceful settlement of the differences, and proposed a joint defence against the Marathas. It was the Nawab's insincerity and duplicity that destroyed all chances of accommodation. Like the Nizam who later refused a matrimonial connection with Tipu on the ground of social status, the Nawab would not have his name in the treaty of Madras alongside the "Naik's".

✓Fourthly, the composition of the Madras Government raised difficulties in the way of good relations with Haidar. The Government consisted of a governor and council appointed by the Company under powers delegated to it by the early charters of the Crown and Parliament. The councillors, who had equal power with the governor, varied in number from 10 to 16. The council included the chiefs of subordinate settlements, who did not often attend the Council meetings. But at times of disputes, they were hurriedly called by interested members to influence the decision in the Council, just as Pigot did on 22 August 1776 by summoning Richard Latham from Cuddalore. Nothing could be decided but by a majority of votes. Any member could move any resolution. The governor's concur-

rence to the majority decision was not essential. He could neither summon nor adjourn the council arbitrarily, but had to follow the normal established rules. No meeting of the council could be dissolved but by consent of the majority; any meeting could be called at the request of three or more members; if the President failed to call a meeting on the request of three or more members, the Secretary was to summon it; no meeting not so summoned could be deemed a council meeting; and no orders were to be accepted by civil or military servants unless issued in the name of the President and Council and counter-signed by the Secretary.¹ Once a resolution was passed by a majority, it was binding on the minority to give full support for its execution. Every member could freely express his opinion, which was entered on the records as a minute, whether assenting or dissenting. As the Company's proprietors and directors were at a distance, they were very particular that every transaction should be thoroughly discussed, and fully entered on the records, all of which were sent home periodically, besides a summary of them in the form of the Madras Government's letters to the Court. The intention was to avoid hasty decisions, to check against corrupt influences, and to avert the concentration of power in the hands of the governor, who might be tempted to excesses. But this intention was not fulfilled. Orme observed, "To conclude, Nothing great will ever be done for the Company by the present system . . . [We] go on patching up with Expedients the Errors arising from the want of a Fixed and well laid out Plan."² In attempting to deny excessive power to any one member, the Court opened the door to many for intrigue, for self-interest and for mutual rivalries. One able governor like Hastings could have done more good than many councils of mediocrity. From 1763 to 1780 rarely did the Madras Government exhibit qualities of

¹ Court to Madras, 11 June 1777, Desp. to Mad. Vol. 7. paras 3, 10, 22.

² Orme to Payne, headed "Characters of the Council, *Entre nous*, nothing else, very material, Confidential", 26 Oct. 1755, Orme Mss. O. V, Vol. 28, p. 26.

greatness. A government by the Council was not suited to Indian surroundings of that period. The Nawab successfully played one member against the other. Chepauk, his residence, became a centre of intrigue. Self-interest was dominant among members even in issues where the Company's reputation was at stake, such as the decision to invade Mysore in 1767, the two Tanjore expeditions, and the arrest of Lord Pigot. Moreover, the Court periodically varied the size of the council. Between 1760 and 1769 it was less than 12, between 1769 and 1777 it was 16, and after 1777 it was only six. From 1778 a powerful select committee of four was appointed with exclusive powers to transact all military and political affairs. How defective the nature of the Government was could be inferred from the fact that no member protested against the necessity to invade Mysore in 1767, and no effective pressure could be brought on the majority to remain prepared for Haidar's invasion in 1780. Haidar frequently complained that what one government had agreed to, the other would turn it down.

✓ Fifthly, a number of border disputes strained English relations with Haidar. The boundaries of the two powers were not clearly defined, and could never be defined, when ambition reigned on either side. Haidar's set policy was the expansion of his territories. Although he was careful with regard to the Company's or the Nawab's territories, he would not hesitate to encroach, if an opportunity presented itself. The Tellicherry settlement was in alliance with numerous Malabar chiefs, but he did not spare any of those. This was a serious point of dispute between him and the Bombay Government, and strained often his relations with them. But he did not mind, for he knew that Bombay needed the products of his dominions, and that they could not afford to break with him. But his western possessions were both his weak and strong points; weak in the sense that they were vulnerable to a sea attack, and that the presence of several warring Nair chiefs gave Tellicherry a handle to distress him; and strong in the sense that he built a navy there, that he could enter into a direct contact with the French at Mahé and at Mauritius, and that he derived valuable commercial products from Malabar. With the Carnatic boundaries, he

did not take so much liberty. He knew that the Nawab's presence at Madras would make it an excuse to reduce him. But the rumours of massing of troops on the frontiers, lifting of cattle, border raids, and poligar trouble kept the Madras Government constantly alarmed as to Haidar's intentions. He possessed a chain of strong hill forts from where he could surprise the Carnatic. The Nawab, who was not well disposed towards him, always made these an issue to bring about a rupture between the Government and Haidar. Being equally apprehensive of the Nawab's designs, Haidar would also never relax his vigilance, with the result that tension was ever present on the borders making our period of study a scene of either a cold or a hot war.

✓ Sixthly, Haidar's good relations with the French were a sore point. Superficially it offered those who did not know the real nature of those relations, an excuse to embroil Haidar with the English. It proceeded from the theory that the friends of the French were the enemies of the English. The Nawab exploited this point fully. Fortunately, the Madras Government would not always agree with him, for they knew that their policy alone had been responsible for driving Haidar to the French camp. Haidar's policy towards the Europeans had broadly three aspects, to keep them as a check upon one another, to obtain military supplies from them, and to secure their aid at times of exigency. He was neither the favourite nor the foe of the one or the other. The French, the Dutch, the Portuguese and the English, all should exist, according to his policy, side by side, and serve his purpose, namely that of lending him assistance against his enemies. From 1761 to 1778 he did not ask the French aid half as many times as he did the English or even the Dutch. It is wrong to say that his association with the French was a source of threat to the Carnatic or to the English. He was not interested in the conflict of the European powers. When he did participate in 1780, it was to advance his own interests, and not of the French. His relations with the English would have been more cordial than with the French, if the former had supplied him with his basic requirements, arms and military aid.

① Lastly, Haidar's personal abilities had a profound effect on his relations with the English. He was bold and enterprising, very different from other chieftains with whom the Company had come in contact at the time. Although he could neither read nor write, he had an extraordinary memory, and could go through "arithmetical calculations of some length with equal accuracy, and more quickness than the most expert accountant". Unlike Dupleix, whose great abilities were political, Haidar could claim some proficiency in the military field as well. Although he never defeated the Marathās or the Madras army in a pitched battle, he possessed enough skill to escape a rout, enough ability to surprise a detachment, and enough foresight and dash to exploit the weakness of his adversary. He remedied his deficiency in tactical ability by discretion and prudence. He was a good judge of the ground he chose for a battle. His disposition for making or receiving an attack was much admired by military leaders on the English side.² He was not self-complacent, and knew his limitations. He adopted his own method of warfare, which was to avoid pitched battles, to surprise in night attacks, to cut off supplies, to plunder baggage and to intercept detachments.

His political abilities exceeded his military ones. His clear perception of an issue would at once guide him where his interests lay. His shrewdness would extricate him from his difficulties. His foresight would preclude him from entering on grandiose schemes. His resolution, prudence and activity would translate his designs into action. Lastly, his presence of mind and sagacity never failed him even at times of his worst difficulties. Such a person was bound to play an important part in the politics of the period. As the Company were also contesting for power, the relations between the two were not easy.

¹ Wilks, *History of Mysore*, vol. I, p. 217.

² Haidar's Military System, anonymous, Feb. 1782, *Home Misc.* Vol. 84, pp. 936-41.

CHAPTER I

EARLY RELATIONS (1752-1765)

✓ English relations with Mysore begin from the Carnatic War of 1750-55. Till the end of 1752 Mysore was an ally of the Madras government, but from that time it fought on the opposite side. This change was brought about by the failure of Muhammad Ali, the Nawab of the Carnatic, to fulfil his promise of ceding Trichinopoly to the Mysoreans. Both parties began to use all their arts and policy, one to retain it, and the other to recover it. Consequently, the relations between them were greatly strained. Haidar who succeeded to power in 1760, inherited Nanjaraj's bitterness for the Nawab. When hostilities broke out in Europe in 1756 between France and England, the French found Haidar willing to support them. After the fall of Pondicherry in 1761, when the French were removed from the active politics of the Carnatic, Haidar was reconciled to the English both at Madras and at Bombay. The Bombay government adopted more conciliatory measures towards him, and his relations were more cordial with them than with the Madras government. Haidar attributed this to the presence of Muhammad Ali at Madras. The rivalry between these two was beyond all reconciliation.

✓ In order to understand Haidar's early relations with the Madras government, it seems necessary to trace the Trichinopoly question. After the battle of Ambur on 3 August 1749, in which Anwar-ud-din Khan, the Nawab of Arcot, was killed, his younger son, Muhammad Ali Khan, fled to Trichinopoly with only a few adherents. He stood there unsupported either by sanads or friends.¹ Although the English at Fort St. David came to his rescue, the subsequent events in which Nasir Jang, the Subedar of the Deccan, was killed and the French influence was enhanced, made his position desperate. His rival, Chanda

¹ Papers Relative to the Assumption of the Civil and Military Govt. of the Carnatic, Home Misc. Vol. 285. pp. 12-14.

Sahib, subjugated the whole of the Carnatic and closely besieged him in the Trichinopoly fort. Its surrender seemed imminent. At such a critical period he applied to Nanjaraj for help.¹ In September 1751 the Nawab sent his wakil, Seshagiri Pandit, to Nanjaraj soliciting aid. An agreement was drawn up by which the Nawab agreed to surrender Trichinopoly with its dependencies of Madura and Tinnevely to the Mysoreans in return for ten lakhs of rupees received by him from the Raja of Mysore.² The fact that the Mysore government were not well disposed towards Chanda Sahib, who during the time of his governorship of Trichinopoly had formed a design to conquer Karur, a strong frontier fort of Mysore, and that the offer of Trichinopoly with its dependencies was too tempting, prompted Nanjaraj to conclude the agreement. Not only did Nanjaraj pay a sum of money to the Nawab, but himself came down with 4,000 regular and 3,000 irregular troops to Trichinopoly, together with 2,000 Maratha horse under Murar Rao of Gutti, whose expenses were also charged to the Mysore account. Thus the Mysore army helped the English much in forcing the French army under Law to surrender on 3 June 1752.³ Chanda Sahib gave himself up to the allies, and the Tanjorean general, Monaji, put him to death. The Nawab's failing interests received a new lease of life.

With the execution of Chanda Sahib begins the controversy over Trichinopoly. Once his position became secure, the Nawab refused to surrender the place. He argued that Trichinopoly formed the best part of his dominions. If the place was given up before the French were excluded from the contest, Nanjaraj might retire to Mysore.⁴ Trichinopoly

¹ Colonel Lawrence's Account of his Wars beginning with the History of the Province from 1730 continued to September 1754, (hereinafter cited Lawrence's Journal) Orme Mss. O.V. Vol. 13, p. 20.

² Copy of an Agreement bearing Muhammad Ali's seal to the Raja of Mysore, Chikkadevaraja, 6 Zi-ka-da, 1164 (27 Sept. 1751) Home Misc. Vol. 170, p. 624.

³ Lawrence's Journal, pp. 20-27.

⁴ Ibid, p. 31.

belonged to the Mughals, and the Nawab had no authority to alienate it. That would involve him and the English in wars with them.¹ Nanjaraj would not be convinced by these arguments. He rightly insisted that the Nawab should fulfil his promise.² The Mysorean and the Maratha armies remained encamped within the walls of Trichinopoly, and the efforts of Captain John Dalton, the commander of the garrison, to induce them to join the Nawab failed. Nanjaraj said that if the Nawab were to sign another agreement promising to perform his previous engagement, he would send 4,000 horse.³ The Nawab consented to it, and accordingly on 9 July 1752 he agreed to deliver up the fort two months after that date, the interval being required "to remove from thence my furniture and necessaries and my own family and relations."⁴ But Dalton reported to Madras that the Nawab was not sincere in this promise as well.⁵ Lawrence supported the policy of the Nawab, and observed, "The Nabob truly objected that it was not their agreement, nor reasonable, that the town of Trichinopoly should be the price of its Relief."⁶ The truth is that both parties had agreed to the treaty for their own purposes; Nanjaraj, to mark time until the Madras army left Trichinopoly in order that he might surprise the garrison, and the Nawab, to conciliate Nanjaraj until the Carnatic was recovered. By the new agreement the island of Srirangam was delivered up to Nanjaraj, and 700 of his troops were admitted into the fort.⁷

The Madras government found themselves in a difficult situation. It was only on 29 June 1752 that they first came to

¹ Extracts of Ft. St. George Extraordinary Occurrences relative to the Private Agreement between the Nawab of Arcot and the King of Mysore for the Cession of Trichinopoly, Home Misc. Vol. 329, p. 6.

² Lawrence's Journal, p. 30.

³ Board's Minute, Cons. 29 June 1752, Home Misc. Vol. 329, pp. 4-6.

⁴ Copy of an Agreement bearing the Seal of Muhammad Ali, 26 Shaban 1165, A. H. (9 July 1752) Home Misc. Vol. 170, pp. 619-20.

⁵ Board's minute, Cons. 29 June 1752, Home Misc. Vol. 329 p. 6.

⁶ Lawrence's Journal, p. 30.

⁷ Board's minute, Cons. 27 July 1752, Home Misc. Vol. 329, p. 26.

know of the secret article. It is not true to say, as does the *Memoire pour le Sieur Dupleix*, which was published in Paris in 1759 in support of Dupleix's policy, that the Nawab's promise had been guaranteed by the English for the surrender of the fort.¹ The article had been kept a guarded secret, and caused not a little surprise when revealed. They thought that the fulfilment of the promise would draw upon themselves "the Resentment of the Moors in general."² If it was not fulfilled, the Nawab would lose Nanjaraj's support. Moreover, Dupleix had not responded favourably to the advances of the Nawab. Therefore, thinking that the only alternative was to compose differences with Nanjaraj, Thomas Saunders, the Madras governor, invited a wakil from the Mysore camp.³ Nanjaraj sent Berki Venkata Rao to Madras. Saunders told him that neither the Nawab could surrender the district, for it belonged to the Mughals, nor the Madras government could intervene in the dispute, for it would draw upon themselves the resentment of the Mughals. Venkata Rao replied that the Mughals had no reason to oppose the transfer, for his master would pay them the same tribute as the Nawab had been paying. However, the Government were not keen on the surrender at this time. They observed, "We think it ought not to be delivered up, yet but that to prevent the Mysore King's being disgusted, it be hinted to him that when the Nawab is once settled in his province, if he can be prevailed on, and the Circar's premission obtained, we shall have no objection."⁴

This attitude did not help resolve the differences. The moment the Nawab left Trichinopoly to reduce Vellore, Nanjaraj organised a series of plots to seize the fort. He first tried to set free the French prisoners in the fort through a Neapolitan, Captain Clement Poverio, in the Nawab's service.⁵ The attempt failed. Dalton turned out the 700 men stationed in

¹ *Memoire pour le Sieur Dupleix*, Translation in French in India, Vol. 16, p. 54.

² Board's Minute, 8 July 1752, Home Misc. Vol. 329, p. 13.

³ Board's Minute, Cons. 27 July 1752, Ibid. p. 26.

⁴ Board's minute, Cons. 3 Aug. 1752, Ibid. p. 29.

⁵ Lawrence's Journal, pp. 42-44.

the fort by the treaty, and captured Gopal Rao, a cousin of Nanjaraj, who spent a good part of his life in the English custody.¹ Nanjaraj next tried to bribe Dalton with two lakhs of rupees.² When this also failed, Nanjaraj cut off supplies to the fort, causing great inconvenience to the garrison.³

Nanjaraj took one more step. He opened up negotiations with Dupleix. The latter would scarcely miss so fair an opportunity to advance the interests of his nation. He offered Nanjaraj not only Trichinopoly but also Tanjore.⁴ This was a wise move which was calculated to keep both Nanjaraj and the Tanjore Raja on the French side, one, by the tempting offer, and the other, by the frightening step. At first the negotiations between the French and the Mysoreans were slow, and Nanjaraj made it appear that it was Murar Rao who was interested in going over to the French.⁵ But by 10 August both Nanjaraj and Murar Rao were certainly in treaty with Dupleix.⁶ When the Madras government came to know of this, they decided to oppose Nanjaraj, for "if such a conduct is not strictly conformable to the Law of Nations, it is yet perfectly agreeable to the Custom in Europe, of which the late War produced many examples."⁷

The Nawab tried to disengage the French alliance with Mysore in his own way. He concluded a separate agreement with Murar Rao, which was solemnly ratified "in the presence of their God at Syringham."⁸ According to this Murar Rao was to lend 2,000 horse to the Nawab, and the Nawab was to give him three districts belonging to the Cuddapah Nawab, pay the Chauth for Arcot, give up his share of the plunder of Srirangam, and deliver up the outposts of Trichinopoly to

¹ Dalton to Madras, cons. 20 July 1752, Home Misc. Vol. 329, p. 20.

² Dalton to Madras, cons. 27 July 1752, Ibid, pp. 23-24.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Lawrence's Journal, p. 39.

⁵ Dalton to Madras, cons. 13 July 1752, Home Misc. vol. 329, pp. 15-16.

⁶ Dalton to Madras, 10 Aug. 1752, Ibid, pp. 31-32.

⁷ Board's minute, Ibid, pp. 32-33.

⁸ Dalton to Madras, cons. 24 Aug, 1752, Ibid, p. 39.

aggrandisement, which was revealed by the Nawab's treaty with him. Robert Orme wrote to Lord Holdernessee, Secretary of State, that it was partly on account of the Tanjore Raja that Trichinopoly was not surrendered.¹

But the Government were keen on making peace with Nanjaraj. They thought that the Nawab could not retain both Trichinopoly and Arcot, for his force would be divided. An alliance with Nanjaraj would open up Mysore to the Company's investments. Therefore, when Lawrence refused to negotiate, they appointed Thomas Cook, a member of the Fort St. David Council, for the purpose.² But he made silly excuses and extraordinary demands, such as a sum of 1,000 pagodas as a previous recompense to cover any risk to his life, and a body-guard. When they threatened to dismiss him, he proceeded in November 1753.³ But Nanjaraj refused to treat with him.⁴

This question agitated the Company's home government as well. In November 1753 Robert Orme recommended to them the surrender of Trichinopoly to Nanjaraj, if he paid a sum of money to the Nawab, concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with him, and granted certain concessions to the English. Orme said, "...the Necessity of appeasing the King of Misoor is almost as Evident as is that of establishing Mohamedally Nabob of Arcot."⁵ Orme thought that the Nawab was not fit to rule over Trichinopoly, for "Neither the situation [n]or Talents of Mahomed ally's Family enable them to govern well so great an Extent as that of the Territories of Trichinopoly and Carnatic joined together; whilst Trichinopoly is under the Dominion of Mahomed ally, it will always remain a place of Refuge to Malcontents and a seat of war and Rebellion, so that had the King of Mysoor no Pretensions, it would be for the peace of the Carnatica and consequently for

¹ Orme to Holdernessee, 5 Jan. 1755, Orme Mss. O. V. vol. 7, pp. 249-50

² Board's minute, cons. 8 Sept. 1753, *M.M.C.* pp. 143-45

³ Board's minute, cons. 8 Oct. 1753, *Ibid.* pp. 159-62

⁴ Cook to Madras, 12 Nov. 1753, cons. 21 Nov. 1753, *Ibid.* p. 203

⁵ Orme's Reflexions, "A Point to be Considered", 24 Nov. 1753, Orme Mss. O. V. Vol. 17, pp. 121-6

the Interest of the English to give it to some other Prince."¹ Perhaps, impressed by these ideas, as also by the proposals of 11 May 1753, the Company ordered on 13 February 1756 the surrender of Trichinopoly.

Before Cook arrived at Trichinopoly, the Nawab had empowered Saunders to open a separate negotiation with Venkata Rao at Madras, and to agree to the surrender of the fort provided Nanjaraj paid 15 lakhs of rupees to the Nawab, discharged all his debt to the Company, and ceded to him a territory of two lakhs of revenue anywhere in Mysore State.² As Nanjaraj was averse to negotiations at Trichinopoly, Saunders contacted Venkata Rao, who agreed to all the proposals of 11 May except two, namely, 15 lakhs of rupees to the Nawab, and the retention of the fort for 12 months in the hands of the Government.³ These negotiations did not make any progress until March 1754, for Nanjaraj was beaten severely during the interval, and the Madras Government thought that he would come to terms on more advantageous conditions.⁴

In March 1754 Venkata Rao submitted a Memorandum which contained all the proposals of 11 May.⁵ In their anxiety for peace the Government showed some more concessions to Nanjaraj. He was to pay 10 lakhs of rupees to the Nawab instead of 15 lakhs, and he was to be exempted from ceding the territory of two lakhs in Mysore. But the Company's debt was to be paid in full in bills on money lenders at Madras. If these terms were accepted, the Government would not only give up Trichinopoly but also guarantee its peaceful possession by Nanjaraj.⁶ On 13 May they reduced Venkata Rao's proposals into the form of a treaty.⁷ But Lawrence strongly opposed these measures and argued that the Company might

¹ Ibid, pp. 126-7

² Board's minute, cons. 30 Oct. 1753, *M. M. C.* p. 182

³ Board's minute, cons. 12 Nov. 1753, Ibid, p. 195

⁴ Board's minute, cons. 10 Dec. 1753, Ibid, pp. 219-220

⁵ Board's minute, cons. 25 March 1754, *M.M.C.* for 1754, p. 71

⁶ Madras to Lawrence, Ibid, pp. 77-78

⁷ Proposals made by Venkata Rao, cons. 13 May 1754, Ibid, pp. 104-6

realise money, but the war would not be finished, for Nanjaraj would be busy in consolidating his new acquisitions rather than in supporting the Nawab.¹ The Government thought otherwise and wrote to Lawrence that their anxiety was due to the march of Bussy to Masulipatam and Dupleix's expectation of a French force from Europe.² They observed, "It is plain not the Equity of the Dispute between the Country Powers but Self-Preservation and Self-Interest (Motives that Influence the great Councils of Nations) were our Inducements for taking part."³

When they were thus determined to end the dispute, news came of the recall of Dupleix and the arrival of Godeheu, the new governor, who wrote on 1 August offering to make peace.⁴ Although Venkata Rao urged a speedy conclusion of the treaty, they deferred it until they knew the French intentions with greater certainty.⁵ Hostilities were suspended on 4 October, and a provisional treaty was signed in January 1755. One of its articles provided that both parties were to declare war against any of their allies who might disturb peace.⁶ Orme wrote to Holdernes, "If Trichinopoly is lost, the Nabob's principality would be in Utopia."⁷

Nanjaraj continued to besiege Trichinopoly. On 14 August 1754 Haidar seized 35 carts laden with arms and baggage.⁸ Nanjaraj tried to disengage the French from the English by offering the French commander, du Saussay, three lakhs of pagodas, but the attempt failed.⁹ Salabat Jang's invasion of Mysore in January 1755 with Bussy's aid, and the exaction of a large indemnity, 52 lakhs of rupees, forced

¹ Lawrence to Saunders, 24 June 1754, cons. 1 July 1754, Ibid, pp. 144-5

² Madras to Lawrence, 18 July 1754, Ibid, p. 162

³ Board's minute, cons. 29 July 1754, Ibid, p. 174

⁴ Board's minute, cons. 5 Aug. 1754, Ibid, p. 176

⁵ Board's minute, cons. 16 Sept. 1754, Ibid, p. 206

⁶ Board's minute, cons. 7 Oct. 1754, Ibid, p. 234-5

⁷ Orme to Holdernes, 5 Jan. 1755, Orme MSS. O.V. vol. 17, p. 255

⁸ A Sketch of Hydar Ally's Life, Orme MSS. O.V. vol. 10, p. 229

⁹ Committee's Minute, cons. 2 Apl. 1755, M.S.C.P. Range "C" vol. 48
(there is no pagination in this Series).

Nanjaraj to retire to his state in April 1755.¹

When the Home Government came to know of Venkata Rao's proposals, they advised Madras on 13 February 1756 to give up Trichinopoly to Nanjaraj.² Several reasons forced the Madras Government to think that it was undesirable to implement this order, such as the confusion that prevailed in Mysore with the Raja's imprisonment, the exhaustion of the Mysore treasury in the wars against the Marathas and Salabat Jang, the increase in the Nawab's debt to the Company from 35 lakhs in 1754 to 60 lakhs in 1756, and the undesirability of raking up a dispute which seemed settled. Notwithstanding, owing to the reluctance of the Madras Government to disregard the Court's orders, they directed Orme to enquire privately from Venkata Rao if Nanjaraj was still willing to agree to all the proposals of 13 May 1754.³

Accordingly, Orme wrote to Venkata Rao who in reply forwarded Nanjaraj's letter stating that a small amount would immediately be paid, and a larger sum to cover the Nawab's debt to the Company would be paid after the delivery of the fort.⁴ This reply being vague, the Government asked Orme to ascertain the exact amount Nanjaraj would pay.⁵ Orme demanded from Nanjaraj at least 50 lakhs of rupees, which if

¹ Ananda Ranga Pillai, *A Private Diary*, vol. IX, p. 320. The indemnity is stated to be 56 lakhs of rupees by Wilks (*Hist. of Mysore*, vol. I, p. 214), by Hayavadana Rao, (*Hist. of Mysore*, vol. II, p. 191) and by Prof. Sinha (*Haidar Ali*, p. 6). This is not corroborated by the records. Caillaud wrote to Madras that it was 52. (30 May 1755, cons. 12 June 1755, M.S.C.P. Range C vol. 48). Orme also says 52. (*Hist.* vol. I, p. 404).

² Court to the Select Committee at Madras, 13 Feb. 1756, Personal Records, vol. 14, p. 1029. Some of the Court letters to Madras are not to be found in the Court's Despatches to Madras. However, they are found in Personal Records compiled later for quick reference by the East India staff. The authenticity of these letters cannot much be doubted, although they are not so reliable as the original letters.

³ Committee's minute, cons. 25 Oct. 1756, M.S.C.P. Range C, vol. 50

⁴ Venkata Rao to Orme, 23 Dec. 1756, cons. 6 Jan. 1757, *Ibid*, vol. 51, pp. 14-16

⁵ Committee's minute, cons. 6 Jan. 1757, *Ibid*, p. 16

paid, Orme himself would go to Mysore to settle all other points.¹ Orme did not receive a reply to his letter. Meanwhile, Venkata Rao had been carried away by the Marathas in their invasion.² Orme was informed later by another agent that the maximum Nanjaraj would pay was 30 lakhs of rupees. Orme came down to 45 lakhs, but the business could not be finished. Orme wrote to John Payne, "In my opinion the Mysoreans who were certainly once very rich are now by [incursions?] they have suffered from Salabadjang and the Morattoes become very poor, and will prove higling Merchants in this Business."³ Moreover, the Nawab having come to know of these proceedings contemplated moving to Trichinopoly in order to prevent the loss of that place.⁴ Orme in his private capacity suggested to Payne that if Nanjaraj were to pay the required sum and the Nawab was not willing for the deal, the Company should ask the Nawab to surrender Arcot for the debt. Orme added, "I know not what whether such Double Dealing may square with the Politics of Europe, but in Asia, nothing but dissimulation will do."⁵ The Home Government refused to accept 30 lakhs, although at first they had thought that this sum was not a bad bargain.⁶ In their letter of 13 March 1761 they revoked absolutely all powers "heretofore given you of compounding for Trichinopoly."⁷

Thus the Trichinopoly question caused much strain in Mysore-Madras relations. Nanjaraj spent fruitlessly millions of rupees, according to the Madras Government 20 millions, which exhausted his treasury and brought about his ruin.⁸

¹ Orme to John Payne (Deputy Chairman of the Company), 9 Feb. 1757, Orme MSS. O.V. vol. 28, p. 131

² Orme to Payne, 4 July 1757, Ibid, pp. 157-8

³ Orme to Payne, 17 Nov. 1757, Ibid, pp. 225-6

⁴ Ibid. p. 217

⁵ Ibid, p. 218. The whole of this letter is curious (pp. 217-227)

⁶ Court to Madras, 23 Jan. 1759, Personal Records, vol. 14, pp. 1019-21

⁷ Court to Madras, 13 March 1761, Ibid, para 10, p. 1031

⁸ Board's minute, cons. 29 July 1754, M.M.C. p. 174. Ranga Pillai says 30 millions in one place, and 40 in another. (*Private Diary*, IX, p. 239 and p. 370)

On both Nanjaraj and his successor, Haidar, it created the impression that the Nawab had deliberately played a fraud on the Mysoreans. However, the dispute helped all parties except Nanjaraj and the Nawab. The English, the French, Murar Rao and Haidar, all stood to gain. Because of this dispute which prolonged the war, the English advanced the Nawab such large sums that he could not even discharge their interest and had to remain subservient to their power. Dupleix was able to prolong the war after Law's surrender, Chanda's execution and Clive's brilliant campaigns. Murar Rao received money from both Nanjaraj and the Nawab, and marched off.¹ Haidar found Trichinopoly a fine training ground militarily, and an excellent opportunity politically, for Nanjaraj was rendered so weak financially that he could not stay for long in office. Ananda Ranga Pillai, who had been in a way Foreign Secretary to Dupleix, observed, "As all the countries dependent upon Mysore had been ruined, the Raja, his mother and the Pradhani Pandit resolved to seize and imprison Nandi Raja and reappoint Pradhani Pandit Venkata-pati Ayyan, who was formerly Sarvadhikari."² Although the Nawab retained Trichinopoly, the debt he incurred, the new enemy he created in Mysore, the disaffection of the poligars, and the rebellion of his brother, Mahfuz Khan, in whose charge the district was given, did not give him any advantage.³ However, in this dispute the Madras Government adopted in succession all three alternatives before them, namely, neutrality, intervention and mediation. The question had been almost settled, when the sudden recall of Dupleix destroyed all chances of peaceful accommodation.

Orme makes an observation with which it is difficult to agree. He says that it was better in the interests of Nanjaraj himself that Trichinopoly was not handed over to him, for "it would sooner or later have involved him in a war with the Mogul Government, which probably would have ended in

¹ Palk to Madras, 20 June 1754, cons. 1 July 1754, *M.M.C.* pp. 146-7

² A.R. Pillai, 7 Oct. 1755, *Private Diary*, vol. IX, p. 370

³ Orme to Payne, 12 March 1758, Orme Mss. O.V. vol. 28, p. 247

reducing the Kingdom of Mysore itself, like the Carnatic, to be a province of their empire."¹ It was too much to expect from the disintegrating Mughal Empire that they would have reduced Mysore. Their deputy, Salabat Jang, was no more than a puppet in the French hands. When Dupleix himself was an ally of Nanjaraj, the latter had nothing to fear from the Mughals.

✓ When hostilities broke out again between France and England in 1756, the Madras Government who had sent a large force under Clive to recover the Bengal settlements, could not hope to gain any advantage over the French.² Therefore they remained peaceful. The French also adopted the same policy, as they had not received any reinforcements. But, when d' Aché arrived from Europe in April 1758 with a force under Lally, the French reduced a number of small forts within a short period.³ Bussy sent further reinforcements from Golconda in Hyderabad, and Lally besieged Madras in December 1758. These French successes revived the Mysorean hopes to recover Trichinopoly. Infact the Mysoreans had not been reconciled to the loss of that place at all. In July 1757 Nanjaraj had sent Haidar to occupy Srirangam.⁴ In October 1757, Nanjaraj had sent his *vakil*, Venkatanarnappa, to de Lyrit seeking French aid to capture Madura.⁵ In February 1758 a party of 500 French troops had set out under Astruc, a French commander, to join Haidar at Dindigal.⁶

✓ When the French failed to take Madras, they sent an agent to Seringapatam early in 1759 soliciting aid. They were not successful in the attempt.⁷ They sent again two agents in

¹ Orme, *A History of the Military Transactions*, vol. I, p. 389

² Madras to Clive, cons. 13 Nov. 1756, M.S.C.P. Range C, vol. 50

³ John Call (an Engineer at Madras), *Journal of the Siege of Madras*, Mss. Eur. E. I, pp. 10-11

⁴ A. R. Pillai, *A Private Diary*, vol. XI, p. 9

⁵ Ibid, p. 63

⁶ Caillaud to Madras, 12 Feb. 1758, cons. 23 Feb. 1758, M.S.C.P. Range C, vol. 53, p.104

⁷ Captain Joseph Smith to Madras, 4 March 1759, cons. 29 March 1759, M.M.S.P. Range D, vol. 14, p. 77

March 1760 for the same purpose.¹ By this time Haidar had become the master of Mysore. Lally wrote to him, "We both must drive the English that we can have no troubles in the country. Otherwise they will always endeavour to disturb you in company with Mogulls if they have opportunity."² Haidar thereupon sent 2,000 horse and some sepoys under Venkoji Pandit, who arrived at Tiagarh, a fort in the North Arcot district, on 4 June.³ The arrival of this force did not help the French. Lally complained that they plundered the villages instead of opposing the English.⁴ This necessitated the conclusion of a definite treaty of alliance. Noronha, a Portuguese priest, better known as the Bishop of Halicarnassus, conducted the negotiation to a successful end on 28 June 1760.⁵ According to this Haidar was to assist Lally with 3,000 sepoys and 2,000 horse, and Lally was to pay two lakhs of rupees after two months from 4 June, the date Haidar's army arrived at Tiagarh, and one lakh per month thereafter. Tiagarh with its dependencies would be ceded to Haidar as a jagir. The French were to provide him with 10 eighteen-pounders, stores, fire-locks and ammunition. They would retain Madura and Tinnevely, and other conquests would be divided equally between Haidar and the French.⁶ It is significant to note here that Nanjaraj had struggled for eight years to obtain Trichinopoly, but Haidar was now assigning its principal parts, Madura and Tinnevely, to the French, and that Trichinopoly did not figure at all in the Treaty.

✓ Why did Haidar enter into this agreement? He had newly succeeded to power, and had not yet stabilised his position. He was anxious to keep some European power as his ally. Captain Richard Smith, the commanding officer at Trichino-

¹ Advice from Pondicherry, cons. 10 March 1760, Ibid, vol. 43, p. 244

² Lally to Haidar, undated, Orme Mss. India, vol. VIII, p. 2029

³ Krishna Rao to Madras, cons. 9 June 1760, M.M S.P. Range D vol. 43, p. 526

⁴ Lally to Haidar, cons. 3 June 1760, Ibid, p. 599

⁵ A. R. Pillai, *A Private Diary*, vol. XII, p. 73

⁶ An Agreement between Haidar and the French, 29 June 1760, Orme Mss. India, vol. VIII, p. 2029

poly, wrote to Madras, "When he had so many rivals in the Raja of Mysore's court, he undertook to assist the French only on their promise that they would help him with all their force which was expected shortly."¹ He preferred the French to the English because he knew that the Nawab was against him. Haidar did make some advances to the Nawab soon after the French quitted Srirangam, but the response was poor.² Although Haidar inherited to a certain degree Nanjaraj's bitterness for the Nawab, it was not such as to prejudice his judgment. Trichinopoly was not even mentioned in the Agreement of 28 June. Moreover, the Madras Government ignored Haidar. They wrote to Bombay that his support of the French would make no difference in the war.³ The French not only agreed to cede Tiagarh, but also to supply him with military stores, a prime consideration with him. He supported the French because of his anxiety to consolidate his position, and not because of any interest in the quarrels of the European powers. If the Madras Government had courted his friendship there is no reason to think that he would not have responded favourably.

✓ Although the Madras Government wrote to Bombay that they were not perturbed by Haidar's alliance with the French, they were really perturbed, and thought that it might affect the siege of Pondicherry, which they were carrying on at the time. They were also apprehensive lest the Mysore horse should ravage their territories and cut off supplies to their army.⁴ Smith suggested that the invasion of Mysore was the only remedy.⁵ They approved of his suggestion and directed him to attack Karur and Dindigal.⁶ But Smith was not ready for so quick an attack, as he did not have sufficient troops, and Haidar had a good body of horse at Karur.⁷ Meanwhile, the

¹ Smith to Madras, 26 June 1760, cons. 9 July, 1760, M.M.S.P., Range D, vol. 44, p. 616

² Ibid

³ Madras to Bombay, cons. 12 June 1760, Ibid, vol. 43, p. 552

⁴ Board's minute, cons. 9 June 1760, Ibid, p. 526

⁵ Smith to Madras, 31 May 1760, cons. 12 June 1760, Ibid, pp. 553

⁶ Madras to Smith, cons. 13 June 1760, Ibid, p. 557

⁷ Smith to Madras, 26 June 1760, cons. 9 July 1760, Ibid, vol. 44, p. 614

Government had decided to induce Murar Rao to invade Mysore.¹

✓Before the Government could concert their plans of operations, Haidar's army under Makhdoom defeated Major More completely near Perambek. With great difficulty More joined Eyre Coote on 20 July. About 40 Europeans were killed and wounded in the battle.² On 5 August the Government collected a strong force under Major Achilles at Wandiwash to oppose the Mysore army.³ By the end of July Smith was also ready to move from Trichinopoly, and Husain Khan, the Nawab's commander, began to plunder the Mysore districts.⁴ Smith took Pudukota and Elur, and appeared before Karur. He wrote to Madras, "Caroor once taken we have the key to the very centre of Misur Kingdom."⁵ On 27 August he took the town of Karur, about which he wrote, "Perhaps, Sir, in India you have not seen a Black Town so large or of better buildings."⁶ On 1 September Bonappa, the *Killedar*, capitulated the fort. Two articles are interesting in the capitulation that was signed. One provided that the Europeans who had deserted from the Madras army should be delivered up. This suggests that desertion among Europeans was not uncommon. The other provided that if within 20 days no letter was received from the Governor of Madras to deliver up the fort to Bonappa, the Mysoreans would evacuate it.⁷ This strange condition which postponed the delivery for 20 days, and expressed the hope that the Government might intervene, was owing to the extraordinary occurrences that took place on 12 August at Seringapatam. Khande Rao, Haidar's

¹ Board's minute, cons. 23 June 1760, *Ibid*, vol. 43, p. 578

² Coote to Madras, 19 July 1760, cons. 21 July 1760, *Ibid*, vol. 44, pp. 632-4

³ Madras to Achilles, cons. 5 Aug. 1760, *Ibid*, p. 656

⁴ Smith to Madras, 29 July 1760, cons. 10 Aug. 1760, *Ibid*, p. 674

⁵ Smith to Madras, 16 Aug. 1760, Orme Mss. O.V. vol. 26, p. 64

⁶ Smith to Commander-in-Chief, 27 Aug. 1760, *Ibid*, p. 66

⁷ Articles of Capitulation, 1 Sept. 1760, cons. 15 Sept. 1760, M.M.S.P. Range D, vol. 44, pp. 790-1

trusted Secretary, turned against him and forced him to escape precipitately. Haidar's fortune was at the lowest ebb. Bonappa was hopeful that Khande Rao might join the English to destroy Haidar completely, and might prevail on the Madras Government to restore Karur as a condition for a Mysore alliance.

The offensive of the Madras Government had been well timed. A Maratha army under Visaji Pandit had agreed to support the Raja against Haidar in return for 40 lakhs of rupees and five forts.¹ Smith was hopeful that these disturbances in Mysore would open for the English a large field for conquest.² But the Government opposed the idea of further offensive both because of the want of resources and because of the uncertainty of Mysore politics. They observed, "In the meantime should the King send any force against Hydernaig, that we should not have him oppose, nor join him, but rather act against Hydernaig separately, if an opportunity should offer, for altho' Hydernaig be in rebellion to the King, as well as an enemy to us, we are by no means satisfied that the King is not also opposed to our interest."³ Therefore, they asked Smith to remain neutral in the dispute, and to refer to Madras if the Raja were to make any advances.⁴ The Raja wrote to Smith dissociating himself completely from the past events, and proposing an alliance with the English, by which he would send 5,000 horse and 6 or 7,000 sepoy to their aid against the French, and they were to desist in return from further conquests in Mysore.⁵ The Government thought that such an alliance was advantageous to them on three grounds. First, the party opposed to Haidar who was in alliance with the French, would come to power in Mysore. Secondly, it would counteract any French attempt to seek the support of some other Indian power. Lastly, it might induce the Raja to make political and commercial concessions to the Company. There-

¹ John Andrews to Madras, 3 Sept. 1760, cons. 8 Sept. 1760, Ibid, p. 752

² Smith to Madras, 6 Sept. 1760, cons. 15 Sept. 1760, Ibid, p. 792-3

³ Board's minute, cons. 15 Sept. 1760, Ibid, p. 794

⁴ Madras to Smith, 16 Sept. 1760, Orme Mss. O.V. vol. 26, pp. 85-6

⁵ King of Mysore to Smith, undated, recd. 16 Sept. 1760, Ibid, pp. 77-80

fore, they accepted the Raja's offer, invited a *vakil* from him, and directed all hostilities to cease against him.¹ Besides, they ordered Major Preston to join the Raja's forces against Haidar.²

The Government anxiously waited for the *vakil* to come. They learnt that he had set out. Yet he did not come.³ They reminded the Raja to carry out his proposal, but to no purpose.⁴ The reason for Khande Rao's failure to send the *vakil* was his own difficulty at home. Haidar composed his differences with Visaji in November. The Afghan menace in the north which culminated in the third battle of Panipat in January 1761 had forced the Marathas to recall their troops from different parts. It changed greatly the situation in Mysore. Khande Rao could hardly think of sending a force to the Carnatic, when another revolution seemed imminent at the capital. The Madras Government were disappointed in their hopes of both aid and concessions. Rumours prevailed that Haidar would return to the Carnatic to join the French. Smith suggested that the English also should change their policy and support Haidar. Smith observed, "Haider's attachment to the French was founded upon the principle of interest, as they had always supported him in his usurpation. It is reasonable to imagine that a negotiation with Haidernaige on our part would be attended with success; we can assist him in his pretensions, the French are incapable."⁵ The Government disagreed with this view thinking that neither the Raja nor Haidar was well disposed towards them. They wanted to gain time, for which they directed Smith to open negotiations with both the Raja and Haidar.⁶

Accordingly, Smith met the Raja's minister, Beni Krishna, who asked for the restoration of Karur, an alliance between

¹ Board's minute, cons. 6 Oct. 1760, M.M.S.P. Range D, vol. 44, pp. 872-3

² Madras to Preston, cons. 8 Oct. 1760, Ibid, p. 876

³ Board's minute, cons. 24 Nov. 1760, Ibid, p. 1014

⁴ Board's minute, cons. 4 Dec. 1760, Ibid, pp. 1055-6

⁵ Smith to Madras, 29 Nov. 1760, cons. 18 Dec. 1760, Ibid, pp. 1077-8

⁶ Madras to Smith, 9 Jan, 1761, Orme Mss. O.V, vol. 27, p. 1

Mysore and Madras, and the release of Gopal Rao.¹ Smith demanded a lakh of pagodas for restoring Karur, was willing for the alliance if the Raja were to defray all the expenses of the troops, and had no objection to the release of Gopal Rao if the first two points were settled. However, Smith got an impression that the Raja was not anxious for an alliance, that he doubted the sincerity of the Government, and that he would not withdraw the troops from the border despite Haidar's increasing threat. Smith observed, "As the Raja is a weak-man, his resolution to support Khande Rao might change."² Still, the English gained one important point, namely the assurance that if Haidar moved into the Carnatic, the Mysoreans would send 2,000 horse and as many sepoys to join the Madras army.³ Smith sounded Haidar also, but the response was poor.⁴

These negotiations were conducted at a very critical period, when the fate of Pondicherry was held in suspense. Smith's troops were released to join Major Achilles in the Carnatic to defeat Haidar's support of the French. The policy to temporise both with the Raja and Haidar was wise. Smith wrote to his sister, "*This was a grande coupe de politique*, and the only measure that could be thought on to cover Preston's attack, & of course to prevent our army being harassed whilst they were intent on the siege of Pondicherry. *This was opposing Misorian to Misorian.*"⁵ Pondicherry fell on 16 January, and, with it a ten years war in the Carnatic came to a close. There was no danger now from Haidar, for he would not make any mischief without the French support.

After the surrender of Pondicherry, the Government invited the Raja's *vakil* to Madras to consider the proposals of an

¹ See back page 15

² Smith to Madras, 17 Jan. 1761, cons. 27 Jan. 1761, M. M. S. P. Range 251, vol. 47, pp. 93-95

³ Smith to his sister, 25 Jan. 1761, Orme Mss. O.V. vol. 27, pp. 25-26

⁴ Smith to Madras, 17 Jan. 1761, cons. 27 Jan. 1761, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 47, p. 95

⁵ Smith to his sister, 25 Jan. 1761, Orme Mss. O.V. vol. 27, p. 26

alliance.¹ Six months later on 15 July 1761 they received a letter from the Raja soliciting a body of force to oppose Haidar. They decided not to intervene, thinking that, although the Raja's offer had great advantages to the Company, the loss of the French in the Deccan, despite the large resources they commanded there, was a lesson not to follow their example by sending troops to distant parts from the capital. They further argued that it was undesirable to intervene "when the country is scarce settled" and "without first having money in hand."² It is difficult to agree with the Madras Government that their revised policy of neutrality was due to the three factors of the French example, the want of money and the unsettled state of the Carnatic. This policy is inconsistent with their previous resolutions of 6 October 1760, when they had decided to intervene and of 27 January 1761, when they had invited a *vakil* from Mysore. The real reason for the change of policy was the improvement in Haidar's position who had defeated Khande Rao and had recovered his power. At such a time the English intervention would have been really harmful to their own interests. Professor Sinha seems to think that the French example deterred them from intervention, and that they never entertained any idea of an alliance with the Raja of Mysore except for their willingness at one stage to exchange Karur for one lakh of pagodas.³ This is not borne out by the Government's resolutions of 6 October 1760 and 27 January 1761. They tried to enter into an alliance, but it was Khande Rao's own embarrassments at home that defeated their design.

✓ The fall of Pondicherry in January 1761, and Haidar's success in May of the same year put a period to the war in the south making both the English and Haidar major powers. The year 1761 witnessed two more important events. The disastrous defeat of the Marathas at Panipat turned their eyes from the north to the south, making Mysore the particular object of their attacks. The other change was the fall of Salabat Jang and the rise of Nizam Ali in the Deccan. Salabat sought the aid

¹ Board's minute, cons. 27 Jan. 1761, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 47, p.98

² Board's minute, cons. 15 July 1761, *Ibid*, pp, 518-9

³ N, K, Sinha, *Haidar Ali*, p. 61

of the Madras Government, but they declined to give any. Perhaps, here the French example might have been relevant, for they wrote to the Court, "...indeed we are not desirous of grasping more than we can hold."¹

✓ The Government's relations with Haidar during 1761-65 were neither friendly nor hostile. He was not biased against them, but the main obstacle in the way of better relations was the Nawab, who consistently represented to the Government that there was danger from Haidar, and urged them to attack him. Haidar was too busy consolidating his position to cause any disturbances in the Carnatic, and the Government rightly thought that he knew it was against his interest to quarrel with them.² However, there were certain border disputes, which strained the relations.

✓ The appearance of Haidar's army near Venkatagiri, a frontier fort, made the Nawab infer that Haidar had hostile designs on the Carnatic.³ But this apprehension proved unfounded. When the Satgarh *Killedar*, a rebel, applied to Haidar for help, the latter refused.⁴ Haidar's activity in the neighbourhood of the Carnatic prompted the Government to send a body of force to the Mysore borders.⁵ Far from disturbing peace in the Carnatic, Haidar sent a *vakil* to Madras in March 1764 seeking aid.⁶ This was because the Marathas under Madhava Rao invaded Mysore early in 1764, and Haidar was anxious to secure aid from the Madras Government. He was not successful in getting any.⁷ Therefore he turned to another source, namely the Bombay Government. As Haidar had been involved in the affairs of Bidnur and the Marathas in 1763 and 1764, it is with that Presidency

¹ Madras to the Court, 2 Oct. 1768, Letters Received, vol. 1 A, para 18

² Board's minute, cons. 4 Jan. 1762, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 48, pp. 4-5

³ Nawab to Madras, cons. 21 Feb. 1763, Ibid, vol. 49, p. 67

⁴ Campbell to Madras, 1 Apl. 1763, cons. 4 Apl. 1763, Ibid, p. 171

⁵ Board's minute, cons. 5 July 1763, Ibid, pp. 55-6

⁶ Board's minute, cons. 12 March 1754, Ibid, vol. 50, p. 121

⁷ Sajun Lal, K. "Hyder Ali's Appeal to the Hon'ble East India Company, 1764" *Ind. Hist. Quart.* vol. 19, 1943, pp. 184-7

that he had much to do rather than with Madras.

Of the three Presidencies only Bombay had been less involved in the politics of the Indian powers, and more in their own trade. The western coast, where they wanted to secure their trade on a firm basis, was rich in such commercial crops as pepper, cardamum and sandal wood. John Stracey, the Resident at Honavar, had tried in June 1761 to conclude a treaty with the Queen of Bidnur for the grant of exclusive right in pepper trade to the Company. But he had failed, and had left her court without taking leave of her.¹ When Haidar conquered Bidnur in January 1763 and sent several parties to subjugate other places on the western coast, one of them arrived at Honavar, which surrendered. Stracey retired to a neighbouring place, Anjdiv, thinking that Haidar who had many French in his service, would never grant commercial privileges to the Company.² But in the first meeting itself of a Company's linguist at Mangalore, Haidar promised to continue all the privileges to the Company, provided they supplied him with 7,000 muskets.³ This encouraged Stracey to meet Haidar, who received him well, and said that he would grant the Company an exclusive right in pepper trade of Honavar, and would permit the building of a factory there, provided they supplied him with small arms. Although Stracey told him that the Company never sold or assisted Indian powers with arms, he wrote to Bombay that if Haidar's demand was complied with, it would result in many advantages to the Company. He added that the French in Haidar's pay seemed to have little influence over him, and that he was discontented with them.⁴ Besides, Haidar himself directly applied to Bombay for 3 or 4,000 muskets.⁵ The Bombay Board decided to supply him

¹ Bombay to the Court, 10 Apl. 1762, Bombay Letters Received, vol. 2, pp. 50-51

² Stracey to Bombay, 4 Feb. 1763, cons. 16 Feb. 1763, B.P.C. Range 341, vol. 26, pp. 125-6

³ Tellicherry to Bombay, cons. 11 March 1763, Ibid, p. 171

⁴ Stracey to Bombay, 7 March 1763, cons. 21 March 1763, Ibid, pp. 193-4

⁵ Haidar to Bombay, undated, cons. 22 March, 1763, Ibid, p. 202

with 500 muskets, "more specially as, should we omit this favourable juncture of cultivating his friendship, he would probably throw himself into the arms of the French to whom he had hitherto been attached," and because he had conquered "the whole Canarese Dominions."¹ Although the Court had prohibited the supply of arms to any Indian power, the Board justified their policy on the ground that Haidar would not grant them any concession without some return, that he would oppose them with all his power if the arms were refused, and that he would receive these supplies from other sources, such as the Portuguese, French, Danes and Dutch, "who in his present situation would be glad to cultivate his friendship to our prejudice."² Therefore, they sent Stracey to Haidar with these arms and with the instructions that further supply of arms to him would depend on Haidar's support in procuring pepper in his dominions, in recovering Company's debt from their defaulters, and in promoting the sale of woollen and other European goods in his territories. Stracey was not to deliver the arms if Haidar had any improper connections with the French, or hostile designs against the Company.³

✓ Stracey arrived at Honavar on 8 April, and reported to the Board that Haidar was not in alliance with the French.⁴ Stracey proceeded to Bidnur where Haidar was staying, and successfully concluded on 27 March 1763 a treaty which was called a "Firmaund"⁵. It was a commercial treaty by which Haidar permitted the Company to build a factory at Honavar, to export 300 *corge* of rice from Tellicherry, to confine in their

¹ Board's minute, cons. 22 March 1763, Ibid, pp. 196-7

² Ibid

³ Instructions to Stracey, cons. 2 April 1763, Ibid, pp. 230-1

⁴ Stracey to Bombay, 11 Apl. 1763, cons. 12 May 1763, Ibid, p. 321

⁵ C.U. Aitchison. *Treaties, Engagements and Sanads*, vol. IX, No. XXXV, pp. 194-5. It is interesting to note that this treaty is called a *farman* both by the Bombay Government and Haidar. It was the Bombay Government who had first called it a *farman*, and had enclosed a sketch of it to Stracey on 2 April. This suggests that they were less careful of the legal scruples, for not having assumed any formal sovereignty, Haidar had no right to grant any *farman*, William Logan refers to it as a treaty. (*Malabar*, vol. I, p. 405)

factory any one who failed to pay their debt, and to anchor English grabs,¹ gallivats² and armed boats in his ports. The two parties agreed that they would not assist the enemies of each other.³

✓ Haidar conceded these concessions to the Bombay Government because he was desirous of obtaining arms, cannons and his other military requirements.⁴ Besides, he was anxious to build some fighting vessels in their marine yard, and they permitted him to do so thinking that his having a marine force would be a check on the Marathas, and would give the English an opportunity "of taking satisfaction in case of Rupture at any time with him."⁵ Yet another reason was Haidar's hope that the Bombay Government would be helpful in terminating his differences with the Nawab of the Carnatic. Stracey wrote to Bombay, "...if after we have solicited and obtained favours and make a league of Amity with him on one coast, whilst we enter into a War with him on the other, he knew not how he would reconcile [to] this Behaviour."⁶ The Bombay Government wrote to Madras urging them to accommodate their differences with him.⁷

✓ The Court did not approve of the Bombay Government's policy on the ground that the supply of arms to Indian powers was undesirable, and asked Bombay to stop any more supply to Haidar. The Court added, "We have sufficiently experienced the Ill Consequences of Connections and Embroils with the Country Powers on the other side of India, to make us dread their taking rise elsewhere."⁸ The Court regarded the article of

¹ Grab—A light-draft coasting vessel of the East Indies with two or three masts.

² Gallivat—A large boat used in Eastern seas having oars and a triangular sail.

³ C. U. Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements and Sanads*, vol. IX, pp. 194-5

⁴ Board's minute, cons. 28 July 1763, B.P.C. Range 341, vol. 26, p. 500

⁵ Board's minute, cons. 2 Aug. 1763, Ibid, pp. 503-4

⁶ Stracey to Bombay, 26 June 1763, cons. 28 July 1763, Ibid, p. 501

⁷ Board's minute, cons. 2 Aug. 1763, Ibid, p. 503

⁸ Court to Bombay, 3 Apl, 1764, Desp. to Bombay, vol. 2, para 41, p. 446

neutrality as impolitic, for Haidar was a "Man of aspiring Genius" who was likely to be a formidable enemy rather than a friend to the Company. It would remove all restraints on him in his reduction of the small Malabar powers. The Court disapproved of in particular the supply of ships "which he would not have got with any degree of Perfection in any other Place."¹ They thought that he would not remain long in friendship with them unless they entered into all the schemes he might propose. That the Bombay Government judged Haidar better than the Court, could be inferred from the latter's letter to the former a little later, "As the Nabob continues to allow us the sole exportation of pepper, you must endeavour to keep him in good disposition."²

Certain new difficulties arose in the way of implementing the treaty of May 1763. The first was the treaty of alliance of 21 April 1757 between Tellicherry settlement and the Raja of Chirakal. By this treaty the Raja had been promised aid by the Company, if he was attacked by any power. The Raja now enquired what help he could expect from the Company if Haidar attacked him.³ The Bombay Government thought that their treaty with Haidar did not preclude them from assisting their allies, and that it merely prevented them from supporting any offensive act against him.⁴ The second difficulty was the increasing demands of Haidar for arms. His demands became so frequent that they could not supply him any more. Lastly, the Madras Government suspected that despite his alliance with the Bombay Government Haidar was secretly assisting Yusuf Khan, the rebel at Madura.⁵ But Haidar was not causing any trouble to Madras at this time, for he was involved in a war against the Marathas from October 1763.⁶

¹ Court to Bombay, 22 March 1765, *Ibid*, paras 97-9, pp. 628-31

² Court to Bombay, 4 Apl. 1767, *Ibid*, para 69, p. 1072

³ Tellicherry to Bombay, 24 Aug. 1763, cons. 24 Sept. 1763, B.P.C. Range 341, vol. 26, p. 595

⁴ Board's minute, cons. 27 Sept. 1763, *Ibid*, p. 601

⁵ Madras to Bombay, cons. 14 May 1764, *Ibid*, pp. 307-8

⁶ Tellicherry to Bombay, 29 Oct. 1763, cons. 11 Nov. 1763, *Ibid*, p. 690

When the Bombay Government asked him to desist from secretly encouraging Yusuf Khan, Haidar's explanation was, "Mohomed Ally Cawn is always telling the Governor of Madrass Idle Tales to my prejudice and endeavours to set him against me, but he is a good man and does not regard what Mohamed Ally Cawn tells him and continues to correspond with me."¹ Far from breaking with the English, Haidar was now thinking of a closer alliance with them.

Haidar proposed to the Bombay Government an offensive alliance of three powers, the Company, the Nizam and himself, against the Marathas. He observed, "Nabob Nizam ally proposes to come here with his foree, and then if you join us, we three can entirely demolish the Morattas.... The Grant of Arcott is in my hands and I have prevented their coming to this side ; the places there and at Chinapattam [Madras] are all open ; if the Maratha army which consists of about 50 or 60,000 men should come, they will ruin the English Country."² Haidar asked for a supply of arms to him, and sent his two *vakils*, Abdul Gani and Mankoji, to Bombay to explain further his proposals.³

Although Madhava Rao also had written to Bombay for military aid, and the Home Government had clearly forbidden the supply of arms to Indian powers, the Bombay Government decided to send some guns and muskets to Haidar.⁴ Besides, they deputed Stracey to him with instructions to enquire the concessions he would grant in return for the English alliance, the exact position of his government, his resources in men and money, and his connections and interests with other powers. Stracey was to ask for "an exclusive Right to every grain of

¹ Haidar to Bombay, 27 Aug. 1764, cons. 15 Oct. 1764, Ibid, vol. 27, p. 620

² Ibid, p. 619. "The Grant of Arcott" referred here is probably the *Sanad* which Haidar obtained in 1761 from Basalat Jang for the Nawabship of Sira and its dependencies.

³ Ibid, pp. 619-20

⁴ Madhava Rao to Bombay, 2 Sept. 1764, cons. 15 Oct. 1764, Ibid, p. 621

intentions.¹ But the Bombay Government were not so apprehensive. They thought that he could not afford to alienate them.² After the Maratha withdrawal from Mysore when rumours persisted of Haider's designs on Malabar, Bombay asked Tellicherry to evade carefully any support to their Malabar allies without causing any disgust in them, and to send two persons to Haider to point out who their allies were, and to ask him not to attack them. Besides, Crammelin wrote personally to Haider asking him to abandon his ambitious designs. The Government thought that these steps were adequate to ward off the danger.³ They were effective for a short period. But Haider renewed his project of attack in January 1766.

Thus during the first phase of Haider's relations with the English, the Madras Government's policy towards him was different from the Bombay Government's. Whereas the latter preferred their friendship to him, the former did not. The question of Trichinopoly, the presence of the Nawab at Madras and the frequent border disputes were the main obstacles in the way of better relations between Mysore and Madras. Moreover, the commercial interests of the Madras Government in Mysore were not so great as Bombay Government's. The presence of the Dutch, the Portuguese and the French on the western coast competing for the rich commercial commodities of the area, the unsettled political conditions of the Malabar powers and the relatively small size of the Company's settlements on that coast, all made the Bombay Government more anxious for Haider's friendship than the Madras Government. However, the policy of the Madras Government was neither one of hostility, nor of cordiality but of disinterestedness in Haider's affairs. Affairs stood at this stage when new factors brought about the first Mysore War.

¹ Tellicherry to Bombay, 2 Jan. 1765, cons. 28 Jan. 1765, *Ibid.*, vol. 28, p. 49

² Bombay to Tellicherry, cons. 6 Jan. 1765, *Ibid.*, p. 11

³ Board's minute, cons. 31 Oct. 1765, *Ibid.*, p. 547

CHAPTER II

PRELUDE TO THE FIRST MYSORE WAR (1765-1767)

✓
[Peace had prevailed in the Carnatic from the fall of Pondicherry in 1761 to the outbreak of the Mysore War in 1767. This was due to the policy of the Madras Government not to intervene in the disputes of the Indian powers. Rumours of Haidar's designs on the Carnatic did prevail, but the Government rightly attributed them to the hostile propaganda of interested parties. This sound policy based on moderation on the one hand and vigilance for the security of the Carnatic on the other, underwent a radical change from the middle of 1766. Certain external factors such as the Mughal grant of the Northern Sarkars to the Company, Madhava Rao's secret alliance with the Nizam, Haidar's conquest of Malabar and the Nizam's grant of the Arcot Sanad to Haidar made the Madras Government change their policy. But these factors would not have brought about a rupture with Haidar, had they managed their affairs more prudently.

Ever since Haidar had come to power, there had been friction between him and the Madras Government. They complained that he associated himself with the French, and took them in his service, as for instance a body of troops under Chevalier de Muy and Maistre de la Tour had joined him in November 1761.¹ A number of border disputes had strained relations. Every rebellious *Killedar* of a border fort looked for support across the frontier. The presence of troops on either side of the borders had added to the tension.² Despite these facts Madras had adopted a policy of peace towards Haidar. From 1761 to 1766 their aim was to keep him as a check

¹ Board's minute, cons. 1 Jan. 1762, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 48, p. 1

² Preston to Madras, 13 March 1763, cons. 21 March 1763, Ibid, vol. 49,

against the Marathas. In February 1765 they received a letter from Madhava Rao soliciting their aid against Haidar. The Nawab pressed them to join the Marathas, as that was the only measure to keep them on the Company's side. But Robert Palk, the Madras governor, opposed the policy, as it would be engaging in a war which it is impossible to say when it will end.¹ Moreover, the Government thought that if they were to support the Marathas, the Nizam would join Haidar; war would be prolonged; and even if the Marathas were to be successful the Company would not gain any advantage, for they would be more troublesome neighbours to the Company than Haidar.² In March 1765 Haidar concluded his war with Madhava Rao, and that ended any further persuasions by the Nawab to support the Marathas.

In April 1765 the Nizam invaded the Carnatic with a large force, 40,000 horse and 10,000 sepoys. So incompetent was this expedition that the Madras commander, Colonel Charles Campbell, chased the invader out of the Carnatic within a week.³ Having recrossed the Krishna, the Nizam wrote in a friendly manner to Palk, and sent an elephant and a dress as presents.⁴ This expedition slightly improved Haidar's relations with the Nawab, who became conscious of threats from other quarters than Mysore. In May Vinaji Pandit, the Mysore *vakil*, told Palk that the Nizam had solicited Haidar's aid against the Carnatic, but he had refused to give any.⁵ Thereupon, the Madras Government wrote a friendly letter to Haidar.⁶

The undemarcated boundaries of Mysore and Madras were giving rise to frequent border disputes. It was not Haidar that was always at fault. In June 1765 Vinaji complained to

¹ Board's minute, cons. 12 Feb. 1765, Ibid, vol. 52, pp. 106-7

² Ibid

³ Campbell's Journal, 4 April to 2 Aug. 1765, Orme Mss. O. V. vol. 74, pp. 119-206

⁴ Madras to the Court, 8 Aug. 1765, Letters Recd. vol. 2, para 2

⁵ Haidar to Vinaji, cons. 10 May 1765, M. M. S. P. Range 251, vol. 52, p. 412

⁶ Board's minute, cons. 10 May 1765, Ibid, p. 412

Palk that the Nawab's *poligars* near Namkal and Karur were causing trouble to Haidar.¹ Major John Wood, in charge of the southern command, confirmed that Swami Naik, one of the Nawab's *poligars*, was a sad rascal, for he has robbed and plundered their most sacred places of worship of all the images.² The Government directed Wood to capture Swami Naik, and hand him over to Haidar as a proof of their good intentions.³ They were adopting a strictly neutral policy.

[Giving shelter to rebellious chiefs was another cause of dispute between the Nawab and Haidar. When Chanda Sahib's son, Raza Sahib, sought shelter with Haidar, the Nawab went to the extent of urging the Madras Government to declare war.⁴ Although they turned down his proposal, they sent a detachment to Vellore under Captain Abraham Bonjour.⁵ Rumours of Haidar's hostility against the Carnatic originated with those who had not settled their affairs with him such as the Malabar chiefs and the Raja of Travancore.⁶ Thus Haidar's relations with Madras were strained but not to the extent of a break. Madras Government's policy at this time was not "to interrupt the harmony so necessary to be maintained between Mysore and Arcot whose limits join from North to South".⁷

It must be remembered that the Madras Government were unanimous in all their decisions concerning Haidar. There was no member who supported the Nawab's policy for rupture with him.⁸ The Court of Directors had laid down a policy of strict non-intervention in the disputes of Indian powers.⁹ The Court had clearly warned, "Military expeditions are so expensive

¹ Board's minute, cons. 17 June 1765, Ibid, vol. 53, pp. 588-9

² Wood to Madras, 16 June 1765, cons. 24 June 1765, Ibid, p. 619

³ Madras to Wood, cons. 3 July 1765, Ibid, p. 654

⁴ Board's minute, cons. 16 Sept. 1765, Ibid, pp. 850-51

⁵ Board's minute, cons. 3 Dec. 1765, Ibid, p. 1021

⁶ Board's minute, cons. 24 Dec. 1765, Ibid, p. 1061

⁷ Board's minute, cons. 7 Jan. 1766, Ibid, pp. 10-11

⁸ The Members of the Council were Palk, Lawrence, Charles Bouchier, Richard Fairfield, Samuel Ardley, Charles Turner and George Stratton.

⁹ Court to Madras, 10 Dec. 1763, Add. Mss. 34,687, p. 32

and ruinous and their consequences so indefinite that we shall be better contented to enjoy what we already possess in peace than to risque the best part in new engagements, attended with fresh scenes of warfare in hopes of acquiring more.”¹ Although the Court were emphatic that their servants ought not to extend territories at the risk of war, their instructions were disregarded in 1766.

In 1766 Robert Palk was the governor at Madras, whose policy led to a war with Haidar at the close of the year. Palk had first come to India with Admiral Boscawen, and made a Chaplain to St. David. Saunders favoured him much, and employed him often on peace-making missions. Orme wrote to Payne that during the Carnatic war Palk made for himself at least £ 10,000.² As paymaster of the army, and the holder of a bullock contract he made a lot of money. He was much interested in private trade. He admits that he accepted gifts from prospective renters of land.³ This weakness for money in his character must be remembered in connection with the causes of the Mysore War, for it was alleged that he received a lakh of pagodas from the Nizam for concluding a hostile alliance against Haidar.⁴

Early in 1766 Haidar's relations with the Madras Government were quite friendly. In January he restored to the Nawab the fort of Melpadi, which the Mysoreans had seized during the Carnatic war, but Haidar desired in return that the Nawab should restore Karur to him, which Richard Smith had captured in 1761.⁵ The Government refused to restore it on the ground that they had taken it at a time when he was in alliance with the French, and that the place originally belonged to the Nawab from whom the Mysoreans had seized it during the Carnatic War.⁶ Haidar's restoration of Melpadi and his offer

¹ Court to Madras, 24 Dec. 1765, Desp. to Mad. vol. 3, para 5, p. 282

² Orme to Payne, 26 Oct. 1755, Orme Mss. O. V. vol. 28, p. 7

³ *Report on Palk Papers*, Hist. Mss. Com. Introduction, pp. VIII-IX

⁴ Charles Bouchier to Palk, 10 March 1769, Add. Mss. 34, 686, p. 97

⁵ Board's minute, cons. 20 Jan. 1767, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 55, p. 34

⁶ Board's minute, cons. 17 Feb. 1766, Ibid, pp. 76-7

of friendship were not without a purpose. He had undertaken at this time the conquest of Malabar, and he desired to keep Madras in good humour.

In December 1765 the Tellicherry Settlement learnt Haidar's preparations to conquer Malabar. On the instructions of the Bombay Government James Ryley, the Tellicherry Chief, sent two persons, William Townsend and Robert Sparkes, to Haidar demanding a confirmation of all the trade privileges granted to the Company by the several Malabar powers.¹ Haidar readily consented to their demand, and issued a *farman* on 23 February 1766, by which the Company's rights to the sole purchase and export of all the Malabar products were confirmed.² The agents then asked Haidar to desist from attacking the Company's ally, the Raja of Kolattiri. Haidar promised to do so if the Raja were to pay 200,000 pagodas due from him to the Bidnur Government. As this was not possible, Haidar reduced not only Kolattiri, but also Kотиote, Kartinadu and Calicut.³

The Bombay Government were greatly perturbed by these reports. They held a special meeting of their Board, in which they decided to inform Haidar that unless he changed his policy they would support their allies. They sent also a detachment of 100 Europeans to Tellicherry, and asked Ryley to assist the Company's allies secretly, and to contact the Madras Government for further aid. They wrote separately to Madras to make a diversion on Mysore and to assist Tellicherry. They regarded the grant that Haidar had given them as unsatisfactory and as merely a cloak "to amuse and prevent our interfering in his schemes of conquest".⁴

¹ Tellicherry to Bombay, 21 Feb. 1766, cons. 16 March 1766, B.P.C. Range 341, vol. 29, p. 210

² C. U. Aitchison, *Treat. Eng. and Sanads*, vol. IX, No. XXXVI, pp. 195-6

³ Tellicherry to Bombay, 10 March 1766, cons. 2 Apl. 1766, B.P.C. Range 341, vol. 29, pp. 236-7

⁴ Board's minute, cons. 4 Apl, 1766, Ibid, p. 241-3

Haidar handled the situation with tact. He assured the Bombay Government that he had no hostile designs against the Company. He treated Stracey with such civility that he recommended a supply of arms to Haidar.¹ Besides, he granted all the Sunda pepper to the Company, and the crisis seemed to pass off. But the Bombay Government's instructions to Ryley secretly to support the Malabar powers once again created a serious situation. Ryley sent a detachment under Lieutenant Hopkins to Randattara, a place where the Company had some property, and where Ali Raja had stationed a force. A clash took place between Hopkins' force and Ali Raja's in which Hopkins was forced to retreat losing a gun and four Europeans.² When Haidar intervened and offered to restore Randattara to the Company, Ryley was not prepared for a compromise unless the gun and stores were also restored.³ This was also complied with. Haidar complained to Palk that the whole trouble was owing to Ryley's secret despatch of a force to Randattara.⁴ However, the incident was the first armed clash between the Company and Haidar's supporters. Haidar's policy was again evident that he would not break with the English. He wrote two letters to Bombay regretting for what had happened and assuring them of his friendship. As a further proof of his good intentions he sent his ship for repairs at their marine yard.⁵

Haidar's policy had the desired effect. The Bombay Government revised their policy, and decided not to oppose him further. They consented to repair his ship also. The reason for their change of policy was the receipt of the Madras letter of 22 May in reply to theirs of 4 April asking Madras to launch an expedition on Mysore. The Madras Government had strongly disapproved of such a policy, for they had secured the

¹ Stracey to Bombay, 18 March 1766, cons. 8 Apl. 1766, Ibid, p. 245

² Tellicherry to Bombay, 27 Apl. 1766, cons. 27 May 1766, Ibid, pp. 313-4

³ Tellicherry to Bombay, 30 April 1766, cons. 2 June 1766, Ibid, pp. 316-7

⁴ Palk's minute, cons. 9 June 1766, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 55, p. 342

⁵ Board's minute, cons. 6 June 1766, B. P. C. Range 341, vol. 29, pp. 318-9

Mughal grant for the Northern Sarkars, and were exerting their utmost to take possession of them. The Nizam was evading the issue, and seeking Haidar's aid. At such a time Madras decided not to alienate Haidar.¹

The Bombay Government realised that peace with Haidar was necessary for a few other reasons. He had become the master of Malabar, and had grown so formidable that Ryley's attempt to oppose him had failed. He was in a friendly mood, and the products of his dominions formed a large part of their shipping to Europe and China. Crommelin wrote to Ryley, "In short the Honble Company and Individuals must be injured to the last Degree if deprived of the Mallabar Coast."² The Bombay Board further sent Ryley the Madras letter to see the necessity for remaining on good terms with Haidar. In other words the Board revised their policy completely. They drew up a new treaty, and sent it to Haidar.³ Most of its articles were the same as those of the 1763 treaty.⁴ Only the twelfth article therein is noteworthy, which stipulated that Haidar was not to enter into any alliance with any European power and was not to attack any of the Company's allies, particularly the Nawab of Arcot and the Raja of Travancore.⁵

Haidar agreed to conclude a new treaty, and invited a person from Bombay for the purpose. His main demands were supply of 3 or 4,000 new English muskets to him, and a defensive alliance. He changed entirely their XII article, and proposed instead that he would send 10 or 15,000 troops for their support in case of an attack on their territory, and likewise they were to support him with an equal number of troops, if he was attacked.⁶ Haidar's evasion of the article aroused the Bombay

¹ Board's minute, cons. 24 June 1766, Ibid, pp. 339-40

² Crommelin to Ryley, cons. 8 July 1766, Ibid, p. 391 ; also Board's minute, cons. 27 June 1766, Ibid, pp. 351-2

³ Crommelin to Haidar, 8 July 1766, Ibid, pp. 385-6

⁴ See back p. 34

⁵ Articles of a treaty between Haidar and the Company, cons. 11 July 1766, B.P.C. Range 341, vol. 29, pp. 388-9

⁶ Articles of Agreement passed by Haidar under his seal, cons. 11 Nov, 1766, Ibid, p. 685

Board's suspicion that he had some designs on the Nawab. Moreover, he had added, "Mohomed Ally Cawn of Arcot has also an intention thro' the persuasion of low People to have some disputes with me, but I also take no notice of it out of Regard to Your Honours."¹ Therefore, the Board deferred the conclusion of any treaty. Meanwhile, the affairs in the Carnatic had taken a serious turn.

Thus Haidar managed to escape a rupture with Bombay, although he had attacked their zone of influence. At one stage events had come to a crisis. But for the Madras Government's intervention, it would have been difficult to avert a major flare up after Hopkins' defeat. However, Haidar's conquest of Malabar was an important acquisition for him, as it gave him a long coast, and made him a sea power; he alone among Indian powers was able to build a respectable navy. He exhibited in this expedition both political sagacity and military prowess, for while consistently assuring Bombay and Madras of his peaceful intentions, he struck at the Malabar powers swiftly and effectively. But it must be remembered that his task was greatly facilitated by the events on the Coromandel Coast.

By April 1766 Haidar's relations with the Madras Government had so far improved that they had even prevailed on the Nawab to be on good terms with him.² They had induced Bombay to abandon their hostile designs against Haidar. When the Madras Government published on 3 March the Mughal *Farman* granting the Sarkars to the Company, Haidar congratulated them.³ Above all he proposed a defensive alliance with them, and instructed Vinaji to meet Palk and convince him that both Mysore and the Carnatic would be safe from the invasions of the Nizam and the Marathas if such an alliance was concluded.⁴ If Palk were to agree to this he was to send an Englishman with Vinaji to Mysore with powers to conclude a

¹ Haidar to Crommelin, 28 Sept. 1766, cons. 11 Nov. 1766, Ibid, p. 681

² Madras to the Court, 1 April 1766, Letters Received, vol. 2, para 40

³ Haidar to Madras, cons. 9 June 1766, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 55, p. 342

⁴ Haidar to Vinaji, cons. 3 July 1766, Ibid, p. 409.

treaty. Haidar said that the presence of Mahfuz Khan¹ in Mysore should cause no concern at Madras, for if the two powers were to remain on good terms, "I know how to give him a proper answer."² The Nawab was always suspicious that Mahfuz Khan and Raza Sahib, who had better claims to the Carnatic, might induce Haidar to espouse their cause.³

The reasons for these advances by Haidar deserve notice. First, he was as yet apprehensive lest Bombay should oppose him for the loss of their influence in Malabar. Secondly, he dreaded a Maratha invasion of Mysore at this time. In the peace negotiations of March 1765 Madhava Rao had demanded Harihar and Basvapatna, two important outposts, and Haidar rightly thought that a claim to these places would be renewed at any time.⁴ Thirdly, Haidar had offended Madhava Rao by encouraging a Maratha rebel, Babuji Naik, and was in correspondence with Janoji Bhosle and Raghunath Rao.⁵ Lastly, early in 1766 Madhava Rao and the Nizam had entered into a secret understanding which was never committed to writing, but was supposed to be against Haidar.⁶ On their way back after defeating Janoji, Madhava Rao and the Nizam held a conference for 10 days from 5 February at Kurumkhed, in south Berar, and entered into the secret understanding.⁷ Haidar was naturally anxious to break this alliance, and it was for the same purpose that he had proposed a defensive alliance with the Bombay Government as well. On

¹ Mahfuz Khan, the elder brother of the Nawab, had left him in July 1765 on the pretence of going to Mecca for pilgrimage. He sought shelter with the Nizam, from whom he went to Haidar in May (Madras to the Court, 22 Jan. 1767, Lett. Recd. vol. 3, para 42)

² Haidar to Vinaji, cons. 3 July 1766, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 55, p. 409

³ Muhammad Ali was the younger and the illegitimate son of Anwar-ud-din Khan. Until Clive's obtaining of a *sanad* from Shah Alam in 1765, the Nawab had no legal title to power.

⁴ Sinha, N. K. *Haidar Ali*, p. 53

⁵ G. Narayana Rao, "Second Invasion of the Peshwa Madhava Rao," *Quar. Jour. Myth. Soc.* vol. 37, p. 74

⁶ Grant Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*, vol. II, p. 183

⁷ Sardesai, *New History of the Marattas*, vol. II, pp. 491-2, 532

the other hand the Madras Government were also anxious for an alliance with Haidar, for the question of the Northern Sarkars was about to involve them in a war against the Nizam.

On the Orissa coast there were five districts, Ganjam, Chicacole, Rajahmundry, Ellore and Guntur, called the Northern Sarkars, which in extent were so long and so narrow that they were in the words of Warren Hastings, "like the Definition of a mathematical line, length without breadth."¹ Ever since Colonel Francis Forde destroyed the French influence in the Sarkars in 1758, all the three claimants to power in the Deccan, Salabat Jang, Nizam Ali and Basalat Jang, had tried to secure Madras Government's aid in exchange for the Sarkars, but the Government had refused to intervene in their disputes.² When the Nizam finally succeeded in the contest, he repeated his offer and actually sent them the *sanads* for the Sarkars asking them in return for a body of troops. They were anxious for obtaining the Sarkars, but not for lending him the aid. They proposed instead that they would maintain a force within the Sarkars for collecting revenues, which they would remit him half, and retain the other half for themselves. The Nizam disapproved of this proposal.³ In 1765 negotiations were again renewed, and the Nizam was again willing to cede them the Sarkars, if they were to lend him 700 Europeans and 3,000 sepoys.⁴ As this force was intended to be employed against the Marathas, the Government rejected his proposal, and asked the Nizam to rent the Sarkars for five lakhs of rupees in the first year, 10 in the second and 15 thereafter.⁵ He did not accept this offer as well, but permitted them to send a body of force to his *zamindar*, Husain Ali Khan, whom he had granted the *sanads*.⁶

The Court's policy on this question was that they were glad to acquire the Sarkars if it were "not too full of Hazard." After giving top priority to the security of the Carnatic, if any

¹ Hastings to Madras, 2 July 1781, Home Misc. vol. 246, p. 190

² Madras to the Court, 9 Nov. 1762, Letters Recd. vol. IA, para 10

³ Ibid, para 12

⁴ Madras to the Court, 20 Oct. 1764, Ibid, para 29, p. 70

⁵ Ibid, paras, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 10

⁶ Madras to the Court, 14 Oct. 1765, Ibid, paras 25 and 26

troops could be spared, the Government had the Court's permission to lend them to the Nizam, but even in this event great care should be taken to procure the expenses for the troops, lest the Company should suffer in the end, "as We have reason to believe was the Case of the French Company."¹ The Court warned their servants to "be extremely cautious how you engage in new scenes of war, which once undertaken must be prosecuted, & thus from a small beginning we may again find ourselves involved in Difficulties beyond our strength....in short it is impossible to foresee all the evil consequences of such an expedition."²

After the battle of Baksar on the application of Palk, Clive obtained from Shah Alam Mughal *sanads* for the Sarkars, and sent them to Madras on 20 August 1765.³ Three persons, the Nizam, Basalat Jang and Husain Ali, were likely to be affected by this *farman*. The Nizam would lose his entire coastal strip. Basalat Jang, who was on good terms with Murar Rao and the Nawabs of the Cuddapah and Karnul, would lose Guntur, and Husain Ali, who was the *zamindar*, would lose his interest. The Madras Government did not like to alienate all these three, and therefore they decided not to acquire Guntur.⁴ They proceeded to acquire the other four Sarkars, collected a force of more than 3,000 troops, and appointed Brigadier-General John Caillaud to command them.⁵ Thinking that the march of the Nizam with Madhava Rao against Janoji of Berar was a suitable occasion, the *sanads* were published at Masulipatam on 3 March.⁶ Within a short period Caillaud reduced all the four Sarkars.⁷ The Nizam reacted violently against these measures, and desired to recover his Sarkars with the support of Haidar and the Marathas. Caillaud and John Pybus, the Chief of Masuli-

¹ Court to Madras, 4 Jan. 1765, Desp. to Madras, para 14, pp. 369-70

² Court to Madras, 26 Apl. 1765, Ibid, para 14, p. 367

³ Board's minute, 12 Oct. 1765, Home Misc. vol. 262, p. 355

⁴ Madras to Caillaud, cons. 16 April 1766, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 57, p. 127

⁵ Instructions to Caillaud, cons. 28 Jan. 1766, Ibid, pp. 35-6

⁶ Caillaud to Madras, 4 March 1766, cons. 10 March 1766, Ibid, p. 67

⁷ Caillaud to Madras, 9 March 1766, cons. 17 March 1766, Ibid, pp. 73-6

patam, wanted to threaten the Nizam by informing him that the Company were determined to use their influence with Shah Alam to appoint another "Soubah of the Deccan, and to march our armies from Bengall & the Coast to support him in it."¹ The Madras Government approved of these steps.

Such was the situation when Haidar first made his advances to the Government. They were not forward in accepting them, for they suspected that he was insincere. On 10 May they had received intelligence that the Nizam had sent Mahfuz Khan to Haidar with the proposals of a hostile alliance against the Madras Government and with a *sanad* for the Carnatic. According to these proposals Haidar was to pay the Nizam immediately four lakhs of pagodas, on the Nizam's crossing the Krishna, 20 lakhs of rupees, on his arriving near Cuddapah, 30 lakhs of rupees and on the subjugation of Arcot, 50 lakhs of rupees.² Although the Government did not believe that intelligence which suggested that the Nizam depended too much on Haidar for finances, they had some reasons to doubt Haidar's good intentions. The arrival of Mahfuz Khan at Haidar's camp with the *sanads*, the preparations for war in Mysore, and Haidar's contact with the French at Pondicherry through Raza Sahib convinced the Madras Government that it was necessary to disengage Haidar from the Nizam.³

The Government decided to send James Bouchier,⁴ one of their civil servants, to Mysore. They instructed him not to conclude any defensive treaty but merely to explore Haidar's views and designs. On the defensive alliance, which Haidar had proposed and which alone would have brought him nearer to the Government, they thought it was disadvantageous to them for "Any assistance we shall send him must have a greater

¹ Board's minute, cons. 26 Apl. 1766, Ibid, p. 131

² Intelligence from the Nizam's Court near the Krishna, cons. 21 May 1766, Ibid, pp. 163-4

³ A Haidar's confidant to a Nawab's relation, cons. 3 July 1766, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 56, pp. 410-11

⁴ James Bouchier; 1751, writer; 1768, Member of the Council; 1771, out of service

effect than a body of cavalry sent to the Nabob."¹ Therefore, only a general assurance was to be given to Haidar that the enemies and friends of both would be mutual. Bouchier was to enquire the truth about the rumours that Haidar had secured the *sanads* for the Carnatic. Concerning the Northern Sarkars, Haidar was to be told that the Nizam would not be deprived of their revenues, as the Government would pay him more than he ever received. They would not agree to any demand of Haidar for exemption from the payment of tribute to the Nizam. Any discussion on Karur was to be avoided.²

These instructions suggest that the Government had merely adopted a temporising policy. They desired to occupy Haidar until they had consolidated their position in the Sarkars. On the other hand Haidar was also insincere, for his position was more critical than theirs. If he rejected the Nizam's proposals, there was every probability of the Nizam-Madhava Rao expedition materialising sooner than expected. If he accepted the Nizam's offer the Government's hostility was certain from one side, and Madhava Rao's from the other. Therefore, he too adopted a temporising policy. At the time he invited Bouchier to his court, he accepted the Arcot sanads from the Nizam.³ Both parties were trying to out-wit each other. The Nawab, whose rivalry towards Haidar was well-known, wrote to him, "Your actions indeed have been such as are rare to be met with in History, and such as will ever be remembered."⁴ He sent two persons in his service, Muhammad Bakar and Boswell, to assist Bouchier in his negotiations.⁵ The diplomacy was quite in accord with that which was common in India since Dupleix's time.

When Bouchier set out for Mysore, Haidar refused to see him, pleading that he was "violently indisposed".⁶ Vinaji

¹ Instructions to Bouchier, cons. 18 July 1766, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 56, p. 471

² Ibid, p. 465-71

³ Caillaud to Madras, 13 July 1766, cons. 20 July 1766, Ibid, pp. 477

⁴ Nawab to Haidar, cons. 14 July 1766, Ibid, pp. 434-6

⁵ Ibid

⁶ Bouchier to Palk, 29 July 1766, cons. 31 July 1766, Ibid, p. 511

alone proceeded to Mysore. Palk directed Bouchier not to proceed, even if Haidar invited him, because the Madras Government were negotiating with the Nizam as well, and if they were to be successful, there would be no necessity to court Haidar's friendship.¹ On 31 July Palk recalled Bouchier.² Thus the mission failed before it was given a fair trial. It failed because neither party would make up its mind before it knew on which side the Nizam would finally join.

In order to force the Madras Government to withdraw from the Sarkars, the Nizam contemplated an invasion of the Carnatic in alliance with Haidar and the Marathas. To avert this the Government were prepared to assist the Nizam with a body of troops, supply him all his military requirements, and pay him an annual sum, if he were to agree to confirm the *farman*.³ He was in no mood to listen. Caillaud reported that the Nizam had ordered the messengers to be executed.⁴ Caillaud further reported that the Nizam's troops were mutinous for want of pay, and that his chief minister, Rukn-ud-daula, had been kept in close prison for two days.⁵ This made the Madras Government adopt a bold policy. They asked Caillaud to march towards Khameniat, and if necessary to Hyderabad itself. They observed, "It is so much the Principle of the People in General of this Country never to listen to any Terms which are not dictated by the Sword."⁶ But this policy of firmness was again changed to one of conciliation. The Government now thought of lending 200 European infantry, a company of artillery and three battalion of sepoys to the Nizam, the expenses of which would be borne out of the Sarkar revenues. The Nizam could use this force either against Haidar or against the Marathas. At times when the Nizam did not require this force,

¹ Palk to Bouchier, cons. 21 July 1766, Ibid, p. 475

² Palk to Bouchier, cons. 31 July 1766, Ibid, p. 512

³ Instructions to Mutebar Khan (the Nawab's *Killedar* of Valkonda). cons. 26 Apl. 1761, Ibid, vol. 57, pp. 132-5

⁴ Caillaud to Madras, 28 Apl. 1766, cons. 5 May 1766, Ibid, p. 139

⁵ Caillaud to Madras, 16 July 1766, cons. 23 July 1766, Ibid, p. 204

⁶ Board's minute, cons. 6 Aug. 1766, Ibid, p. 212

the Government would pay him five or six lakhs of rupees. They directed either Pybus or Lewen Smith, the second in council at Masulipatam, to proceed to Hyderabad on Rukn-ud-daula's invitation.¹

The important reason for this change of policy was the Bengal letter of 26 July. They wrote to Madras, "The Morattas are the only Enemies in Indostan who can annoy us or interrupt the Collection of our immense revenues and we know of no method which can so effectually prevent their raising Disturbances, as the finding full Employment for them at home. This we are of Opinion can only be effected by an alliance with the Subah of the Decan. An English Force employed in the Service of Nizam Ally would render him so truly formidable and keep the Morattas in such awe that they could never dare to attempt distant Invasions, and a few Years of Peace in these Provinces would be productive of advantages unknown to the Company in former ages. If therefore you should join us in opinion and can prevail upon Nizam Ally to adopt this scheme, We shall very readily contribute our Quota of Troops both black and white, to be under your immediate Orders and Direction, nor do we think they can be employed to a better purpose, or more for the Interest of our Hon'ble Masters."² The Madras Government considered this plan so important that they took an oath of secrecy never to reveal it to any one, and more so to the Nawab.³ A Maratha army under Raghunath Rao and Murar Rao had been encamped not far from Kora with threatening designs on the Company's possessions, and this made the Bengal Government anxious to put down the Marathas.⁴ The Madras Government approved of the plan, and instructed Caillaud to assure Rukn-ud-daula of their friendship.⁵

On 19 September the Government learnt that the main obstacle in the negotiations with the Nizam was the Nawab,

¹ Instructions to Pybus and Smith, cons. 14 Aug. 1766, Ibid, pp. 220-27

² Bengal to Madras, 26 July 1766, cons. 1 Sept. 1766, Ibid, p. 241

³ Board's minute, cons. 1 Sept. 1766, Ibid, p. 242

⁴ Bengal to Madras, 26 July 1766, cons. 1 Sept. 1766, Ibid, p. 239

⁵ Madras to Caillaud, cons. 1 Sept. 1766, Ibid, pp. 243-4

and that if a person was sent from the Government, the Nizam would receive him. Accordingly, they sent Caillaud to Hyderabad with full powers to conclude a treaty. He could agree to increase the aid of European troops to 500, but he was not to divulge the Bengal plan.¹ But on 22 September Caillaud was allowed to hint at the plan "in the greatest secrecy."² A few days later the Government made their proposals further attractive by increasing the tribute in all to 10 lakhs, by agreeing to pay three lakhs immediately as advance, by delivering up the diamond mines in Mustafanagar to the Nizam, and by sanctioning a lakh of rupees for presents to the ministers.³ They gave Caillaud further latitude to conclude a treaty on any terms except "Dishonourable or Dangerous to our Hon'ble Masters."⁴ On 12 October Caillaud received his passports, and proceeded to Hyderabad. On 12 November he concluded the treaty, by which the Nizam granted the Company the Sarkars in return for an annual tribute of nine lakhs of rupees, and a body of troops "to settle the affairs of His Highness's government in everything that is right and proper, whenever required."⁵ But the Government retained the liberty to withdraw them, if their safety so demanded. Caillaud distributed two lakhs as presents among Rukn-ud-daula and other important ministers of the Nizam.⁶

During the course of the negotiations Caillaud discovered that the Nizam was willing to attack Haidar, that the Marathas had agreed to this plan, and that the Nizam desired the Government's participation in it. On 14 November when Caillaud took leave of the Nizam, the latter told him that he required the assistance within a month, or at least by the end of Decem-

¹ Instructions to Caillaud and Smith, cons. 19 Sept. 1766, Ibid. pp. 278-83

² Madras to Caillaud, cons. 22 Sept. 1766, Ibid, p. 286

³ Board's minute, cons. 2 Oct. 1766, Ibid, pp. 295-6

⁴ Madras to Caillaud, cons. 14 Oct. 1766, Ibid, p. 303

⁵ C. U. Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements and Sanads*, vol. IX, No. 11, pp. 22-7

⁶ Caillaud's Account of the Negotiations, cons. 8 Dec. 1766, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 57, p. 372

ber. Caillaud told him that the Government were prepared to lend aid, but its actual despatch might involve some delay.¹ Caillaud justified this offensive alliance on the ground that it was necessary to restrain the ambitions of Haidar.²

(Thus the prospects for Haidar were entirely changed from a defensive alliance with the Madras Government to a powerful hostile alliance of all his three neighbours against him. When he learnt this, he hastened Vinaji to Madras, and invited Bouchier to Mysore.³ It was too late. The Madras Government concealed their real intentions and told Vinaji that they would remain friendly with their neighbours. Lest the Nizam should become uneasy at Vinaji's presence at Madras, they sent Haidar's letter to Hyderabad with a note that they would do nothing inconsistent with the treaty.⁴

[Why did the Government agree to a hostile alliance against Haidar? The reasons they proffered are not convincing. Palk wrote to Saunders that it was almost impossible to remain friendly with Haidar, who had encouraged Yusuf Khan's revolt. had reduced Sira, Cuddapah, Bidnur and Malabar, had excited trouble in Tinnevely and Madura, and had taken the French in his service. Palk observed, "The Vakil confessed to me that his master and his Dirbar were so intoxicated with their success that they seemed to think even the Europeans could not stop their career."⁵ The Madras Government wrote to the Court that his receipt of the Arcot *sanads*, his bitter rivalry with the Nawab, his possession of a large coast on Malabar, his despatch of troops to Coimbatore, his riches and ambitions "had rendered himself obnoxious to all the Country Governments."⁶

These reasons are not convincing, because they had considered him in the past not as dangerous but as an useful check

¹ Ibid, p. 369

² Ibid, p. 370

³ Board's minute, cons. 30 Dec. 1766, Ibid, vol. 56, p. 639

⁴ Ibid

⁵ Palk to (Saunders ?), undated, *Report on Palk Mss.* No. 40, pp. 61-3

⁶ Madras to the Court, 22 Jan. 1767, Letters Received, vol. 2, paras

you may lessen or destroy the Power of a very Dangerous Neighbour. The reduction of so aspiring a man as Hyder Ally within Bounds must be attempted sooner or later . . . the Chief Strength of the Marrattas is Horse ; the chief strength of Hyder Ally is Infantry, Cannon and Small arms ; from the one you have nothing to apprehend but ravages, plundering and loss in revenue ; from the other, extirpation.”¹ It must be remembered that this was not inducing the Madras Government to attack Haidar, but merely a reply to a supposition what should be done in case Haidar attacked the Carnatic in league with the other two powers. Palk had sought advice on this point, and Clive gave it.² But Clive’s contribution to the Government’s change of policy was the mental preparation for bold designs. Palk wanted to remain peaceful. Clive forced him to think on aggressive lines. Crommelin diverted the thought against Haidar.

It appears from the Government’s letter to the Court, and from their subsequent justification of their conduct that the Nizam insisted on their co-operation against Haidar, and that the Sarkars could not have been obtained on any other condition.” It is difficult to agree with this view. Caillaud wrote to Palk almost daily from 26 October to 14 November, and no letter said so. It was to Najib, Husain Ali Khan’s servant, that the Nizam first revealed his intentions to attack Haidar. During the conferences this question came up but once on the carpet, and that on 5 November. Caillaud appeared on that day to be disinclined to support such a design only “to prevent jealousy.” He observed, “I shall therefore give it out that we cannot agree, and that I must first come to Madras.”³ It appears that Caillaud was more anxious to give aid than the Nizam to receive it. We read in the final account of Caillaud’s negotiations at Hyderabad, “When everything was almost

¹ Clive to Palk, 17 Oct. 1766, cons. 17 Nov. 1766, Ibid, p. 342

² Palk to Clive, cons. 1 Sept. 1766, Ibid, p. 250

³ Madras to Court, 22 Jan. 1767, Letters Received, vol. 2, para 68

⁴ Caillaud to Palk, 5 Nov. 1766, cons. 27 Nov. 1766, M. M. S. P. Range 251, vol. 57, p. 352

agreed on, and the articles drawing out, I pressed Ruccun-ud-Dowlah to inform me his master's Intentions, not as I said from a motive of Curiosity, but that we might have time to take the proper measures for his service. I often urged this Subject, but the answer was still put off from Day to Day; and at last I was informed the Soubah would let me know his intentions when I came to take leave."¹ On 14 November, two days after the treaty was drawn, the Nizam demanded the Company's aid, and if Caillaud had so wished, he could have evaded the issue. In August the Madras Government had thought that 200 Europeans and three battalions of sepoys were the maximum they could spare.² But in November Caillaud recommended that the minimum should be 500 Europeans and five battalions of sepoys.³ Clive had urged action against the Marathas, but the Madras Government went against Haidar, thinking that once he was destroyed the Nizam would join the Company to defeat the Marathas.⁴ Thus the views of the Madras Government became extensive. Nothing would have prevented their obtaining of the Sarkars from the Nizam on the basis of a defensive treaty. Their anxiety to defeat both Haidar and the Marathas, and to prevent the Nizam-Madhava Rao alliance taking a hostile turn against the Carnatic accounts for their action against Haidar.

Once a change of policy was brought about, other considerations soon arose. The first was gaining of advantages for the Company. Palk wanted to force Haidar to surrender the Carnatic passes to the Nawab.⁵ John Call⁶ wrote to Palk that Madras Government supported the Nizam against Haidar because it coincided with their interests, and because they

¹ Caillaud's Account of the Negotiations, cons. 8 Dec. 1766, Ibid pp. 369

² Board's minute, cons. 11 Aug. 1766, Ibid, p. 217

³ Caillaud to Madras, 28 Nov. 1766, cons. 8 Dec. 1766, Ibid, p. 371

⁴ Board's minute, cons. 17 Nov. 1766, Ibid, p. 344

⁵ Palk to (Saunders?), undated, *Report on Palk Mss.* Hist. Mss. Com. No. 40, p. 63

⁶ John Call; writer, 1757; Member of the Council, 1766; Retired. 1771

hoped by that step "to engage the Subah to root out Hyder Ally entirely."¹ The Madras Government justified their action on the ground that it would promote the Nizam's as well as the Nawab's and the Company's interests.² The Government wrote to Bombay that their policy would result in "Acquisitions and Privileges."³

Secondly, private interests were not ignored. Money was a weakness with Palk. He had made plenty of it. Palk received from the Nizam a lakh of pagodas, and Caillaud, 60,000 pagodas for negotiating the treaty.⁴ On 2 October the Government sent Caillaud four lakhs of rupees, three for the advance to the Nizam towards the tribute, and one for presents.⁵ The Nizam did not demand any ready money, and the presents finally came to two lakhs; but we do not know what happened to the balance of two lakhs.⁶ The Court reprimanded Madras, "When we see the opulent fortunes suddenly acquired by our servants who are returned since that period, it gives but too much weight to the public opinion that this rage for negotiation, treaties, and alliances has private advantage more for its object than the public good."⁷ Speaking about the authors of the treaty, Wilks, a servant of the Company, observes, "... whether less commendable motives influenced their conduct calls aloud for a strict enquiry."⁸ Indeed, when we reflect on the corruption and venality of the time, it is not difficult to believe that personal interests were involved. When the Court strongly criticised their acts, Charles Bouchier, who succeeded Palk,

¹ Call to Palk, 6 Apl. 1767, *Report on Palk Mss.* No. 25, p. 43

² Madras to the Court, 22 Jan. 1767, *Letters Received*, vol. 2, para 71

³ Madras to Bombay, 18 Nov. 1766, cons. 30 Dec. 1766, B.P.C. Range 341, vol. 29, p. 819

⁴ Bouchier to Palk, 10 March 1769, Add. Mss. 34, 685, p. 97; also *Report on Palk Mss.* Introduction, p. IX

⁵ Board's minute, cons. 2 Oct. 1766, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 57, p. 295

⁶ Caillaud to Palk, 7 Nov. 1766, cons. 27 Nov. 1766, *Ibid*, p. 352

⁷ Court to Madras, 13 May 1768, *Despatches to Madras*, vol. 4, p. 342

⁸ Wilks' Account of the First Mysore War, 23 July 1769, *French in India*, vol. 4, No. 1352

lamented, "It is a great misfortune to have such masters to scan our actions."¹

Lastly, Francis Browne, a contemporary, gives another reason, which was not improbable. He wrote from Madras, "Such who were most considerably involved in the Nabob's misfortune greedily embraced every occasion that flattered them with a prospect of recovering their property, and there are not wanting those who conjecture that the war was commenced with a full hope of obtaining this end by extirpating Hyder Ally from the Kingdom of Mysore and placing Mohamed Ally on that throne, who in return was to resign the territory of Arcot to the Company for his private and public debts and all the expences of the war."² We lack the corroborating evidence for this view. This might have been the ulterior intention of a few members of the Government at a later stage, but not at the critical stage of framing the policy. As late as 14 August the Government observed that it would be greatly in the interest of both Haidar and the Nizam, if they were to enter into a defensive alliance with the Company against the Marathas.³

What was the Nawab's part in all these transactions? It was not great. Although he desired to extirpate Haidar, he was incapable of influencing the Government's policy, at least so long as Palk was in office. There can be no doubt of the Nawab's ambitions. Enclosing the Mughal *sanads* recognising the Nawab's title to the Carnatic, Clive wrote to Palk, "He wanted Titles as great as the Vizir & to be made Subadar of the Decan, but it was thought time enough to confer that on him when he has conquered it."⁴ For acquiring the Sarkars he had advanced five lakhs of rupees to Husain Ali.⁵ Suspecting that the Nawab was jealous of the Company's acquisition of the Sarkars, and that he might disturb them by giving constant alarms of Haidar's or Maratha

¹ Bouchier to Smith, 3 Aug. 1767, Orme Mss. vol. 76, p. 124

² Details of the War with Hyder Ally in a letter from F. Browne to England, 23 Feb. 1769, Orme Mss. vol. 71, p. 24

³ Instructions to Caillaud, Pybus and Smith, cons. 14 Aug. 1766 M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 57, pp. 226-7

⁴ Clive to Palk, 20 Aug. 1763, Home Misc. vol. 252, p. 356

⁵ Madras to the Court, 1 Apl. 1767, Letters Recd. vol. 2, para 15

invasions, the Madras Government had offered them the management of the Sarkars, and he had readily consented to it. But they soon revised their policy, and thus avoided the mistake, which Sir Thomas Rumbold was to commit later, namely that of entrusting the Sarkar to his care. They decided to retain the Sarkars under their own hands, "not only as it would be less complicated, but give less umbrage to Nizam Ally, already jealous of the Nawab's designs on the Deckan."¹ From that time, the Nawab's share in the transactions was almost nil except for the despatch of his servant, Husain Tahir Khan, to Hyderabad from where he returned disappointed. It was Najib, Husain Ali Khan's servant, who was present in the talks, and none from the Nawab. Caillaud did not forget to settle the Nawab's dispute with the Nizam. In return for five lakhs of rupees the Nizam renounced all claims for ever on the Nawab and recognised him as the accredited prince of the Carnatic.²

The answer to the question whether the Government took a right step in agreeing to reduce Haidar is in the negative. How utterly short-sighted their policy was could be revealed by their argument that they were joining the Nizam as merely his auxiliaries, and that Haidar would look upon this alliance in the same light as Nanjaraj did, when Bussy assisted Salabat in his expedition against Mysore in 1755, and yet Nanjaraj continued to be friendly with the French at Pondicherry.³ They thought that the conquest of Mysore was easy, that Haidar's ministers and *poligars* were disaffected, and that they would surrender the forts on the mere approach of the Madras army.⁴ They further believed that the Nizam and the Marathas were sincerely inclined to destroy Haidar.⁵ Infact the policy to attack Haidar had not received the Government's mature consideration, and it was only a hasty expediency to prevent a triple alliance of the Indian powers

¹ Ibid

² Caillaud to Palk, 2 Nov. 1766, cons. 27 Nov. 1766, M. M. S. P. Range 251, vol. 57, p. 350

³ Board's minute, cons. 10 Jan. 1767, Ibid, vol. 58, p. 24

⁴ Browne's Letter to England, 23 Feb. 1767, Orme Mss. vol. 71, p. 23

⁵ Board's minute, cons. 17 Nov. 1766, M. M. C. P. Range 251, vol. 57, p. 344

against the Carnatic. Call was certainly right in his remark, "If then we are disappointed, we have nothing to blame but our own sanguine hopes, which flattered us that everything would go as we would have it. Another time we must endeavour to know what we are going about before we set out."¹ Charles Bouchier wrote to Smith about Haidar, "That for our part, we had no real quarrel with him, and it was entirely at the repeated instances of Mahawada Rao and in consequence of the Suba's earnest desire we had undertaken the expedition." Pybus confirms this view when he wrote to Palk, "You know it never was a plan that I could think well of."² Henry Verelst, who succeeded Clive, wrote to Smith, "The late treaty with Nizam Ally, I really cannot think has been concluded upon honourable terms for the Company . . . our entering into an offensive and defensive alliance with the Soubah connected with the Morattas will I am afraid prove a very expensive affair."³ The Court strongly criticised the Government and stated, "The Charters granted to the East India Company have no tendency to enter into offensive wars."⁴

As regards the reason why the Nizam turned against Haidar, our wonder is not so great. It was self-interest and self-preservation. His treasury was exhausted, and his troops were a mere rabble.⁵ He tried to win over Haidar, who seemed willing. But Madhava Rao disapproved of this plan, and prepared for his second invasion of Mysore. The Nizam would not take a step which would draw Madhava Rao's resentment upon himself. Meanwhile, Caillaud made attractive offers which would make good the loss of the Sarkars by the conquests in Mysore. The prospects held out to the Nizam precisely suited his interests. Haidar had captured parts of Cuddapah, on the

¹ Call to Palk, 6 Apl. 1767, *Report on Palk Mss.* No. 25, p. 43

² Bouchier to Smith, 19 March 1767, *Orme Mss.* vol. 76, p. 46

³ Pybus to Palk, 15 Apl. 1767, *Report on Palk Mss.* No. 30, p. 49

⁴ Verelst to Smith, 16 Feb. 1767, *Orme Mss.* vol. 76, p. 31

⁵ Court to Madras, 25 March 1768, *Desp. to Madras*, vol. 4, para 15, p. 241

⁶ Madras to the Court, 20 Oct. 1767, *Lett, Recd.* vol. 2, para 43

borders of Hyderabad. It is true that the Nizam had offered his co-operation to Haidar and had received 12 or 13 lakhs of rupees in return.¹ But in politics consistency and gratitude do not count, and the least of all with the Nizam's politics. Grant Duff suggests one more reason. Although the Nizam was in league with Madhava Rao, the Nizam was so much apprehensive of him that he wanted to keep the English on his side in order to ensure a fair partition of the spoils of war against Haidar.²

The conclusion of the treaty was a great diplomatic victory for the Government. Haidar was outwitted. But he would not accept defeat. He tried to overreach them, and was successful in the end. Their success was only the beginning of endless difficulties, from which they knew not how to extricate themselves.]

Caillaud had agreed to send a force to the Nizam by about the end of December. Therefore, on 18 December they appointed Colonel Joseph Smith to the command of the force that would be sent to him.³ It was to be a powerful detachment of 600 European infantry, 100 artillery, 30 cavalry and 5,000 sepoys with 14 pieces of cannon.⁴ As the assembling of these troops would take some time, they sent Smith to the Nizam with 30 horse to keep him steady in his project.⁵ Smith reached Hyderabad on 16 January, and found that the Nizam had already set out from the capital with 17,000 troops of his own together with 10,000 belonging to the Marathas in his pay.⁶ His army was increased to 150,000 horse and 50,000 infantry, when Basalat Jang, the Nawabs of Cuddapah and Karnul and other *poligars* joined him.⁷ Had the Marathas also joined him, as

¹ Board's minute, cons. 16 Oct. 1766, M. M. S. P. Range 251, vol. 57, p. 304

² Grant Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*, vol. II, p. 194

³ Instructions to Smith, cons. 18 Dec. 1766, M. M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 57, p. 395

⁴ Madras to Bombay, cons. 5 Feb. 1767, Ibid, vol. 58, p. 91

⁵ Instructions to Smith, cons. 18 Dec. 1766, Ibid, vol. 57, p. 396

⁶ Smith to Madras, 22 Jan. 1767, cons. 2 Feb. 1767, Ibid, vol. 58, pp. 61-2

⁷ Journal of Joseph Smith, 15 Feb. 1767, Orme Mss. vol. 215, p. 10; also Smith to Orme, middle of March 1767, Orme Mss, vol, XI, p. 3041

Intrigue was rampant in his court. Smith observed, "Hyder Ally wants not many advocates of consequence in camp, and his treasure (I am afraid) has found its way here, sooner than our troops."¹ Haidar's supporters were urging the Nizam to give up the expedition, as the season was far advanced.² Madhava Rao reduced a good part of Mysore, and rumours prevailed that both he and the Nizam would recross the Krishna. The Nizam was still 200 miles away from the Marathas, and was stopping at every place to collect tribute from his own *poligars*.³ Haidar took every measure to disengage the allies, offered them attractive terms to withdraw to their own states, fortified his strong forts, and waited until the rainy season, when supply difficulties would automatically force them to retreat.

The Madras Government thought that all their troubles were due to the want of a concerted treaty among the allies stipulating the share of each party and the plan to be pursued.⁴ John Call drew up such a treaty.⁵ It reveals the ambitious object of the Government. Call observes, "This object is the entire overthrow of Hyder Ally Cawn who had usurped the Government of Maysore Country."⁶ Call became thereafter the chief exponent of a forward policy in Mysore. He wrote, "No offers, no concessions, no opposition ought to divert us from our purpose, if it can be effected."⁷ The very first article of his treaty stated that the allies would fight until Haidar "falls in action, is made a prisoner, or quits the Government of Maysore."⁸ Other articles also suggest the same view that Haidar should be des-

¹ Smith to Madras, 26 Feb. 1767, cons. 10 March 1767, Ibid, p. 209

² Ibid, p. 210

³ Call to Palk, 19 March 1767, *Report on Palk Mss.* No. 19, pp. 23-4

⁴ Madras to Smith, cons. 16 Feb. 1767, M. M. S. P. Range 251, vol. 58, p. 118

⁵ Call to Palk, 19 March 1767, *Report on Palk Mss.* No. 19, p. 24

⁶ Memorandum by John Call, (25 ?) March 1767, Ibid, p. 31

⁷ Ibid p. 32

⁸ Treaty to be entered between the Subah and the Marathas as suggested by the Madras Council, cons. 25 March 1767, M. M. S. P. Range 251, vol. 58, p. 234

troysed and that Mysore should be partitioned among different powers, the Nizam, the Marathas, the Company, the Nawabs of the Carnatic, Cuddapah and Karnul, the Malabar chiefs and Murar Rao. The share of each of these powers was also indicated in the treaty. Districts contiguous to their territories should be given to them.¹

The noteworthy points in the treaty are that the Madras Government were not a direct party to it, but merely an auxiliary of the Nizam, and that it was definitely a pro-Nizam and anti-Maratha treaty. Only the Nizam's forces, but not the Marathas', were to garrison the conquered forts. Treasure was to be equally divided, but not territories, for "One maxim must be laid down as positive and without deviation, (Viz) That as little territorial possession as possible be ceded to the Marattas."² The treaty further reveals the extensive views of the Madras Government. They said that they had two objects before them, one, to preserve the Sarkars, and the other, to support the Nizam. They would accomplish these by adopting three measures; first, by overthrowing Haidar; secondly, by reducing the Marathas; and lastly, by enhancing the Nizam's authority all over the Deccan.³ In other words the elimination of Haidar and the reduction of the Marathas would increase so much the power of the Madras Government that they would play in the south the same part as Clive had played in Bengal, Bihar and Oudh. However, this treaty was also as impolitic as that of November, for, if Haidar had been alienated by the latter, the Marathas would be by the former. On top of all, the instructions issued to James Bouchier and Smith contained germs of dissatisfaction to the Nizam as well. They were to tell the Nizam that if he insisted on returning home, the Government might join the Marathas to destroy Haidar. Bouchier was to secure Guntur from Basalat, and Bassein and

¹ Ibid

² Memorandum by John Call, (25 ?) March 1767, *Report on Palk Mss.* p. 32

³ Board's minute, cons. 25 March 1767, M. M. S. P. Range 251, vol. 51 pp. 225-6

Salsette from Madhava Rao.¹

While the English at Madras were thus busy, the Nizam was negotiating with Haidar for 50 lakhs of rupees.² The Marathas grew jealous of the large force the English were about to send to the Nizam, and their *vakil* met Bouchier at Madras to ask what their real intentions were.³ The Nawab was doing all he could to alienate the Government from the Nizam in order to bring about a closer alliance with the Marathas, and to gain a larger share in the conquests.⁴ Madhava Rao settled with Haidar for 35 lakhs of rupees and some districts.⁵ Nothing remained but a financial controversy for the Nizam also to make peace. He was demanding 50 lakhs, but Haidar was offering 20 lakhs.⁶

These hard realities made the Madras Government feel the bad consequences of their policy.⁷ Thinking that Haidar's resentment should be averted, Bouchier wrote to Smith, "We cannot submit to be treated as mercenary troops to undertake any idle scheme he or his ministers may project."⁸ Their policy now was to force the Nizam to adopt one of these alternatives: to execute the original plan, to winter in Mysore, or to lend them a body of troops to finish the task. The idea of reducing Haidar was not given up, although Bouchier was conscious of the consequences. He observed, "...thus enraged and full resentment as Hyder Ally has reason to be against us for not listening to overtures he lately made us, he would take the first opportunity to be revenged."⁹

A new development took place towards the close of March; Madhava Rao sent a *vakil* to Madras with "a very

¹ Instructions to Bouchier and Smith, 25 March 1767, Ibid, pp. 229-33

² Smith to Orme, middle of March 1767, Orme Mss. vol. XI, p. 3043

³ Call to Palk, 19 March 1767, *Report on Palk Mss.* No. 19, p. 24

⁴ Ibid, p. 25

⁵ Smith to Madras, 24 March 1767, cons. 4 Apl. 1767, M. M. S. P. Range 251, vol. 58, pp. 275-6

⁶ Ibid

⁷ Bouchier to Smith, 26 March 1767, Orme Mss. vol. 76, p. 59

⁸ Ibid

imperious letter" to the Nawab demanding the *chauth*. Bouchier became apprehensive of the progress the Marathas had made in Mysore, and wrote to Smith, "We may find them much worse neighbours than Hyder Ally. And it may thence be most prudent to join with the Subah in making peace with him if we can procure advantageous terms."¹ Bouchier went a step further, and suggested that the English and the Nizam should join Haidar to force the Marathas to quit their conquests. However, this was not the Madras Government's considered opinion, but Bouchier's own idea, "which has just entered my head."²

The Government refused to pay the *chauth* on the ground that the Mughals and the Nizam had renounced their claims on the Nawab, and that the Government were strong enough to oppose any invaders.³ However, when they learnt that Madhava Rao was advancing towards the Carnatic, they were perturbed, and hastened a detachment under Major Abraham Bonjour to the Carnatic passes. The object was two-fold; to oppose any invasion, and to seize Haidar's passes, while he was busy elsewhere. They appointed Call to proceed to the Carnatic frontier to meet Madhava Rao.⁴

This decision was not wise, for it increased Haidar's hostility at their aggressive designs of seizing his passes. How inconsistent was Bouchier's policy could be inferred from his instructions to Smith to use the Nizam's good offices for making Haidar surrender his passes to the English, and a statement in the same instructions, "Should matters between us and the Soubah come to the state Bussy was reduced to, of being surrounded by his army and blockaded in Hyd'bad, you may have it in your power to fight your way thro'."⁵ For this

¹ Bouchier to Smith, 1 Apl. 1767, Orme Mss. vol. 76, p. 65

² Ibid

³ Board's minute, cons. 4 Apl. 1767, M. M. S. P. Range 251, vol. 58, pp. 280-2

⁴ Ibid, pp. 284-5

⁵ Bouchier to Smith, 1 Apl. 1767, Orme Mss. vol. 76, pp. 68-72

purpose Smith was asked to store provisions for 20 days and encamp near water.

At last the Madras army under Lieutenant Colonel Charles Tod joined the Nizam on 13 April.¹ Hardly had they joined, when unforeseen circumstances forced them to withdraw. The completion of the campaign by the Marathas, the unwillingness of the Nizam to prosecute the war, the scarcity of supplies, and the sickness and desertion among the Madras troops caused innumerable difficulties for the English.² Smith sent Tod to Madhava Rao to urge him not to abandon the expedition.³ Tod's embassy revealed how divergent were the views of the Confederates. Madhava Rao received him with scant respect, and evaded completely the main question of co-operation with the English. Tod observed, "I blush when I think of the degree of contempt I was treated with, considering my Station, and those I represented."⁴ Tod reported that Haidar had made his peace both with the Marathas and the Nizam, and that "After all their mysterious transactions who can tell but something may be in agitation against the Carnatic, and to begin with the interception of this army."⁵

Despite these disquieting reports, the Madras Government proceeded with their aggressive policy of seizing the passes, on the ground that such a step would induce Haidar to come to terms "as he will be sensible that he will not have it so much in his power to disturb us."⁶ They captured Vaniyambadi, Tirupattur and Ambur. Only Gigadevi and Krishnagiri could not be taken.⁷ When they learnt that both their confederates might join Haidar against them, they reinforced their troops on the frontiers, directed Call to seize all passes, and decided

¹ Journal and Orderly Book of Smith, Orme Mss. vol. 215, p. 9

² Smith to Madras, 19 Apl. 1767, cons. 29 Apl. 1767, M. M. S. P. Range 251, vol. 58, p. 343

³ Smith's instructions to Tod, 24 Apl. 1767, cons. 8 May 1767, Ibid p. 365

⁴ Tod to Smith, 30 Apl. 1767, cons. 8 May 1767, Ibid, pp. 36-79

⁵ Ibid, p. 369

⁶ Board's minute, cons. 25 Apl. 1767, Ibid, pp. 332-3

⁷ Madras to Smith, cons. 25 May 1767, Ibid, p. 421

to recall their troops from the Nizam.¹ On 12 May Smith separated himself from the camp and marched towards Bangalore.² However, on the request of Rukn-ud-daula three battalion of sepoys were left behind. Smith came to Kadapa nattam, a frontier fort, where Call was staying.³ On 1 Jun Bouchier also left the Nizam.

Meanwhile, Haidar had tried to conciliate the Madras Government.⁴ He sought the mediation of Bombay in his dispute with Madras.⁵ He sent a *vakil* to Madras also to convince them of his friendly intentions, and to demand the restoration of his passes.⁶ He made the Nizam and Madhava Rao also write to them to restore those passes, and to desist from further conquests.⁷ These attempts had no effect, and the Madras Government informed the Nizam and Madhava Rao that these passes were essential for their safety.⁸

The Nizam still concealed his real intentions. Rukn-ud-daula desired to send a *vakil*, Sharaf Ahmed Khan, to Madras to assure them of the Nizam's friendship, and asked for a body of 500 troops to accompany the Nizam on his return journey. They believed Rukn-ud-daula, and directed Captain William Baillie accordingly.⁹ In order to occupy the Government further in false hopes, Rukn-ud-daula renounced the claim of two lakhs of rupees for Chicacole Sarkar to meet the expenses of their troops. Bouchier wrote to Smith, "I am indeed extremely happy that matters are at length so happily con-

¹ Board's minute, cons. 8 May 1767, Ibid, pp. 369-70

² Smith to Madras, cons. 16 May 1767, Ibid, p. 396

³ Smith to Madras, 17 May 1767, cons. 25 May 1767, Ibid, pp. 434-5

⁴ Pybus to Palk, 15 Apl. 1767, *Report on Palk Mss.* No. 30, p. 42

⁵ Bombay to Madras, 26 May 1767, cons. 15 June 1767, M.M.S.P. Board's minute, 251, vol. 58, p. 462

⁶ Haidar to his *vakil*, 29 June 1767, cons. 25 July 1767, Ibid, vol. 58, pp. 559-90

⁷ Nizam and Madhava Rao to Madras, cons. 3 July 1767, Ibid, vol. 58, p. 502

⁸ Board's minute, cons. 3 July 1767, Ibid, p. 502

⁹ Board's minute, cons. 3 July 1767, Ibid, pp. 424-6

cluded.”¹ Bouchier had so poor an opinion of Haidar’s ability that he observed, “Indeed I could almost wish that he would be so fool-hardy as to think himself able to overcome us.”² But consistent reports came in that Haidar was assembling forces near the frontier, and that the Nizam was also with him.³ The Government were not dismayed, but observed, “One battle gained over enemies will restore in a day more than will be lost in a year.”⁴ However, on 15 July they reluctantly mobilised their forces, for “We can scarce believe Hyder Ally will detach any considerable body.”⁵ The new allies were marching towards the Carnatic, and the first Mysore war was already in progress.

[How was the Haidar-Nizam alliance brought about? Haidar was not afraid of the Nizam’s army, for the Nizam’s advisers were his supporters, and the Nizam’s army was defective in arms, discipline and pay. Haidar’s only fear was the Madras army, but he had made enough arrangements to know every movement of Smith.⁶ Although the Maratha success and Mir Raza’s⁷ desertion hastened the Nizam’s march towards Mysore, and frustrated for a time the efforts of Haidar’s supporters in the Nizam’s camp, the latter’s distress for supplies, his dire necessity for money, and the constant raids by Mysore horse soon created difficulties for him. Basalat Jang and Mahfuz Khan brought greater pressure on him to conclude a separate treaty with Haidar. Although at first Rukn-ud-daula was opposed to this view, he too changed his mind, and played a double role. While assuring the Madras Government of the Nizam’s good intentions, he negotiated with Haidar an

¹ Bouchier to Smith, 5 July 1767, Orme Mss. vol. 76, pp. 97-8

² Ibid, p. 98

³ Smith to Madras, 10 July 1767, cons. 15 July 1767, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 58, pp. 535-7

⁴ Madras to the Nawab, 16 July 1767, Orme Mss. vol. 76, pp. 103-5

⁵ Board’s minute, cons. 15 July 1767, M. M. S. P. Range 251, vol. 58, pp. 538-40

⁶ M. Maistre de la Tour, *Hyder Shah*, p. 116

⁷ Mir Raza was Haidar’s brother-in-law and the commander of Sira. He had deserted Haidar, and had gone over to Madhava Rao.

alliance against them. He set out himself for Haidar's camp, and concluded a treaty. According to Maistre, the only source concerning this treaty, it was agreed that Tipu should marry Mahfuz Khan's daughter. The Nizam and Haidar should enter into an alliance to reduce the Nawab. Haidar would pay the Nizam six lakhs of rupees every month during the war. Raza Sahib would renounce his claim to the Carnatic, and would receive Tanjore instead. Finally, the two parties agreed not to separate until their object was fulfilled. Rukn-ud-daula departed loaded with presents. Tipu was sent with 6,000 troops to secure ratification of the treaty with the Nizam. Haidar's reason for the despatch of this large force was his apprehension of the Nizam. Haidar is said to have stated, "I am afraid of the perfidious and cruel Nizam; he has assassinated his own brother; will he spare my son? or at least have I not reason to conclude that he will detain him, and compel me by the apprehension of my son's danger either to pay him a large sum or to make great concessions to him? For in short, I trust my son in the hands of 'a wretch to whom nothing is sacred.'" However, nothing untoward happened, and the treaty was ratified. Tipu was well received, and conferred the title of *Nasib-ud-daula*, or the fortune of the state.² These transactions were over by the middle of May. So secretly were they carried out that Smith and James Bouchier knew nothing of them. The Madras Government had expected that at the worst the Nizam might retire, but they never thought that he would turn against them. Haidar's diplomacy ultimately proved more effective. Not only did he break the confederacy, but also turned it against them.

Why did the Nizam change his policy? His conduct was strange from the beginning. He would neither return home, nor prosecute the war. Either policy would have helped the English, for they would have saved the expenses of sending troops to him in one case, and gained some advantages in the other. He made their troops take unnecessarily the Cuddapah

¹ Quoted in M. M. D. L. T. *Hyder Shah*, pp. 132-4

² Kirmani, *History of Hyder Naik*, p. 248 (Trans.)

route, when they could have joined him sooner through the Carnatic passes. They did everything to show their sincerity but he suffered all sorts of intrigues to go on in his camp. He allowed Madhava Rao to overrun Mysore, while he wasted time reducing his own *poligars*. On entering Mysore he concluded a separate peace with Haidar, in which the Madras Government was not included. On top of all, he entered into an offensive alliance with the power whom he had set out to destroy, and against the power which was his erst-while ally. History offers few instances of so sudden a change in policy, where an enemy became overnight a friend, and a friend an enemy.

The background in which the Hyderabad treaty was concluded offers some reasons for it. The Nizam was not reconciled to the loss of the Sarkars, and the way they were acquired. The Court rightly observed, "It appears to us very clear that Nizam Ally never can from the heart consent to our holding the Circars independent of him, and the reason is plain, it is not his interest; he has even refused to put them into your hands, though you offered him a great deal more than perhaps he ever got by them before, apprehending that once possessed of them as renters, we might be tempted to keep them as Lords." It is true that he consented to cede them by the treaty, but what alternative had he when Caillaud was marching towards Hyderabad? The treaty he concluded was a deception, "in order to put you from your guard."² The treaty offered Haidar's supporters at his court a pretext to excite his jealousy on the ground that the Government first deprived him of his territories, and next dragged him into an expensive war. Rukn-ud-daula bluntly asked Richard Latham, Madras Agent with the Nizam, "Pray, have we ever down to this time attacked the English settlements or molested them in their trade? Did not the English first begin encroachments or commence hostilities with us by seizing the Circars? And afterwards almost forced us into a treaty with them by which those Circars

¹ Court to Madras, 4 March 1767, Desp. to Madras, vol. 3, para 5, p. 569

² Ibid

were for ever ceded to the Company.”¹ The Madras Government were conscious of this fact when they observed, “Our availing ourselves of the Moghul Senads for taking possession of the Circars in the manner we did must create in Nizam allee a prejudice against us.”²

The Government’s subsequent policy also did much to alienate the Nizam, the instructions of 4 April demanding the relinquishment of the tribute and the surrender of Guntur were impolitic, for these demands hardly a few months after the treaty and even before the Madras army joined him, disgusted the Nizam. Rukn-ud-daula remarked to Ibrahim Baig, a commander of the Nizam’s and a supporter of the Madras Government, “What dependence can I place on them in future? They have learnt to ask so much even for their desertion; next year they would ask for the Circar, the year after that, Hyderabad itself. What then would be left but shame and poverty? Is it not better whilst the Nizam has troops with him, whilst he has the name of governing the Deccan to try and root out a perfidious friend, or bravely with the empire to lose his life?”³ The late despatch and the early withdrawal of the troops added to the Nizam’s misgivings. Caillaud had promised the troops by the end of December, but they did not join before 13 April. Had a powerful detachment joined early, the Nizam would have thought twice before listening to Haidar’s supporters. Smith rightly observed, “I remonstrated to General Caillaud more than once that their sending me to the Court without a body of troops was doing nothing, for these people are not to be moved with words but force.”⁴ Haidar’s money and the Nizam’s own necessities brought about a change in politics. Rukn-ud-daula told Richard Latham that according to the treaty the Nizam

¹ Latham to Madras, 24 July 1767, cons. 30 July 1767, M. M. S. P. Range 251, vol. 59, p. 630

² Bouchier to Smith, 3 Aug. 1767, Orme Mss. vol. 76, p. 123

³ Quoted in Latham to Madras, 21 July 1767, cons. 25 July 1767, M. M. S. P. Range 251, vol. 59, p. 577

⁴ Smith to Orme, middle of March 1767, Orme Mss. vol. XI, p. 3041

was to recover his dominions in the Deccan, but the withdrawal of their troops would make him lose what he had.¹

The Nizam dreaded the Maratha power, and he dared not prosecute the war after they made peace. The Court wrote to Madras, "What you deem treachery in Nizam Ally is nothing more than his ideas of his own interest, which most probably is, that an alliance with Hyder Ally will be the best security he can have against the Marathas."² It is true that both the Marathas and the Nizam disliked Haidar, but their dislike of the Nawab was greater, for he was under the influence of a foreign power. Caillaud had secured for the Nawab a status independent of the Nizam, who had now a new cause for resentment.

Lastly, the character of the Nizam influenced his policies. He was unscrupulous by nature. Only the prospects of recovering his territories had brought him nearer to the Madras Government. When he found that the Marathas had anticipated his design, and that Haidar was too powerful to surrender any territory, he adopted the next best course of intimidating the Nawab to secure some advantage. The Nizam was not a man of strong will. He depended too much on his advisers for his policy. They were Rukn-ud-daula, Sher Jang, Basalat Jang and Raja Ramachandra. Except for the first, the rest were not well disposed towards the Madras Government. Caillaud had warned the Government, "The part Mr. Bussy had acted arose fresh in their minds."³ Rukn-ud-daula had confessed to Caillaud that it was to maintain his influence that he had been anxious to retain the Madras Government's friendship.⁴ When he found that his position was gradually undermined by serious lapses on their part, he made a compromise with the hostile group. Caillaud's estimate of Rukn-ud-daula was that there

¹ Latham to Madras, 13 Aug. 1767, M. M. S. P. Range 251, vol. 59, p. 683

² Court to Madras, 13 May. 1768, Desp. to Madras, vol. 4, p. 337

³ Caillaud to Madras, 28 Nov. 1766, cons. 8 December 1766, M.M.S.P., Range 251, vol. 57, p. 362

⁴ Ibid, p. 363

were for ever ceded to the Company.’¹ The Madras Government were conscious of this fact when they observed, “Our availing ourselves of the Moghul Senads for taking possession of the Circars in the manner we did must create in Nizam allee a prejudice against us.”²

The Government’s subsequent policy also did much to alienate the Nizam, the instructions of 4 April demanding the relinquishment of the tribute and the surrender of Guntur were impolitic, for these demands hardly a few months after the treaty and even before the Madras army joined him, disgusted the Nizam. Rukn-ud-daula remarked to Ibrahim Baig, a commander of the Nizam’s and a supporter of the Madras Government, “What dependence can I place on them in future? They have learnt to ask so much even for their desertion; next year they would ask for the Circar, the year after that, Hyderabad itself. What then would be left but shame and poverty? Is it not better whilst the Nizam has troops with him, whilst he has the name of governing the Deccan to try and root out a perfidious friend, or bravely with the empire to lose his life?”³ The late despatch and the early withdrawal of the troops added to the Nizam’s misgivings. Caillaud had promised the troops by the end of December, but they did not join before 13 April. Had a powerful detachment joined early, the Nizam would have thought twice before listening to Haidar’s supporters. Smith rightly observed, “I remonstrated to General Caillaud more than once that their sending me to the Court without a body of troops was doing nothing, for these people are not to be moved with words but force.”⁴ Haidar’s money and the Nizam’s own necessities brought about a change in politics. Rukn-ud-daula told Richard Latham that according to the treaty the Nizam

¹ Latham to Madras, 24 July 1767, cons. 30 July 1767, M. M. S. P. Range 251, vol. 59, p. 630

² Bouchier to Smith, 3 Aug. 1767, Orme Mss. vol. 76, p. 123

³ Quoted in Latham to Madras, 21 July 1767, cons. 25 July 1767, M. M. S. P. Range 251, vol. 59, p. 577

⁴ Smith to Orme, middle of March 1767, Orme Mss. vol. XI, p. 3041

was to recover his dominions in the Deccan, but the withdrawal of their troops would make him lose what he had.¹

The Nizam dreaded the Maratha power, and he dared not prosecute the war after they made peace. The Court wrote to Madras, "What you deem treachery in Nizam Ally is nothing more than his ideas of his own interest, which most probably is, that an alliance with Hyder Ally will be the best security he can have against the Marathas."² It is true that both the Marathas and the Nizam disliked Haidar, but their dislike of the Nawab was greater, for he was under the influence of a foreign power. Caillaud had secured for the Nawab a status independent of the Nizam, who had now a new cause for resentment.

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¹ Latham to Madras, 13 Aug. 1767, M. M. S. P. Range 251, vol. 59, p. 683

² Court to Madras, 13 May. 1768, Desp. to Madras, vol. 4, p. 337

³ Caillaud to Madras, 28 Nov. 1766, cons. 8 December 1766, M.M.S.P, Range 251, vol. 57, p. 362

⁴ Ibid, p. 363

decisions of Madras. Extensive use has been made of the Company's records, Persian sources and Orme Manuscripts of India Office Library, the Private papers of Robert Palk, Warren Hastings and Lord Macartney in British Museum, and the French records in Paris.

This study which was originally made for the Doctorate degree of the University of London in 1960 was subsequently revised. It could never have been undertaken by the author, had not the British Council very generously given him a scholarship to go to England for a period of two years. I take this opportunity to express my grateful thanks to them. I am equally indebted to the authorities of the Mysore University for their sanction of the deputation leave, which enabled me to proceed abroad. I thank the Central Research Funds Committee of the London University for their grant to go to Paris in order to consult the French records.

I take this opportunity to record also my deep sense of gratitude to Dr. K. A. Ballhatchet, Reader in the History of India, University of London, under whose guidance the present work was carried on, and whose advice and assistance were of inestimable value at every stage. I owe my sincere thanks to Dr. A. L. Basham, Professor of the History of South Asia, University of London, for the encouragement I received from him during my stay in London. My thanks are also due to the staff of India Office Library, the British Museum, the School of Oriental and African Studies, Bibliothèque Nationale and Archives Nationales of Paris for their kindness and assistance. Finally, I thank Sri G. S. Abdul Hameed, Coffee Planter, Chikmagalur, for his ever present interest in me, Smt. Sufiabi, my wife, for her timely assistance in London while submitting the thesis for Ph.D., degree, Sri Salar Masood of the Department of Geography, University of Mysore, for his kindness in preparing the maps, Sri G. H. Rama Rao, of the Mysore Printing & Publishing House for the printing and get-up of the book, Sri M. Sathyanarayana Rao of Messrs. Rao and Raghavan for publishing it and Sri Abdul Aziz, Research Scholar, for reading through the galley proofs.

PREFACE

Mysore was a major power with which the East India Company came in contact during the early period of their territorial power in India. With no State did they fight so many wars or for so long. The fact that it was a powerful state, an ally of the French and a barrier to the Maratha expansion in the south naturally gave special significance to the Company's relations with its *de facto* ruler, Haidar Ali. No attempt has hitherto been made to discuss these relations in detail. Both Colonel Mark Wilks and Professor Narendra Krishna Sinha have examined the military history of the period in great detail, but neither has completely explained its political aspects. The scope of Wilks' study, from the origin of the Hindu Government of Mysore to the fall of the Muslim dynasty in 1799, was so large, and the sources known at the time he wrote in 1810 were so limited that he could hardly find out the causes behind the political decisions. Although Professor Sinha's book is an excellent monograph on Haidar, it is not an exhaustive study covering all aspects of British relations with him. There is much material that has not been used, and there are quite a few new facts which call for a new interpretation. This study is an attempt to fill the gap.

British relations with Haidar Ali were dominated by the two wars which were fought during the period. Some new light is thrown on several problems pertaining to the rise, progress and conclusion of these wars. As Haidar's activities affected greatly the Presidency of Madras, the policies of that Presidency appear prominent in the study. Regard is also paid to his relations with Bombay, as well as to the keen interest evinced by the Bengal and Home Governments in the disputes of Madras with Mysore. The rivalry between Haidar and the Nawab of Arcot, the ambitions of the neighbouring powers such as the Nizam and the Marathas, and the presence of other European powers, chiefly the French, influenced to a large extent the policies of the Madras Government. An attempt is made to indicate the impact of these conflicting forces on the

the Hyderabad treaty was the main cause of the Mysore War. We feel that the subsequent bungling diplomacy of the Madras Government was the main cause. The treaty had not stipulated the quota of troops to be lent to the Nizam, and they could have sent even a nominal force, but they made it a powerful detachment of 800 Europeans and 5,000 sepoys. This excited the jealousy of the other Indian powers. The policy in November 1766 was to check Haidar's ambitions within proper bounds. In March 1767 it underwent a change in the direction of his total extirpation. The treaty never meant that the Nizam should lose his tribute; this was demanded. Likewise, Basalat was asked to give up his sarkar. The treaty implied that the Madras Government should act as auxiliaries. How could they do so when they attacked Haidar's passes? In fact Vinaji was assuring Madras that his master was prepared for a compromise if they restored his passes. Therefore, violation of the spirit of the Hyderabad treaty accounts more for the war than the treaty itself. A Saunders, a Pigot, or even a Palk might have averted it. Palk put it aptly later, "When the Nizam Ally settled with Hyder, certainly we should have done the same." As for Haidar, he did not commit a single political mistake. Steadily and methodically he tried to break the alliance, and then to turn it against the Madras Government. He was successful in both. Only the Madras Government mismanaged their affairs. They took too much responsibility upon their shoulders, despite the consistent warnings from the Court, first, in agreeing to an offensive agreement, secondly, in meditating the total destruction of a neighbouring power which was not deserving of so severe a punishment, and lastly, in implementing their treaty in so improper a way.

¹ Palk to William Goodlad, 5 Nov. 1769, *Report on Palk Mss.*, No. 80, p. 111

CHAPTER III

PROSECUTION OF THE WAR (1767-8)

In the prosecution of the war the Madras Government committed a series of mistakes. Although they had known the hostile designs of Haidar and the Nizam as early as May, only half of their army was present on the frontiers to oppose the invaders as late as September. The other half was still in Trichinopoly. Had they effected a blow on the Nizam, as per the military advice, before he joined Haidar, there was every chance of averting the war altogether. They tried to defeat the allies after their entry into the Carnatic, and were successful in the attempt, but they did not make proper use of their victories, three in number. Haidar would have been too glad to make peace, and in fact he did make advances. But ambition led them into wrong channels. They proposed impracticable plans, and took the advice of inexperienced and unworthy persons, such as Cail and Chevalier de St. Lubin, a French adventurer. Only one advantage they secured, the Nizam's disengagement from the alliance. There also they did not derive the maximum benefit, for they set free an enemy, despite his extraordinary conduct, without making him either pay them a single rupee, or cede them a single fort. Worse still, they agreed to pay him the tribute, which was to cost them another war in 1780. All this was for the fair dream of confiscating Mysore to the Nawab's dominions.

When it became certain that the new allies would invade the Carnatic, the Madras Government debated whether they should adopt a defensive or an offensive policy. Tedd had recommended an offensive against the Nizam before the latter joined Haidar.¹ All the members of the government supported

¹ Board's minute, cons. 22 July 1767, M. M. S. P. Range 251, vol. 58, p. 575

² Members of the Government: Charles Bouchier (Governor), John Pybus, Colonel Joseph Smith, Samuel Ardley, John Cail, George Stratton, George Dawson, James Bouchier, Henry Bracke and George Mackay;

Tod's view excepting Pybus. He dissented and argued that the Nizam was not really hostile against the Company, that there could be no unity between such rivals as Haidar and the Nizam, that an offensive on the part of the English might unite these two, were they not so disposed, and that knowing the superiority of the Madras army Haidar would never venture to attack the Carnatic.¹ But the Government decided to take the offensive on the ground that if the Nizam was defeated, Haidar would abandon his project. Accordingly, they directed Smith to attack the Nizam within a prudent distance until the troops from Trichinopoly joined the main army.² But the Government countermanded these orders three days later on the receipt of the Court's letter recommending peace in the strongest terms with all neighbours. The Court had observed, "We fear it is not in human wisdom to foresee what circumstances may arise to tempt you from step to step into difficulties from whence you may not easily find means to extricate yourselves."³ Bouchier hastily informed Smith not to take the offensive, and in confidence told him that Pybus had dissented from the measure, and that if anything untoward were to happen, the Court would severely censure the Government for disregarding the warning of one of the members.⁴

The Government's decision to forestall the Nizam's advance was proper, but their later revision was not. As the politicians on the spot, they should have judged the situation better than the Court who were not aware of the new developments. This delicacy to the Court's orders stands in strange contrast to their earlier policy towards Haidar. However, they missed a fine opportunity of nipping in the bud an expensive war, because the Nizam was so apprehensive of their attack before his junction with Haidar that on Smith's movement from

¹ Pybus's minute, cons. 30 July 1767, M, M. S. P. Range 251, vol. 59, p. 635

² Madras to Smith, cons. 30 July 1767, Ibid, pp. 637-8

³ Court to Madras, 4 March 1767, Desp. to Mad. Vol. 3, Para 4, pp. 568-9

⁴ Bouchier to Smith, 3 Aug. 1767, Orme Mss. vol. 76, p. 124

Melpadi, he fell back towards Bangalore.¹

Meanwhile, the Nizam made his intentions quite clear that he would invade the Carnatic, if his four conditions were not fulfilled. They were, first, the return of the *sanad* for Chicacole, secondly, the payment of 178,000 rupees towards the tribute, thirdly, the assurance that their troops when lent would be entirely at his disposal, and lastly, the undertaking that these proposals would be faithfully carried out.² The Government rejected these demands, and Bouchier said that the Nizam would not be given a rupee for his behaviour.³ Bouchier was hopeful that the invasion might not take place at all. He wrote to Smith that both the Nizam and Rukn-ud-daula knew quite well the superiority of the English arms, that the Nizam was experiencing financial distress, as Haidar had not yet paid him the agreed sum of seven lakhs of rupees, and that he was only making a show of attack to exact this sum from Haidar.⁴

When intelligence continued to come that the allies were marching, the Madras Government decided to seek Murar Rao's aid by offering him some parts of Mysore not contiguous to the Carnatic, and an exclusive share of whatever plunder his troops might seize.⁵ The Nawab suggested that Maratha aid should also be sought, but the Government disapproved of it, thinking that extreme necessity alone would force them to adopt such a measure.⁶

During the week following 25 August the Government were occupied in discussions of policy to overthrow Haidar. Their reasons for it were that he had grown a dangerous neighbour, that he was in contact with the French, that he was supporting the claimants to the Nawabship of the Carnatic, such as Mahfuz Khan and Raza Sahib, and that Clive had

¹ Smith to Madras, 9 Aug. 1767, cons. 13 Aug. 1767, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 59, pp. 676-9

² Latham to Madras, cons. 13 Aug. 1767, Ibid, pp. 683-4

³ Bouchier to Smith, 18 Aug. 1767, Orme Mss. vol. 76, pp. 137-8

⁴ Bouchier to Smith, 17 Aug. 1767, Ibid, pp. 130-1

⁵ Board's minute, cons. 17 Aug. 1767, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 59, pp. 698-701

⁶ Board's minute, cons. 24 Aug. 1767, Ibid, pp. 725-6

advocated a bold policy, namely, "the overthrow of Hyder Ali's usurped power."¹ Therefore, they decided that "his reduction is our most principal object, as the only sure method to give peace to the Carnatic and stability to our possessions. The sooner we extirpate him and restore the ancient family of Rajahs the better."² But the only difficulty in the way of implementing such a policy was the apprehension of Madhava Rao's jealousy, who might come down to the Carnatic to demand the *chauth*. In order to obviate this, the Madras Board thought of securing his alliance, but before doing so, they desired to see whether it was possible to occupy the Marathas in their home affairs by encouraging Madhava Rao's differences with Raghunath Rao or Janoji. For this purpose they wrote to Bengal.³ But without waiting to see the result of such a policy, only three days later they wrote again to Bombay to conclude an alliance with Madhava Rao, the terms of which were Haidar's overthrow, the restoration of the Hindu Rajas to power both in Mysore and Bidnur, the payment of the *chauth* to the Marathas for these states, and the surrender of Sira and a few other districts to the Nawab.⁴ The Madras Board took these decisions at a time when the Maratha *vakil* at Arcot had told the Nawab that Madhava Rao contemplated the substitution of one of Shah Alam's sons for the Nizam.⁵

These decisions were unwise. Instead of concerting measures to repel the invaders, the Madras Board were busy in partitioning imaginary conquests. Moreover, in view of what the Maratha *vakil* had told the Nawab, and how Tod's embassy had been received by Madhava Rao, it was undesirable to expect Maratha aid. The Madras Government were conscious of the consequences of allowing a change of Government at Hyderabad when they observed, "...it is an incontestible maxim that the Government of the Deccan should be preserved, or else it must

¹ Board's minute, cons. 25 Aug. 1767, Ibid, pp. 778-9 ~/

² Madras to Bengal, cons. 31 Aug. 1767, Ibid, p. 757

³ Ibid

⁴ Madras to Bombay, 3 Sept. 1767, Ibid, p. 777

⁵ Ibid

fall to the Marathas and increase their power and make them our neighbours, both in the Carnatic and the Sarcars." Besides, the terms they proposed to Madhava Rao were not advantageous, and it was highly doubtful he would accept them. The whole of Mysore was to be under their protection, and he was to receive merely the *chauth*. Haidar's overthrow with Maratha alliance had been the consistent policy of the Nawab, and the Government were now thinking precisely on the same lines. Therefore, he must have won them over to his point of view. We are surprised that having taken these decisions early in September, the Government could write to the Court soon after that they were trying to remain in peace with all the neighbours "without interfering with politics or forming a connection with any power that may lead us into a war."²

Before this policy was implemented, the allies entered the Carnatic on 25 August through the Kaveripatam pass with an army of 65,000 fighting men. Haidar had 12,800 cavalry, 18,000 infantry, 210 Europeans, and 49 pieces of artillery, and the Nizam had about 25,000 cavalry, 10,000 infantry and 60 pieces of cannon.³ Smith's army did not exceed more than 600 Europeans and six battalions of sepoys.⁴ The war began with apparent advantages to the allies, who entered the Carnatic ravaging and pillaging. Smith hesitated to give battle, for nearly half the Madras army under Wood had not yet joined him from Trichinopoly. Several fortresses including Madras was so bare of troops that they could not even post sentries to different points. Kaveripatam, a strong fort on the frontier, soon fell to Haidar.


Fortunately for the Madras Government Smith won a victory at Changama, a small village on the frontier, on 2 September.

¹ Ibid

² Madras to the Court, 21 Sept. 1767, Letters Received, vol. 3, para 23

³ Haidar's Force, 23 July 1767, Orme Mss. vol. 33, p. 64. The Nizam's army against Haidar had exceeded 150,000 men, but it was much reduced later owing to the scarcity of provisions and the withdrawal of most of the *poligars* and *zamindars*.

⁴ Each battalion consisted of nearly 1,000 troops.



THE FIRST MYSORE WAR

[This defeat of the allies damped their spirits, and shattered their hopes, if they had any, of conquering the Carnatic.] It raised the expectations of the Madras Government so much that they wrote to Smith, "We imagine you are well apprized how important a service it would be if Hyder Alli could be made a prisoner, or shall fall in battle."² Haidar himself received a contusion in the leg, and he lost about 1,500 killed and wounded, but the loss of the Madras army did not exceed 170.³ The battle impressed him of the superiority of the Madras army, as also of their commander. Thereafter he took care to post his army in strong situations, morasses or hills to prevent Smith's artillery or infantry from crossing.⁴

[Although Smith won a victory, he could not turn it to much advantage. As was the case in this and the next Mysore wars, difficulties of provisions and transport robbed all the benefits of the Madras army's victories.] Haidar's horse was so good that Smith could not send a letter with safety to Madras, and that he saw the villages in flame, but was powerless to prevent.⁵ Smith had practically no cavalry excepting a few which were less than 100. When he asked the Madras Government to raise a regiment, they refused and said that the absence of cavalry had not affected their superiority in the past.⁶ Smith recommended the cantoning of troops owing to heavy rainfalls, scarcity of provisions, and Haidar's strategy of avoiding a pitched battle.⁷ The Government declined this proposal as well, thinking that would mean loss of reputation and places. They asked Smith to wait until the arrival of three battalions from

¹ Madras to Bengal, cons. 5 Sept. 1767, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 59, p. 803; also cons. 9 Sept. 1767, Ibid, p. 812

² Bouchier to Smith, cons. 14 Sept. 1767, Ibid, p. 849

³ Capt. Henry Augs. Mont. Cosby's (in Smith's army) Journal, 2 Sept. 1767, Orme Mss. vol. 215, p. 34

⁴ Smith to Madras, 19 Sept. 1767, cons. 24 Sept. 1767, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 59, p. 911

⁵ Smith to Madras, 12 Sept. 1767, cons. 15 Sept. 1767, Ibid, p. 854

⁶ Madras to Smith, cons. 15 Sept. 1767, Ibid, p. 855

⁷ Smith to Madras, 19 Sept. 1767, cons. 24 Sept. 1767, Ibid, p. 911

Bengal.¹ But the Bengal Government intended that their troops should be employed to detach the Nizam from the alliance by marching against his capital. They said that such a policy would oblige him to purchase peace by paying a sum of money, which would indemnify the Madras Government's expenses.² Smith was also of the same view that the expected aid from Bengal should be diverted towards Hyderabad.

On 25 September Bouchier informed the Madras Board that a Frenchman, Chevalier de St. Lubin, had come down to Madras deserting Haidar. An adventurer, an opportunist and an intriguer, Lubin was destined to play an important part in the Madras politics of the time, and he gained quickly a great influence over certain members of the Board, particularly Call. St. Lubin was to figure a decade later as well intriguing at Poona against the Company. He gave a particular account of Haidar's forces, fortresses and treasure, making an impression that he knew his every secret. He said that Haidar had treated him so ill that he had formed a plan to destroy Haidar, the first step of which was to draw off the Europeans, artillery men and Mughal horse in his service.³

The Madras Board believed St. Lubin, and thought that there was no harm in accepting his plan. They asked him to start his work of exciting desertion in Haidar's army.⁴ From that time St. Lubin became an important man at Madras, and in fact so important that Smith wrote to Orme, "This very French renegade was and is idolized by all the Dons of the Settlement; even the women have caught this infection and cry 'What a charming man the Chevalier is!', 'sweet creature', says another, 'an excellent dancing master' says a third, and in short every perfection is centred in that half starved French."⁵ He misguided the Government by giving them wrong reports that the conquest of Mysore was easy and that Haidar's

¹ Madras to Smith, cons. 24 Sept. 1767, Ibid, p. 913

² Bengal to Madras, 24 Oct. 1767, cons. 16 Nov. 1767, Ibid, pp. 1221-4

³ Smith to Madras, cons. 21 Sept, Ibid, pp. 908-9

⁴ Board's minute, cons. 25 Sept. 1767, Ibid, pp. 916-21

⁵ Smith to Orme, 28 March 1768, Orme Mss. vol. 33, p. 55

killedars would surrender the forts on the mere approach of the Madras army.¹ Speaking of Haidar's treasure supposed to be hidden in Bidnur, St. Lubin said, "What quantities of pearl, diamonds and rubies and ready money! What riches may be acquired by the Company and individuals!"² He said that he knew a Moor in Haidar's service who could be trusted "to deliver up a pass, a post, a place or carry off Hyder Ally himself."³ The Madras Government believed these stories; and offered a lakh of rupees to any one who could carry off Haidar or the Nizam.⁴ In November 1767, he caused unnecessary alarm at Madras by giving wrong reports that Haidar and the Nizam would surprise the Black Town.⁵ In March 1768 under the pretext that he would be helpful in procuring provisions, he accompanied the Field Deputies, who were appointed then, and became a source of irritation to Smith. So foolish was the Government's policy that the Court strongly reprimanded them for taking this French into their confidence.⁶

(Meanwhile, on 25 September the allies suffered another defeat at Tiruvannamalai.) It was more crushing than the first, as the other half of the Madras army also under Wood had joined Smith, who commanded now 1,300 Europeans, 8,000 sepoys and 30 pieces of artillery.⁷ The allies were so badly routed that Smith observed, "Two thousand good horse would have put us in possession of both the armies with Hyder Ally and Nizam Ally at their head."⁸ The Nizam blamed Haidar for the defeat, and Haidar, the Nizam. Eloi José Correa Peixoto, a captain

¹ F. Browne to England, 23 Feb. 1769, Orme Mss. vol. 71, p. 23

² Proposals of St. Lubin, cons. 15 Oct. 1767, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 59, pp. 1063-6

³ Quoted in Martin to St. Lubin, cons. 1 Feb. 1768, Ibid, vol. 61, p. 139

⁴ Board's minute, cons. 24 Nov. 1767, Ibid, vol. 60, p. 1290

⁵ St. Lubin to Madras, 27 Nov. 1767, cons. 2 Dec. 1767, Ibid, pp. 1346-7

⁶ Court to Madras, 22 March 1771, Desp. to Mad. vol. 5, para 21, p. 142

⁷ Cosby's Journal, 26 Sept. 1767, Orme Mss. vol. 215, p. 42

⁸ Smith to Madras, 26 Sept. 1767, cons. 29 Sept. 1767, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 59, p. 955

⁹ Cosby's Journal, 26 Sept. 1767, Orme Mss. vol. 215, p. 43

in Haidar's army and his historian, writes that the Nizam's army did not co-operate in this battle, and that the whole brunt fell on Haidar. Peixoto attributes the defeat partly to Haidar's detachment of Tipu from his army with a large force to plunder Madras. If this force had remained with Haidar, Peixoto says that "the fate of the war would have been different."¹ We may not believe him; but at least we may suppose that the defeat would not have been crushing. Tipu had really a strong body which caused consternation at Madras, and forced Bouchier, Call, the Nawab and his son to escape precipitately in a small vessel, which by accident was present near their garden house. Otherwise all of them would have been taken prisoners.² After this battle Smith thought that the allies were finally expelled from the Carnatic. The incessant rains, the want of provisions even for a day and the fatigue caused to the Madras army compelled Smith to canton the troops at different places, Tiruvannamalai, Conjeevaram and Trichinopoly. Haidar utilised this interval of two months to invade the Carnatic again, seized Vaniyambadi, Tirupattur and two other mud forts.³ Then he besieged Ambur so effectively that its commander Captain Mathews Calvert wrote to Major Abraham Bonjour at Vellore, "The Europeans I have with me come in a body and begged I would give up the fort".⁴ Smith wrote to Orme, "I believe it is the first instance known through out our history of Europeans pressing to surrender a town to blacks".⁵

Meanwhile, the Madras Government were concerting measures to overthrow Haidar. Their first step was to secure Madhava Rao's consent to this policy. They invited the Maratha *vakil* at Madras to a conference, and explained to him their reasons for it. The *vakil* suggested the deputation of an English agent to Madhava Rao.⁶ As a person from Bombay could be

¹ Peixoto, History of Haidar, Mss. Eur. D. 295, p. 252

² M. M. D. L. T. *History of Hyder Ali Khan*, p. 192 (1908 edn.)

³ Smith to the Court, 9 Oct. 1768, Orme Mss. vol. 10, pp. 69-70

⁴ Calvert to Bonjour, 27 Nov. 1767, cons. 1 Dec. 1767, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 60, p. 1341

⁵ Smith to Orme, 28 March 1768, Orme Mss. vol. 33, p. 30

⁶ Madras to Bombay, cons. 2 Oct. 1767, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 59, p. 982; also Bouchier to Smith, 6 Oct. 1767, Orme Mss. vol. 76, p. 160

more easily sent, they wrote to Bombay to invite Madhava Rao to an alliance, and to propose that he should send 10,000 horse to join the Madras army for conquering Mysore, and another body of troops to co-operate with the Bombay army for reducing Malabar and Bidnur. The Madras Government issued further instructions to the Nawab's *vakil*, Naga Rao, who was sent to Madhava Rao to explain the necessity for reducing Haidar.¹

The Bombay Government were disinclined to support this policy, because their marine and land forces had been locked up in the Persian Gulf, and because of their apprehension that a rupture with Haidar would disturb their trade in Malabar. The utmost they could do was to prevent Madhava Rao from supporting the allies by encouraging his dispute with Raghunath Rao, and to excite trouble for Haidar by encouraging the Nair chiefs.² But on 10 October the Bombay Government further informed Madras that there was no hope of occupying the Marathas in their family disputes, for a reconciliation had taken place between the two chiefs. However, Bombay offered to send a person to Poona to prevent Madhava Rao from supporting the allies.³

Accordingly, when the Bombay Board sent one of their members, Thomas Mostyn, to Poona in December, Madhava Rao frankly told him that he would adopt one of the three measures, to join the allies against the Madras Government, to join the Madras Government against them, or to separate the Nizam from the alliance and destroy Haidar.⁴ Mostyn gained an impression at Poona that the Maratha neutrality in the dispute was uncertain, but Madhava Rao had not yet made up his mind which side he should support.⁵ Mostyn stayed on at Poona to watch his movements.

¹ Board's minute, cons. 1 Oct. 1767, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 58, pp. 967-9

² Bombay to Madras, 30 Sept. 1767, cons. 9 Nov. 1767, Ibid, vol. 60, pp. 1159-60

³ Bombay to Madras, 10 Oct. 1767, cons. 21 Nov. 1767, Ibid, p. 1254

⁴ Mostyn to Madras, 1 Jan. 1768, cons. 11 Feb. 1768, Ibid, vol. 61, p. 173

⁵ Ibid

These advances of the Madras Government to Madhava Rao took place at a time when Bengal had clearly warned them not to aggrandise the Maratha power, because they had written to Bengal a haughty letter demanding the chauth for that presidency. The Bengal Government suspected that such a demand would never have been made, unless the Marathas were already in league with the other two Indian powers. Bengal wrote to Bombay, "Recent experience has taught us the Marathas are not to be solicited. The cession of countries is but a temporary expedient which will never bind them to our interest. Without securing any permanent advantage it will encourage them to fresh demands which they will not fail to enforce the moment they discover their own importance and our weakness."¹

[Haidar's policy during this period was one of accommodation with the Madras Government.] He invited Stracey from Bombay. Stracey met him twice near Vaniyambadi in November, and wrote to Madras, "...by the conversation I have had with him he seems to be inclined to peace; with regard to the terms he hinted that if the Subah had satisfaction as to his demands relative to the countries he lately gave up to the Nabob of Arcot, other matters might easily be settled".² This suggests that Haidar had no dispute with Madras, and that he would not have been unreasonable in settling the Nizam's dispute with them. After the two victories it is quite likely that the Madras Government could have obtained advantageous terms from Haidar, but their policy was different. In answer to Stracey's letter, they invited him to Madras to brief him "more particularly of our intention relative to Hyder Ali."³

[The Madras Government were employing all means at their disposal to subvert Haidar, including exciting the Raja of Mysore to revolt.] Bouchier employed a person, Ranga Rao, to procure intelligence as to what was going on at Seringapatam and to know if the Raja's family was interested in subverting

¹ Bengal to Madras, 21 Sept. 1767, cons. 20 Oct. 1767, Ibid, vol. 60 pp. 1088-9

² Stracey to Madras, 10 Nov. 1767, cons, 15 Nov. 1767, Ibid, pp. 1206-7

³ Madras to Stracey, cons. 15 Nov. 1767, Ibid, p. 1209

Haidar. Ranga Rao reported that the scheme could easily be a success, that Nanjaraj, the grand old man, was still alive, and that he had a *Diwan*, Srinivasa Rao, who might be helpful. Dodbalapur, in Mysore State, was fixed as a place for the exchange of secret information between Nanjaraj and Madras. Ranga Rao was again sent to Nanjaraj with instructions that if the Raja were to contribute towards the cost of an expedition to Mysore, Haidar would be destroyed. The Bombay Government would attack him from the west, and the Rajas of Travancore and Coimbatore, and the Nair chiefs, would also take up arms against him.¹ However, Haidar's effective intelligence system frustrated this scheme. Moreover, later events made the Madras Government think that it was more prudent to give Mysore to the Nawab than to the Raja.

[On 15 November the Madras troops again took the field, relieved Ambur on 3 December, and won a battle at Vaniyam-badi on 8 December.² Smith defeated Haidar for the third time.] The loss on either side was not great, about 200 killed and wounded in all, but Smith gained two important advantages, the Nizam's withdrawal from the alliance, and the desertion of Haidar's European cavalry, 80 in number, which was brought about through St. Lubin's intrigue.³ Haidar made another attempt to regain his military reputation, moved himself in person with 4,000 select horse, 1,000 sepoy, and five field pieces to intercept a convoy coming under Major Fitzgerald, and made a resolute attack on him.⁴ But Smith had anticipated the design, and had despatched Wood to Fitzgerald's relief. [Haidar was forced to retire, and on 5 January he quitted the Carnatic completely. With his withdrawal the first phase of the war came to an end.

Haidar's third defeat encouraged the Madras Government to revive their policy of his overthrow. But they said that it should be done with the least expense to the Company. This

¹ Board's minute, cons. 16 Nov. 1767, Ibid, pp. 1229-32

² Smith to the Court, 9 Oct. 1768, Orme Mss. vol. 10, p. 70

³ Cosby's Journal, 8 Dec. 1767, Orme Mss. vol. 215, pp. 46-8

⁴ Smith to Madras, 27 Dec, 1767, cons. 2 Jan, 1768, M.M.S.P, Range 251, vol, 61, p, 4

could be done by making the conquests in Mysore pay for the expenses. Another important point considered at this time was the appointment of a person of rank and ability to manage the conquests. They thought that such a person should be a native prince to counteract the consequent jealousy of the other Indian powers on the Company's progress.] They chose the Nawab for this purpose. The conquests should be in his name; he should accompany the army; and he should bear all the expenses of the conquests, which would be given into his charge, excepting Bangalore and Seringapatam to be retained by the Company. He should appoint his son, Moin-ul-Mulk, as his deputy in the Carnatic to pay the Company's *kists* and the expenses of the troops. The Nawab was to draw off Haidar's *zamindars*, to procure supplies for the troops, and to administer the conquests.¹

The Nawab accepted these proposals with certain modifications. The *Diwani* of Mysore was to be permanently ceded to him. The Madras officers were not to confer or correspond with the Mysore Raja, or any of Haidar's chiefs. The spoils of the war would belong to the Nawab, for he defrayed the expenses of the war. The operation of the war should be entrusted to a council of three, with himself and two other field deputies to be appointed. He should be the medium for peace, if it became inevitable.²

The Madras Government's policy was unwise. As the Court put it, it was conquering Mysore for Muhammad Ali.³ It was driving Haidar to extremities, and exciting the jealousy of other Indian powers. The Government knew that the Nawab had no money. How could he pay the expenses of conquests? It would take some time before the conquests would yield any profit. The only alternative was to borrow money. But the prevalent rate of interest was 20 percent, which was so high that he would be ruined. But it was so tempting to Europeans that, according to George Mackay, one of the Council, "the

¹ Board's minute, cons. 16 Dec. 1767, *Ibid*, vol. 60, pp. 1448-51

² Nawab's Porposals, cons. 11 April 1768, *Ibid*, vol. 61, p. 490

³ Court to Madras, 23 March 1770, *Desp. to Madras*, vol. 4, p. 1033

fortunes of all the individuals in these settlements, very few excepted, are in this sinking fund.”¹ The consequence of throwing every expense upon the Nawab would be beneficial neither to him nor to the Company. He would be loaded with a debt which he would not be able to discharge all his life. The Company would suffer because, if the policy was successful, he would receive Mysore; if it failed, the Company was under the obligation to share the loss. As the policy actually failed, such was the crash that the Company’s stock fell by as much as 60 percent.² In adopting this policy, the Madras Government paid no consideration to their own finances, their military strength, Haidar’s resources, the nature of his dominions (full of hill forts and narrow passes) and its effect on other powers. The Bengal Government disapproved of the policy of enlarging the Nawab’s power, and wrote to Madras, “Divide and govern is an old maxim in politics. . . . We are convinced that to keep him the same faithful ally he has been, the surest plan will be not to enlarge his power, and strengthen his hands.” With their experience of how Haidar had turned the Nizam against the Company, the Madras Government should not have ventured on a new project.

In order to facilitate the execution of their policy, the Government decided in January 1768 to conclude peace with the Nizam. Their policy towards the Nizam had been different in November 1767, when the purpose of diverting Peach’s detachment towards Hyderabad was not only to draw him off from the alliance, but also if possible to remove him altogether. They observed, “For the grand point we ought to aim at is to have the Carnatic, Mysore country and the Deccan so much under our influence that no disputes or jealousies may arise between the several governing powers, and that we may be able by this system to lay the foundation of internal tranquillity in these countries by which means alone the Marathas can be kept

¹ Mackay to Orme, 2 Nov. 1767, Orme Mss. vol. 30, pp. 88-9

² *Transactions in India*, p. 102

³ Bengal to Madras, 20 Dec. 1767, cons. 18 Jan. 1768, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 61, p. 62

in bounds.”¹ The Bengal Government had also countenanced the policy of removing the Nizam, and of placing one of Shah Alam’s sons in his stead.² They actually obtained a blank *farman* from the Mughal Emperor.³

Having gone so far the Madras Government dropped the idea, because a suitable substitute was not available. No brother of the Nizam was alive except Basalat Jang, whose hostility to the Government was well known. Although the Nizam had a son, he too could not be trusted.⁴ Besides, a large force would be required to maintain a new Subah in power.⁵ However, the Court strongly criticised this measure, and wrote to Madras, “By your wild proposal to Bengal of putting up one of Shah Alam’s sons, we fear all the barriers to Maratha power will be broken and that they will add the Deccan and Mysore to their extensive empire.”⁶

Meanwhile, Peach was advancing towards Hyderabad. The Nizam was alarmed, and began making advances to the Madras Government. He sent a person, Muzafar Khan, to Madras to know their terms. They said that the Nizam should first separate himself from Haidar, and seek their support, just as Shah Alam had sought it in the north. Muzafar Khan said that the Nizam might act still better, and turn against Haidar in the next battle.⁷ Accordingly, in the battle of Vaniyambadi the Nizam did not co-operate with Haidar, but did not go to the extent of turning against him as well. On 17 December Raja Ramachandra Rao, the Nizam’s minister, visited Smith, who asked him to deliver up Haidar to the English. The Raja replied that this would be done the moment Haidar left the Carnatic. The Raja invited Smith to Rukn-ud-daula’s camp, but Smith

¹ Board’s minute, cons. 16 Nov. 1767, Ibid, vol. 60, p. 1227

² Bengal to Madras, 27 Oct. 1767, cons. 12 Dec. 1767, Ibid, pp.1400-1

³ Shah Alam to Bengal, 13 Feb. 1768, *Cal. Pers. Cor.* vol. II, No. 790, p. 225

⁴ Board’s minute, cons. 15 Nov. 1767, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 60, pp. 1226-7

⁵ Madras to Bengal, cons. 9 Jan. 1768, Ibid, vol. 61, p. 41

⁶ Court to Madras, 13 May 1768, *Desp. to Mad.* vol. 4, p. 338

⁷ Bouchier to Smith, 5 Dec, 1767, Orme Mss, vol. 76, p. 220-22

declined to go. Thereupon, Rukn-ud-daula himself came to Smith. Smith wrote to Madras, "I will insist upon Haidar's person or at least his head, which if Rukn-ud-daula will not promise to produce, I am determined to try what force the offer of a lakh or two will have with the Raja; I am apt to think his scruples will vanish at the sound."¹ Bouchier approved of the idea, but warned Smith never to mention the reward to any one "as you must be sensible how much the public are ever inclined to condemn such a measure."² But very soon it turned out to be a device to occupy the Government in order to keep Smith in suspense until the Nizam's army could get out of his reach.³

In January it became evident that the Nizam could not continue long in the Carnatic. The Bengal detachment had taken Khamemat and Warangal, and was making rapid advance towards Hyderabad. Haidar had stopped his instalments to the Nizam, who had now to face a new difficulty. Added to these, the Nizam was apprehensive lest the Marathas should invade his dominions during his absence. Therefore, he desired to make peace.⁴ But he manoeuvred in such a way as to make it appear that the Madras Government were seeking peace. Rukn-ud-daula repeatedly invited Smith to his camp.⁵ Being pressed much, Smith sent Fitzgerald to the Nizam, who desired that Fitzgerald should accompany the ministers, Rukn-ud-daula, Raja Ramachandra and Raja Bir Bahadur, to Madras, who would be going there to finalise the treaty. Fitzgerald promised to do so.⁶ It was at once apparent at Madras that Fitzgerald's action was highly improper and that it would appear to other powers that it was the Company and not the Nizam who was soliciting for peace. Therefore, they urged Rukn-ud-daula's visit to Madras so that "it might be known to all the country powers that it was they, and not us, suing for

¹ Smith to Madras, 19 Dec. 1767, cons. 22 Dec. 1767, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 60, pp. 1483-4

² Bouchier to Smith, 22 Dec. 1767, Orme Mss. vol. 76, p. 235

³ Bouchier to Smith, 23 Dec. 1767, Ibid, p. 237

⁴ Madras to Smith, cons. 2 Jan. 1768, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 61, p. 7

⁵ Smith to Madras, cons. 21 Jan. 1768, Ibid, p. 104

⁶ Fitzgerald to Madras, 29 Jan. 1768, cons. 30 Jan. 1768, Ibid, p. 135

peace.”¹ They further informed the Nizam that unless he immediately sent his ministers, he would hear the fall of Hyderabad.² The Government had learnt through the French in Haidar’s service that he had been persuading the Nizam not to make peace, and that the Nizam had told him that the purpose of Rukn-ud-daula’s visit to Madras was to gain time until the Nizam’s son arrived from Hyderabad with 10,000 troops.³ The Government directed Smith to surprise the Nizam, if he suspected any treachery.⁴ However, nothing untoward happened, and the ministers arrived at Madras on 9 February. But they had come without credentials from the Nizam. This revived the suspicion that it might be “a finesse to answer some hidden purpose.”⁵ All business was stopped, unless they procured the necessary letter of authority from the Nizam, which they did by 15 February.⁶

The Government proceeded to consider the terms of peace. They were in a generous mood, which prevented them from making either territorial or financial demands. They said, “We must leave him something more than the empty name.” If he was left dissatisfied, they argued, he would be tempted soon to break with them. He was to cede the Northern Sarkars to the Company, and pay the expenses of the war, 25 lakhs of rupees, against him. This would be deducted out of the tribute payable to him for the Sarkars in six equal instalments. They would not send him a body of force whenever he demanded. He should agree to the Company’s *diwani* over Mysore, and they would pay him in return seven lakhs of rupees towards the tribute, as also the *chauth* to the Marathas. The Company would appoint a governor to and keep a force in the Mysore Kingdom. He was to declare Haidar an usurper and a rebel, renounce all

¹ Madras to Fitzgerald, cons. 30 Jan. 1768, Ibid, p. 106

² Ibid

³ Martin to St. Lubin, cons. 1 Feb. 1768, Ibid, p. 138

⁴ Board’s minute, cons. 1 Feb. 1768, Ibid, p. 138

⁵ Board’s minute, cons. 9 Feb. 1768, Ibid, p. 153-4

⁶ Board’s minute, cons. 15 Feb. 1768, Ibid, p. 178

⁷ Ibid, p. 185

connections with him, and revoke all *sanads* and honours granted to him.¹ The ministers offered no difficulty in agreeing to these terms. The treaty was signed on 26 February, and ratified by the Nizam on 13 March. The Maratha *vakil* was also a signatory to it.

Why did the Madras Government concede such liberal terms to the Nizam? They thought that their formidable rival was Haidar, whose reduction would be difficult, if the Nizam was not disengaged. Their finances were far from satisfactory. Their expected income was 13 lakhs of rupees, but the expenditure was 18 lakhs.² Supplies from Bengal were uncertain. Peace with the Nizam would bring revenues from the Sarkars, where his supporters had stopped all payments. The Bengal troops under Peach had been reduced after garrisoning Khamemat. If Bengal were to recall their troops, the Nizam might rise in his demands. The problem of supplies to a distant theatre of war was difficult.³

The treaty ended the Nizam's inglorious campaign in the Carnatic. It gave the Company an independent right to the Sarkars. Previously they held these by virtue of a grant from the Nizam, but now they based their right on the Mughal *farman*. They were obliged by the 1766 treaty to give him military aid; this was now made optional. He was to pay for any aid, if they sent it. The inclusion of the Maratha *vakil* was "considered a master stroke in diplomacy," as Madhava Rao could not plead ignorance of the Government's right to choose a governor for Mysore.⁴ This right to choose a governor for Mysore was regarded as a remedy if the Mysore Raja or his minister were to prove another Haidar. The stationing of a part of the English army in Mysore would protect their trade and commerce. The Government considered these terms as highly advantageous.⁵

¹ Board's minute, cons. 15 Feb. 1768, Ibid, pp. 178-90

² Ibid, pp. 179-80

³ Ibid, pp. 180-81

⁴ Bouchier to Smith, 8 March 1768, Orme Mss. vol. 76, p. 349

⁵ Board's minute, cons. 21 March 1768, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 61,

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⁷ Ibid, p. 185

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¹ Board's minute, cons. 15 Feb. 1768, Ibid, pp. 178-90

² Ibid, pp. 179-80

³ Ibid, pp. 180-81

⁴ Bouchier to Smith, 8 March 1768, Orme Mss. vol. 76, p. 349

⁵ Board's minute, cons. 21 March 1768, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 61,

But the treaty was not as advantageous as could have been. Smith was partly right in thinking that the Government showed undeserving concessions to the Nizam.¹ He was not made to suffer for his breach of faith. Neither territory nor cash was demanded from him. When his capital was threatened, he would have made peace on any terms. They could have at least obtained exemption from the tribute for the Sarkars. They had pressed such a demand before his invasion of the Carnatic, but they now remained silent, when he might possibly have conceded it. The treaty needlessly provoked Haidar's hostility by declaring him "an usurper, a rebel, a restless and a troublesome man". While they hesitated to conquer Hyderabad on the ground that the Court had forbidden any extension of the Company's territory, no such scruple prevented them from acquiring the *diwani* of Mysore. The Court rightly censured Madras, "Judge then what we must feel when we contemplate the designs you have formed of such a vast addition to our possessions, measure so wild and imprudent deprives us of all confidence in your judgment."² Nor was the Nizam pleased with the treaty. He disgraced Rukn-ud-daula for a time for concluding it.³ In October 1768 the Nizam sent him to Madhava Rao, and rumours were rife that a triple alliance was again contemplated.⁴ The important consideration before the Madras Government was how to isolate Haidar, and beat him. For this they made all sorts of compromises.

Having disengaged the Nizam from the alliance, the Madras Government proceeded to appoint a committee of three, called Field Deputies, to direct the operations of the war, to accompany the army, to assist the Nawab in managing the conquests, and to procure supplies, provisions and bullocks. It was to consist of the commander-in-chief, Smith, who was

¹ Smith to Orme, 28 March 1768, Orme Mss. vol. 33, p. 52

² Court to Madras, 19 March 1769, Desp. to Mad. vol. 4, p. 598

³ Field Deputies to Madras, 13 July 1768, cons. 19 July 1768, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 62, p. 883

⁴ Broome to Madras, 6 Nov. 1768, cons. 10 Dec, 1768, Ibid, vol. 64, p. 1758

to preside, and two members of the Council, Call and Mackay. Call's choice was inevitable, as he was the chief exponent of the forward policy, and Mackay was chosen because he being a friend of Smith, the Committee might work smoothly.¹ All military powers were delegated to them, which was an unprecedented step. This was done because it would avoid delay in receiving and despatching orders from Madras, and because, as the season was far advanced for active campaign, every effective device should be adopted to execute the policy of Haidar's overthrow.² The plan was to conquer Mysore from two directions, from the south and east of Mysore. Smith was to proceed from the east, with 600 Europeans, five battalions of sepoys and 12 field pieces, and Wood was to penetrate through the south with 500 Europeans, four battalions of sepoys and 10 field pieces.³

The places that were to be first conquered became a chief point of dispute between the Madras Board and Smith. They thought that the reduction of Haidar's strong forts like Bangalore and Seringapatam was unnecessary, and that the capture of his less important forts would equally distress him. This was because an attempt on his strong forts would take long time, would cause more loss of men and money, and would give Haidar time to take offensive in other directions. Besides, the Madras army had not carried battering cannons with them, and Haidar's troops beaten thrice might surrender small forts quickly.⁴ Smith differed from this view and said that the capture of small forts was of no use, and that Bangalore and Seringapatam were the citadel of Haidar's power, which would remain unaffected as long as he held them. Smith recommended the offensive from the south only, and not from the Bangalore side, where there was "neither provision

¹ Call to Palk, 26 Jan. 1769, Adj. Mss. 34,685, pp. 121-2

² Board's minute, cons. 25 March 1763, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 61, pp.411-3

³ Board's minute, cons. 2 April 1763, Ibid, pp.476-81; also cons. 18 Jan. 1768, Ibid, pp. 78-80

⁴ Bouchier to Smith, (undated), Orme Mss. vol. 76, pp. 358-60

nor forage.”² The Government overruled this military advice which was very sound. All their later difficulties could be traced to these initial mistakes. They thought that Haidar could be subdued only by a simultaneous attack from two directions. They observed, “As Hyder Ally is the life of all opposition and his fall may pave the way to easy accomplishment of our views with regard to the Mysore country, it is against him, and where he is, our greatest efforts must be exerted.”³

Therefore, in the instructions to the deputies the Government excluded the reduction of Bangalore and Seringapatam. The deputies set out from Madras on 5 April. Although the instructions excluded the conquest of strong forts, they decided to take Krishnagiri, a very strong fort, thinking that its fall might intimidate other forts.⁴ After a siege of over two months, it was captured. A few other forts, such as Venkatagiri, Mulbagal, Kolar and Anekal were also seized. As Smith had envisaged, the conquest of these places did not give the Madras Government any advantage. With Bangalore and Seringapatam in his hands, Haidar could cut off their supplies, surprise them in night attacks, and harass their baggage. These forts could not be taken, because the rainy season was near, and because they were very strong. He had not only strengthened them, but also had invited the Marathas to his support.

When the English took the offensive in Mysore, Haidar sent Raza Sahib to Poona soliciting Madhava Rao's aid, and offering 30 lakhs of rupees towards the arrears of the *chauth*.¹ This amount was actually deposited with the money lenders, and was to be paid into the Maratha treasury in two instalments, 17 lakhs to be paid on the march of Gopal Rao and Ananda Rao, Maratha commanders at Miraj, towards Haidar, and the balance on their actual junction with the Mysore army. The detachment under these commanders

¹ Smith to Madras, 13 March 1768, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 61, pp. 357-8; also Smith to Bouchier, 8 Jan. 1768, cons. 11 Jan. 1768, Ibid, p. 48

² Board's minute, cons. 18 Jan. 1768, Ibid, pp. 78-80

³ Deputies to Madras, 22 Apl. 1768, cons. 25 Apl. 1768, Ibid, p. 517

⁴ Smith to Orme, 28 March 1768, Orme Mss. vol. 33. n. 53

consisted of 1,500 horse.¹ The effect of Haidar's offer was that Raza Sahib was permitted to recruit sepoy and horsemen for Haidar from any part of the Maratha Empire.² Although Haidar did not actually secure any Maratha aid, his efforts had the propaganda value of creating confusion at Madras.

The detachment sent under Wood to the south was more fortunate. He reduced a number of places such as Dharma-puri, Tengrikota, Kaveripuram, Salem and Atur. He proceeded as far as Gazalhatti and Satyamangalam, only 80 miles from Seringapatam. He took Coimbatore and Dindigal as well.³ Within six months he deprived Haidar of all his southern possessions, yielding a revenue of 25 lakhs of rupees, and forming his chief supply depots. Owing to a change in the war plan Wood was recalled from the south to besiege Bangalore, and thus he was prevented from penetrating further towards Seringapatam.

Haidar was distressed on the western coast as well by the Bombay Government's invasion of Malabar.⁴ They desired to reduce Mangalore first, and then co-operate with the Madras army in their march towards Seringapatam. A strong reason for undertaking this campaign was the Bombay Government's anxiety to seize Bidnur, a province rich in commercial commodities. They wanted to set up there a representative of their own, Faizula Khan, a commander in Haidar's army. They chose this person because his father had been in the Nawab's service, and therefore he might be inclined to remain faithful to the Company. Madras did not approve of this choice, and proposed instead the Nawab himself, who would be acquiring the *diwani* for the whole of Mysore.⁵ Their second preference was the young

¹ Broome to Deputies, 8 Oct. 1768, Orme Mss. vol. 328, p. 3 (Charles Broome was the Bombay Resident at Poona, who succeeded Mostyn).

² Board's minute, cons. 20 Aug. 1768, M. M. S. P. Range 251, vol. 62, p. 1015

³ Wood to Madras, 4 Aug. 1768, cons. 11 Aug. 1768, M. M. S. P. Range 251, vol. 62, p. 988

⁴ Bombay to Madras, 4 Feb. 1768, cons. 29 Feb. 1768, Ibid, vol. 61, p. 260

⁵ This decision was taken on 29 Feb. 1768, when the Nizam had not yet ratified his treaty.

Raja of Bidnur who had sought shelter at Poona.¹

On 19 February Bombay sent an expedition of 400 Europeans and 800 sepoys under Major John Gouin and John Watson to reduce Mangalore, Honavar and the Fortified Island. John Sibbald, Bombay agent at Honavar, had induced the commander of Haidar's fleet, Mir Khan Kelshu, to desert with the fleet of two grabs and five gallivats.² Within a short period Gouin seized Mangalore, Honavar and the Fortified Island. But his further progress was checked by Tipu's arrival with 3,000 troops. Bombay troops near Miraj were defeated in April.³ As the monsoon season was near, and the Bombay fort itself was short of troops, Gouin and Watson left Mangalore on 27 April for Bombay, leaving behind 250 Europeans and 1,200 sepoys at Honavar.⁴

Hardly had Gouin and Watson left Mangalore, when Haidar appeared in person with a large force and recovered all his possessions. On 11 May 1768 the Bombay troops evacuated Mangalore precipitately, leaving behind the sick and the wounded.⁵ They created such confusion that 40 to 50 Europeans fell into Haidar's hands, and nearly 80 Europeans and 162 sepoys were missing. The treasure and the papers which were on board the *Salamander* also fell into Haidar's hands.⁶ It is surprising that the garrison exhibited such a lack of discipline. They had the necessary requisites for a long siege, enough for 3,000 men for four months.⁷ The fort was defensible. The Committee of Enquiry that was instituted to go into the causes of their conduct observed, "A judicial exertion to oppose Haidar's approaches and in disputing every inch of ground with him

¹ Board's minute, cons. 29 Feb. 1768, M. M. S. P. Range 251, vol. 61, p. 268

² Sibbald to Gouin, 22 Feb. 1768, Orme Mss. vol. 86, p. 11

³ Sibbald to Gouin, 18 Apl. 1768, Ibid, p. 78

⁴ Bombay to Madras, 14 May 1768, cons. 8 June 1768, M. M. S. P. Range 251, vol. 62, p. 704

⁵ Sibbald and Stracey to Bombay, 14 May 1768, cons. 1 July 1768, Ibid, p. 807

⁶ Ibid, pp. 811-2

⁷ Bombay to Madras, 14 June 1768, cons. 1 July 1768, Ibid, p. 803

could very probably have induced him to relinquish the enterprise."¹ The loss of Mangalore was unfortunate for the Company, because Haidar procured much gun powder, many pieces of artillery and other military stores, which he badly needed.² He seized Honavar and the Fortified Island as well, and made 34 Europeans prisoners. He gained great confidence after these events, and his disaffected *poligars* were frightened to remain loyal or at least neutral. The Bombay Board lost their conquests as quickly as they had gained them. The loss of Mangalore was a turning point in the war, for Haidar took the offensive thereafter.³

As soon as the Court had learnt of the war, they hastily despatched a letter to Madras to make peace at the earliest opportunity. They criticised the policy of Madras, "If it had not been for the imprudent measures you have taken, the Country powers would have left you in peace."⁴ The Court stated that they were not interested in the extension of their territories in India, that they would not enter into any offensive wars, and that they wished to see the Indian powers remain as a check upon one another.⁵ The Court had disapproved of all the transactions of the Madras Government ever since the Hyderabad treaty was concluded, and had urged them strongly to make peace. With this letter before them Madras should have had no alternative to peace, but they pursued their own policy.

Meanwhile, the deputies were directing the operations of the war. Although the Government had excluded Bangalore from the conquest, the deputies attempted to take it on the ground that it would soon fall, as Haidar was absent in Mangalore.⁶ But it was very difficult to take Bangalore, as it was well

¹ Report of the Officers regarding the Abandonment of Mangalore, cons. 4 Aug. 1768, Ibid, p. 967

² Bombay to Madras, 14 June 1768, cons. 1 July 1768, Ibid, p. 801

³ Bombay to Madras, 28 June 1768, cons. 23 July 1768, Ibid, p. 917

⁴ Court to Madras, 13 May 1768, Desp. to Madras, vol. 4, para 12, p. 341

⁵ Ibid, para 10

⁶ Deputies to Madras, 22 Apl. 1768, cons. 25 Apl. 1768, M. M. S. P. Range 251, vol. 61, p. 517

provided, and as the Madras army lacked the battering cannons. The deputies decided to procure them from Madras, and to stock provisions at Kolar.¹ Until these preparations were finished, the deputies tried to excite desertion among Haidar's men, and wrote to Madras that a few of his officers had agreed to deliver him up for two lakhs of pagodas.² The Madras Government thought that the object was well worth the reward if accomplished.³

The siege of Bangalore became a big controversy. Although the Government had strongly opposed its siege at first, they began now feverishly to support it. They would not even wait until the necessary equipments were sent up.⁴ The deputies thought it impossible to reduce it immediately, for the fort was very strong, well provided and well garrisoned, and that the "Comparison between Haidar's other places and Bangalore was as wide as Poonamalee and Madras."⁵ Moreover, Haidar had returned from Mangalore, and the Madras army was not sure of provisions for more than 10 days.⁶

The deputies were prepared to attempt the siege, if their four proposals were accepted. Wood was to be recalled from the south to join Smith so that one detachment might besiege the fort, and the other might oppose Haidar in open field; heavy cannons were to be sent up from Madras; Murar Rao's horse were to be procured; and the Company's cavalry under Fitzgerald were to join Smith from Vellore. The deputies said that if these proposals were accepted, Haidar would be defeated or obliged to fly towards the west in three or four days.⁷

¹ Deputies to Madras, 13 July 1768, cons. 19 July 1768, Ibid, vol. 62 p. 884

² Deputies to Madras, 24 May 1768, cons. 28 May 1768, Ibid, vol. 62, p. 657

³ Board's minute, cons. 28 May 1768, Ibid, p. 660

⁴ Board's minute, cons. 19 July 1768, Ibid, pp. 889-90

⁵ Deputies to Madras, 27 July 1768, cons. 1 Aug. 1768, Ibid, pp. 939-41

⁶ Ibid

⁷ Deputies to Madras, 16 Aug. 1768, cons. 24 Aug. 1768, Ibid, pp. 1033-5

The deputies committed a mistake in suggesting this plan, for Wood's recall from the south was sure to result in the loss of those conquests. The deputies argued that Haidar would not detach a force to recover them, when he was confronted with their whole army near his strong fort. They expected that he might send cavalry. If he did, they thought, Wood's presence was unnecessary, for he had no cavalry. Further, they questioned the very worth of such conquests which could not be retained without a force being ever present there.¹ Later events proved that this was a mistaken reasoning, and that they hastened the loss of the only valuable acquisitions they had made. Call expected that Bangalore would fall by September, and that Haidar would risk a pitched battle, which would bring the whole of Mysore to the Company.²

The Government approved of the deputies' plan, directed Wood to join Smith, sent up heavy guns, stores and provisions to Kolar, and secured Murar Rao's aid by concluding a treaty with him. He was to furnish 3,000 horse in return for a lakh of rupees in advance and 50,000 every month. By a secret article his son, Lakshman Rao, was to be granted a jagir of 70, or 80,000 rupees near Gudi Binda, a taluk, contiguous to his principality.³

All the demands being fulfilled, the deputies proceeded to besiege Bangalore, but it could not be taken unless Haidar was defeated in a straight fight. They gave up the idea of the siege, and pursued Haidar to defeat him.⁴ Smith pursued him from one direction and Wood, from another, but he would escape from a third.⁵ Nearly for two months Haidar was hotly chased, but to no purpose. By the middle of October it became apparent that he could neither be pursued, nor brought to an action. The Madras army being exhausted in the process, both

¹ Deputies to Madras, 29 July 1768, cons. 6 Aug. 1768, *Ibid*, p. 962

² Call to Josiah Du Pré (new member of the Council), 8 Aug. 1768, Orme Mss. vol. 304, p. 12

³ Deputies to Madras, 27 July 1768, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 62, p. 941

⁴ Deputies to Madras, cons. 5 Sept. 1768, *Ibid*, p. 1067

⁵ Deputies to Madras, 26 Sept. 1768, cons. 30 Sept. 1768, *Ibid*, vol. 63, p. 1190

mith and Wood strongly urged for peace.¹

Haidar was also anxious for peace ever since the Nizam was disengaged. In April he had sent a person to the deputies, and had written to Bouchier. Smith was for peace, but the deputies differed from him. They thought that Haidar was insincere in his advances, that he could never be a peaceful neighbour, and that he should be destroyed at all costs.² Agreeing with the deputies the Government rejected Haidar's advances, and refused to see his *vakil* until he declared the concessions he was prepared to make. They thought that Haidar's *poligars* would revolt against him, and that unless they secured the Carnatic passes from him, there was no need to make peace. Therefore, they sent back the *vakil* who had come as far as the deputies' camp.³

After recovering Mangalore Haidar renewed his advances through William Hornby, the Tellicherry chief.⁴ Hornby brought Haidar in touch with Bombay, who corresponded with him through the European prisoners in his hands. Haidar wrote to Bombay that he had always adopted a friendly policy towards the Company, that his dispute was with Muhammad Ali and not with them, and that notwithstanding he was prepared for an accommodation.⁵ If peace was not established, Haidar warned both Madras and Bombay, "I am going to Arcot, Trichinopoly, Tinnevely and all the countries thereabout, where I will plunder and put all inhabitants to death, break their wells and tanks, and drive away their cattle, burn all the houses, and not even leave a shed standing, and totally destroy the whole of the country."⁶ Besides, Haidar sent

¹ Smith to Call, 28 Oct. 1768, Orme Mss. vol. 293, p. 118; Wood to Smith, 18 Oct. 1768, cons. 24 Oct. 1768, M. M. S. P. Range 251, vol. 63, p. 1312

² Deputies to Gouin, 25 Apl. 1768, Orme Mss. vol. 78, p. 156

³ Madras to the Court, 11 May 1768, Letters Recd. vol. 3, para 8

⁴ Tellicherry to Wood, 26 May 1768, cons. 20 June 1768, M. M. S. P. Range 251, vol. 62, p. 763

⁵ Haidar to Bombay, 18 June 1768, cons. 30 Sept. 1768, vol. 63, p. 1206

⁶ Quoted in Hornby to Wood, 18 June 1768, cons. 6 Aug. 1768, Ibid, vol. 62, p. 958

to Bombay a *vakil* who told them that if peace was not granted, Haidar would seek the support of other powers, thereby suggesting that he would approach the Marathas.¹

These threats and inducements had some effect on the deputies, who thought that peace could be made if he paid 50 lakhs, ceded a good part of his territory to Madras, and showed concessions to Bombay.² The Madras Government were also now inclined to think that peace was desirable with him, and that he could be a good check upon the Marathas.³ Strangely enough, the Nawab was also not averse to peace.⁴ But the Government would not take the initiative. If Haidar were to ask for peace, and declare the concessions he would make, they would be willing to negotiate.⁵

Meanwhile, some correspondence was going on between Haidar and Smith. Haidar had invited a person from Smith. Haidar frankly told him that he would go to the very gates of Madras and ravage the whole Carnatic, if his peace proposals were rejected. In order to drive home this point Haidar sent a *vakil* to Smith, who was told that Haidar would secure Maratha aid, if all other methods failed. The *vakil* further told Smith that Haidar would naturally suffer the Marathas to gain some advantage rather than lose his all to the Madras Government. But if the Government were to make peace, he would give them what he would have given the Marathas, namely, two lakhs of rupees on condition of a defensive alliance with him. Smith referred these proposals to the deputies who dealt with political matters.⁶

The Nawab urged the deputies not to lose the oppor-

¹ Bombay to Madras, 25 Aug. 1768, cons. 30 Sept. 1768, Ibid, vol. 63, p. 1204

² Deputies to Bombay, 10 July 1768, Orme Mss. vol. 78, p. 253

³ Board's minute, cons. 20 Aug. 1768, M. M. S. P. Range 251, vol. 62, pp. 1011-12

⁴ Deputies to Madras, 13 July 1768, cons. 19 July 1768, Ibid, p. 888

⁵ Board's minute, cons. 20 Aug. 1768, Ibid, pp. 1011-12

⁶ Deputies to Madras, 18 Sept. 1768, cons. 22 Sept. 1768, Ibid, vol. 63, pp. 1155-7

tunity, as Haidar was inclined to make some concessions.¹ The Government also had good reasons for peace—their own distress for money, the uncertain attitude of the Marathas, and the Bengal Government's rupture with Shuja-ud-daula of Oudh. The terms the Government proposed were that Haidar should pay the expenses of the war, surrender the Carnatic passes to the Company, pay a tribute of seven lakhs of rupees to the Nizam as stipulated in the March treaty with him, give up the district promised by the Government to Murar Rao, pardon those who had supported the Company, and grant trade privileges to Bombay. If he agreed to these proposals, his *vakil* would be received at Madras.²

On the deputies' desire Haidar sent them his paymaster, Narayana Rao, to Kolar. The deputies demanded that Haidar should pay 50 lakhs of rupees, cede all the conquests they had made except Kolar and Hosur, demolish those forts in the Carnatic which were still in his hands, and surrender Sankridrug, a very strong fort.³ Narayana Rao pleaded that these were exceedingly harsh terms. The deputies gave up their claim to a few minor forts in Coimbatore, but demanded Gudi Binda for Murar Rao. Narayana Rao again urged that these were unacceptable terms. Then the deputies stipulated their minimum, which was the payment of 30 lakhs cash, and the surrender of the conquest east of the Cauvery, the Baramahal and Sankridrug. They would give up their conquests in Bangalore district.⁴

Haidar offered 10 lakhs of rupees and the Baramahal. He said that he would give no more. The deputies were unwilling to accept anything less than their demands, and the negotiations broke off. Narayana Rao suggested the despatch of an Englishman to Haidar, and Mackay himself was selected for the purpose, but nothing came of this as well. Narayana Rao was dismissed with a memorandum which sealed all chances of

¹ Ibid

² Board's minute, cons. 30 Sept. 1768, Ibid, pp. 1179-80

³ Deputies to Madras, 25 Sept. 1768, cons. 30 Sept. 1768, Ibid, p. 1186

⁴ Deputies to Madras, 30 Sept. 1768, cons. 5 Oct. 1768, Ibid, p. 1216

further negotiations. The indemnity in it was increased to 60 lakhs, but was to be deducted 10 lakhs each year from the revenues of Haidar's southern districts, which were to be permanently ceded to the Company. After the indemnity was fully discharged, the Government would pay him every year 10 lakhs.¹ Haidar rejected these terms as totally unacceptable.

The Government thought that the deputies made exorbitant demands, and that they should have asked for absolutely essential forts with just sufficient territory to cover the expenses of garrisoning them.² They thought that the Baramahal and Dindigal would have been quite reasonable demands, and that the acquisition of territory as far as Coimbatore and Gazalhatti pass revealed nothing but excessive ambitions of the Government.³ Likewise they disapproved of the indemnity demanded. The total expenses of the war till then had been 7,07,854 pagodas or less than 25 lakhs of rupees, but the indemnity demanded ranged from 30 to 60 lakhs of rupees. The Government regretted that no room was left for renewing the negotiations, and suspected that the Nawab and Murar Rao might have misguided the deputies.⁴ In reality the Nawab was not so much responsible as the deputies themselves.

The negotiations broke off, because the deputies thought that Haidar would be ruined, if he did not concede their demands. They argued that he would have to offer much more to seek the Maratha support. The deputies wrote to the Government, "Though it may be contrary to the Company's orders and indeed very different from your Honours' intentions to extend your possessions, yet we conceive *this extension must take place*, if you expect to have any equivalent for the expenses of the war."⁵ Their further reason for their demands was that in case of a rupture, a door should be kept open to

¹ Deputies to Madras, 3 Oct. 1768, cons. 8 Oct. 1768, Ibid, pp. 1231-4

² Board's minute, cons. 30 Sept. 1768, Ibid, pp. 1191-2

³ Board's minute, cons. 5 Oct. 1768, Ibid, p. 1221

⁴ Madras to the Deputies, cons. 8 Oct. 1768, Ibid, p. 1237

⁵ Deputies to Madras, 30 Sept. 1768, cons. 5 Oct. 1768, Ibid, pp. 1217-18

Board's diversion on the western coast, the Nizam's disengagement from the alliance, and the Maratha neutrality, all seemed to help the Government in executing their policy. But the policy could not be a success, because they did not listen to the military advice. From the beginning Smith disagreed with their plans of warfare. The situation grew worse when they appointed field deputies. Neither the Nawab nor Mackay had any military experience. Only Call as colonel in the engineering corps had some experience, but not enough to intrude into every military detail, which he did. This interference caused serious difficulties in the last phase of the war. Although the Government's position had not yet been damaged by these mistakes, it steadily deteriorated after October. Had they responded favourably to Haidar's advances, all their subsequent troubles could have been avoided.]

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION OF THE WAR (1768-69)

[Haidar's policy was to end the war as quickly as possible. When the deputies rejected his offer of concessions, he was left with no alternative but to win his point by force of arms. Fortunately for him, the mistakes committed by the Bombay troops on the one coast, and by the deputies on the other, facilitated his task. He surprised the Madras army in many places, recovered all his losses in the south, intensified his intrigues at Poona, and entered the Carnatic once again. So sudden was his appearance before Madras that the tables were completely turned, and it looked as if the Company would be lucky, if he granted them peace. But knowing his own limitations, he did not rise in his demands, and made peace.]

With Haidar's recovery of his western possessions and with the recall of Wood from the south, the Madras Government's offensive against him came to an end, and he took the offensive thereafter. His attempts to surprise their detachments, to ravage their territory, and to avoid pitched battles diverted them from their main object of besieging Bangalore. After the failure of the peace talks, he captured Mulbagal on 2 October, and fought a battle there against Wood, which was "the most serious and warmest contest that Haidar has yet supported, and nothing but the most steady and determined behaviour could have resisted that powerful and ruinous army."¹ The Madras army lost two guns and much stores with 80 Europeans and 200 sepoys killed and wounded.² Wood said that he had never seen "such an obstinate affair in India."³

Despite these reverses the deputies were averse to an

¹ Smith to Madras, 9 Oct. 1768, cons. 13 Oct. 1768, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 63, p. 1276

² Mackay to Orme, 12 Oct. 1768, Orme Mss. vol. 30, p. 106

³ Wood to Madras, 5 Oct. 1768, cons. 10 Oct. 1768, M. M. S. P. Range 251, vol. 63, p. 1257

accommodation, and urged a vigorous prosecution of the war until Haidar was subdued.¹ The Government were no longer in a mood to take the deputies' advice. They held the deputies responsible for all their misfortunes, for recalling Wood from the south, for alternately proposing and abandoning the siege of Bangalore, and for the failure of the peace talks. The Government accused them of conceiving and executing immature plans. They regretted that the best English army failed to achieve a single object under the deputies' advice. Therefore, on 28 October the Government dissolved the Committee of deputies and recalled them to Madras. They empowered Smith with full authority to invest Bangalore or Seringapatam or adopt any other plan he deemed fit. If none of these were possible, he was also to return to Madras.² Smith confessed that he could do neither, and he too returned to Madras.³

As the Government rightly observed, the deputies had not rendered any useful service, and their presence had only added to the confusion. Both Smith and Wood resented their undue interference in military details. The Government had been reduced to an agency supplying the needs of the deputies. They should have been recalled much earlier. But the recall of Smith was unfortunate, for he was the only able commander. They needlessly censured him on the ground that if Wood could have been successful in the south, there was no reason why Smith should not have been in the north. Therefore, their inference was, "All honour is due to the conduct of one, and blame to the other."⁴ Wood became thereafter their favourite, and he was empowered to pursue any measure. The Government asked him to act vigorously in order to subdue Haidar.⁵

¹ Deputies to Madras, 14 Oct. 1768, cons. 1 Nov. 1768, Ibid., p. 1336; also Deputies to Madras, 25 Oct. 1768, cons. 1 Nov. 1768, Ibid., p. 1351

² Board's minute, cons. 28 Oct. 1768, Ibid., p. 1321; also of 1 Nov. 1768, Ibid., p. 1371; and Madras to Smith, 2 Nov. 1768, Ibid., pp. 1383-5

³ Smith to Madras, 19 Nov. 1768, cons. 28 Nov. 1768, Ibid., p. 1607

⁴ Board's minute, cons. 28 Nov. 1768, Ibid., p. 1618

⁵ Madras to Wood, cons. 21 Nov. 1768, Ibid., p. 1543

But the Government were soon disillusioned in their expectation of Wood's ability to beat Haidar, who inflicted almost a severe blow on him at Bagalur, near Kolar, on 22 November, only a few days after Smith's recall. This victory was more brilliant for Haidar than his first at Mulbagal.¹ Wood was so much disheartened by this battle that he thought that the whole of Madras army would never be able to defeat Haidar.² This was in contradiction to Wood's earlier claim that a single detachment under his own command could easily beat Haidar.³ Wood was recalled and court-martialled.

Wood fared much worse than Smith. Haidar spread rumours that he expelled Wood from Mysore.⁴ The recall of both Smith and Wood added credit to this view. Unnerved by these reports, certain forts surrendered to Haidar without resistance. The Government were at last convinced of certain facts which Smith had been consistently trying to bring home to them. First, Haidar could not be pursued or forced to a battle owing to the superiority of his horse. Secondly, the pursuit was disadvantageous to the Madras army, as it fatigued their troops and exhausted their ammunition. Thirdly, these unsuccessful pursuits would make Haidar more daring. Lastly, a protracted war would lead to his success, as he commanded more resources. Therefore, the Government agreed with Smith that they should first try to retain their southern conquests.⁵ But even in this respect Haidar had forestalled their decision.)

In November Haidar sent his general, Faizulla Khan, to recover his southern possessions. Within a short period he took Coimbatore and a number of other places. After Wood's recall, no attempt had been made to keep the several forts in a defensible condition and hence Faizulla had no difficulty in recovering them all. Although they had brought not much revenue to

¹ Fitzgerald to Smith, 24 Nov. 1768, cons. 29 Nov. 1768, Ibid, p. 1663

² Ibid, p. 1665

³ Board's minute, cons. 29 Nov. 1768, Ibid, pp. 1666-7

⁴ Fitzgerald to Madras, 22 Dec. 1768, cons. 30 Dec. 1768, Ibid, vol. 64, p. 2022

⁵ Board's minute, cons. 2 Dec. 1768, Ibid, pp. 1695-1704

the Madras Government, their possessions would have been advantageous to them in peace negotiations. Therefore, they decided to take them again, but two new developments, rumours of the Nizam and Maratha alliance with Haidar, and Haidar's entry into the Carnatic, prevented these efforts as well.

* The Maratha attitude towards the Company had grown rigid ever since the Bombay attack on Malabar in March 1768. Mostyn tried to conciliate the Poona court by suggesting that Haidar's reduction was in the interest of both the Company and the Marathas, and that the latter should not oppose the Bombay expedition. The Poona court did not agree. Being apprehensive lest Bidnur and Sunda should fall into English hands, Madhava Rao sent a person to Bombay demanding these places if seized.¹ The Madras Government's policy to overthrow Haidar further alarmed Madhava Rao, who was not satisfied by the bait that the *chauth* would be paid to him regularly.² The Marathas would never let Madras overrun Mysore, for that was "the best bird they had to pluck." When the Madras Government's hopes of securing the Maratha aid were completely frustrated, they tried to obviate at least the hostile intentions of the Marathas. For this purpose they asked Bengal to keep the Poona Court neutral either by "flattering their expectations" or by frightening them with the ill consequences of the Company's hostility.³ Madras suggested that Bengal should induce Janoji to attack Madhava Rao, and alarm him for the safety of his capital, if he supported Haidar.⁴ The deputies suggested that this purpose would be best served by "proper insinuation from Allahabad or by direct correspondence with the Marathas," and by prolonging Madhava Rao's dispute with Raghunath Rao for the Peshwaship.⁵ But the Bengal Govern-

¹ Bombay to Madras, 5 Apl. 1768, cons. 14 May 1768, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 62, p. 588

² Bombay to Madras, 4 May 1768, cons. 2 June 1768, Ibid, p. 695

³ Board's minute, cons. 21 March 1768, Ibid, vol. 61, p. 382

⁴ Madras to Bengal, cons. 19 May 1768, Ibid, vol. 62, p. 638

⁵ Board's minute, cons. 23 July 1768, Ibid, p. 912

⁶ Deputies to Madras, 11 May 1768, cons. 14 May 1768, Ibid, pp.595-7

ment informed Madras that they had their own quarrel with Janoji over the cession of Cuttack.¹ Even if this dispute were to be resolved, it was difficult to induce either Janoji or Raghu-nath Rao to quarrel with Madhava Rao unless the Bengal Government were prepared to support them with troops, a requirement which was scarcely possible at the moment to fulfil.²

As already discussed, Haidar had been active in soliciting Madhava Rao's aid. He had sent Raza Sahib to Poona with money. Secret negotiations were in progress for a triple alliance of the Marathas, the Nizam and Haidar against the Company.³ The Nizam sent Rukn-ud-daula to Poona.⁴ Raza Sahib returned to Mysore with some troops and with a promise that more would follow. On 21 September Madhava Rao himself set out from Poona with the intention of joining Haidar.⁵ Gopal Rao had been already directed to march ahead. A powerful detachment was sent to Konkan. The Maratha fleet was kept ready for emergency.⁶ Rukn-ud-daula successfully concluded an alliance at Poona, and it remained only to be openly declared.⁷ On 11 December Madhava Rao and Gopal Rao were about 450 and 180 miles respectively from Kolar.⁸ By 25 December Gopal Rao was expected at Hoskote, about 20 miles from Bangalore.⁹ Charles Broome said that Madhava Rao had undertaken the expedition because of three reasons, Haidar's attractive offer of gold, the Maratha demand of the *chauth* on the Carnatic (a sum of 450,000 rupees was due from the Nawab) and the Maratha unwillingness to remain quiet when all family disputes

¹ Bengal to Madras, 20 July 1768, cons. 20 Aug. 1768, Ibid, p. 1013

² Bengal to Madras, 10 Aug. 1768, cons. 19 Sept. 1768, Ibid, p. 1115

³ Board's minute, cons. 23 July 1768, Ibid, p. 912

⁴ Board's minute, cons. 24 Aug. 1768, Ibid, p. 1045

⁵ Broome to Deputies, 8 Oct. 1768, Orme, Mss. vol. 328, p. 4

⁶ Broome to Madras, 6 Nov. 1768, cons. 10 Dec. 1768, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 64, p. 1756

⁷ Broome to Madras, 14 Nov. 1768, cons. 10 Dec. 1768, Ibid, p. 1758

⁸ Board's minute, cons. 11 Dec. 1768, Ibid, p. 1791

⁹ Lang to Madras, cons. 25 Dec. 1768, Ibid, p. 1939

had been settled.¹ Thus it looked as if Haidar's diplomacy seemed to work more successfully than the Madras Government's.

The Government were greatly perturbed by these reports. They thought that Haidar's refusal to accommodate in October, Shuja-ud-daula's rebellion in the north, and the Nizam's despatch of Rukn-ud-daula to Poona might have been all due to a secret league of the Indian powers against the Company. They suspected that Shuja-ud-daula might attack Bengal, the Nizam might seize the Sarkars, and Madhava Rao and Haidar might invade the Carnatic.² The remedy the Government proposed to avert this danger was either exciting trouble for the Marathas at home, or the payment of a sum of money to them, or the cession of some territory. As Raghunath Rao had been closely imprisoned, and neither the Nawab nor they had any money, they preferred the last alternative of offering some territory. They decided to give up what did not belong to them. Bidnur was to be first conquered and then given to the Marathas. They authorised Broome to conclude an agreement by which they would assist Madhava Rao in the conquest of Bidnur if he refrained from supporting Haidar. Madhava Rao was to be further conciliated by an assurance that the Government desired only the restoration of the Hindu Raja to power in Mysore, and that they would guarantee on his behalf regular payments of the *chauth* to the Marathas.³

The deputies informed Madras that Murar Rao had agreed to win Madhava Rao to the Company's side on condition that Bidnur was to be conquered for the Marathas by the Madras army, and that Murar Rao was to receive two districts, Chikballapur and Devanhalli, for his services.⁴ Besides, the Nawab would pay 450,000 rupees immediately to the Marathas. If Madhava Rao were to reject these terms, he should be told that

¹ Broome to Deputies, 8 Oct. 1768, Orme Mss. vol. 328, pp. 5-6

² Board's minute, cons. 7 Nov. 1768, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 63, pp. 1440-6

³ Ibid

⁴ Deputies to Madras, 9 Oct. 1768, cons. 13 Oct. 1768, Ibid, pp. 1262-4

Bengal had sent Colonel Richard Smith to Allahabad to declare to the Maratha *vakil* that if his master assisted Haidar, the English would immediately invade the Maratha country from Bengal, and that they had settled terms of friendship with Janoji of Berar.¹ Broome was to handle this piece of information with proper care. The Nawab proposed a scheme of his own to disengage Madhava Rao, namely that the Marathas should remain neutral in return for Bidnur and a defensive alliance by which they would be entitled to get Madras Government's aid. But the Marathas should also agree to the acquisition of the whole of Mysore by the Nawab. He drew up a memorandum to this effect, and desired to send it to Madhava Rao through Naga Rao.²

The Government accepted neither the deputies' nor the Nawab's proposal, as it was too delicate a matter to entrust it either to Murar Rao or to the Nawab. They further thought that there was no use in courting Madhava Rao's friendship if he had already been alienated by Haidar's gold. They regarded the Nawab's proposal as a striking instance "to pursue the war for the sake of territory."³ They even contemplated the disbanding of a great part of the Nawab's force, which they called a "useless and expensive rabble."⁴ This is openly admitting the fact that their policy had failed. Likewise, they disapproved of the deputies' plan to threaten Madhava Rao with an attack from Bengal. They highly criticised the deputies' letter to Broome disclosing the secret mission of Richard Smith to Allahabad, particularly when it was doubtful if Bengal would execute its threat or not.⁵

Abandoning the diplomatic pressure to defeat Madhava Rao's intentions, the Government concentrated on the defence of the Carnatic, dropped the idea of recovering Haidar's south-

¹ Deputies to Broome, 8 Nov. 1768, cons. 14 Nov. 1768, Ibid, pp. 1498-9

² Memorandum of the Nawab given to Naga Rao (the Nawab's *vakil*) cons. 13 Oct. 1768, Ibid, p. 1267.

³ Board's minute, cons. 13 Oct. 1767, Ibid, pp. 1269-70

⁴ Ibid, pp. 1271-2

⁵ Board's minute, cons. 14 Nov. 1768, Ibid, p. 1503

ern districts asked for the supplies of provisions and money from Bengal, induced Bombay to launch a second expedition on Mangalore, warned the subordinate settlements to be prepared against any surprise attack, and directed the commanding officer, Colonel Ross Long, to shift the heavy stores from Kolar to Vellore.¹

After having made all these preparations, the Government found to their happy surprise that the Maratha storm had subsided. The diplomacy of the Bengal Government successfully employed Madhava Rao against Janoji. At the time when Gopal Rao had been ordered for the Carnatic, Madhava Rao learnt that Dewaji Pant, Janoji's minister, was carrying on an intrigue with the Bengal Government. In order to force Janoji to submission Madhava Rao, who had set out for the Carnatic marched upon Nagpur early in January 1769.² In the fluctuating politics of the time with whimsical despots at the helm of affairs, consistency was unknown.

The Bengal Government took an active part in bringing about this war, for they were interested in preventing Madhava Rao's alliance with Haidar. Their anxiety to occupy the Marathas in their family disputes further increased, when they came to know that Madhava Rao had sent an expedition under Ramachandra Ganesh to the north as well.³ Therefore, they concluded an offensive alliance with Janoji, which alarmed Madhava Rao, and turned out to be the main reason for his change of policy.⁴ The Bengal Government concluded a new treaty with Shuja-ud-daula which enabled them to move a detachment from Allahabad towards Madhava Rao's territory if he moved north or south. They directed Peach to attack Madhava Rao's dominions in conjunction with Janoji, if his intentions were hostile against the company.⁵ The Bengal

¹ Board's minute, cons. 10 Dec. 1768, Ibid, vol. 64, pp. 1759-61

² Sardesai, *New History of the Marathas*, vol. II, pp. 527-8

³ Ibid, p. 527

⁴ Bengal to Madras, 17 Dec. 1768, cons. 26 Jan. 1769, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 65, pp. 49-50

⁵ Ibid

Government took these measures for one more reason. They were apprehensive lest Haidar should drag the French also into the war, and make it a powerful confederacy of the Indian and European rivals of the Company. The effect of this policy was that Maratha affairs both in Berar and in the north were greatly disturbed, and Madhava Rao had no alternative to war against Janoji. In that war which was fought from January to April 1769, the Bengal Government did not go to Janoji's aid, but he rendered them an useful service in successfully occupying Madhava Rao. (In the early stages of the Mysore War, Madhava Rao remained neutral, because Raghunath Rao was troublesome. In the later stages, when Madhava Rao was anxious to intervene, he was prevented by Janoji's trouble.) Added to these, Jauhar Singh, the Jat Raja, and Beja Singh, the Mewar Raja, had revolted in the north, and kept the Marathas occupied.¹

Another development which distressed the Madras Government was Haidar's entry into the Carnatic in December 1768. Within six months he recovered all that he had lost in the two previous campaigns. He appeared before Tanjore whose Raja purchased peace by paying him four lakhs of rupees.² Haidar intensified his offensive early in 1769, when his plundering parties were dispersed all over the Carnatic.³ In order to prevent these ravages, the Government decided to send their own plundering parties to ravage his territories. For this purpose they tried to enlist Murar Rao's and the Nawab's cavalry into their service, but their plan was not executed, because meanwhile Haidar finished the war by appearing himself before Madras.⁴

After the failure of the peace talks in October, the deputies had reduced their demands to 35 lakhs of rupees with Barama-

¹ Mostyn to Madras, 22 Dec. 1769, cons. 18 Jan, 1769, Ibid, vol. 65, p. 82

² Smith to Orme, 26 June 1769, Orme Mss. vol. 10, p. 164

³ Smith to Madras, 19 Feb. 1769, cons. 22 Feb. 1769, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 65, p. 112

⁴ Board's minute, cons. 2 Feb. 1769, Ibid, vol. 65, p. 76

hal and certain other forts.¹ Haidar refused to give neither money nor territory. Josiah Du Pré, one of of Councillors, wrote to Orme, "...ought we with such an advantage to submit to the loss of our expenses in the war and restore to our enemy what we have subdued?"² The Government were also of the same view that the conquests they had made gave them "a good claim to an indemnification for the past, and some security for the future."³

When Haidar recovered all his losses together with Karur, which they had retained since 1761, far from being elated he judged it an opportune time to make peace. He renewed his advances in December, and invited a person from Madras to know their terms. The Government again suspected his sincerity. Nevertheless, as he had taken the initiative, they asked him to convey his proposals in writing.⁴ When his ravages increased in intensity, and when the war was brought to their doors in the harvest season of the year, they thought that even a truce was welcome. They offered to send him their agent, Mudu Krishna, to ask for a cease fire.⁵

Meanwhile, Haidar had sent a *vakil* to Fitzgerald expressing his willingness to make peace.⁶ Fitzgerald in his turn sent Captain Brooke to Haidar. A very interesting and frank talk took place between the two. Haidar held the Nawab solely responsible for the war, and expressed his surprise that Bouchier should have listened to him. Haidar said that he was eager to conclude a defensive alliance with the Company, because the Marathas invaded his country frequently. He claimed that his state formed a barrier to the Carnatic against the Maratha attacks. He disclosed that Madhava Rao had

¹ Deputies to Madras, 14 Oct. 1768, Ibid, vol. 63, p. 1338-43. The forts named were Pedanaikdurgam, Venkatagiri, Tengrikota, Kaveripuram, Dharmapuri and Dindigal.

² Du Pré to Orme, 25 Oct. 1768, Orme Mss. vol. 30, p. 108

³ Board's minute, cons. 28 Oct. 1768, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 63, pp. 1320-1

⁴ Board's minute, cons. 12 Dec. 1768, Ibid, vol. 64, pp. 1832-3

⁵ Board's minute, cons. 12 Jan. 1769, Ibid, vol. 65, pp. 18-19

⁶ Fitzgerald to Madras, 11 Jan. 1769, cons. 16. Jan. 1769, Ibid, p. 25

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⁴ Board's minute, cons. 2 Feb. 1769, Ibid, vol. 65, p. 76

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² Du Pré to Orme, 25 Oct. 1768, Orme Mss. vol. 30, p. 108

³ Board's minute, cons. 28 Oct. 1768, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 63, pp. 1320-1

⁴ Board's minute, cons. 12 Dec. 1768, Ibid, vol. 64, pp. 1832-3

⁵ Board's minute, cons. 12 Jan. 1769, Ibid, vol. 65, pp. 18-19

⁶ Fitzgerald to Madras, 11 Jan. 1769, cons. 16. Jan. 1769, Ibid, p. 25

return for Dindigal and Melpadi. The allies of the Company, particularly the Raja of Travancore, the Nawab of Cuddapah and Murar Rao should be included. No proposal for offensive or defensive alliance was to be accepted. If Haidar made it an essential condition of peace, a vague defensive alliance was to be agreed on, without stipulating the nature, or time, or mode of mutual assistance. A mere general assurance was to be given that the enemies and friends of both would be mutual. The Nawab was also to be included in the treaty.¹ Thus the Government were prepared not to retain any advantage. If such had been their policy only three months earlier, they could have obtained peace without difficulty.

Andrews met Haidar on 19 February. Haidar presented his terms in a memorandum in which the first point was a defensive alliance. Other points were, only customary tribute was to be taken from the Raja of Tanjore. Haidar's ships and guns seized by Bombay should be restored. The Nawab's managers had collected five lakh pagodas from his southern districts. Of this he would exempt three, but two lakh should be paid. The Nawab had taken 20 elephants; these should be returned. All his forts still in their possession should be restored. The Bengal Government had captured his two merchant ships, which should be returned. His deserters in the Vaniyambadi battle had carried off his horses; they should be given back. Lastly, Chanda Sahib's family and relations were in the Nawab's custody, and they should be released.² Of these demands none was going to be more difficult than the last. Since the execution of Chanda in 1752, his family was living in peace at Madras. But a number of adherents of this family had taken service with Haidar. Chanda's son, Raza Sahib, was himself with him. No wonder if he and other *Navayets*, the particular community of Muslims to which Chanda belonged, urged Haidar to secure their release.

Of these the Government accepted the principle of defen-

¹ Instructions to Andrews, cons. 28 Jan. 1769, Ibid, pp. 65-74

² Haidar's Memorandum, cons. 25 Feb, 1769, Ibid, pp. 112-22

sive alliance and the mutual restitution of places. But they thought that Haidar had no right to stipulate any condition for the Tanjore Raja, and that the ships taken by Bombay were their lawful war booty. Haidar's demand of two lakh of pagodas was rejected as highly improper. They said that even if this humiliating condition was accepted, there was no money to pay either with them or with the Nawab. The elephants taken by the Nawab, and the horses carried off by the deserters were not to be restored. The demand for the release of Chanda's family was much resented, and totally rejected. They said that these people did not belong to Mysore, that they had nothing to do with the war, and that it was a deliberate attempt to humiliate the Nawab.¹

Haidar's proposals thus did not improve the prospects of peace. It looked as if it was his turn to be rigid. Du Pré thought that the English had overshot their mark at Kolar, and that Haidar might do the same now.² Intelligence was received that Haidar had held a meeting with a French agent at Cuddalore, and that he was carrying on correspondence with Pondicherry with the intention of dragging the French also into the war.³ But Haidar did not commit the mistake the Government had done in October. He gradually reduced his demands, relinquished his claim to elephants, gave up his demand for money, and invited Andrews to conclude peace.⁴ But he would not give up his demand on the Nawab for the release of Chanda's family. Du Pré put it rightly. "It appears to me that the Articles Hyder proposes, which we have rejected are made purposely to insult the Nabob: men of that kind of spirit can much sooner prevail on themselves to relinquish points of interest than points of pride."⁵ Haidar's *vakil*, Shama Rao, had frankly told Smith that no demand but that on the Nawab

¹ Board's minute, cons. 25 Feb. 1769, Ibid, pp. 112-22

² Du Pré to Smith, 12 March 1769, Orme Mss. vol. 79, p. 471

³ Bouchier to Smith, 4 March 1769, Ibid, p. 463

⁴ Haidar to Bouchier, 13 March 1769, Orme, 16 March 1769. M.M.S.P., Range 251, vol. 65, pp. 145-6

⁵ Du Pré to Smith, 12 March 1769, Orme Mss. vol. 79, p. 471

would be pressed.¹

The Government authorised Andrews to conclude a treaty, if Haidar waived his condition for the release of Chanda's family. Concerning a defensive alliance, the Government again reminded Andrews to give merely a general assurance of aid.² They were so much disgusted of the war that they would not prolong it, even if it were to take a favourable turn, because it was sure to ruin the Carnatic. They further argued that the war "may also be ruinous to Hyder, yet it is no valid consolation, that we ruin our enemy with us."³ This was a remarkable change in their policy, which had been consistently aimed at his destruction.

Before Andrews could proceed on his second mission, Haidar dramatically appeared before Madras on 28 March 1769. Next day his plundering parties came as near as Triplicane. He wrote a letter to Bouchier and Du Pré stating that he had come personally to make peace, and that Du Pré might be sent to him for the purpose. Bouchier summoned an extraordinary meeting of the Board, which decided to make peace, and to send Du Pré to Haidar. The previously drawn instructions to Andrews were given to Du Pré. Smith was directed to carry out Du Pré's orders and to halt at a distance from Haidar lest the latter being alarmed should break off the negotiations.³

Du Pré spent the whole of 30 March in Haidar's camp, and returned in the night to report his conference with Haidar. The several controversial points of the previous few days could hardly be settled satisfactorily in a few hours. However, Du Pré's tact had overcome most of the difficulties, and agreement had been reached on many issues. The first difficulty had arisen over Haidar's insistence on the Tanjore Raja's inclusion in the treaty. Du Pré's efforts to prevent this had no effect. Haidar said that if the Raja was to be dropped, Murar Rao and Travancore Raja should also be dropped. This argument

¹ Board's minute, cons. 6 March 1769, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 65, p. 130-2

² Board's minute, cons. 20 March 1769, Ibid, p. 151

³ Board's minute, cons. 29 March 1769, Ibid, pp. 207-8

induced Du Pré to include the Raja.

The second difficulty concerned the defensive alliance. Haidar insisted that the distressed party in a war should be assisted with as many troops as it asked for, and not with as many as could be spared by the other. Du Pré explained the difficulties of his Government in agreeing to such a condition, namely the limited number of troops they maintained at Madras, and the long time that would be required to receive reinforcements from England, and to train a new body of sepoys. Haidar agreed to a compromise, "That in case either of the contracting parties shall be attacked, they shall mutually assist each other to drive the enemy out."

Regarding peace with Bombay Haidar insisted that they should return his ships, or else he would not release their prisoners. Du Pré's argument that Madras could not undertake to restore what did not belong to them made Haidar agree to release their prisoners and restore their privileges. The issue that did not offer any difficulty was the mutual restitution of conquests and prisoners. Du Pré made a feeble effort to obtain Karur, but Haidar firmly asserted that it was his own, and that it had been unjustly retained by the Nawab so long.

But the greatest difficulty was about the release of Chanda's family. Haidar was more adamant on this point than on any other. Du Pré vainly attempted to explain that it was a delicate point with the Nawab, that the Government had promised protection to the family, that the question was entirely unconnected with the war, and that it was improper to rake up a settled issue. Haidar resorted to a different tactic, and desired their release on humanitarian ground. He asked what right the Nawab had to condemn the members who once belonged to a ruling family to lead for ever a miserable life. Du Pré felt helpless at this line of argument. Haidar further said that he would be satisfied if the Government were to simply deliver them up, and would not have it mentioned in the treaty. The subject was dropped and resumed several times, and still remained unsettled when Du Pré returned to consult his colleagues. He reported that Haidar was determined to gain this point, and

that many of his principal officers, who belonged to this community were urging him to secure the release at all costs. Du Pré suspected that negotiations might break off, if a compromise was not made on this point.

Another difficulty was with regard to the position of Smith's army. Haidar wanted the Madras army to be 25 or 30 miles away from him. Du Pré considered this distance as too far, and suggested 15 miles. Haidar was not satisfied, and threatened to move northward. It meant plundering an area which had escaped damage. Du Pré was reluctant to oblige Haidar, when some points yet remained unsettled. Therefore, he asked Haidar to wait until he consulted the Board. They decided that it was better to oblige Haidar than risk ravages in the north. Smith was accordingly directed to keep 25 miles away from Haidar.¹

On 31 March the Board invited the Nawab to their meeting, and he approved of the several agreed points with great reluctance. It was not without persuasion that he consented to release Chanda's family. As the Nawab had not been included by name, the Government asked him to give them a letter authorizing them to conclude peace on his behalf. He agreed to do so. Haidar sent his two *vakils* to the fort to finalise the treaty.² Before this work could begin Haidar complained that Smith was moving towards him. When the Government asked Smith to stop, he explained that the army was so short of supplies that either he had to move or the supplies had to be sent. Haidar agreed to the second alternative, and Smith's march was stopped. Hardly had this been done, when Haidar complained Lang's march from the Arcot side. The Government stopped Lang's march as well.³

The drafting of the treaty was considerably delayed by Haidar's renewal of the demand that the ships seized by Bombay should be returned. He remained silent from the morning of 1 April to the evening of the next day. The Government grew suspicious of his designs, and directed Smith to be

¹ Ibid, pp. 208-14

² Board's minute, cons. 31 March 1769, Ibid, pp. 214-17

³ Board's minute, cons. 2 Apl. 1769, Ibid, pp. 219-20

prepared to surprise him, if he moved north. Haidar actually moved north, and by the evening of 2 April he was at Trivatur, six miles from Madras. This destroyed all hopes of peace, but the *vakils* explained that only the want of forage had necessitated a change of camp. Haidar also wrote to them that he would waive his claim to the ships if the Government were to give him the military stores at Kolar and Venkatagiri. They readily consented to it, for consistent reports had come that these forts were on the verge of fall. But in their concern for prestige they would abandon these stores only on the condition that it should not be mentioned in the treaty. Haidar agreed to it.¹

(All issues being settled, the treaty was signed on 3 April) by the Government. Edward Stracey, the Persian Translator, was appointed to obtain Haidar's signature. Stracey was also to obtain from him a letter to Faizulla to withdraw from Madura and Tinevelley, and to hand over the seized forts to the Government's servants, and not to the *poligars*. Likewise, letters were to be obtained to Haidar's commanders at Mulbagal and Kolar to cease hostilities. Haidar signed the treaty and gave these letters.²

On 5 April a deputation consisting of Du Pré, Andrews, James Bouchier and Stracey called on Haidar to offer the customary presents. In return Haidar desired to visit Bouchier, the Nawab, Murar Rao and Call, but it was politely declined, for Bouchier thought that it meant delay in Haidar's deparature, and that every hour of his stay was harmful to the inhabitants.³

Although the treaty was signed and ratified, the Government were not yet relieved of their anxieties. Haidar demanded that the release of the *Navayets* should be general, and not merely confined to Chanda's family. Haidar refused to release the English prisoners and to move beyond 10 miles from Madras, unless this condition was fulfilled. The Nawab was again summoned to the Board meeting and persuaded to release

¹ Board's minute, cons.3 Apl. 1769, Ibid, p. 227

² Board's minute, cons. 4 Apl. 1769, Ibid, p. 227

³ Bouchier to Smith, 5 Apl. 1769, Orme Mss. vol. 79, p. 491

all the *Navayets*.¹ Lest Haidar should invent some other excuse to put off his departure, the Government invited Smith to Madras to consult the possibility of overpowering him, should it be necessary. Smith was not hopeful of success considering the bad state of the troops, the distressed condition of the territory, and the poor state of the treasury.² Fortunately, no such exigency arose, and Haidar quickly withdrew to his own State. He also obliged the Government by taking the route of their choice and causing no damage to the region which had escaped his plunder.

(The treaty of Madras which ended the first Mysore War was a short document of only five articles. The first listed the names of the contracting parties, but omitted the Nawab's, for the protection of whose interests the treaty had been mainly concluded. Although amends were made by mentioning his territories, the deliberate omission of his name reveals the intensity of the rivalry between the two parties. The Government tried to bridge the differences, but they were so deeply rooted that nothing could induce these two "to be on fair terms with each other, much less to enter into any sincere engagement of friendship."³ The Nawab himself was not anxious that his name should be included, because he was not prepared to give Haidar the title of the Nawab.⁴ It may be remembered that in theory Haidar was only a *Dalvoy* or minister, and had no legal right to style himself a Nawab. But having dictated a treaty at the gates of Madras it was scarcely expected of him not to assert his right to an equal rank with that of Muhammad Ali. Therefore, the latter preferred his name to be excluded from the treaty.

There was one more reason for the Nawab's reluctance to be included by name. It was the Madras Government which had decided to make peace despite the Nawab's best efforts to

¹ Board's minute, cons. 6 Apl. 1769, M. M. S. P. Range 251, vol. 65, pp. 234-9

² Ibid, p. 239

³ Board's minute, cons. 4 Apl. 1769, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 65, p. 228

⁴ Madras to the Court, 16 Sept. 1769, Letters Recd. vol. 4, para 4

break it. He circulated reports that it was not imperative for the Government to have ended the war, for he had undertaken to finance them until the war was brought to a successful close.¹ But his offer to finance was subject to the Government's consent to secure Madhava Rao's aid, and conquer Bidnur for him at their expense. They doubted both the desirability of such a measure and the Nawab's ability to finance. They said that if he was able to finance, he was unpardonable for having denied it so long, and if he was unable, he was equally unpardonable for trying to deceive them.² They argued that by the time Maratha aid was procured, Haidar would have desolated the undamaged areas, which were yielding revenues. Even if the aid had come in time, it was impolitic to receive it, for in attempting to reduce one enemy they would have enhanced the power of another. The Nawab further claimed that he had conceived a plan by which 4,000 of Haidar's best horsemen would have deserted him in return for two lakhs of rupees.³ The Government were surprised at the Nawab's readiness to finance such impracticable schemes, and they rightly inferred that he was only attempting to break off the negotiations.⁴

Thus the first article revealed the inveterate rivalry between Haidar and the Nawab. It is a rare phenomenon in diplomatic history that the name of one of the principal parties was omitted in a treaty. The first article revealed one more point. The power that counted in the Carnatic was that of the Company's servants, and not that of the Nawab. He could not bring about peace in October when he desired it, and he could not prevent it in March when he opposed it.

If the Nawab's exclusion from the treaty is remarkable, the Tanjore Raja's inclusion in it is much more so. We can understand that Murar Rao and the Travancore Raja, who had opposed Haidar, were included to guard against Haidar's vengeance on them later. But what right the Tanjore Raja had

¹ Board's minute cons. 10 Apl. 1769. M.M.S.P. Range 251 vol. 65. p. 252

² Ibid

³ Ibid, p. 256

⁴ Ibid, p. 256

for a place in the treaty, when he had not offended Haidar and was not a party in the war? The Raja's conduct explains the inclusion. At a time when he had pleaded poverty to the Nawab he had paid four lakhs to Haidar, and had refused to lend a single horse to the Madras army.¹ Therefore, it was quite possible that the Nawab and the Government might take action against him. To prevent this Haidar guaranteed protection to him in the treaty. The Government did their best to prevent it. When that was not possible, they made a merit of their failure by naming him as their friend and ally. But the Raja knew who was really responsible for his inclusion.

The third striking feature of the treaty was the defensive alliance. Haidar had aimed at an offensive alliance, but they firmly rejected it. They reluctantly consented to a defensive one, as no peace could be made without it. They were conscious of its implications, and regretted the necessity which made it inevitable. From Haidar's point of view, that was his only major gain of the war. He had insisted on it ever since the peace talks from December 1768. He did not realise that they had accepted it with mental reservations. They hoped to repudiate it at the earliest opportunity. They observed, "We must trust to the chance of future times to render it of no effect."² Again "...We must depend on future events to release us from [an embarrassed situation] rather than break off wholly on this point."³ They hoped that a situation would not arise to invoke this clause. But a situation did arise only a year later, when they knew not how to extricate themselves. In a way this clause did more harm than good, as it was chiefly instrumental for the subsequent strained relations between the two powers. In the whole treaty this was the weakest and the most delicate point, for the Government had accepted a responsibility which they could not discharge. If they had accepted it with the intention of not discharging it, they were guilty of insincerity. If

¹ Smith to Orme, 26 June 1769, Orme Mss. vol. 10, p. 164

² Board's minute, cons. 25 Feb. 1769, M. M. S. P. Range 251, vol. 65, p. 115

³ Instructions to Andrews, cons. 20 March 1769, Ibid, p. 151

close at Haidar's heels, hardly 10 miles from him. Lang with another detachment was not far from him on the Arcot road. Haidar had appeared only with his cavalry, leaving his heavy cannon behind, and his men and horses were fatigued by forced marches. In these circumstances it was not any military necessity that dictated peace, but several other factors; first, the instructions from the Court; secondly, the low state of the Government's treasury; thirdly, the poor state of the Madras army; fourthly, the ravaged conditions of the Carnatic; fifthly, the state of Haidar's army and his own abilities; and lastly, the rivalry between the civil and military authorities at Madras. Let us examine each of these at some length, which in a way would also be a review of the war.

① The Court had never approved of the Mysore War, which was without their sanction. They had consistently recommended peace with all their neighbours. Their orders of 13 May were emphatic that the war should be brought to an immediate close.² When Haidar himself had made advances, the Court would have strongly censured Madras, if the latter had disobeyed the orders from home. But it must be remembered that the Court's orders were not a compelling factor, but only an inducing one. Had there been any hope of beating Haidar, these orders would certainly have been disregarded. Therefore, this factor was the least in its influence.

② The low state of the Government's treasury was the most important factor. Their treasury was exhausted in the first campaign itself.³ Only the Bengal Government's aid had helped them to carry on the war. But they were not sure how long Bengal would support them, particularly when the finances of that presidency were also far from satisfactory, and Shuja-ud-daula had grown restless.⁴ The Government's other source of

¹ Smith to Orme, 26 June 1769, Orme Mss. vol. 10, p. 164

² See back, p. 105

³ Madras to Bengal, cons. 9 Jan. 1768, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 61, p. 42

⁴ Bengal to Madras, 20 July 1768, cons. 20 Aug. 1768, Ibid, vol. 62, p. 1013

income was the Nawab. He too had no money, and was the most difficult person to deal with in financial matters. The Madras army was under the Government's control, but the means of supplying it were in the Nawab's hands, whose "idle vanity, desire of power and jealousy of control renders [sic] all dependence on him precarious".¹ In October 1768 they asked him to lend as much as he could. He promised to lend 60,000 pagodas per month on condition that the Carnatic should remain in peace. With these 60,000 pagodas, the receipt of revenue from the Company's lands, and income from Haidar's southern districts, the Government depended on Bengal for their expenses, and were upwards of 60,000 pagodas in arrears by February 1769.² With Haidar's entry into the Carnatic, they lost their income from their possessions, as also the Nawab's payments, which were subject to the Carnatic remaining in peace. Therefore, they had to depend on what they had on hand, and that was not enough to last for two months. In December 1768 itself they were reduced to extremities.

In November they approached the Nawab, who agreed to pay one lakh of rupees in December and another lakh in January. As this amount was not sufficient, the Government borrowed 60,500 pagodas at 8 percent. Besides, they sequestered the two dividends amounting to 85,530 pagodas due to the Nawab's creditors.³ They had earlier appropriated the money intended for investments in China.⁴ An idea of their budget for 1769 would show their precarious position. Their total expected revenues were 4,20,400 pagodas, of which 2,50,000 were due from the Nawab alone, another 86,400 from Bengal, and only 84,000 were there in the treasury. But the expenditure was 1,50,000 pagodas per month, or 18 lakhs for the year, if the war had continued. It was highly doubtful if the Nawab would have paid his share. In 1777 his total debt was

¹ Madras to the Court, 8 March 1769, Home Misc. vol. 101, p. 245

² Board's minute, cons. 10 Apl. 1769, M. M. S. P. Range 251, vol. 65, pp. 246-7

³ Alexander Wynch to Palk, 22 Oct. 1768, Add. Mss. 34, 686, p. 65

⁴ Madras to the Court, 11 May 1768, Lett. Recd. vol. 3, para 13

consolidated to a figure of 60 lakhs of pagodas (£ 2,400,000).¹ Of this sum 10 lakhs formed the debt he incurred for the war out of 16 lakhs, which was the total cost of the Mysore war.² But the Nawab alleged that he had spent besides five lakhs on his own troops during the war.³ Thus the war had already cost upwards of 20 lakhs, and there was no more money left either with the Government or with the Nawab for its further continuation.

(3) The state of the Madras army was also a factor. This army was superior to any of the Indian powers, and had accomplished great feats. Even Haidar had not gained any decisive victory over them, and his whole force was required to harass Wood's detachment at Mulbagal and Bagalur. But the Madras army was weak in cavalry, the want of which had robbed them of all their victories, for they could not pursue Haidar. He could cut off their supplies, surprise their detachments, ravage their territories, and avoid pitched battles. They had no money to raise a regiment of their own. They tried to enlist Murar Rao's 3,000 and the Nawab's 1,500 horsemen, but these were just sufficient to cover Haidar's night attacks. The Nawab's cavalry was of no use, because as long as he stayed in Kolar, it never stirred a mile from his camp.⁴ After his return to Madras, it refused to move from Arcot for want of pay. Murar Rao's 3,000 horsemen in August were reduced to 1,000 in January and these were employed to shift stores from Kolar to Vellore. The Government urged Murar Rao to complete his number of 3,000, paid the arrears of the Nawab's cavalry, and urged the *poligars* to furnish 500 horsemen. The Nawab promised that he would buy off 4,000 of Haidar's best horsemen, and that he would remit a sum of money to Hyderabad to procure a body of horse. The Tanjore Raja was asked to send 2,000 horsemen.

¹ Private Debt of the Nawab, Nov. 1778, Add. Mss. 29, 206, pp. 16-7

² Lindsay to Lord Weymouth (Secretary, for War), 13 Oct. 1770, Home Misc. vol. 103, p. 147

³ Sir John Lindsay's Narrative, 13 Oct. 1770, Ibid, p. 638

⁴ Board's minute, cons. 10 Apl. 1769, M. M. S. P. Range 251, vol. 65, p. 255

If these plans had materialised, Haidar could have been opposed. But nothing came of them. The Nawab's horsemen moved when Haidar was at the gates of Madras. Nothing was heard of Haidar's horsemen deserting him. The *poligars* evaded sending their quota. The Tanjore Raja was not interested in the war, and the distress for cavalry was not removed.

The Madras infantry was in excellent order, and it won victories at Changama, Tiruvannamalai and Vaniyambadi. But Haidar learnt a lesson from them that he should avoid a straight fight. He made the infantry pursue him, in which they were no good. The process fatigued and exhausted them. Sickness and desertion increased. In Coimbatore 200 Europeans and two battalions were lost. The Europeans were reduced from 1,300 in September 1767 to 491 in March 1769. The sepoys were reduced by half, and the cavalry, from 400 to 68.¹ If these were the conditions in March, the best season of the year, worse was to follow in July, when monsoons would set in. Haidar was conscious of these facts, and he indicated them to Du Pré, adding that he would burn the Carnatic, if peace was not made.²

The transport system of the Madras army was highly defective. It suffered from want of good bullocks. Whereas Haidar could cover 30 miles in a day, they could hardly cover 15.³ Sometimes even sick and wounded had to be left behind for want of means to carry them.⁴ Want of forage rendered the remaining bullocks weak and incapable. Smith wrote to Madras, "There is scarce a blade of any kind of verdure to be seen, and we have already consumed even the thatch of all the neighbouring villages".⁵ The nature of the country added to the difficulties of the transport. The rugged and mountainous tracts, the distance from the sea, the absence of any navigable river, and the presence of a chain of strong hill forts, from where

¹ Ibid, p. 259

² Ibid, p. 260

³ Smith to Madras, 2 Dec. 1767, cons. 5 Dec. 1767, Ibid, vol. 60, p. 1351

⁴ Smith to Madras, 8 Jan. 1768, cons. 11 Jan. 1768, Ibid, vol. 61, p. 45

⁵ Smith to Madras, 18 Aug. 1768, cons. 24 Aug. 1768, Ibid, vol. 62,

supplies could be cut off, gave advantage to Haidar, who had a good cavalry and an excellent train of bullocks for his transport.

The scarcity of provisions was yet another difficulty of the Madras army. Want of provisions forced Smith to fall back to Polur after the battle of Changama without taking advantage of the victory. After the battle of Tiruvannamalai there was not a day's provision with the army. Many a time only paddy was available to the troops, who had to boil, dry and beat it before use. The army needed 100 bullock loads of rice every day. The Government were at a loss to find both bullocks and rice to supply on this scale.¹

(2) Besides these factors, excessive rains caused desertion among the sepoys, and sickness among the Europeans. Hardly had the campaign begun in September 1767, when the troops wished it ended soon. Smith wrote to Orme, "I am well convinced that were we to remain like this, not ten would be alive by January. Doctors list is again full."² Bad weather, bad water and bad meat considerably reduced the number of Europeans.³ In Wood's detachment 40 out of 355 Europeans, and 14 companies of sepoys in four battalions were sick in August.⁴ The Nawab who had accompanied the army fell dangerously ill, and was despaired of his life.⁵

The ravaged conditions of the Carnatic discouraged the Government. Haidar entered the Carnatic twice, in August 1767 and in November 1768. Except for an interval of six months from March to October 1768, the Carnatic was never free from his cavalry. His prime motive was to distress them by cutting of supplies, burning the crops, driving away the cattle, and raising the villages to ground. This he did so effectively

¹ Wood to Smith, 18 Jan. 1768, cons. 25 Jan. 1768, Ibid, vol. 61, p. 110

² Smith to Orme, 8 Oct. 1768, Orme Mss. vol. 10, p. 31

³ Smith to Madras, 24 Feb. 1768, cons. 5 March 1768, M.M.S.P, Range 251, vol. 61, p. 285

⁴ Wood to Madras, 10 Aug. 1768, cons. 17 Aug. 1768, Ibid, vol. 62, p. 1008

⁵ Deputies to Madras, 11 Aug. 1768, cons. 15 Aug. 1768, Ibid, p. 990

that "not an inhabitant or hut is seen in a day's journey." When Haidar appeared before Madras, the inhabitants of the neighbouring villages rushed to the capital, and their feeding problem was difficult. The grain in the Black Town would not have lasted for 15 days.

The position of Haidar's army was different. After three months of preparations the Madras army could not besiege Bangalore, because "the enemy's forces were adjudged too formidable."¹ Rapidity of Haidar's movement never let their army approach nearer than a day's march. He suffered no such difficulties as the scarcity of provisions, want of transport, distress for money or lack of cavalry. The Madras army found no supplies in the areas they reduced, but he found plenty in areas he conquered. Although his troops lacked the discipline of their troops, this very weakness was a virtue, for at times of retreat or pursuit, his troops could disperse in any direction they liked, causing fatigue to their troops. But the movement of their troops rendered their march very slow. His troops were used to hardship and fatigue, and could subsist on any kind of food. But they were sensitive to inclement weather, excessive rains, forced marches and bad food. Except for 4,000 of his best horsemen, the rest were irregulars, called *Pindaris*, who were not expected to fight. Their job was looting, which they did well. It is said that instead of his paying them a salary, they paid him a tax, which bore a proportionate ratio to yield of the loot.² In short, Haidar's army was suited to his technique of war, which was to avoid pitched battles, and run about the land harassing the Madras army, which pursued him. Their army was disgusted by this type of warfare, and accomplished nothing effective in the later phases of the war.

The abilities of Haidar was another important factor. The other Indian powers with whom the Company had come in contact were not used to stand against the Europeans, and

¹ Board's minute, cons. 10 Apl. 1769, Ibid, vol. 65, p. 261

² Ibid, p. 253

³ Haidar's Military System, unknown author, Feb. 1782, House Misc. vol. 84, p. 934

lacked men of spirit and capacity. But Haidar was different from them. He was a born soldier. As early as 1752 he had acquired a name for daring exploits against them. Unlike the Nawab or the Nizam, he was of robust health, and could stand the fatigue of a campaign. He was not addicted to the prevailing luxuries of the other courts.¹ His word was law throughout his dominions. His treasury was full; his magazines were well stocked; his army was fairly large and fought under his personal command; and he was a shrewd diplomat, who knew when to assert, and when to make advances. Had the Madras Government cared to know more about him before adopting their forward policy, they would not have disgraced the Company's reputation as an invincible power.

Lastly, the want of harmony between the civil and military authorities at Madras obstructed the prosecution of the war. When Smith defeated the allies at Changama, the Government criticised him for not driving away the invaders completely.² Their tactless remark that much smaller armies had overpowered larger armies in the past displeased Smith.³ In disgust Smith wrote to Orme that the very Government which had been frightened to death before the Tiruvannamalai battle became so bold as to censure Smith for not completely destroying the allies.⁴ Smith disagreed with most of the plans they proposed, such as the offensive in the Baramahal, and the indecisive proposals to take Bangalore or not. Smith was averse to their interference in military affairs. They held him responsible for the failure of their plans, but he attributed it to their "ill-digested plans."⁵ He blamed them for negligence to stock the frontier posts with provisions, but they said, "...we think Colonel Smith has been deficient, remaining in suspense, and neither adopting the measure proposed, nor proposing himself

¹ Smith to Court, 9 Oct. 1768, Orme Mss. vol. 10, p. 65

² Ibid

³ Madras to Smith, cons. 15 Sept. 1767, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 59, p. 856

⁴ Smith to Orme, 28 March 1768, Orme Mss. vol. 33, p. 26

⁵ Smith to the Court, 9 Oct. 1768, Orme Mss. vol. 10, p. 65

any; and thus by not placing any direct or particular object in view; whatever was undertaken seems to have been undertaken without hoping of success, whence a general languor naturally ensued; the troops became dispirited, and to some real wants imaginary distress succeeded; wants and difficulties are the constant concomittance of war, and it is the part of the general to find or at least to try expedients to overcome them.”¹ Smith was by far the best military leader they had, and therefore he could hardly put up with such strictures, when in reality the faults lay on their side.

The appointment of the Field Deputies was perhaps one of the greatest blunders. The gulf between the civil and military authorities further widened. Smith thought that their appointment was made to deprive him of his powers.² The deputies insisted on being informed of every military detail. Once Smith detached a party to escort a convoy and they enquired why he had not taken their permission.³ In October when they asked him to give charge to Wood and come to Kolar for some consultation, he thought that he was slighted.⁴ When he summoned a council of war to discuss some military point, they took strong objection to the measure.⁵ Without consulting Smith, Call changed the garrison of Mulbagal, with the result that an important fort was lost.

Likewise, Wood resented the Deputies' interference, particularly for his recall from the south, where he had been doing good work. This offended him so much that he wished to resign his command.⁶ The climax of events was Smith's recall, and Wood's appointment to the command, but Wood failed miserably. Smith attributed this to the Government's lack of faith in him. He wrote to them, "I am well convinced that every part of my conduct you are pleased to scrutinize will

¹ Board's minute cons. 19 Dec. 1768, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 64, p. 1896

² Smith to Madras, undated, Orme MSS. vol. 10, p. 95

³ Ibid

⁴ Smith to Deputies, 24 Oct. 1768, cons. 1 Nov. 1768, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 63, p. 1361

⁵ Deputies to Smith, 27 Oct. 1768, cons. 1 Nov. 1768, Ibid, p. 1361

⁶ Wood to Madras, 30 Aug. 1768, cons. 5 Sept. 1768, Ibid, vol. 62, p. 100

terminate to my honour.”¹ Smith further thought that if he had been deputed to negotiate with Haidar, he could have secured better terms, for Haidar was prejudiced against the Government, whose letters he had intercepted containing much displeasing matter about him. On the other hand, he had a high regard for Smith, and had expressed his desire more than once to meet him.² Thus the differences between civil and military authorities caused not a little friction in the operations of the war.

What did the Madras Government gain by going to war against Haidar? They gained precisely nothing. It was the most disgraceful war that they ever fought. It was so in every respect, in its origin, in its prosecution, and in its termination. The prestige of the Company which stood very high before the war, was dragged into the mud by an Indian power dictating terms to them at the gates of Madras. Their finances shattered, their mighty schemes wrecked and their morale sunk low, the Government stood at the end of the war on the threshold of despair. William Martin Goodlad, a Company's servant at Madras, wrote to Palk, “Whoever thought that the intended conquerors of the Mysore country would be reduced to make peace at the gates of their own capital! . . . instead of a flourishing investment and full treasury we can scarcely maintain our troops and are overhead and ears in debt.”³ [F. C. Browne, a private individual at Madras, wrote, “We are to bid long adieu to the honour of the British arms in India, to the triumphant superiority from whence originally sprung and on which under proper cultivation might have long flourished in peace and security the full blown glories of our Eastern Empire.”⁴

When the war ended, the misfortunes of the Government did not cease. Du Pré regretted, “I cannot avoid thinking myself unfortunate in coming to India in time to share disgrace and to have henceforth the affairs to manage which are so

¹ Smith to Madras, undated, Orme Mss. vol. 10, p. 97

² Smith to Orme, 26 June 1769, Orme Mss. vol. 10, p. 167

³ Goodlad to Palk, 30 June 1769, *Report on Palk Mss.* No. 79, p. 109

⁴ F. C. Browne to England, 23 July 1769, Home Misc. vol. 768, p. 388

encumbered and entangled that I see no course we can take without [being] exposed to new embarrassment."¹ The defensive clause agreed to was to involve the Company in limitless complications. It had not a small share in provoking another major catastrophe 11 years later. Considering all aspects the most scathing criticism made by the Court was not unjustified on the conduct of the Madras Government. The Court wrote to them :

"As politicians your penetration and whole conduct appear to have been exceedingly weak and deficient....In one word, we declare it [our] opinion that during the administration of our late Governor and Council, the Company's interest and influence in India have suffered such dimunition and discredit that the most consummate abilities, persevering assuidity, unshaken fidelity and intrepid courage in our future servants, may perhaps be found insufficient in many years to restore the English East India Company to a proper degree of credit and dignity in the eyes of the natives and inhabitants of Indostan. You have wantonly made us principals in the quarrel with Hyder, that the said war has been very improperly conducted and most disadvantageously concluded."²

Both Bombay and Bengal were dissatisfied with the way the Government concluded the war.³ The Bengal Government were so displeased that they even thought of renewing the war.⁴ However, the war had one advantage. It made the Madras Government conscious of their limitations. Warren Hastings, a member of the Madras Council, wrote to Palk that they were "more anxious to secure the Company's property than to extend their dominion or retrieve the reputation of their arms."⁵

¹ Du Pré to Orme, 10 June 1769, Orme Mss. vol. 30, p. 127

² Court to Madras, 23 March 1770, Desp. to Madras, vol. 4, Paras 10, 12 and 13, pp. 1035-9

³ Bombay to Madras, 18 June 1769, cons. 10 July 1769, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 65, p. 359

⁴ Bengal to Madras, 21 Apl. 1769, cons. 22 May 1769, Ibid, p. 309

⁵ Hastings to Palk 29 Jan. 1770 *Rept. on Palk Mss.* No. 88 p. 6

What had the initiators of the war to say in the matter? Palk thought that it should have been ended the moment the Nizam made his peace with Haidar.¹ Mackay said, "Such shame and disgrace attended our arms on that unfortunate expedition that I cannot think of it."² But James Bouchier would not accept any responsibility, and would "curse the whole race of Directors—the greatest part of them are block-heads that know nothing of affairs abroad themselves, nor will they be guided by those that do—How could we avoid the war with Hyder?"³

On Haidar's side, he had reasons to feel completely satisfied with the war. It was certainly his ambition to be powerful, which was fulfilled to a certain degree, when he dictated his terms to an European power. His success was due to his playing all his cards prudently and in time. He never lost heart in adversity, and never became proud in fortune. He displayed firmness and tact, shrewdness and sagacity to a remarkable degree. Orme's observation is not out of place here, "....he is a very great man; this Hyder ally, and will figure in my history, if God pleases to let me write it."⁴ His making of the peace with Madhava Rao, his disengagement of the Nizam from the Government, his turning their alliance against them, his battles of Mulbagal and Bagalur, his opportune advances to the Government, and his sudden appearance before Madras, all redound to Haidar's credit. More than all, despite his bitter rivalry with the Nawab, Haidar offered to see him after the peace. It was the Nawab's vanity that would not allow him to meet Haidar, and would not have his name alongside the "Naik's." Haidar had profound respect for the Madras commander, Smith. Smith also entertained the same feeling for him.

However, the war did not leave any trace of bitterness

¹ Palk to Goodlad, 5 Nov. 1769, *Ibid*, No. 80, p. 111

² Mackay to Orme, 4 June 1769, Orme Mss. vol. 30, p. 113

³ James Bouchier to Palk, 24 June 1769, Add. Mss. 34, 686, p. 108

⁴ Orme to James Alexander, 1 Oct. 1769, Orme Mss. vol. 202, p. 24

behind between the combatants. Haidar's restoration of the Company's forts and release of prisoners account for it. The two powers realised that a threat to both was from a third quarter, and not from each other. The frictions which were common before the war totally disappeared at least for a short time until a flaw in the treaty began to operate. However, both parties had reasons to feel glad on one point, namely that the war was at last over.)

CHAPTER V

INTERLUDE BETWEEN THE WARS (1769-1777)

The Treaty of Madras was bound to have serious repercussions both in India and in England. Haidar had sought the Madras Government's alliance with the definite object of defeating the Maratha designs on Mysore. The English at Madras had been conscious of the difficulties ahead, but they had not expected that these difficulties would arise so soon after the treaty. In England the Mysore War brought about almost a financial crisis in the Company. All circles were greatly perturbed, and some novel measures proposed. The Ministry despatched their representative with plenipotentiary powers in order to obtain first hand information about the Company's affairs in India and to instil confidence among the princes there. The Court decided to send three commissioners with almost unlimited powers to superintend their affairs in all their presidencies. But these measures of both the ministry and the Court, although conceived with the best of intentions, turned out to be unfortunate.

✓ Haidar returned to Mysore completely satisfied with the treaty of Madras, which assured him of the Company's aid in case of need. Within a few months after the treaty the Marathas invaded Mysore partly due to Haidar's provocative acts, and partly to Madhava Rao's ambitious policy. After the Mysore War Haidar had reduced Chikbalapur and Talpul, which had been under the Maratha zone of influence.¹ He was in secret correspondence with Janoji Bhosle of Nagpur, who was a rival of Madhava Rao.² It may be remembered that Madhava Rao had set out for the Carnatic during the last campaign of the Mysore war, but Janoji's revolt had diverted the Peshwa's

¹ Sinha, N. K. *Haidar Ali*, pp. 95-6

² Narayana Rao, "Third Invasion of the Peshwa Madhava Rao I," *Quar. Jou. Myth. Soc.*, Vol. XXXI, p. 106

attention to put him down first. This war lasted from January to April 1769, and was concluded to the satisfaction of Madhava Rao. Being defeated Janoji was in secret correspondence with Haidar. [Haidar had gone against Cuddapah and Karnul, and that had excited the jealousy of the neighbouring powers.¹ But these were excuses rather than reasons for Madhava Rao's invasion. He seems to have been convinced that Maratha expansion in the south was more profitable and practicable than in the north. Mysore was their favourite field of exploit] Even before the conclusion of the Mysore war, Madhava Rao had made up his mind to invade Mysore. Early in 1769 he had written to the Nawab that he would assist the Madras Government with 10,000 horse, if they were to bear the expenses. The Madras Government had declined the offer thinking that it would prolong the war, and that the Marathas were untrustworthy.² The defensive clause of the Madras treaty was a great surprise to Madhava Rao, who wrote to Madras that he considered their alliance with Haidar as a threat to the Marathas.³ In May 1769 Rukn-ud-daula informed Madras that Madhava Rao had invited the Nizam for joint attack on Mysore.⁴

[Expecting a Maratha attack, Haidar sounded the Madras Government's reaction for a body of troops, asked for a battalion of sepoys to assist him in recovering from the Marathas his districts lost in 1767, invited a *vakil* from Madras, and desired them to support his policy of assisting Janoji. They declined to do any of these.⁵] They observed, "Engagements and alliances with the powers of India must unavoidably expose us to perpetual dangers, troubles and embarrassments."⁶ Realising that Madras would not countenance his policy of

¹ Board's minute, cons. 24 July 1769, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 65, p. 376

² Board's minute, cons. 11 Feb. 1769, Ibid, pp. 86-7

³ Madras to the Court, 16 Sept. 1769, Letters Recd. vol. 4, Para 5

⁴ Rukn-ud-daula to Madras, cons. 14 May 1769, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 65, p. 394

⁵ Board's minute, cons. 16 June 1769, Ibid, pp. 331-2

⁶ Madras to the Court, 27 June 1769, Letters Recd. vol. 4, Para 29

recovering his districts occupied by the Marathas, he wrote to them that he had given up the idea, but warned them that neither Mysore nor the Carnatic would long remain in peace, for the Marathas were busily engaged in preparing for war. If that happened, he asked Madras not to plead any excuse in sending him the promised aid. He again invited Mudu Krishna for a secret conference.¹ Madras was not willing to support his policy, and declined to send Mudu Krishna to him.²

Thus within six months after the Madras treaty, it became apparent that difficulties were ahead for the Government. Haidar would press his demand for aid by virtue of his treaty. If they refused to give it, he might not release the Bombay prisoners, who were still in his hands. In December 1769 he gave final notice to Madras that he would have to apply for aid, for a Maratha invasion seemed imminent. Their response was poor. He pressed at least for Mudu Krishna to be sent for a secret talk. But they again remained silent.³ He recalled his *rakil*, who was sent back to Mysore even without an escort, owing to the Madras Government's apprehension that it might create an impression of their willingness to support Haidar.⁴ Their action made Haidar think that they might well join the Marathas against him.⁵ But they said that their policy was "to observe our treaties and injure none who do not injure us."⁶

In January 1770 Madhava Rao invaded Mysore with a large army, nearly 75,000 men.⁷ That was his last and the most serious campaign undertaken with the definite object of reducing Haidar completely. At no time had the Marathas fought for so long, or brought so many troops against Haidar. They fought for two and a half years, during the first six months of

¹ Haidar to Madras, cons. 24 July 1769, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 65, pp. 374-5

² Ibid, pp. 375-6

³ Board's minute, cons. 28 Dec. 1769, Ibid, vol. 66, p. 624

⁴ Ibid

⁵ Madras to the Court, 21 Nov. 1769, Letters Recd. vol. 4, Para, 2

⁶ Ibid

⁷ Sinha, N. K. *Haidar Ali*, p. 96

present in India, short of only judicial authority. The commissioners named were Henry Vansittart,¹ Luke Scrafton² and Francis Forde,³ all of whom had served in India. The proposal had the willing support of Clive and the grudging approval of the Ministry.⁴ On 26 September the Commissioners embarked from Portsmouth on board the ill-fated *Aurora*, never to be heard of again. It must be remembered here that the Commissioners' appointment was not the result of the Madras Treaty, for the latest news the Court had received was of 8 March, on the receipt of which they had urged the Commissioners to prosecute the war vigorously.⁵

The remedy the Ministry proposed to protect the British interests in India was the appointment of a Crown representative with plenipotentiary powers to the Princes of India, who had been included in the Paris treaty of 1763. The reason why such an extraordinary step was taken is intricately connected with the Ministry's desire for increasing influence in the Company's affairs, and to share the profits from India. By the Act of 1767 a sum of £400,000 was annually exacted to the Exchequer.⁶ The Act of 1769 further intervened in the affairs of the Company, restricted the dividends to 12½%, and continued to appropriate £400,000 a year.⁷ The news that the French were massing troops in Mauritius and mounting cannon on the Chandranagar fort, that Haidar's successes had brought a financial crisis in the East India stock, and that the Company's servants were disregarding the assurances of protection to the Indian powers,

¹ Henry Vansittart (1732-1770); Member, Madras council, 1757; Governor of Bengal, 1760-4; Director of the E. I. Co. 1769

² Luke Scrafton, Junior Merchant at Decca; author of *Reflections on the Government of Indostan*.

³ Francis Forde; Conqueror of Masulipatam; second in command to Clive in 1758; defeated the Dutch at Chinsura.

⁴ Court's minute, 14 June 1769, Court Book, vol. 78, p. 72

⁵ Court to Commissioners, 26 Sept. 1769, Home Misc. vol. 101, pp. 425-6

⁶ 7 George III, Cap. LVII

⁷ 9 George III, Cap. XXIV

all contributed to the Ministry's intervention. Moreover, the Nawab had sent a secret mission to England seeking redress against the excesses of the Madras Government.

A Scottish adventurer, John Macpherson,¹ had managed to introduce himself to the Nawab in 1767 under the pretext of "showing some electrical experiments and the phenomena of the magick Lanthorn, sights very extraordinary to asiatics."² He convinced the Nawab that if he was sent on a secret mission, he could materially advance the Nawab's interests, as he had high connections with the Earl of Chatham,³ who was then at the head of the Ministry. He carried some £3,000 in jewels and cash as presents to execute his task effectively. As a purser in the Indiaman, *Lord Mansfield*, he sailed for England towards the end of 1767.⁴

By the time Macpherson arrived in England the Duke of Grafton had succeeded Chatham. Macpherson contacted Grafton, and told him that the Nawab was "the person to whom Britain owed the rise of her power in India, and that his attachment and unsullied honour to the English were unparalleled."⁵ Grafton promised support to the Nawab, but refused the presents. Macpherson next contacted Bradshaw, the Secretary of Treasury, who too refused the presents, but consented to consider the Nawab's proposal to lend 70 lakhs of rupees to the British treasury at two percent interest.

¹ Sir John Macpherson (1745-1821); Writer, 1770; dismissed, 1777; reinstated, 1781; member of the Supreme Council, 1782; Governor-General, 1785-6

² Harland to Rochford, 1 Sept. 1772, Home Misc. vol. 110, p. 495

³ On Rockingham's dismissal in July 1766, William Pitt, the first Earl of Chatham, formed a heterogeneous administration of "patriots and courtiers, King's friends and republicans." (*Dict. Nat. Biog.* 1896, XLV, p. 360)

⁴ Harland to Rochford, 1 Sept. 1772, Home Misc. vol. 110, pp. 495-8

⁵ A Short Memorial of Services rendered to His Highness the Nabob, cons. 22 Jan. 1776, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 80, p. 39. This curious document came to the notice of the Madras Board only in 1776, although Sir Robert Harland had sent it to Lord Rochford as early as September 1772. Macpherson was dismissed on the discovery of this paper.

Macpherson met other important men in England such as the Earl of Shelburne, the Earl of Warwick and Lord Grenville to impress on them the same necessity of supporting the Nawab. He claimed also that he published in favour of the Nawab a few articles in *Public Advertiser*, a news paper, and in Major Alexander Dow's history published in 1770.¹

The precise effect of Macpherson's mission cannot be known, but it was remarkable in two respects: an European accepted a commission to plead for an Indian prince against his own nationals, and the ministry paid a hearing to him without bringing in to the the notice of the Company. The mission was not without its effect. When the Court asked for a naval squadron the Ministry tried to intervene in the Company's affairs.² Lord Weymouth, the Secretary for War, enquired the powers the Company would give the Ministry in matters of peace and war when His Majesty's forces were employed. The Court refused to give any powers.³ Despite this refusal Weymouth sent a Crown representative to India apparently to defend the Company's settlements from outside attacks, but in reality as a political agent from the British Crown to the Mughal court and to all the other Indian princes who were included in the Paris Treaty of 1763.⁴

The person appointed for the post was Sir John Lindsay, a young man of 32. Weymouth issued him private instructions of a political nature, apart from the public instructions to lend the naval force to the Company's settlements. He was to procure a true political picture of India, to enquire into the extent and nature of the Nawab's debt, his relations with the Madras Government, the causes of his complaint against them, the position of the French in India, and their relations with

¹ Ibid, pp. 39-47. We read in Dow's *History of Hindustan*, "The author of this history is indebted for the above character of Mohammed to a person, who had a perfect view of the original" (vol. II, p. 361)

² Court's minute, 25 July 1769, Court Book, vol. 78, p. 131

³ Extracts from the Minutes of the General Court, 30 Aug. 1769, Home Misc. vol. 101, pp. 175-87

⁴ Lindsay to Robert Harland, 25 Sept. 1771, Home Misc. vol. 104, p. 657

hopes and fears of both parties by not determining in favour of either, and without promising assistance to the one or the other giving both grounds to hope we would not assist his adversary, which in reality the fact."¹

Meanwhile, in March 1770 Lindsay arrived at Bombay, where he prevented that Government from agreeing to a defensive alliance with Haidar.² The third article of the treaty of Madras had provided for a separate treaty between Haidar and Bombay. In October 1769 Haidar sent his *vakil*, Abdul Gani, to Bombay both to conclude a treaty and to seek their aid. Abdul Gani was held up on his way by the Marathas, but was released on Bombay's intervention.³ Bombay did not agree to a defensive alliance, and the negotiations broke off. Early in 1770 they sent their two agents, Richard Church and James Sibbald, to Haidar with instructions that instead of a defensive alliance both parties should agree not to assist the enemies of each other, and that Haidar should restore to their ally, the Kolattiri Raja, the dominions seized by him.⁴

This was a critical period for Haidar, when the Marathas had oppressed him much. He told the Bombay agents that he would grant them all trade privileges, provided they lent him aid against his enemies, and that at a time when Madras had disappointed him, at least Bombay should not do the same.⁵ He wrote to Madras also asking them to recommend Bombay for lending him a body of troops, and for supplying him with military stores. While declining to recommend for troops, the Madras Government asked Bombay to spare Haidar a few arms, because the French were sending 2,000 troops to Mauritius, perhaps as a first step to join Haidar.⁶

Lindsay was present at this time at Bombay, where he

¹ Ibid, p. 44

² Lindsay to Weymouth, 10 July 1770, Home Misc. vol. 103, pp. 81-5

³ Board's minute, cons. 7 Oct. 1769, B. P. C. Range 341, vol. 32, pp. 680-1; also cons. 28 Oct. 1769, Ibid, p. 700

⁴ Board's minute, cons. 6 Apl. 1770, B. P. C. Range 341, vol. 33, p. 229

⁵ Church and Sibbald to Bombay, 2 May 1770, cons. 26 May 1770, Ibid, p. 302

⁶ Madras to Bombay, 4 June 1770, cons. 3 July 1770, Ibid, p. 369

attempted to dissuade that Government from agreeing to a defensive alliance.¹ But they did not adopt his ideas, and modified their terms proposed to Haidar. While thinking that an alliance with him was inadmissible, they desired to keep a door open for it, should it be necessary. They agreed to the rates payable by both parties for the assistance received.² The rates were the same as in the Madras treaty. Should Haidar were to reject this as well, the Bombay Government were prepared to accept a defensive alliance of the same tenor as in the Madras treaty, although "We in consequence thereof be hereafter under an indispensable necessity of taking part in the dispute between him and the Marathas."³ Such a necessity did not arise, and Haidar agreed to their proposal that enemies and friends of both should be mutual.⁴

Lindsay arrived at Madras in July and very soon he came sharply in conflict with the Madras Government, paying "little regard to the Company's servants and talking of nothing but Parliament and the King."⁵ Lindsay made a spirited advocacy in favour of supporting the Marathas against Haidar. He argued that Haidar was attached to the French, that he could never be a friend of the English, that the Company should disregard the Madras treaty, as it was dishonourable to them, and that they should join the Marathas, whose alliance was very advantageous. Lindsay urged that at least the Nawab, who was not included by name in the Madras treaty should be free to support the Marathas. In short "every reason in the world" led Lindsay to press the Madras Government to reduce Haidar.⁶

The Government unanimously disapproved of such a

¹ Lindsay to Weymouth, 10 July 1770, Home Misc. vol. 103, p. 83

² Board's minute, cons. 8 Aug. 1770, B.P.C. Range 341, vol. 33, pp. 409-10

³ Board's minute, cons. 3 Aug. 1770, Ibid, pp. 391-2

⁴ Aitchison, vol. IX, No. IV, pp. 220-22

⁵ Smith to Orme, 12 Oct. 1770, Orme Mss. vol. 10, p. 188

⁶ Lindsay to Madras, 11 Sept. 1770, cons. 17 Sept. 1770, M. M. S. P. Range 251, vol. 68, p. 408; also Lindsay to Madras, 18 Apl. 1771, cons. 22 Apl. 1770, Ibid, vol. 69, pp. 242-7

policy. They rightly thought that the Nawab's anxiety to reduce Haidar was at the back of Lindsay's arguments. Lindsay's letter of 18 April bore so close a resemblance to the Nawab's of 7 April that the Government called both a "joint work."¹ The Government rejected Lindsay's policy, because it was quite opposed to the repeated instructions from the Court. On 30 June 1769 the Court had observed, "Our policy is to check their [Maratha] growth by every opportunity or at least to avoid lending our force to their aggrandisement, which we certainly do as often as we engage in wars with the few remaining chiefs of India, who are yet capable of coping with them. Nizam Aly and Hyder Naigue are two of such chiefs, and it is our true interest to preserve a good understanding with them."² The Court had gone to the extent of remarking, "Every Moratta that fell in the contest might almost be considered as one of our enemies slain."³

There were a few other reasons for rejecting Lindsay's policy. First, supporting the Marathas meant breaking the treaty of Madras. The Board observed, "We do not afford Hyder Aly aid promised by treaty, because we cannot. But the political necessity must be very great indeed....which shall oblige us to join in a war against him and seek his destruction while we are under an obligation to defend him."⁴ Secondly, it was improper to reduce Haidar on the ground of his friendship with the French, because he sought the English support, which was denied to him, and he would be a fool, if he did not take other steps to defend himself.⁵ Thirdly, it was highly impolitic to permit the Nawab to join the Marathas with his own troops, as that might prove injurious to the British interests in India.⁶ Lastly, Madras did not think that the Marathas could do much mischief, if they were denied aid, for the march of the com-

¹ Board's minute, cons. 22 Apl. 1770, Ibid, p. 251

² Court to Madras, 30 June 1769, Desp. to Mad. vol. 4, Paras 6-7

³ Court to Madras, 23 March 1770, Ibid, Para 12

⁴ Board's minute, cons. 13 May 1771, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol.69, p.369

⁵ Ibid

⁶ Court to Madras, 24 Dec. 1765, Desp. to Mad. vol. 3, Para 8

bined armies of the three presidencies on Poona would frighten them to remain quiet. Thus the Government rejected totally Lindsay's policy, and wrote to the Court that unless the Ministry recalled him, or reduced his powers, incalculable harm would be done to the Company's interests in India.¹

The Ministry's intervention was really unwise. An inexperienced young man with absolutely no knowledge of Indian affairs was sent with plenipotentiary powers. The powers given to him were contrary to the Royal Charters granted to the East India Company.² When the Court protested against this infringement, Rochford, the new Secretary for War, observed, "It was not the King's intention to invest His plenipotentiary with an Authority to lay His Majesty under burthensome obligations in consequence of the Juggdgement he might form of the Ballance of Power, and the Interests and connexions of different states in India."³ The fact is that Lindsay exceeded his instructions, and acted most indiscreetly. Rochford rightly observed that Lindsay's conduct gave Madras "an Idea of his having a censorial authority."⁴

How did the Nawab succeed in winning over Lindsay? Haidar's association with the French, and the Nawab's rivalry with Haidar seem to have brought it about. Lindsay had been despatched to check the rise of the French power in India, which seemed to have scared the Ministry more than the Company. Lindsay did not care to enquire into the exact nature of Haidar's relations with the French, and easily believed the Nawab that Haidar's connection with them was inseparable. The other factor was the Nawab's rivalry with Haidar. The Nawab shrewdly put his case before Lindsay that every advantage would result from a connection with the Marathas, and every disadvantage, from one with Haidar. Such arguments as that the Marathas had no connections with the Europeans, that they bordered on all the Company's settle-

¹ Madras to the Court, 20 July 1771, Letters Recd. vol. 5, Paras 7, 20-21

² Court to Rochford, 8 Apl. 1771, Home Misc. vol. 105, pp. 109-15

³ Rochford to the Court, 20 Apl. 1771, Ibid, p. 134

⁴ Rochford to Harland, 26 Apl. 1771, Ibid, vol. 109, p. 79

ments, and that they were prepared to give Salsette and Bassein to Bombay and grant commercial privileges to them on the western coast, easily convinced Lindsay of the propriety of supporting the Nawab's views.¹ Lindsay wrote to Weymouth, "The Nabob whom I look upon to be no bad Indian Politician. . . appears very much disposed in favour of the Mahrattas; and I acknowledge if things are as they have been represented to me, this connection seems not only to be the most Eligible, but the only chance the English have of maintaining their influence in India."²

The Nawab took advantage of Lindsay's presence at Madras, and demanded from the Company the reduction of their troops in the Carnatic from 10,000 to, 7000, the exemption from payment of 10 lakhs of pagodas towards the cost of the Mysore war, and the acceptance of two lakhs instead of four towards the maintenance of the Madras army.³ Owing to these complications, the Court asked the Ministry to recall Lindsay, or else his presence "must necessarily end in the total loss of authority and consequence to the Company in India, where all princes being despotic, they will never be brought to believe that when the King of England delegates his powers to a minister, the Representatives of the East India Company are entitled to any confidence, Regard or attention."⁴

Fortunately, Rochford who had succeeded Weymouth recalled Lindsay, and appointed Sir Robert Harland instead, with instructions to avoid a controversy with the Madras Government.⁵ Notwithstanding, Harland was furnished with all the secret instructions issued by Weymouth to Lindsay. This suggests that the Ministry had only modified its policy, but not changed it.

Harland came to Madras in September 1771. Lindsay

¹ Lindsay to Weymouth, 13 Oct. 1770, Home Misc. vol. 103, pp. 152-3

² Lindsay to Weymouth, 21 Jan. 1771, Ibid, vol. 104, p. 25

³ Lindsay to Weymouth, 13 Oct. 1770, Ibid, vol. 103, pp. 634-8

⁴ Court to Rochford, 8 Apl. 1771, Ibid, vol. 105, p. 115

⁵ Rochford to Harland, 16 Nov. 1772, Ibid, vol. 110, pp. 466-7; also Rochford to Harland, 19 March 1771, Ibid, vol. 109, pp. 5-11

briefed him on the policy he had pursued.¹ Harland pursued the same policy so far as Haidar was concerned. He pointed out that the Madras treaty of 1768 with the Nizam had declared Haidar a rebel, but that of 1769 promised him aid. In order to remove these contradictions, Harland proposed "a national" alliance with the Marathas.² The Madras Government opposed this measure to support the Marathas, and told Harland that the Company was not constitutionally bound to honour any treaty he might conclude. In Government's view the situation demanded a reduction of the Marathas, for the latter had demanded their aid in a threatening manner.³ In September 1771 a Maratha invasion of the Carnatic seemed almost imminent.

The reason for the Maratha threat was the Tanjore expedition organised by the Nawab, who had contemplated its conquest ever since 1762.⁴ In 1771 he complained that the Tanjore Raja was guilty of three offences, of the improper connections with Haidar, of the breach of the 1762 treaty by his failure to pay the Nawab annually the stipulated tribute of four lakhs of rupees, and of the reduction of the *zamindaris* of Marawar and Nulkuli, which were under the Nawab's protection.⁵ However, these were only excuses.

The real reason was the Nawab's own ambition. Frustrated in the effort to reduce Haidar, the Nawab aimed at exploiting Lindsay's presence at Madras for at least the reduction of Tanjore. Madras wrote to the Court that if they had not supported the Nawab in this affair, the Board would have been accused of "supineness and refusal to vindicate the Nabob's honour and support his government, even as it is these charges are brought against us by Sir John Lindsay."⁶ The pressure of

¹ Lindsay to Harland, 25 Sept. 1771, Ibid, vol. 104, pp. 657-64

² Harland to Madras, 28 Dec. 1771, cons. 30 Dec. 1771, M. M. S. P. Range 251, vol. 70, pp. 902-3

³ Board's minute, cons. 26 Dec. 1771, Ibid, pp. 884-5

⁴ *Nabob of Arcot Papers*, Appendix No. VI, p. 77

⁵ Madras to the Court, 11 Sept. 1771, Home Misc. vol. 105, pp. 459-60

⁶ Madras to the Court, 20 July 1771, Ibid, vol. 106, p. 36

the Nawab's private debt was another cause. His creditors were anxious to secure assignments of revenues in Tanjore.¹ Yet another cause was the Nawab's payment of one lakh of pagodas to certain "individuals" in order to induce them to agree to the expedition, with a promise of two more lakhs after the expedition.² However, there was one difficulty. The Raja being a Maratha, and a Maratha army being present in Mysore, there was every possibility of an attack on the Carnatic, if Tanjore was reduced. The Nawab averted this difficulty by bribing both Madhava Rao Sadasiv, the Maratha *vakil* at Madras, and Trimbak Rao, the Maratha commander in Mysore. The Nawab was to pay in all four lakhs of pagodas to them. The sum was promised, but not paid.³ The charm of money had the desired effect, and the Maratha leaders became accomplices.

The Tanjore expedition lasted from 12 September to 27 October, when Tulaji, its Raja, was forced to pay the Nawab eight lakhs of rupees immediately, and to the army five lakhs, with 27 lakhs in assignment of revenues.⁴ According to Harland the total reduction of Tanjore was prevented only by Tulaji's payment of a lakh of pagodas to Du Pré.⁵ If this were true, "individuals" in the Government received a lakh to start the aggression, and another lakh to stop it. However, the termination of the Tanjore expedition was only the beginning of troubles for the Nawab. Trimbak Rao threatened an invasion of the Carnatic for going against Tanjore, actually moved towards the Carnatic frontier, and sent a few parties to plunder it. Warren Hastings declared that the Marathas had actually committed hostilities against the Nawab.⁶ But the reasons for Trimbak Rao's strange conduct, of first agreeing to the

¹ *Cambridge History of India*, vol. V, p. 279

² Harland to Rochford, 15 Feb. 1772, Home Misc. vol. 109, pp. 197-9

³ *Nabob of Arcot Papers*, Appendix, No. XIV, p. 220

⁴ The Raja's Proposals for Peace, 20 Oct. 1771, Home Misc. vol. 106, pp. 143-5

⁵ Harland to Rochford, 15 Feb. 1772, *Ibid*, vol. 109, pp. 197-9

⁶ Hastings' minute, cons. 10 Dec. 1771, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 70, p. 836

aggressive act and then suddenly appearing on the Carnatic borders, seem to be two. First, he desired to collect the promised sum from the Nawab, who paid it to Madhava Rao Sadasiv on 29 November.¹ Had Trimbak Rao, not moved towards the Carnatic, he would not have realised the sum so quickly. Secondly, it suited Trimbak Rao's policy to make the Tanjore issue a pretext to draw the Nawab and the Madras Government into an alliance with the Marathas. From December 1771 to April 1772, great pressure was brought on the Nawab from Trimbak Rao and the Peshwa, Madhava Rao, himself.² Madhava Rao Sadasiv personally met Harland, and explained the advantages of an alliance with the Marathas, namely, the exemption from the *chaugh*, the surrender of the Carnatic passes, the supply of pepper and sandal wood, and the grant of some districts belonging to Haider on the western coast.³

The Nawab once again began to put pressure on the Madras Government to join the Marathas. He asked their permission to send at least his own troops.⁴ Harland supported the Nawab, and threatened the conclusion of a separate alliance with the Marathas.⁵ The Madras Government again declined to countenance such a policy, and refused to send a single soldier, if Harland were to carry out his threat of a separate alliance with the Marathas.⁶

Harland's policy was highly defective, as he too adopted the Nawab's views, just as Lindsay had done. The Nawab employed the same arguments to influence Harland, namely

¹ *Nabob of Arcot Papers*, Appendix, No. XIV, p. 224

² Trimbak Rao to the Nawab, 20 Dec. 1771, Home Misc. vol. 110, pp. 223-7; Madhava Rao to Madhava Rao Sadasiv, Nov. 1771, Ibid, pp. 202-4

³ Trimbak Rao to Harland, 26 Dec. 1771, Ibid, pp. 139-40; Madhava Rao Sadasiv to Harland, 22 Dec. 1771, Ibid. pp. 127-31

⁴ Nawab to Madras, 13 Dec. 1771, *First Rept. by the Com. of Secrecy*, 1781, Appendix, No. 23, pp. 326-9

⁵ Harland to Madras, 28 Dec. 1771, cons. 30 Dec. 1771, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 70, pp. 902-3

⁶ Madras to Harland, 1 Jan. 1772, Ibid. vol. 71, p. 9

that the Company's neutrality would force the two parties to seek French aid, and that an alignment with the Marathas was more advantageous. Rumours prevailed that Madhava Rao was sending an agent, Abdul Gafur, an inhabitant of Constantinople who had arrived at Poona, to the French court.¹ In February 1772 Sadasiv further induced Harland by the offer of 20,000 horse at the Maratha expense to the Company in case of war against the French. Sadasiv threatened an invasion of the Carnatic, if this offer was rejected.² The Madras Government would not agree. A Maratha invasion seemed imminent, but the Nawab's further payment of 450,000 rupees towards the *chauth* averted the exigency.³

In these controversies at Madras Haidar was completely ignored. None paid any heed to his pressing appeals. Considering the Nawab's attitude, he was lucky that a hostile alliance was not formed against him. He had not been wanting in every device to secure help from Madras. In December 1771 he offered them 800,000 rupees as presents to the Company, 300,000 to Du Pré, and 100,000 per month for the troops.⁴ Besides, he offered to send 4 or 5,000 troops to surprise the Marathas nearer their home.⁵ The Government declined these offers. All that they did was to recommend Bombay to supply him with 2 or 3,000 stand of arms, and that also on knowing that they had already delivered him 500 stand.⁶

The Bombay Government adopted a more favourable policy towards Haidar. They were prepared to send him 500 Europeans, 1,200 sepoys and a train of artillery, provided he paid them 500,000 pagodas, and ceded Mangalore and Pirgarh

¹ Madras to the Court, 28 Feb. 1772, Home Misc. vol. 106, pp. 281-2; also translation of a letter from Abdul Gafur to Rustum Ali Khan, formerly salt farmer at Masulipatam, 16 Oct. 1771, Ibid, pp. 284-5

² Harland to Rochford, 15 Feb. 1772, Home Misc. vol. 109, pp. 223-8

³ Madras to the Court, 28 Feb. 1772, Lett. Recd. vol. 6, Para 51

⁴ Board's minute, cons. 30 Dec. 1771, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 70, p. 911

⁵ Haidar to Madras, 31 Dec. 1771, *First Rept.* 1781, Appendix No. 22, pp. 314-15

⁶ Madras to the Court, 20 July 1771, Letters Recd. vol. 5, Para 11

(Sadasivgarh).¹ The Court dissuaded Bombay from adopting such a policy, and asked them to stop the supplies.² Fortunately for Haidar [the Maratha War came to a close in July 1772.

The conclusion of the Maratha War was a great relief both to Haidar and to the Madras Government. At no time had both experienced such stress and strain. The very existence of Haidar was at stake. He felt that he was sadly let down by the Madras Government. Their policy made him grow cold towards them in the last few years of his life. For another six years from 1772-78 he made further attempts at co-operation with them, but the result was no better. During this time he did not ventilate his grievances, but in 1780 he expressed his strong resentment at the Company for the breach of the treaty.³ Lord Macartney thought that Haidar's disappointment in 1770 was mainly instrumental for his participation in the confederacy of 1780.⁴ Haidar had a legitimate cause for complaint. At no time had he a better claim or a more urgent necessity for the Company's aid. The Madras Government were guilty of a clear breach of faith. Had they kept their promise in 1771, Haidar would have thought twice in 1780 before joining a hostile alliance against them. Even token help would have absolved them of the charge of breaking their treaty. Their policy of neutrality would have been perfectly justified, had they not been bound by treaty to help him.

However, their policy suited their immediate interests. They avoided altogether a war in the Carnatic. Despite the strong pressure from the Nawab, the Marathas and the Crown representatives, they maintained their policy, which was in the early stages, "If we could perpetuate this quarrel, we think it would be good policy to do so, provided neither subdues the other, for whilst they are engaged in war, we may enjoy peace."⁵ For some time they occupied both parties in hopes of securing

¹ Bombay to the Court, 30 Oct. 1771, Home Misc. vol. 106, pp.110-11

² Court to Bombay, 1 Apl. 1772, Desp. to Bombay, vol. 4, paras 5, 7, & 8

³ Haidar to Rumbold, 19 March 1780, Home Misc. vol. 166, pp. 293-5

⁴ Macartney to the Court, 30 Sept. 1781, Ibid, vol. 161, pp. 89-90

⁵ Madras to the Court, 29 Sept. 1770, Lett. Recd. vol. 5, Para 3

aid, but when that pretext was no longer tenable, they refused to support either. The court approved of their policy, and felt only sorry that the Nawab did not countenance it.¹

For a year from July 1772 to July 1773, when Haidar was busy in the conquest of Coorg and Malabar, nothing particular happened in his relations with the Madras Government. In July 1773 with the Nawab's decision to launch a second expedition against Tanjore, the jealousy of the neighbours was again excited. On the ground that Tulaji was carrying on an intrigue with Haidar, the Marathas, the French, the Dutch and the Danes, and had not paid the sum stipulated in 1771, the Nawab desired to reduce him completely.² These were again merely excuses. The real reasons were the Nawab's anxiety to annex the rich province, the pressure from his private creditors, and the complicity of the Madras Government. The Government decided to support the Nawab on his promise of 1,000,000 pagodas to the Company, the maintenance of three battalions of sepoys at his cost and the payment of the expenses of the expedition. Moreover, they thought that Haidar was too much employed in his own affairs to disturb their scheme.³ But from what followed after Pigot's restoration of Tanjore, there is strong reason to think that the corrupt influences of the private debt, and the Nawab's anxiety to add Tanjore to his dominions were the major causes of the war.⁴

Although the Government thought that Haidar was not interested in the Tanjore affair, they received intelligence that he might march to the rescue of Tulaji and that Haidar's commander, Mir Sahib, had a force of 6,000 troops near Dindigal, not far from Tanjore.⁵ It was further believed that the Peshwa had asked Haidar to assist the Raja.⁶ But these

¹ Court to Madras, 10 Apl. 1771, Desp. to Madras, vol. 5, paras 3, 5 & 6

² *The Restoration of the King of Tanjore Considered*, pp. 91-99

³ Board's minute, cons. 28 June and 29 June 1773, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 74, pp. 500-6; also *Nabob of Arcot papers*, Appendix, No. xxxvii, p. 1117

⁴ Harper (Commander at Trichinopoly) to Madras, 16 July 1773, cons. 21 July 1773. vol. 74, pp. 570-1

⁵ *Mostyn's Third Embassy*, 22 Sept. 1773, p. 229

apprehensions proved baseless. [Haidar was busy in the conquest of Coorg and Wynad. Soon after the Tanjore expedition, he sent two *vakils* to Madras for congratulating the Government and the Nawab.¹ The reduction of Tanjore caused a great stir in England. It gave rise to a lot of pamphleteering by Burke's group on the Raja's side, and by the Arcot group on the Nawab's side. In consultation with the Ministry, the Court decided to restore the Raja.²

The reduction of Tanjore became a pretext for a possible Maratha invasion of the Carnatic. Raghunath Rao, who became the Peshwa after Narayana Rao's murder, desired to distract the attention of his people from a domestic issue to a foreign war. Nizam Ali, Haidar Ali and Muhammad Ali were the three powers at whose cost he could gain his object. The Peshwa's choice fell on the weakest of them, the Nizam, who was soon defeated. The next choice was either the Nawab or Haidar. Haidar had been sufficiently squeezed in the previous war. Moreover, he had been on good terms with Raghunath Rao in the past. Therefore, the Nawab who had offended the Marathas by his capture of Tanjore, a Maratha principality seemed to be the likely choice.

In December 1773 the Nawab was given formal notice from Poona that he should either pay the *chauth* or join the Marathas against Haidar.³ The Nawab began his frantic attempts to force the Government join the Marathas. But Alexander Wynch, the Governor, frankly told him that it was impossible. Wynch left it to the Nawab to pay the *chauth* or not.⁴

This situation brought about a change in the Nawab towards Haidar. In August 1773 Haidar had invited a *vakil*

¹ William Townsend (Bombay representative with Haidar) to Madras, 13 Oct. 1773, cons. 27 Dec. 1773, Ibid, vol. 74, p. 892

² *The Restoration of the King of Tanjore Considered*, pp. 118-19

³ Ranaji (minister to Raghunath Rao) to the Nawab, 16 Dec. 1773, Home Misc. vol. 112, pp. 447-51

⁴ Wynch to the Nawab, 5 Jan. 1774, Ibid, pp. 471-2

from the Nawab.¹ In October he took the initiative of sending two Mysore *vakils*, Ali Zaman Shah and Mehdi Ali Khan, to Madras to impress on the Nawab the desirability of composing their mutual differences in view of the Maratha threat. [Haidar proposed an alliance with the Nawab, the terms of which were mutual aid, free trade in each other's territories, and a promise not to make a separate peace with an enemy.] Haidar added, "I call Almighty, his Prophet and the Koran to testify the truth of this to which I have solemnly sworn in the mosque."² The Nawab agreed to these proposals with a modification that neither party should give protection to the rebels of the other.⁴

[The Madras Government's reaction to these proposals was non-committal.] Wynch said that the Government would not discourage any step that might improve the Nawab's relations with Haidar.⁵ [But these negotiations did not bear any fruit. The Nawab's rivalry with Haidar had not abated in any measure. The Nawab's insincerity was such that his letter to Madras seeking their consent to the alliance dwelt more on the advantages of a connection with the Marathas. Regretting that the Government's refusal to join the Marathas had brought about a dangerous situation, the Nawab said that he was compelled by circumstances to make "friendship" with Haidar.⁶

The Nawab's policy was still more surprising when he attempted to bring the Government on the Maratha side even after submitting his proposals for an alliance with Haidar. [He wrote to the Government that great advantages would result from an alliance with the Marathas, but none with Haidar, and that the Marathas had a hundred times the power of Haidar to ruin the Carnatic.⁷ He warned the Government that in case of

¹ Nawab to Madras, cons. 30 Aug. 1773, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 74, p. 647

² Haidar to the Nawab, 10 Oct. 1773, Home Misc. vol. 112, p. 427

³ Haidar's Proposals, Ibid, pp. 432-3

⁴ Nawab to Haidar, 29 Dec. 1773, Ibid, p. 433

⁵ Wynch to the Nawab, 5 Jan. 1774, Ibid, p. 468

⁶ Nawab to Wynch, 29 Dec. 1774, Ibid, pp. 423-4

⁷ Nawab to Wynch, 11 Jan. 1774, Ibid, p. 480

rejection of his proposals, they would have to keep an army for eight months in a year on the banks of the Krishna.¹ The Government refused to approve of such a policy, and asked the Nawab how could he have any faith in their treaties with himself, if they were to break theirs with Haidar.² The Nawab then proposed that both Haidar and the Marathas should be occupied with promises of an alliance.³

[When the rumours of a Maratha attack on the Carnatic persisted, the Nawab again attempted to improve his relations with Haidar.] The Mysore *vakils* who had been detained since October were dismissed on 2 February. In his turn the Nawab sent his own *vakils*, Syed Fateh Ali and Ali Nawaz Khan, to Haidar for concluding an alliance.⁴

[These negotiations also failed.] Raghunath Rao's difficulties at Poona prevented a Maratha invasion of the Carnatic.⁵ The Madras *vakils* accomplished nothing at Seringapatam. Haidar was also less anxious, as his relations with Raghunath Rao had so far improved as to recover from the latter all the territories lost in the previous war.⁶ When the Bombay Government seized Salsette, the Nawab grew apprehensive of the Maratha designs on the Carnatic, and renewed his proposal of an alliance with Haidar.⁷ But the Bengal Government defeated the proposal 'this time on the ground that it was contrary to the Court's orders, and that it would inevitably result in a war.'⁸

After this no more attempt was made to compose the differences, and events gradually led to the situation where deep seated rivalries often culminated in a War. Haidar had

¹ Board's minute, cons. 14 Jan. 1774, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 75, p. 76

² Board's minute, cons. 13 Jan. 1774, Ibid, p. 71

³ Board's minute, cons. 2 Feb. 1774, Ibid, p. 138

⁴ Board's minute, cons. 3 Feb. 1774, 11 Feb. 1774, Ibid, p. 159 and p. 173 respectively.

⁵ Mostyn to Madras, cons. 21 Feb. 1774, Ibid, p. 185

⁶ Mostyn to Madras, cons. 7 March 1774, Ibid, pp. 241-2

⁷ Nawab to Madras, 15 Feb. 1775, Home Misc. vol. 126, pp. 22-3

⁸ Bengal to Madras, 23 Oct. 1775, cons. 13 Nov. 1775, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 79, p. 1403

tried his best to remain friendly, but it was the Nawab's duplicity that destroyed all chances of a rapprochement. ✓

[In March 1775 Haidar concluded a defensive alliance with the Dutch.] His contact with them was as old as 1762. The Dutch policy in India was to concentrate on commerce, particularly in pepper trade, and not on political or territorial objectives, for their resources in India were not enough to meet the expenses of maintaining an army.¹ Haidar's policy towards the Dutch, as with other Europeans, was to encourage them to remain as a check upon other Europeans, to obtain from them his military requirements, and to secure their military aid at times of need. In 1763 he had applied to Wayerman, the Dutch Governor at Cochin, for 1,000 muskets.² In 1766 he had proposed a defensive alliance with them, and asked their assistance of 1,000 troops.³ The Government at Batavia turned down all these proposals, and adopted a strictly neutral policy.⁴

With the advent of Moens in 1771 as the Dutch Governor at Cochin, Haidar's contacts with them became closer. Haidar had emerged as a single dominant power in Malabar, and a commercial Company could not adopt a cold policy towards him. His conquest of Coorg and Palghat made the Dutch apprehensive lest their allies, the Raja of Cochin, the Zamorin of Calicut, and the Cranganur Raja, might also be reduced. Therefore, in March 1775 Moens sent to Seringapatam two agents, Saffin and Riberto, to negotiate a treaty.⁵ Haidar was also anxious for some alliance lest the Nawab should bring about a hostile league of the Marathas and the Company against Mysore. On 30 March 1775 a defensive treaty was concluded between Haidar and the Dutch, by which they agreed to lend him 200 Europeans, if possible more, and he would in

¹ K. P. P. Menon, *History of Keralas*, vol. I, p. 358

² P. C. Alexander, *The Dutch in Malabar*, p. 79

³ K. M. Pannikar, *Malabar and the Dutch*, p. 102

⁴ Logan, W. *Malabar*, vol. I, p. 421

⁵ Van Louhizen, J. "The Dutch East India Company and Mysore," Unpublished Cambridge Ph.D. thesis, 1958, p. 147

return grant them the trade monopoly in sandal-wood, pepper and cardamum of his dominions. They also agreed to supply him with military stores.¹ [This treaty was not enforced as the Batavian Government did not ratify it.]

The supply of military stores weighed much with Haidar in concluding the proposed treaty with the Dutch, because neither Bombay nor Madras had been supplying him any. When Haidar declared his intentions not to deliver the English any sandalwood or pepper unless his demand was complied with, the Bombay Government urged the Court to relax the prohibition against supplying him war-like materials.² The restrictions were not relaxed. The fall of Mahé in 1779, which turned out to be an important cause of the Second Mysore War, had special significance, for the Court would neither themselves supply his requirements, nor would allow others to do so.

(In August 1776 a serious revolution took place at Madras.) Lord Pigot who had come as the Governor for the second time in 1775 was arrested and power was seized by the majority of the Council, headed by George Stratton. (This revolution was closely connected with the Tanjore affair.) The Nawab opposed the restoration of Tanjore to the Raja, when Pigot tried to enforce it on the orders of the Court. Despite the Nawab's protests, Tanjore was restored. This led to a serious intrigue resulting in the arrest of Pigot. The revolution aroused a big controversy in England, and several pamphlets were published, which contained speculation about its causes. It now seems that private interests, Pigot's tactlessness, and the Nawab's intrigues were responsible for it.³ Paul Benfield, who was the Nawab's creditor, and whose finances were at stake played big mischief. The Nawab regarded that his dignity and interests were injured by the restoration. Other members of the Board, such as Sir Robert Fletcher, the commander, and George Mackay,

¹ Haidar's treaty with the Dutch, 30 March 1775, M. M. S. P. Range 25I, vol. 79, pp. 1545-7

² Bombay to the Court, 22 Dec. 1776, Home Misc. vol. 134, pp. 47-8

³ Darlrymple's minute, cons. 10 June 1776, *Papers Relative to the Restoration of the King of Tanjore*, pp. 204-17

the last in the Council, had personal reasons to be dissatisfied with Pigot.¹ But Pigot also handled the situation without foresight or tact. He arrested Fletcher, and suspended two other members of the Board for opposing his policies. Hastings also had been opposed in his Council, but he had never attempted to suspend his colleagues. Besides, Pigot proclaimed certain dangerous theories, such as that the Governor's concurrence was necessary for every measure to pass into an act, that he could prevent any question from being moved at the Board, that he could adjourn the Board whenever he pleased, and that he could refuse his signature to any resolution passed by the majority.² (The revolution at Madras did much to discredit the Government's reputation in the eyes of the Indian powers.

The dissensions at Madras helped Haidar to advance his interests. From 1775 increasing reports were received at Madras that he had hostile designs on the Carnatic, and that he would reduce Melpadi.³ He reduced Murar Rao, and seized his fort Gutti. Basalat Jang's fort of Bellary was also captured. Adoni, his capital, was only saved by the payment of 400,000 rupees.⁴ Haidar collected 250,000 rupees from Karnul.⁵ He made full use of the dissensions both at Poona, where a succession issue had torn the Marathas, and at Madras where Tanjore question had divided the Government.

The Madras Government's reaction to these reports of the Nawab was that he was anxious to bring about a rupture between them and Haidar. When the Nawab reported that Cuddapah might fall, the Government asked him in what manner he was interested in it.⁶ When he reported Haidar's military preparations, they asked him to keep in reserve suffi-

¹ H. D. Love, *Vestiges of Old Madras*, pp. 99-100; also H. Dodwell, *Warren Hastings' Letters to Sir John Macpherson*, pp. 47-8

² Madras to the Court, 24 Sept. 1776, Letters Recd. vol. 8, para 200

³ Fitzgerald to Madras, 17 Jan. 1776, cons. 19 Feb. 1776, M. M. S.P. Range 251, vol. 80, p. 277

⁴ Nawab to Madras, cons. 7 Dec. 1775, Ibid, vol. 79, p. 1525

⁵ Intelligence from Ongole, cons. 2 Jan. 1776, Ibid, vol. 80, p. 1

⁶ Board's minute, cons. 7 Dec. 1775, Ibid, vol. p. 1525

cient money to bear the expenses of a war.¹ They either discredited his reports, or were self-complacent. Stuart entered on a long minute repudiating the reasoning that there was danger from Haidar. Stuart argued that Haidar's preparations were against the Marathas, whom he had offended by seizing their territories during their civil war, and that his policy was to squeeze small powers in order to have enough funds, should a necessity arise to appease the Marathas. Haidar's consciousness of the Company's strength, his own limitations and his vulnerability on the western coast would not induce him, Stuart thought, to break with the English. He added, "I hope, therefore, that Hyder's name will not so often be brought forward by any authority to frighten the Settlement or as a reason for cautioning the troops, or augmenting our force a day sooner than the utility of such measures, after mature, cool discussion on general grounds may lead the Board to adopt."²

Thus despite the severe stress and strain in the English relations with Haidar during this interlude between the first and the second Mysore wars, both parties displayed remarkable restraint, and resisted the temptation of ventilating their grievances openly. Haidar's main grievance was their refusal to relieve him during distress.~ Their complaint was that he was reducing smaller powers, some of whom were their allies such as Murar Rao. But their policy in this respect was so weak that they did not even lodge a protest against him. It was only the Nawab who was constantly drilling into their ears of the necessity to be firm with Haidar. The Court also pointed out the necessity, "It is incumbent on you to be no less attentive to the growing and dangerous power of Hyder Ally."³ Yet Madras remained unprepared. Perhaps, they thought that when he had overlooked their more serious short-coming namely that of denying him the aid due to him, he

¹ Board's minute, cons. 7 Nov. 1776, Ibid, vol. 82, pp. 1302-4.

² Stuart's minute, cons. 16 Dec. 1776, Ibid, vol. 82, pp. 1476-7; also pp. 1471-8

³ Court to Madras, 5 Apl. 1776, Desp. to Madras, vol. 7, para 18

might not break with them for smaller issues. But from 1775 there was a change in Haidar. Earlier he had been very solicitous of their support and co-operation. Later he just desired their neutrality. Raghunath Rao's treaty with Bombay, and the consequent difficulties that followed for the Marathas removed Haidar's main difficulty, and he became cold towards Madras. *His activities in Cuddapah, Karnul, Gutti, Bellary and Adoni,* and his designs even on the Travancore Raja were very bold measures.¹ They indicated that he could defy his treaty with Madras as much as they had done. But he was adopting a systematic and cautious policy so as to avoid an open rupture.]

¹ Board's minute, cons. 7 Dec. 1775, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 79, p.1525

The immediate reaction in England to the arrest of Lord Pigot was the recall of both the contesting parties, Pigot and Stratton. On 11 June 1777 the Court revised the constitution of the Madras Government, reduced the strength of the Council from 16 to six members, strictly forbade them from private trade and from lending money to the Nawab, and eliminated the motive for such activities by enhancing the salaries of the Governor to 40,000 pagodas and of the other members to

16,000 pagodas a year.¹ John Whitehill, one of the Government, brought these orders from England in the record time of 79 days.² By the time he arrived at Madras, 31 August 1777, Pigot had passed away in May 1777. As Sir Thomas Rumbold, who had been appointed Governor, had not yet arrived in India, Whitehill formed the Government with Anthony Sadleir, Quintin Crawford, Charles Smith, Samuel Johnson and Peter Perring as the other members.

On 13 February 1778 Rumbold took charge as Governor. He had served both at Madras and in Bengal in civil and military capacities, and was quite an experienced person in India affairs. He had entered Parliament in 1770, and the Company's Direction in 1772. In 1773 he had contested for the office of the Governor-General. Having failed to secure that post, he tried seriously in 1775 to become the Governor of Madras, but he narrowly missed it by four votes in the General Court.³ After the failure of Pigot's policy when a necessity arose to appoint a new Governor, Rumbold contested again for it, and was successful. The Nawab's agent, Lauchlin Maclean, prepared the ground for Rumbold's appointment by influencing the Ministry.⁴

[When Rumbold assumed office at Madras, he thought that the prospects of peace were bright in the Carnatic, if only the French remained quiet. But they were not likely to remain so in consequence of affairs in Europe, where a war was about to break out. They were already active in winning Haidar's support. Bellecombe, the French Governor at Pondicherry, was supplying him all his military requirements. Rumbold desired to win Haidar to his side, and wrote to the Court, "This done you need entertain no fears; if all the other powers are combined with the French to destroy you, it would be impossible."⁵

¹ Court to Madras, 11 June 1777, Desp. to Mad. vol. 7, Paras 11 to 20

² H. D. Love, *Vestiges of Old Madras*, vol. III, p. 105

³ L. S. Sutherland, *East India Company in Eighteenth century politics*, p. 289

⁴ Ibid, pp. 320-1

⁵ Rumbold to the Court, 15 March 1778, Letters Received, vol. 9, Paras 174-5

A policy of conciliation towards Haider was essential for one more reason, namely that both the Home Government and the presidencies of Bengal and Bombay had decided to intervene in the Maratha affairs. In that event it was better to keep Haider friendly, lest he should take advantage of the English pre-occupations.

Fortunately for the English Haider was at war with the Marathas, whose army under Hari Pant was invading northern Mysore early in 1778. Haider made pressing appeals for aid to Rumbold, whose response seemed favourable. Rumbold wrote to Hastings, "...it strikes me that our mode of assisting the Bombay Government in this operations [sic] against the Mahrattas should be thro' Hyder—This would answer two ends, it would be giving Hyder an instance of our intentions to promote a firm alliance with him, it would break the chain of the French Politics and evidently be the best way of co-operating with you and Bombay against our 'General Enemy.'"¹ Haider was willing to concede almost any reasonable demand of the Madras Government in return for their military aid, such as the expenses of their troops, the grant of commercial concessions, and the co-operation against the Marathas to establish Raghunath Rao at Poona. But Rumbold would not promise help to Haider, unless Hastings approved of the measure. Rumbold wrote to Hastings, "I do suppose there never was a more favourable opportunity to become the umpires of Indostan than the present, the disputes amongst the Mahrattas, the declaration in favour of Ragaboy, the wishes of Hyder to join us, the detachment of your troops intended to proceed after the rains from Korah, and the assistance which may be given from hence by a junction with Hyder will all contribute to the execution of one grand and general Plan."² Rumbold thought that he could raise four or five battalions, which would be paid by Haider, and which could give a favourable turn to Raghunath Rao's cause at Poona."

¹ Rumbold to Hastings, 23 March 1778, Add. Mss. 29, 140, pp. 221-22

² Rumbold to Hastings, 25 Apl. 1778, Ibid, pp. 415-15

³ Ibid

[This was the position when early in July 1778 Haidar's *yakil* Vinaji Pandit, made a formal proposal for an alliance with the Madras Government. He offered for the consideration of the Government four points, (1) Haidar's assistance in conducting Raghunath Rao to Poona, (2) supply of military stores to Haidar, (3) grant of a body of Madras troops to him the expenses of which he would defray either in cash or grant of lands, (4) and the conclusion of a new treaty.¹ It may be observed here that a completely new and attractive offer was made this time, such as had never been made before, namely the grant of land in return for military aid. The Madras Government were inclined to accept the offer, but no treaty could be concluded without the previous permission of the Supreme Government. Therefore, they sought the advice of the Bengal Government, and urged them to accept the offer. An important consideration for thus recommending it strongly was the news that hostilities had already broken out in Europe.²

The Bengal Government disapproved of an offensive alliance with Haidar, and considered it unwise to take his aid for restoring Raghunath Rao to power.³ The real reason why Haidar's offer was turned down was that Hastings had his own design of intervention in the Maratha politics different from the Bombay Government's. He preferred Mudaji Bhosle's candidature to Raghunath Rao's for the Poona Government. He had despatched a force under Colonel Mathews Leslie to the frontiers of Berar in order to implement this policy. He had sent Alexander Elliot, his Private Secretary, to conclude an offensive and defensive alliance with Mudaji Bhosle. Hastings knew that Raghunath Rao was unpopular in almost all circles, for Hastings had written to Elliot, "You remember Nizam's letter. I have answered, yet I have no Design to favour

¹ Committee's minute, cons. 4 July 1778, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 88, pp. 1112-3

² Intelligence of the French Declaration of War against the English, 25 June 1778, Ibid, p. 1045

³ Bengal to Madras, 14 Aug. 1778, cons. 9 Sept. 1778, M. S. C. P. Range C, vol. 63, p. 349

Ragobah.”¹

[On the receipt of news of war in Europe both the Madras and the Bengal Governments busily engaged themselves in reducing the French settlements in India. Hastings seized Chandranagar, and Rumbold reduced Karekal, Yanam and their factory at Masulipatam, and besieged Pondicherry, which capitulated on 19 October.] Bellecombe attempted to secure Haidar's support. From the beginning of 1778 the French had shown “uncommon assiduity” in winning his aid.² In May they had supplied him with large military stores, 1,500 stand of arms, 12 pieces of heavy cannon, and six field pieces with shots and shells.³ On knowing the outbreak of war in Europe Bellecombe had applied to Haidar for 12 or 15,000 horse.⁴ It was rumoured that he would send at least 10,000 men.⁵ Notwithstanding, when Pondicherry fell Haidar did not move a single soldier. A French memorandum attributes this failure to their inability to sustain the siege a little longer, and to their want of some success on sea.⁶ Bellecombe had written to Haidar that the French had as many as 107 vessels in Indian seas, that the English had no hopes of receiving any reinforcement from Europe, and that they had been completely vanquished in America.⁷ Yet [the strongest French fortress in India was reduced within two months, and therefore Haidar was deterred, according to the French sources, from openly declaring against the English. This explanation is not convincing, for as late as July 1778 Haidar was pressing for English aid. Rumbold was

¹ Hastings to Elliot, 30 July 1778, Add. Mss. 29, 141, p. 188

² Rumbold to the Court, 15 March 1778, Letters Received, vol. 9, p. 174

³ Rumbold to Hastings, 5 May 1778, Add. Mss. 29, 140, p. 352

⁴ Bellecombe to Haidar, 15 July 1778, Correspondance de Bellecombe, Bib. Nat. N.A. 9368, p. 315

⁵ Capt. Meck to Madras, 27 July 1778, cons. 2 Aug. 1778, M.S.C.P. Range C, vol. 63, p. 69

⁶ Précis Historique, Geographic et Politique de L'Indostan, 1781, Arch. des. Aff. Etran. Asie, vol. 4, p. 92

⁷ Bellecombe to Haidar, 15 July 1778, Correspondance de Bellecombe, Bib. Nat. N.A. 9368, p. 315

not far wrong in his expectation that Haidar would remain neutral as he was not interested in the struggle of the Europeans.¹ This was quite true of Haidar's policy towards the Europeans, subject to one qualification, namely that such a struggle did not affect his interests. This accounts for his policy. The fall of Pondicherry was not likely to affect those interests, and therefore he remained quiet. But the question was entirely different with regard to Mahé, where his interests were involved.]

On 27 November Rumbold proposed that Mahé should be captured. Among the other considerations that were debated such as finance, troops and the possibility of French reinforcement from the Isles, the desirability of knowing Haidar's reaction to an expedition was given particular attention.² This was because consistent rumours had prevailed that Haidar would oppose any attack on Mahé, that he had asked his tributaries in Malabar to support the French, and that he had assured Picot, the Governor of Mahé, all possible assistance, money, rice, troops and powder.³ Mahé had 300 Europeans, and 3,000 sepoys.⁴ If Haidar were to lend his support to them, the siege was likely to prolong. Despite these apprehensions the committee unanimously decided to reduce Mahé. Sir Hector Munro, a member of the committee, thought that Haidar was not yet prepared for a war, and that Mahé should be taken before the French sent any reinforcement.⁵ Charles Smith, another member of the committee strongly supported the idea, and said, "It is seldom the policy of an Eastern Prince to support a falling power, and the more he may be inclined to favour the French, so much more necessary becomes it for us to destroy their channel of communication."⁶ The Bengal Government also

¹ Rumbold to the Court, 31 Oct. 1778, Letters Received, vol. 9, p. 278

² Rumbold's minute, cons. 27 Nov. 1778, M.S.C.P. Range C, vol. 64, pp. 659-62

³ Haidar to Picot, 6 Aug. 1778, Bib. Nat. N. A. 9065, p. 132

⁴ Richard Church (Chief of Tellicherry) to Madras, 2 Sept. 1778, cons. 19 Sept. 1778, M.S.C.P. Range C, vol. 63, pp. 351-2

⁵ Munro's minute, cons. 30 Nov. 1778, Ibid, vol. 64, pp. 691-3

⁶ Smith's minute, cons. 30 Nov. 1778, Ibid, vol. 64, pp. 695-7

urged the reduction on the ground that Mahé was not far from Bombay, and that its loss would deprive the French of any footing in India.¹ Sir Eyre Coote, who was present at the time at Madras, supported the same policy.²

On 7 December the Government decided to reduce Mahé, and appointed Colonel John Braithwaite to the command. However, they took one precaution. He was not to sail from Anjengo, unless they gave him their final orders, and he was not to launch the expedition, if he came to know that Haidar had openly declared against the English, or had given the French sufficient force to resist, or Mahé had been reinforced.³ In February the news came that the Bombay army, which had been sent to conduct Raghunath Rao to Poona, had failed in its object. This caused a hesitation in the Madras Government, who wrote to Bengal, "Hyder now perceiving so glaring an instance of weakness and disgrace may be encouraged openly to resist our proposed attempt on Mahé, which he considers in some sort as under his protection."⁴ But the Madras Government decided not to stop the expedition on the ground that it would be a weakness to recall it in the face of the Maratha victory, that such a recall might result in the loss of Tellicherry to the French, and that a success against Mahé might retrieve the loss of reputation suffered in Bombay.⁵

Meanwhile, Haidar made it clear to Madras that he would oppose the expedition.⁶ Braithwaite learnt through his secret intelligence that Haidar seemed resolved to break with the English.⁷ Haidar wrote to Rumbold that Mahé was situated in the territory of his tributary, the Raja of Kartnadu, and that

¹ Bengal to Madras, 16 Nov. 1778, cons. 14 Dec. 1778, Ibid, p. 808

² Coote's minute, cons. 29 Dec. 1778, Ibid, p. 904

³ Instructions to Braithwaite, cons. 18 Jan. 1779, Ibid, vol. 65, pp. 120-1

⁴ Madras to Bengal, cons. 7 Feb. 1779, Ibid, pp. 213-15

⁵ Ibid

⁶ Nawab to Madras, 16 Feb. 1779, Home Misc. vol. 249, p. 2

⁷ Braithwaite to Madras, 3 March 1779, cons. 6 Apl. 1779, M.S.C.P. Range C, vol. 66, pp. 60-6

he would consider its reduction as a hostile act.¹ Haidar's protests had no effect on the Government.² Smith thought that Haidar was just threatening them to join him against the Marathas, and that he would not support the French, a declining power.³ Rumbold also discounted the view that Haidar might break with the English.⁴

[Only the Nawab opposed the measure, and warned the Government that Haidar's threat was not an empty one, that he was firm in his intention to support the French, and that experience had shown that he was true to his word.⁵ The Nawab suggested that the expedition should be deferred and a conciliatory letter be written to Haidar, because even if Mahé was taken, that would not stop the French influx, for Haidar had other ports to receive them. The Nawab further pleaded that the attack should at least be postponed until reinforcements arrived from England, when Haidar would be afraid of provoking them, and that it was extremely unwise to precipitate the issue at a time when Haidar was at the height of his power, and the Marathas were unfriendly. In a letter of 12 pages the Nawab argued very convincingly that it was undesirable to provoke too many enemies at the same time.⁶

[The Government ignored the Nawab's advice. They had always differed from him on Mysore policy. He had all along insisted on a firm policy towards Haidar, and they had advocated a conciliatory one; but now the Nawab urged caution, and they remained firm. Three reasons seem to have been responsible for the Nawab's changed policy. First, his treasury was empty, and his troops were in open rebellion for want of pay.⁶ Secondly, the Nawab had considered in the past

¹ Haidar to Rumbold, 19 March 1779, cons. 7 Apl. 1779, Home Misc. vol. 249, p. 96

² Smith's minute, cons. 18 Feb. 1779, M.S.C.P. Range C, vol. 65, pp. 269-71

³ Rumbold's minute, cons. 22 Feb. 1779, Ibid, pp. 273-6

⁴ Nawab to Madras, 16 Feb. 1779, Home Misc. vol. 249, p. 2

⁵ Nawab to Rumbold, 23 Feb. 1779, Home Misc. vol. 249, pp. 36-48

⁶ Nawab to Madras, 18 Feb. 1779, Home Misc. vol. 249, pp. 10-11

that the Marathas were a sure check on Haidar's aggrandizing policy, but as they were themselves involved now in trouble with the English, they could not be forced to fall on Haidar's territory in the north, should he decide to quarrel with the English. Lastly, the French were no longer a menace to the Nawab in the sense they had been during Dupleix's days. When all their Indian settlements had been reduced, a small pocket on the western coast, the Nawab must have thought, was not likely to affect his interests. But the Madras Government judged the issue in a different light. They advanced two arguments in support of their policy. First, once they assured Haidar of their sincere desire to keep their treaties, he would cease to be hostile, and he would be an useful ally of the Company.¹ Secondly, the instructions brought by Sir Eyre Coote from home were explicit that all the French settlements should be reduced.²

These two reasons do not sufficiently explain the Government's conduct. It is scarcely true that a power would be an useful ally, when a policy diametrically opposite to its intentions was pursued. Nor was it true that the Home Government expected a rigid implementation of their instructions at the risk of involving their affairs in inextricable difficulties. ✓ The firmness in the Madras Government's policy could be attributed to two factors, first, the extreme sensitivity of the English to any French revival, however remote it might be, and secondly, the uneasy relations of the Government with the Nawab, which characterised their policy all through our period of study. The Madras Government thought that, if Haidar had really entertained hostile designs, he could execute them only with the French help from the Islands. If so, it was all the more essential that Mahé, the French base, should be destroyed. Rumbold wrote to Hastings that when Bellecombe had been to the western coast early in 1778, a treaty was

¹ Madras to the Court, 13 March 1779, *Ibid*, vol. 144, p. 35

² Coote's minute, cons. 4 Feb. 1779, *M. S. C. P. Range C*, vol. 65, p. 210

supposed to have been concluded between him and Haidar.¹ Such a treaty was not concluded in 1778, but negotiations were certainly going on, and the French had been unusually active in Haidar's court. The fall of Mahé, according to Rumbold, would result both in eliminating the French influence from India, however feeble it might be at the time, and in reducing Haidar's hostility towards the English, because he would not commit hostilities "unless he sees a French armament ready to support him."²

The second factor which influenced the Madras Government's policy was their relations with the Nawab, which were strained at this time, early in 1779. Rumbold wrote to Hastings that the Nawab was reluctant to pay his instalments due to the Government, and that his "avarice," and "jealousy" had been frustrating their policies.³ When the Nawab pointed out that the Government's policy might result in the invasion of the Carnatic, Rumbold wrote to him, "To suppose the Carnatic in so weak a state as your Highness represents by that Declaration, would be to reflect severely on your Government, and to judge you incapable of that prudent foresight which prompts every wise Prince to be on his Guard against the worst that can happen."⁴ Rumbold added, "By the Blessing of God, the Company were never more able to protect you against your enemies than they are at this moment."⁵ Although this optimism was not warranted by facts, as neither the Government's nor the Nawab's finances were sound, nor were the Government militarily prepared, Rumbold's reaction to the Nawab's advice reveals that even sound advice of the latter had no fair chance of acceptance by the former.

When rumours persisted that war was inevitable, the

¹ Rumbold to Hastings, 23 Feb. 1779, Add. Mss. 29, 143, pp. 101- 2

² Rumbold to Hastings, 26 March 1779, Add. Mss. 29, 143, p. 153

³ Rumbold to Hastings, 3 Jan. 1779, Add. Mss. 29, 142, p. 295

⁴ Rumbold to the Nawab, 25 Feb. 1779, *Minutes of Evidence on the Bar of House of Commons in the case of Rumbold* (hereinafter cited *Minutes of Evidence*) p. 466

⁵ Ibid

Government decided to postpone the expedition.¹ But this decision was revised only three days later on the ground that any postponement would make the Indian powers draw unfair conclusions of the Company's strength, and that the reports prevailing about Haidar in the last week of February showed a little improvement in the situation.² Mahé quickly fell on 19 March, within five days after Braithwaite's arrival before it, without firing a single shot. The fall was so sudden that it disappointed Haidar, whose troops were on their way to the French relief.³

Mahé's reduction was an important cause of the Mysore War. No other factor so much estranged Haidar's relations with the Government as it did. It was from Mahé that he received his main supply of arms. His army trained on western lines would be useless without western arms. The English had stopped giving him all supplies, and they were now closing the other centres from where he could obtain them. As his relations with the Dutch were also strained at this time owing to their support of a few of his disaffected Malabar powers, only the French had been supplying him his essential military requirements. At a time when his Malabar chieftains were in open rebellion against him, if Mahé were also to fall into English hands, and a powerful detachment was stationed there, his affairs were sure to fall into greater confusion. Moreover, Haidar was more apprehensive of the Madras Government, where the Nawab was present, than the Bombay government, with whom his relations were relatively more cordial, and which controlled Tellicherry. Therefore, the control of Mahé from Madras was perhaps more dangerous in his eyes than was Tellicherry from Bombay. It was quite apparent to all military authorities that the easiest way to distress him was to march a force on his strong forts of

¹ Committee's minute, cons. 22 Feb. 1779, Home Misc. vol. 249, p. 25

² Charles Oakely (Secretary to the Govt.) to Braithwaite, 25 Feb. 1779 M.S.C.P. Range C, vol. 65, p. 323

³ Braithwaite to Madras, 19 March 1779, cons. 5 Apl. 1779, Ibid, vol. 66, pp. 46-9

Seringapatam and Bangalore from the western coast. The prospects of both Madras and Bombay having a base on his most sensitive frontier embarrassed him more than any other factor.]

Haidar's apprehensions were not without foundation considering the tone in which Rumbold broke the news of Mahé's fall to him ".....if you persevere in the conduct you have observed of late, I do not see how it [friendship] can be much longer maintained."¹ [Rumbold spoke of punishing an offender, raked up the old issue of Haidar's attack on Murar Rao of Gutti, and wrote to Bengal that not a moment should be lost in concerting measures to oppose Haidar by uniting the armies of all the three presidencies.² Having gained a point over a doubtful friend, Madras should have been more conciliatory, but it became more rigid and asked Bengal to direct General Thomas Goddard, who commanded the Bengal army in Gujarat, to march on Haidar's capital from the western coast, while Madras would send another army from the eastern side.³ Worse still, having thus exhibited its open hostility against Haidar, the Madras Government's military unpreparedness was such that the first step it took to move a soldier was when his horse had come as near as 45 miles from Madras.

✓ The second main cause of Haidar's differences with the English was the border disturbances in Malabar and the policy of the Tellicherry settlement. For Haidar Malabar was a troubled spot where his disaffected subjects, the Nairs, were constantly seeking the support of other European powers, such as the Dutch, the French and the English. It was not in the interest of these European powers that Haidar should become the unchallenged master of the entire Malabar. Peace in the area was frequently disturbed by Haidar's ambitious designs, by the European intervention in the affairs both secretly and openly, and by the hostility of the Nair chiefs, whose mutual

¹ Rumbold to Haidar, 19 Apl. 1779, Home Misc. vol. 249, pp. 97-9

² Madras to Bengal, cons. 23 Apl. 1779, M.S.C.P. Range C, vol. 66, pp. 134-7

³ Ibid


rivalries, frequent change of policies and fighting calibre had added to the confusion.

In order to understand the extremely explosive situation that arose in 1779, a background is necessary. When Haidar conquered Chirakal in 1766, its Raja fled to Tellicherry, under whose protection he remained until 1774.¹ But in that year he made peace with Haidar, and recovered not only his territory but also the Kottiote principality. The fact that Tellicherry had not assisted him in recovering his lost territory, or perhaps the fall of the settlement might enhance his influence, prompted this Raja thereafter to show increasing ill-will towards the settlement. From 1775 he began to obstruct their trade and investment, frequently raided their territory of Randattara, and collected forcible taxes from the people there. In September 1778 when the news reached of hostilities in Europe, he marched to the assistance of the French at Mahé, and remained there until its fall. Thus the Raja of Chirakal had become a main source of annoyance to Tellicherry. He was also the main instrument of Haidar, who used him to awe his disaffected subjects in the area.

The Tellicherry settlement set the other Nair chiefs, such as the old Raja of Kartnadu, the Karingat Nair, and the four Nambiars in the vicinity of Tellicherry, against the Raja of Chirakal and Haidar. All these chieftains were theoretically the subordinates of Haidar, but when he asked them to support the French, they assured Richard Church, the Tellicherry Chief, that they would rather assist the English against the French. Besides, a confederacy of Haidar's discontented chiefs, Kartnadu, Karingat Nair, the Kottiote Raja and the four Nambiars was formed. When the Kottiote Raja sought shelter at Tellicherry, and asked for a supply of arms, the settlement obliged him in both these respects.² Haidar took particular objection to their policy, and complained that they were encouraging his

¹ Tellicherry to George Horsley (Resident at Honavar, appointed in 1780 to proceed to Haidar), 3 Apl. 1780, Factory Records, Tellicherry, vol. 3, pp. 63-4

² Tellicherry Board's minute, cons. 12 March 1779, Factory Records, Tellicherry, vol. 3, pp. 62-3



BORDER DISTURBANCES IN MALABAR

disloyal chiefs. The settlement defended themselves "... as it appeared to us of the highest importance to this settlement at that juncture (for the siege of Mahé was in a manner begun) that the Cotiote country should be in the hands of a power well affected to the Company....we agreed to give him a small supply of Military stores."¹

When Mahé fell the Raja of Chirakal joined Haidar's troops sent under Balavant Rao, and caused disturbances in the territories of the confederates, whose inhabitants fled to Tellicherry. Haidar again complained that they were extending protection to his rebel subjects, but the settlement argued that it was no new feature, for in 1766 and 1777 the Nairs had sought shelter in Tellicherry, and he had taken no umbrage at it.²

During the rainy season of 1779 the Raja of Chirakal planned to attack Tellicherry, seized Randattara and a few other villages belonging to the Company, and on 31 October in alliance with the young Raja of Kartinadu, he besieged Tellicherry. Thereupon the settlement sought the aid of 2,000 troops from their ally, the Raja of Kotiote. This became the third point of Haidar's dispute with Tellicherry.

[Thus both Haidar and the settlement were at fault, and both pursued a policy of self-interest. It was Haidar who first gave orders to the chiefs of Kartinadu and Chirakal to assist the French.³ But the settlement also provoked Haidar by not differentiating between his policy towards Mahé and the policy towards Tellicherry. He exerted his utmost to prevent the fall of Mahé, 'but he was not interested in the fall of Tellicherry. His three complaints of supply of arms to his subjects, protection to them in the Company's territories, and entertaining of a Nair force were well grounded.] Remonstrating against this policy, Braithwaite rightly wrote to the settlement, ".... but in justice to myself I protest against receiving the Cartenadue King, the Cotiote families and the Nambiar Nairs

¹ Tellicherry to Horsley, 3 Apl. 1780, Ibid, p. 70

² Ibid, p. 73

³ Tellicherry to the Court, cons. 4 Feb. 1779, Ibid, p. 27

the first alternative would disturb the peace in the Deccan, and that the second was ineffective, for Basalat might be unwilling to oblige them, and might seek either the Maratha or Haidar's aid. Moreover, the Nizam would be offended, for he was the guarantee in the treaty for his brother's good conduct.¹ Therefore, the Government wrote to the Nizam in order to force Basalat either to let Guntur to the English for an annual rent, or to dismiss the French from his service, and trust the English for his protection.²

This was a sound policy justified by the success that followed by its adoption in 1775, and still more by the failure that resulted from its abandonment in 1779. In 1775 the Nawab had differed from the Government, and had advocated direct negotiation with Basalat, on the ground that the Nizam in private was hostile to the Company, and that Basalat being weak would be willing to supplant the French for the English at his court.³ But the Government had ignored the Nawab's advice.⁴ On 16 November 1775 the Nizam's reply was received intimating that he had asked Basalat to remove all the French from Guntur.⁵ The Bengal Government approved of this policy.⁶ The crisis seemed to pass over, and the influx of the French was temporarily stopped.

When hostilities broke out in Europe in June 1778, the Guntur question again began to loom large. Rumbold accused Basalat of having made Guntur "a nursery of French and other foreign troops."⁷ It was reported that Lally, the French commander, had 500 Europeans and 2,700 sepoys.⁸ Rumbold

¹ Board's minute, cons. 14 Aug. 1775, Ibid, pp. 1059-63

² Madras to the Nizam, 18 Aug. 1775, *Minutes of Evidence*, p. 344

³ Nawab to Madras, 27 Aug. 1775, Ibid, pp. 78-80

⁴ Board's minute, cons. 4 Sept. 1775, Ibid, p. 82

⁵ Nizam to Madras, 16 Nov. 1775, Ibid, pp. 84-5

⁶ Bengal to Madras, 11 Dec. 1775, Ibid, pp. 357-8

⁷ Rumbold's minute, cons. 10 July 1778, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 88, p. 1209

⁸ Rumbold's minute, cons. 26 July 1778, M. S. C. P. Range C, vol. 63, p. 33

their demand. They asked Hollond to exert his utmost at least to secure a partial remission of the tribute, or a complete exemption from its arrears.¹ The Nizam declined to show any concession, threatened war, and asked Hollond to quit his court. Hollond, however, informed Madras that these were empty threats, and that the Nizam's army was a mere rabble.²

The Bengal Government highly disapproved of this policy. The question of the tribute became a serious constitutional dispute between the Madras and the Bengal Governments.³ They thought that the Nizam's resentment was natural in view of the "urgent and spirited terms" in which the Madras Government had made the demand. Constitutionally, Bengal regarded the step as wrong, for a subordinate presidency ought to have taken the permission of the Supreme Government before opening negotiations, which would have led to a new treaty. Politically, when the Company were at war with the Marathas, the Supreme Government judged it unwise to alienate the Nizam.⁴ Therefore, they intervened, informed the Nizam of their intention to remove the cause of his complaint, asked Hollond to suspend his negotiations, and directed the Madras Government to withdraw their demand.⁵

Rumbold, who was chiefly responsible for the policy, protested against the intervention, and entered on a long minute⁶ expressing his concern and surprise at it. He said that the cause of the Nizam's resentment was the Bengal Government's Maratha policy, their attempt to conclude an offensive alliance with Mudaji Bhosle against him, and their continuation of war against the Poona ministers. Rumbold

¹ Madras to Hollond, cons. 9 July 1779, *Ibid.*, pp. 588-90

² Hollond to Madras, 31 Aug. 1779, cons. 13 Sept. 1779, *Ibid.*, pp. 831-42

³ A. P. Dasgupta, *The Central Authority in British India, 1774-84*, pp. 68-73

⁴ Bengal to Madras, 4 Nov. 1779, cons. 14 Dec. 1779, M.S.C.P. Range C, vol. 67, pp. 258-62

⁵ Bengal to the Nizam, 4 Nov. 1779, cons. 14 Dec. 1779, *Ibid.* p. 265

⁶ Very long minute indeed, 73 pages of the Records.

thought that unless the Maratha war was terminated, neither the surrender of Guntur, nor the payment of the tribute, nor any other concession could appease the Nizam.¹

In this dispute the Bengal Government were right and the Madras Government, wrong. [Accepting the fact that Madras finances were bad, the time chosen to secure the remission was the most ill-judged, for all the major powers in India had been offended at this time in some way or other by the Company. At a time when Rumbold had been personally apprized of the Nizam's umbrage at the Guntur policy, it was extremely impolitic to have raised the tribute issue. It enhanced greatly the Nizam's bitterness for the Company, caused a distrust of their good faith among the Indian powers, and added to the existing embarrassments of all the three presidencies.]

Why did Rumbold pursue such a policy? Ever since he arrived in India, he had not been well disposed towards the Nizam. As early as 25 April 1778 he had written to Hastings, "The Nizam wants some check, he trifles with us on every occasion, and we are paying him a tribute of six Lacks of Rupees annually for taking every opportunity to act with our enemies."² Being nearer to the Nizam than Hastings was, Rumbold watched with indignation the Nizam's hostility towards the Company's Maratha policy. Rumbold was in constant correspondence with Fazal Baig Khan of Nirmal, the Nizam's commander, who was ill-disposed towards his master.³ When the French influence was destroyed at Pondicherry, Mahé and Guntur, when a defensive alliance was concluded with Basalat, and when an English detachment was well on its way to Adoni in June 1779, it is quite likely that Rumbold must have thought that the opportune occasion was well on hand to check the Nizam's hostility. Considering the Nizam's weakness, Rumbold's policy would have been successful, if only Haidar had not been ill-disposed towards Madras, and the Company

¹ Rumbold's minute, cons. 30 Dec. 1779, M. S. C. P. Range C, vol. 67, p. 311-83

² Rumbold to Hastings, 25 Apl. 1778, Add. Mss. 29, 140, p. 315

³ Rumbold to Hastings, 11 July 1779, Add. Mss. 29, 143, p. 457

had not been at war with the Marathas.

Along with the question of the tribute, Bumbold's policy towards Holond became another point of dispute between Madras and Bengal.¹ Although the Madras Government had authorised Holond to keep Bengal informed of all his proceedings at Hyderabad, Bumbold took serious objection and recalled Holond to Madras, when he sent all correspondence to Hastings. Holond refused to return to Madras, and the Nizam was now anxious to retain him until the Bengal Government satisfied him on the questions of Guntur and the tribute. On knowing the recall of Holond from Hyderabad, Hastings appointed him Bengal minister to the Nizam. This provoked Madras to dismiss Holond.² This was done at a time when Bumbold was not present at Madras and yet he was responsible for it because Stephen Sullivan, the Military Secretary at Madras, wrote to Hastings, "You will perceive how unjustly Mr. Whitehill and Sir Hector Munro consider themselves as Executors of this last political testament of Sir Thomas's respecting Mr. Holond's suspension. I sincerely hope the Supreme Council will retaliate upon these Gentlemen."³ When the Bengal Government learnt of the suspension, they took him into their service.⁴ In Holond's question also, Bumbold was at fault, for Holond had not committed any serious offence or deserve suspension. The fact is that he was needlessly victimised for the umbrage Bumbold took on Hastings' intervention, although that intervention was quite justified.

The effect of this dispute on Salidar's relations with the English was that the Nizam came still closer to Salidar and the Indian powers displayed greater hostility towards the Company. Bumbold did not realise that his policy might unite the Indian powers. The only step he took to counteract their hostility

was the despatch of a secret embassy to Haidar in July 1779. The purpose was to know Haidar's real intentions, for it was quite likely, Rumbold thought, that the reports of Haidar's hostility coming through the Nawab's channel were grossly exaggerated.¹ The person chosen for the embassy was a Danish missionary, Christian Frederick Swartz, because of his knowledge of the Indian languages, his disinterestedness in the politics of Indian powers, and the possibility of his going without pomp, keeping the mission a secret. Swartz accepted the commission thinking that it was not political, as he had merely to deliver Rumbold's letter to Haidar and know his intentions, that it might give him a chance to preach Christianity in a new land, and that he could show his regard to the Company, who had been of much help to him.²

Rumbold asked Haidar to declare frankly to Swartz whether he was willing to remain friendly or not. If he was willing, Rumbold offered to see him personally in order to "use the most proper expedients to render our friendship lasting."³ If Haidar was not willing to be friendly, he was to send back Swartz safely. Swartz set out in July, and arrived at Seringapatam on 25 August 1779. Haidar treated him kindly, and made it appear that he would compose his differences with the English. He told Swartz that despite the breach of the treaty by the English, he was willing to live in peace with them, but the Nawab was the main difficulty in the way. Haidar added, "If they offer me the hand of peace and concord, I shall not withdraw mine, provided——."⁴ What precise condition Haidar added here is not known, but despite his condescending attitude, Swartz could detect that Haidar was not well disposed towards the English. He narrated all his differences with them from the time of the Nawab's refusal to surrender

¹ Rumbold's minute, cons. 23 Oct. 1779, M. S. C. P. Range C, vol. 67 pp. 49-51

² H. Pearson, *Memoirs of the Rev. C. F. Swartz*, vol. I, p. 344

³ Rumbold to Haidar, 11 June 1779, *First Report by the Committee of Secrecy*, 1781, App. No. 37, p. 405

⁴ H. Pearson, *Memoirs of Rev. C.F. Swartz*, vol. I, pp. 359-62


Trichinopoly to his latest disputes, Mahé, Guntur and the disturbances in Malabar.

In his letter to Rumbold Haidar rejected the suggestion of a new treaty, and expressed himself strongly against the Madras Government's failure to assist him in the past. He observed, "I was convinced that the King of England and the Company were one, and that there would not be the smallest deviation from the treaties made by the Company, but I now think otherwise from your proceedings."¹ The letter was quite contrary to the spirit with which he treated Swartz, whom he paid 300 rupees for his travel expenses. But the letter served the purpose for which the embassy had been sent, namely to know Haidar's real intentions. The French were active in his court, and the Nizam and the Marathas were pressing for an alliance. At this juncture Rumbold's feeble attempt to disengage him from opposing forces by sending a peaceful missionary was not effective. [Events were fast moving towards an Indian confederacy against the English.

A powerful confederacy, such as had never been seen before, of the Indian powers came into being towards the close of the year 1779. The confederates, Nana, the Nizam, Sindhia, Bhosle and Haidar, agreed to attack all the presidencies of the Company. Nana and Sindhia were to take Bombay, Bhosle would invade Bengal, the Nizam would seize the Sarkars, and Haidar would attack the Carnatic.] In order to understand who formed the confederacy, and what was Haidar's part in it, a brief recapitulation is necessary.

Ever since the death of Madhava Rao I in 1772 Poona became a scene of constant revolutions, and Raghunath Rao, his uncle, became the most disturbing element in the Maratha politics. Raghunath Rao had connections with the Bombay Government from so early a period as 1761. In March 1775 they concluded a treaty with him by which he confirmed the grant of Bassein and Salsette to them in return for their aid for

¹ Haidar to Rumbold, undated, *First Report of the Committee of Secretaries* 1781, Appendix No. 37, pp. 405-6



INDIA OF HASTINGS'S PERIOD

the purpose of regaining his power at Poona. The Bengal Government disapproved of this treaty, and concluded another treaty at Purandhar in 1776, by which Raghunath Rao renounced his claim to the Peshwaship, and the Poona ministers agreed to cede Salsette to the Company. This intervention displeased the Bombay Government, who gave asylum to Raghunath Rao and concluded a fresh alliance with him in 1777.

In November 1777 the same Chevalier de St. Lubin who had made so much mischief during the first Mysore war, arrived at Poona in the assumed capacity of a minister from the French Court to the Peshwa. Nana gave him a grand reception, held secret conferences with him, and treated the English Resident, Thomas Mostyn, coldly, "with distance and contempt," having gone so far as to ask him to quit Poona. Nana entered into a treaty with St. Lubin by which the French were to supply him with military stores and troops in return for a port, Chowl, only 12 miles from Bombay. Although St. Lubin was regarded as an imposter by the other Frenchmen, particularly at Chandranagar, still Chevalier, its governor, corresponded with him.¹ Bellecombe went round to Malabar with nearly 300 Europeans, which fact made the English apprehensive lest the French intrigue at Poona should assume more dangerous proportions.² Although St. Lubin was dismissed in July 1778, the English apprehensions did not subside, specially as a war with France in Europe was expected at any moment.

In July 1778 when the news of the outbreak of hostilities in Europe was known in India, the Bengal Government took the momentous decision of concluding an offensive alliance with Mudaji Bhosle both to counteract the French intrigue in India, and to reduce the Maratha power at Poona. Hastings deputed Elliot to Mudaji to conclude an offensive treaty both against the Poona ministers and the Nizam. In August 1778 hoping

¹ Hastings to Colonel Mathews Leslie, 7 March 1778, Add. Mss. 29, 140, pp. 165-6

² Hornby to Bengal, 5 Apl. 1778, Ibid, pp. 249-9v

that Mudaji would accept the offer of an offensive alliance Hastings sent a detachment under Colonel Mathews Leslie to Berar in order to execute any treaty Elliot might conclude with Mudaji.

These proceedings of the Bengal Government caused a great stir in the Indian courts, particularly at Poona and at Hyderabad. The Poona court's resentment was natural, but the Nizam was also highly perturbed, for he had all along opposed Raghunath Rao's accession to power. Besides, Hastings' new design to assist Mudaji in recovering his districts from the Nizam increased the Nizam's hostility towards the English. Although Hastings' instruction to Elliot were extremely confidential, they were leaked out when a packet from Hastings to Mudaji was intercepted, and sent to Poona.¹ Although the Bengal Government's policy was different from the Bombay Government's in that the latter supported Raghunath Rao, and the former, Mudaji, the Nizam had strong reasons to oppose both these measures, for his interests would have been adversely affected, had either policy been successful. On top of all, when Rumbold acquired Guntur, sent a detachment there, and demanded the remission of the tribute, the Nizam reacted more violently than any other power. He regarded all the three presidencies as his enemies, because of the Bombay Government's support of Raghunath Rao, Hastings' support of Mudaji, and Rumbold's support of Basalat. As if the chain of hostilities was not enough, Rumbold was fast losing Haidar's friendship by a series of blunders. [Never had the Company's servants exhibited a greater contempt for the Indian powers. They attempted to bring about a total subversion of the Maratha power at Poona. They tried to take undue advantage of the Nizam's weakness, until he used all his arts and policy to retaliate them. They provoked Haidar by disregarding all his advances when he was friendly, and by adopting a wrong policy in Malabar and in Guntur when he

¹ Hastings to L. Sullivan, 29 Nov. 1778, Gleig, *Memoirs of W. Hastings*, vol. II, p. 220

was unfriendly. It was not merely the folly of the Company's servants in India that brought their affairs into confusion, but their home government were also equally guilty, for they approved of the treaty with Raghunath Rao, and urged Hastings not to let down the Bombay Government. The British Empire in India had taken till then the appearance of an accident, but it gave now the impression of a considered policy. It was to check these ambitious designs, and to seek satisfaction for their personal grievances, that the several Indian powers sank their differences, and came together into a powerful confederacy.

Who took the leading part in the formation of the Confederacy is a controversial question. Among the confederates, Nana, Sindhia, the Nizam, Haidar and Mudaji Bhosle, the last could easily be excluded, for he was on the most cordial terms with Hastings even after joining the Confederacy. Concerning the rest, various views are held. Rao Bahadur Sardesai makes Nana the mainspring of the grand alliance.¹ Professor Sinha thinks that it was on Haidar's initiative that Nana formed the Confederacy.² The Nizam himself claimed that he was the author, and this view was accepted both by Hastings and Philip Francis. Hastings wrote to the Court, "If the extorted and palliated confessions of the Nabob Nizam Ally Cawn may be credited (and we have the evidence of the most public notoriety to confirm) it was the sole effect of a confederacy formed at his instigation."³ Francis declared before the Parliamentary Committee in the case of Rumbold, "I consider and have no doubt but that it was the Nizam of the Deccan."⁴ But none of these views seems to represent what really had happened.

There is no doubt that the Nizam had some justification for his bold assertion that he played the leading role, but that

¹ G.S. Sardesai, *New History of the Marathas*, vol. III, pp. 94-5

² N.K. Sinha, *Haidar Ali*, pp. 176-8

³ Hastings to the Court, 2 Dec. 1780, *Sixth Report by the Committee of Secrecy*, 1781, Appendix No. 328, p. 923

⁴ *Minutes of Evidence*, pp. 449-51

was in the early stages, and not in the actual formation of the Confederacy.] As early as April 1778 Rumbold wrote to Hastings that the Nizam had ordered his commander, Fazal Baig Khan, to proceed to Poona with a body of troops for the purpose of assisting the ministers.¹ In June 1778 the Nizam wrote to Madras, "...if the gentlemen at Bengal in supporting Ragonaut Row are determined to make war with the Pundit Purdhaun Madherow, I shall be obliged, in consideration of the treaty subsisting between him and me to give him every possible assistance on my part."² The Nizam wrote to Bengal also in the same tone expressing the same desire of assisting the Poona ministers.³ In the Bengal Government's instructions to Elliot for concluding an offensive alliance with Mudaji, we read that the Nizam was "now in close Union with the Ministers of Poona."⁴ William Farmer, a Bombay civilian, wrote from Poona to William Hornby, the Bombay Governor, that in return for the Nizam's services Nana had promised him certain districts, which Haidar had usurped from the Marathas.⁵ These facts show that an union of interests between Nana and the Nizam had already taken place. But there is some difference between vague promises of help and the actual commitment to assist by a formal treaty, which had not yet been envisaged.

In August 1778, after the Bengal Government sent Elliot and Leslie to Mudaji, Hastings received a copy of Nana's letter to the Nizam urging for aid, and stating, "We shall manage the English by means of the French whose Vackeel is with us, with whom we have entered into a Treaty. After the present Disturbances are quelled we shall call in his Troops, act in the most vigorous manner, to be a future example to others."⁶ Nana assumes leadership thereafter in organizing the confederacy. The Nizam had so long only talking of concerted

¹ Rumbold to Hastings, 25 Apl. 1778, Add. Mss. 29, 140, pp. 314-5

² The Nizam to Madras, 21 June 1778, *Minutes of Evidence*, p. 431

³ The Nizam to Bengal, 23 July 1778, *Ibid*, p. 432

⁴ S. Weitzmann, *Warren Hastings and Philip Francis*, Appendix, p. 345

⁵ Farmer to Hornby, 7 May 1778, Add. Mss. 29, 140, pp. 355-7

⁶ Quoted in Hastings to Elliot, 2 Aug. 1778, Add. Mss. 29, 141, p. 214

measures to oppose the Company but Nana took the first effective step by bringing a third party, the French, into the picture. It must be remembered how important this French intrigue was. But for St. Lubin's presence at Poona and Bellecombe's going to Malabar with troops, we doubt very much if Hastings would have made advances to Mudaji, particularly when both Francis and Wheeler had opposed the measure.

What was Haidar's role at this time, the middle of 1778? He was at war with the ministerial party at Poona, who had included the Nizam also against him. In April 1778 Rumbold wrote to Hastings, "I have received the most pressing entreaties from Hyder to enter into some engagements with him, and to bring about a junction of a part of our own troops with his; he promises to assist in establishing Ragaboy at Poona, to pay the expenses of any troops we will assist him with, to enter into the strictest Treaty of alliance with us, and to grant any conditions we may wish on behalf of the Company."¹ Haidar made advances both to the Madras and Bombay Governments. His *vakil* at Bombay proposed to Hornby that Haidar would cede even land in return for an offensive and deffensive alliance.² Therefore, at a time when Nana and the Nizam were exhibiting open hostility towards the Company, Haidar was earnestly soliciting their aid. Haidar's policy did not change until the fall of Pondicherry in October 1778. Till then his and the English policies towards the Marathas were identical. Haidar was as much a supporter of Ragunath Rao's cause as the English were. He had seized the Maratha territories south of the Krishna which had offended the Poona ministers, as also Cuddapah and Karnul which had offended the Nizam. When the French, the Marathas and the Nizam had openly exhibited their hostility against the Company, Haidar had given them the greatest assurances of his attachment to them, although this attachment was intended to serve his own interests.

¹ Rumbold to Hastings, 25 Apl. 1778, Add. Mss. 29, 140, p. 314

² Cyphered enclosure in Hastings' letter to Elliot, 12 Aug. 1778, Add. Mss. 29 141, p. 282

In July 1778 the Bengal Government learnt of the hostilities in Europe. Events moved quite fast; the capture of Chandranagar, the despatch of Elliot to Nagpur, the march of Leslie's detachment to Berar, and the fall of Pondicherry, all followed in quick succession. About the same time, July 1778, Nana emerged leader in a series of revolutions at Poona, and his rival Moraba Phadnis applied to Bombay for help. The Bombay Government resolved to support Raghunath Rao, and to conduct him to Poona. The Bengal Government authorised that measure, provided it was not contrary to any engagement that Elliot might conclude with Mudaji.¹ Leslie died in October, but the march was not stopped. The command fell to a more energetic soldier, Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Goddard. In November the Bombay Government sent a detachment to conduct Raghunath Rao to Poona, and Bumbold acquired Guntur, concluding a defensive alliance with Basalat. These events precipitated great diplomatic activity. All the Indian powers were stirred. The Poona ministers stood in the immediate danger of losing all power. The Nizam's districts in Berar were likely to be seized. Haider grew restless, for his supply depots of Pondicherry and Guntur were cut off, and Mahé was about to be taken. Thus all the major powers began to feel that their interests would suffer, if the activities of the Company's servants were not stopped.

On learning that a Bombay army was well on way to Poona, Nana asked the Nizam for aid. Fazal Baig Khan, the Nizam's commander, who was at Poona, but who was not on good terms with his master, informed Mudaji that Nana had offered the Nizam a grant of land in return for his aid. Dalsie Watherston, whom Goddard had sent to Nagpur to know Mudaji's intentions, wrote to Goddard, "They [the Poona ministers] propose to the Nizam as an inducement for his joining them to assist him in attacking Arcot. They have also instructed their Minister at this court, Bapu Row, to demand the assistance of the Rajah [Mudaji] and have promised to send Scindeah and Helkar with a Body of Troops to assist him in

¹ Gleig, *Memoirs of Warren Hastings*, vol. II, pp. 214-9

levying the Chout of Bengal. They have further proposed to the Rajah to give him an extent of country in the Province of Khendish, that will yield a Revenue equal to that of Cuttack.”¹ The Nizam needed no new inducement. The news of the Bombay Government’s support of Raghunath Rao was enough to fire his jealousy. He readily responded to Nana’s call, and joined him, besides, in inducing Mudaji to do the same. Disappointing Hastings’ high hopes, Mudaji declined to countenance his policy, and refused to co-operate with Goddard.² Lieutenant James Anderson, who arrived at Nagpur after Elliot’s death, wrote to Hastings, “ I have every reason to believe that they [Mudaji and his ministers] have been under the necessity of giving particular assurances both to the Peshwah and Nizam Ally that they will in no respect whatever assist the English.”³ The threat of the Poona ministers together with their inducements, the large Maratha army already assembled, and the Nizam’s horse 10,000 in number stationed near Berar, acted as strong reasons for a change of mind in Mudaji.⁴ This indicates that both Nana and the Nizam were active in the field, but the main initiative had come from Poona. The greatest difficulty in the way of a confederacy was of inducing Mudaji to join it, for Hastings had taken a far-sighted step of winning the support of an important member of the Maratha Empire, unlike the Bombay Government who obtained the support of Raghunath Rao, a person who was disliked in all circles, and who had no army, no finance, and no state to be of any material help to the Company, until they won a battle for him.

Why did Mudaji decline to accept Hastings’ aid ? Hastings had promised him the Peshwaship at Poona. Relations between Mudaji and Hastings had been so cordial that the latter took it for granted that whatever he would propose, the former would accept. This did not happen because of the Bombay

¹ Watherston to Goddard, 27 Dec. 1778, Add. Mss. 29, 142, pp. 251-2

² Hastings to Sullivan, 29 Nov. 1778, Gleig, *Memoirs of Warren Hastings*, vol. II, pp. 219-20

³ Anderson to Hastings, 28 Nov. 1778, Add. Mss. 29, 142, p. 93

⁴ Ibid

Government's wrong policy at this time. They espoused Raghunath Rao's cause, and actually sent an army to restore him to power. This caused a change in Mudaji who had been promised power at Poona, and who now thought that he was deceived.¹ It was because of Raghunath Rao that Hastings was disappointed in his expectations of Mudaji, and it was again because of Raghunath Rao that the Nizam was so hostile against the English. The Bombay Government's decision to support him was the most unfortunate.

The Select Committee at Bombay appointed a committee of three persons, Colonel John Carnac, Colonel Egerton and Thomas Mostyn, to conduct Raghunath Rao to Poona. This decision was a mistake, for Bombay should have learnt a lesson from the first Mysore War, when a similar committee of Field Deputies had brought the Madras affairs almost to a similar ruin. The drama was enacted in Bombay as well. Having advanced as close as 18 miles from Poona, the committee decided to retreat, resulting in the humiliating Convention of Wodgaon on 12 January 1779.² Hornby wrote to Hastings that on 11 January, the day the retreat was ordered, the Poona ministers had sent a *vakil* to Bombay seeking accommodation on the basis of giving an appointment to Raghunath Rao and paying all the expenses of the expedition.³ A day later the retreat decided the issue in the Maratha favour. The Convention had a profound effect on Indian powers, who were encouraged by the military weakness of a Company's government. The Convention had one more important effect. It introduced a new power, who was destined to dominate Indian politics for a decade and a half, namely, Mahadaji Sindhia. It was to Sindhia that Raghunath Rao delivered himself up. It was Sindhia who dictated the Convention and who retained the two English hostages, Farmer and Lieutenant Charles Stewart.⁴ It was Sindhia's leadership that had won success in the field, and it

¹ Watherston to Goddard, 24 Dec. 1778, Add. Mss. 29, 142, pp. 228-30

² Farmer to Popham, 20 Jan. 1779, Add. Mss. 29, 142, pp. 107-9

³ Hornby to Hastings, 5 April 1779, Add. Mss. 29, 143, pp. 188-9

⁴ Goddard to Hastings, 8 Feb. 1779, Ibid, p. 39

was he who assumed the chief role in the Maratha politics after the Convention. Nana was still powerful, but he was a man of political abilities, like Dupleix, with no military prowess. Sindhia like Haidar was proficient in both, and leadership in those days very often devolved on those who possessed both these talents.

Sindhia's conduct from January to July 1779 was quite strange. He was expected to be highly displeased with Goddard's march to Surat, but he was not displeased. Likewise the Bombay Government's peremptory repudiation of the Convention was expected to enhance Sindhia's resentment of them, but it did not. Goddard suspected, "The cause seems to me very evident as he may want very shortly our assistance."¹ Sindhia commanded the largest force, 50,000 cavalry, of all the Maratha chieftains, and his power in the army had excited Nana's jealousy. In May there were dissensions at Poona, the leaders being divided into two camps, Nana and Hari Pant Phadke on one side, Sindhia and Holkar on the other. Although Sindhia possessed no nominal authority at Poona, "he was said to control everything."² From these events the inference is that there had been a shift in the Maratha leadership from Nana to Sindhia, and that the confederacy had not yet come into being.

In June 1779 a dramatic event took place. Raghunath Rao escaped from Sindhia's custody, and fled to Goddard, who gave him protection.³ Once again the Indian courts at Poona, Hyderabad and Nagpur were electrified with hectic activity. Raghunath Rao had renounced earlier all claims to the Peshwaship, and had thrown the insignia of royalty received from the titular Raja of Satara into the Ganges.⁴ But that did not prevent him from taking one more chance. It must be remembered that it was from Sindhia's control that he had fled. Sindhia's honour was at stake. The escape added

¹ Goddard to Hastings, 28 Apl. 1779, Add. Mss. 29, 143, p. 207

² Goddard to Hastings, 2 June 1779, Ibid, pp. 349-50

³ Goddard to Hastings, 6 June 1779, Ibid, p. 368

⁴ Farmer to Oakley, 17 June 1779, Add. Mss. 29, 143, p. 392

to Nana's jealousy of Sindhia.¹ It looked as if Sindhia would strain every nerve to retrieve his honour. The Convention was emphatic that the English should in no case extend shelter to Raghunath Rao. Farmer wrote to Charles Oakley, the Secretary at Madras, "My situation is very critical. . . . it is touching the people here in a very tender point."² Before Raghunath Rao's escape Sindhia had perplexed Nana by his demands for Ahmednagar and 30 lakhs of rupees, but after the escape the differences between the two were composed.³ Before the escape Sindhia had stood for accommodation, and Nana had defeated his attempts, but after the escape, Sindhia was converted to Nana's view.

Nana made urgent appeals to the Nizam for an alliance. Goddard wrote to Hastings, "What is most deserving of attention in his Letter is the diligence used by Nana to engage Nizam ally in the Confederacy with himself, and his address in working upon the passions of the Mogul Prince, by artfully representing the flight of Ghazi-ud-deen Cawn⁴ to Stuart, and his having been permitted to remain there."⁵ The Nizam once again responded favourably and exhibited more bad temper on the escape than Nana did. The Nizam wrote to Nana, "I will repair in person to you, and rouse that bad race from their Dream of Security, and overthrow all their ambitious designs."⁶ Nana renewed his contact with the French also through their agent at Poona, Niamatulla, with whom he ascertained the possibility of securing their aid.⁷ Dewagar Pandit, Mudaji's minister, undertook a journey in July from Nagpur to Poona. The fall of Mahé had incensed Haidar. Thus the situation was ripe for a closer understanding among all the Indian powers,

¹ Goddard to Hastings, 12 June 1779, *Ibid*, p. 386

² Farmer to Oakley, 17 June 1779, *Ibid*, p. 392

³ Goddard to Hastings, 15 July, 1779, *Ibid*, p. 475

⁴ Gazi-ud-din was the son of the eldest brother of the Nizam, and was a claimant to the Subahship of the Deccan.

⁵ Goddard to Hastings, 15 July 1779, *Add. Mss.* 29, 143, p. 472

⁶ The Nizam to Nana, undated, *Minutes of Evidence*, p. 424

⁷ Goddard to Hastings, 15 July 1779, *Add. Mss.* 29, 143, p. 472

Nana, the Nizam, Sindhia, Mudaji and Haidar.

The intense activity of July and August bore fruit in September, when Goddard broke the first news of a confederacy to Hastings, that Nana and Sindhia had entered into a sealed and written agreement with Haidar, the Nizam and Mudaji to make a general attack upon all the three presidencies. Goddard added that the information he had received seemed to be authentic, for Sindhia had gone from Ujjain to Poona, where Dewagar Pandit and the *vakils* from the Nizam and Haidar were also present.¹ This news was authentic in all respects except for Haidar's formal inclusion, which took place in February 1780. Goddard received further intelligence confirming the Confederacy. Some merchants at Poona wrote to their agents at Surat not to enter into new transactions as an extensive war was likely to flare up soon. Goddard added, "Indeed the report is so corroborated from other Quarters that without this proof, I should scarcely admit a doubt within my own Breast of its authenticity."² The Indian Confederacy had undoubtedly come into existence.

Why did Mudaji join the Confederacy? Goddard gives us an explanation, which throws new light on our knowledge of the Confederacy. He wrote to Hastings, "I have been secretly informed that Scindia advised Nana to gain over Moodajee to their Interests by representing how much more it would be for his honour & advantage to connect himself with them who were Marattas than with the English by offering to invest him with the office of Sinaputta,"³ one of the most considerable in the State, and nearly corresponding with that of Bucksly in the Mogul Courts, and to give the Vacant dignity of Sahou Raja to Chimna, the Raja's second son. With these splendid and flattering offers & promises of assistance, if Moodajee would raise an army of Thirty Thous[an]d men to attack Bengal, the Dewan was dismissed to his Master."⁴ Hastings had promised

¹ Goddard to Hastings, 29 Sept. 1779, Add. Mss. 29, 144, p. 92

² Goddard to Hastings, 4 Oct. 1779, Add. Mss. 29, 144, pp. 98-99

³ Senapathi, Commander-in-chief of the Maratha Empire.

⁴ Goddard to Hastings, 20 Oct. 1779, Add. Mss. 29, 144, p. 125

Mudaji the Peshwaship at Poona, but Sindhia overreached Hastings by promising much more, the post of commander-in-chief to Mudaji, and the titular headship of the state to his son, Chimnaji. In those days when power was steadily passing from heads of state to ministers, the office of commander-in-chief was certainly much more attractive than the Peshwaship. Whether Sindhia was sincere in this offer cannot be ascertained, but it served the immediate purpose, namely to disengage Mudaji from Hastings and include him in the Confederacy. We give some credit to Goddard's intelligence, for otherwise it is difficult to explain Mudaji's conduct, who having promised full support to Hastings, disappointed him so much as to join his hostile camp. Sindhia seems to be the main instrument in bringing over Mudaji to the minister's side. Mudaji later wrote to Hastings that it was the Nizam who had compelled him to join the confederacy.¹ The Nizam owned to that fact, and told Hollond that he had threatened Mudaji of an attack, if he did not participate in the Confederacy.² But in view of what Goddard wrote to Hastings, the Nizam's bold assertion was a boast, and Mudaji's explanation to Hastings was an excuse to cover up his shortcoming.

Why did the Nizam join the Confederacy? This is not difficult to explain. He had been consistently opposed to English support of Raghunath Rao. Rumbold's conclusion of an alliance with Basalat, the acquisition of Guntur, the despatch of a force there, and the demand for the remission of the tribute further alienated the Nizam from the English. Having joined the Confederacy, the Nizam did not execute his share of the responsibility, namely an attack on the Sarkars, because Hastings appeased him in time by assuring him that Raghunath Rao's cause would not be supported, that the demand for the remission of the tribute would not be pressed, and that Guntur would not be retained. Raghunath Rao recedes into back-

¹ Mudaji to Hastings, 19 Jan. 1780, *Cal. Per. Corresp.* vol. V, No. 1714, pp. 402-3

² Hollond to Hastings, 12 Aug. 1780, *Add. Mss.* 29, 145, pp. 365-7

ground from that time, and his cause was never heard of. This was a wise move on Hastings' part.

Haidar's part in the formation of the Confederacy was very little. He was rather induced to join it. In the confused politics of the Marathas he was not sure which party, Raghunath Rao or Nana, would finally win. He had nothing to gain from either. Left to himself, he would have preferred Raghunath Rao's accession to power. One of the articles of his treaty with the Marathas stated, "In course of the war, should Ragonaut Row be taken prisoner, you [Haidar] require him to be given up to you. This, as he is our particular enemy, we cannot agree to, but on knowing your reasons, we will endeavour to accommodate ourselves to them."¹ As late as September 1779 his differences with the Poona court had not been resolved, for Krishna Rao Ballal, Nana's agent, asked Haidar to join the alliance and to give up his designs on Adoni and Mudagal belonging to Basalat.² In January 1780 Nana sent a person, Krishna Rao Joshi, to Haidar to settle the outstanding differences, and prepare the ground for his entry into the confederacy.⁴ Nana was still demanding a large sum towards the arrears of the *chauth*. The confirmation of the Maratha districts in Haidar's occupation was another difficulty. George Grey, whom Rumbold sent to Haidar in February 1780, wrote in his Journal that Haidar deputed a person to Nana to adjust his differences with the Poona court.⁴ It was only in February 1780 that a formal treaty between Haidar and the Marathas was concluded.⁵ Haidar joined the confederacy because the Madras Government disturbed his relations with the French, who had been supplying him with

¹ Articles of a treaty of Alliance between Hyder Ally Khan and the Marathas, *First Report by the Com. of Secrecy*, 1781, Appendix No. 18, pp. 287-8

² Krishna Rao to Haidar, (10 Aswini) 5 Sept. 1779, V. K. Rajvade, *Itihasa Sadhanen*, vol. 10, No. 235, pp. 164-5

³ News from Poona, 13 Jan. 1780, *Cal. Pers. Corres.* vol. V, No. 1706, p. 399

⁴ Grey's Journal, Home Misc. vol. 250, p. 15

⁵ Sardesai, *New History of the Marathas*, vol. III, p. 95

arms, and not because he was interested in Maratha politics. He was interested in the problems nearer his home, namely the policy of Madras with respect to Guntur and Mahé, and the disturbances on his western coast. Added to these, Haidar's own ambitions had something to do with his participation in the confederacy. When the Company's governments were involved in difficulties, he would not miss an opportunity to advance his own interests.

Thus it appears that it was neither the Nizam, nor Nana, nor Haidar who was the main architect of the confederacy, but it was Sindhia. All the violent outbursts of the Nizam ever since March 1778 had come to nothing. All the diplomatic skill and shrewdness of Nana had been equally fruitless. But when Sindhia took a keen interest after Raghunath Rao's escape in June 1779, the confederacy was formed within three months. The idea of a confederacy might have originated with Nana, but in its execution Sindhia's part was decisive, for Mudaji's inclusion in it which was the most difficult part of it, was accomplished by Sindhia's intervention. Sindhia of course worked from behind the scene, and all negotiations were conducted in Nana's name. The escape of Raghunath Rao seems to have been the deciding factor in making Sindhia take an active interest, and in rallying all the Maratha chieftains to the ranks of the Poona ministers. Nana's negotiations with Haidar had made no progress until Sindhia's influence became more manifest in the Poona politics. In May 1782 Mudaji told Chapman, Hastings' representative at Nagpur, that Sindhia was the person who negotiated an alliance between Haidar and the Marathas.¹ As Nana had been at war with Haidar, it is quite probable that Haidar became more inclined to join the confederacy only after Sindhia stood guarantee for the faithful observance of the terms of the alliance, although Guntur, Mahé and Tellicherry counted more with Haidar than Maratha politics.² We lack corroborative evidence to establish Sindhia's role in the Confederacy on a more solid basis, but until that can

¹ Chapman to Hastings, 29 May 1782, Add. Mss. 29, 154, p. 313

² Sardesai, *New History of the Marathas*, vol. III, p. 95

be done or undone by the availability of more evidence, we regard Sindhia as having played the most vital part in the final stages of the Confederacy.

✓Haidar's own contribution to the Confederacy was his understanding with the French, which made it more powerful. This understanding was reached by the French initiative. A Frenchman, Piveron de Morlat, who was formerly Procureur General at Pondicherry, resided at his court, and became his friend.¹ The French governor at the Isles of France, De Souillac, an energetic person, was anxious to retrieve the French losses in India. He instructed Piveron to conclude an offensive and defensive alliance with Haidar, by which both parties were to "chastise the English." The French would send 15 or 16,000 men to the Coromandel coast to co-operate with Haidar, who was to bear their expenses and give them provisions.² Although a definite treaty of alliance was not concluded between Haidar and the French, the relations between the two had so far improved that Sir Eyre Coote thought that a treaty had been actually concluded. He sent a copy of the proposed treaty to the Earl of Hillsborough, Secretary of State for War, and did not doubt its authenticity.³ But the treaty had remained only in the negotiation stage. In 1782 when the French sent an expedition to India, the first object that agitated their minds was the conclusion of a treaty with Haidar.

When it became apparent that Haidar would break with the Madras Government, they urged the Bengal Government to end the Maratha war.⁴ Except for writing to them, Madras took no other step. It neither assembled a force, nor repaired the forts, nor stocked any provisions, although it was daily in receipt of reports concerning Haidar's hostility. Only Smith

¹ *Memoirs sur l'Inde, Memoirs et Documents, Asie, Archives des Affaires Etrangères*, vol. 7, p. 279

² *Instructions to Piveron de Morlat, Correspondance General, Archives Nationales*, vol. Colonies C2, 155, pp. 95-98

³ *Articles of a Treaty of Alliance between Hyder and the French, First Report by the Com. of Secrecy, 1781, Appendix No. 18, pp. 288-9*

⁴ *Madras to Bengal, cons. 30 Oct. 1779, M.S.C.P. Range C, vol. 67, pp. 79-80*

urged immediate preparations of war, for he thought that a war was inevitable considering Haidar's policy towards the French, and his unfriendly letter through Swartz.¹ The majority, Rumbold, Whitehill and Munro, did not agree with this view, and did nothing except for writing another letter to Bengal stating that in view of Haidar's assembling of a force of 50,000 men, it was essential that an English army should march from the western coast to surprise his capital.² The majority pleaded want of resources for any military preparations.³

It was difficult for the Bengal Government who were at a distance, who were involved in a Maratha war, and who were divided in their council by the opposition of Francis' group, to understand fully the gravity of the situation in the Carnatic. Moreover, the Bengal Government had been used to hearing constantly only one type of report about Haidar, namely that he was anxious for an alliance with the English. Therefore, when they learnt of something different, they wrote back, "We cannot ourselves distinguish anything in the immediate conduct or correspondence of that chief, which initiates a design so hostile to the English, and we should judge from the uniform system of policy which he has manifested in all his actions for a course of years past, that he is not likely to forego the plans he was pursuing of conquests from the Marathas and all the advantages held out to him by the diversion which our troops will probably occasion on the other side of India in order to attack the Carnatic."⁴

Meanwhile, more reports of Haidar's hostility were received at Madras. When the Nawab reported to the Government about the Confederacy, they took no notice of it, and regarded his information as incorrect on the ground that they had not received any such news.⁵ Rumbold wrote to the Court that

¹ Smith's minute, cons. 10 Nov. 1779, Ibid, pp. 130-3

² Madras to Bengal, cons. 10 Nov. 1779, Ibid, pp. 145-7

³ Committee's minute, Ibid, p. 134

⁴ Bengal to Madras, 20 Dec. 1779, cons. 31 Jan. 1780, Ibid, vol. 69, p. 126

⁵ Committee's minute, cons. 29 Nov. 1779, Ibid, vol. 67, p. 181

Haidar would not commit any hostility especially as reinforcements were expected from Europe.¹ All that Rumbold did was to send another embassy to Haidar when his commander at Calicut, Sardar Khan, captured an English party of eight persons coming from Suez, and refused to release them unless a person was sent to Haidar.² Accordingly the Government sent George Grey, one of their servants, to Haidar apparently to secure their release, but in reality to remove the existing differences between Mysore and Madras. Before Grey's arrival at Seringapatam, Haidar had released the Englishmen. Grey arrived at Seringapatam on 17 February 1780. He was not treated properly, and was made to stay outside the city. Haidar refused even to accept the presents he had brought. Rumours were current in the capital that an offensive alliance had been concluded with the Marathas. The 30 years old claim on Trichinopoly was much talked of.

Grey told Haidar that the English were anxious for a new treaty with him, but Haidar said that there was no need for any, as the previous treaties had not been carried out. When Grey pointed out that the English would strictly observe any new treaty, that they would supply him his military requirements, and that they would guarantee his throne for his family, Haidar said that he needed neither their aid nor their supplies, that he was strong enough to take care of himself and his throne, and that if he took their aid he would be no better than any of their vassals, as for instance Muhammad Ali. Grey tried to remove this misunderstanding, but Haidar continued to remark that the Nawab was an example of how the English would treat their friends. When Grey said firmly that the English were making advances only because of their desire to be friendly, and not out of weakness, for they were never so strong as at that time, Haidar changed his tone, and asked Grey to procure more details about the treaty from Madras.

¹ Rumbold to the Court, 21 Jan. 1780, Letters Received, vol. 9, p. 477

² Rumbold's minute, cons. 5 Jan. 1780, M. S. C. P. Range C, vol. 69, p. 46

Grey stayed for a month, but no good came out of it.

Immediately after Grey's arrival, Haidar despatched express camels to Poona to finalise his alliance. Grey observed that the French were assuring Haidar of their support from Mauritius. Grey's mission was a failure. He was suspected as a spy, and treated as a prisoner rather than as an ambassador. He was kept at a distance from Haidar, as if he had a design on Haidar's life. Grey wrote in his Journal, "I was by no means sorry to leave so inhospitable a region."¹ In his letter to Rumbold Haidar narrated the same old points of dispute with the English, namely the Trichinopoly affair, the breach of the treaty of 1769, the march of Harper's detachment and the border disturbances near Tellicherry. Haidar's letter only revealed that he had made up his mind to break with the English, and that excuses were not wanting. During the interval between Grey's embassy and the actual invasion of the Carnatic, further reports of Haidar's hostility were received at Madras, but the Government remained unprepared, until he entered the Carnatic in July 1780.

✓ How far Rumbold was responsible for the Mysore war is a controversial question. Of course he was not present when the war broke out, as he had left India a few months earlier, but he was thought of as a person who deserted his post on the first notice of an impending danger. In Rumbold's view Haidar's hostility was due to the Maratha war, which the Bombay and the Bengal Governments had initiated.² This is not true because until the reduction of Mahé, the acquisition of Guntur, the despatch of a force to Basalat, and the demand for the remission of the tribute, Haidar had not decided to break with the English. Rumbold could have avoided all these or at least the last three. He pleaded want of money for making war preparations.³ This was no valid reason, for finance should at all costs be found somehow, should a war be

¹ Grey's Journal, Home Misc. vol. 250, pp. 1-19

² Rumbold's minute, cons. 30 Dec. 1779, M. S. C. P. Range C, vol. 67, p. 360

³ Rumbold's minute, cons. 4 Jan. 1779, Ibid, vol. 65, p. 48

forced on a Government. Moreover, the financial position of the Government was not so hopeless, because they had written to the Bengal Government in 1778 that their revenues were sufficient to defray the expenses in peace time, and to invest six lakhs.¹

When reinforcements, in all 1,082 Europeans, came from England early in 1780, Rumbold thought that Haidar would not break with the English, as he was afraid of them. Rumbold declared, "I think there is the greatest prospect that this part of India will remain quiet."² This was too optimistic a view to take considering the consistent reports of Haidar's hostility. We find contradictions in Rumbold's policy. In October 1779 he wrote to Bengal on the necessity of the three presidencies concerting measures to reduce Haidar.³ But in the same month Rumbold wrote to the Court that Haidar would not join the French, for he was too jealous of all European nations to permit them to influence his policy, and that he was too busy in the north of Mysore to undertake any "unprofitable war in the Carnatic."⁴ Nothing explains better the want of judgment in Rumbold than his remark that Haidar would not live long, and that Tipu would look to the English for support.⁵

The disposition of the Company's troops was so defective that it became an important reason for their later discomfiture. 14 forts had less than 150 Europeans among them, but two of them, Pondicherry and Surat, had 1165.⁶ Rumbold took no step to remedy this defect, although the Bengal Government had warned Madras as early as January 1776, that the Europeans were the mainstay for the security of the Company's posses-

¹ Madras to Bengal, cons. 16 Jan. 1778, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 86, pp. 51-2

² Rumbold's minute, cons. 1 Apl. 1780, M. S. C. P. Range C, vol. 69, p. 459

³ Madras to Bengal, cons. 30 Oct. 1779, Ibid, vol. 67, pp. 78-80

⁴ Rumbold to the Court, 16 Oct. 1779, Home Misc. vol. 144, pp. 378-9

⁵ Rumbold's minute, cons. 14 Jan. 1779, M. S. C. P. Range C, vol. 65, p. 111

⁶ *First Report by the Com. of Secrecy*, 1781, p. 51

sions, and that they would lose both their discipline and strength, if dispersed.¹ Munro had urged for a redistribution of the forces, and Rumbold himself had recognised the necessity for it, but nothing was done. Rumbold exhibited both incapacity and corruption. Haidar's *vakil* remained at Madras until the break out of the war, and sent full reports of the Government's inactivity. Rumbold took more interest in his private trade than in his public duties. During the term of his office at Madras, he sent to China £58,000 in order to invest in that country, and to conceal his fortunes.² Besides this, he remitted £150,837 to England.³ His salary was £20,000 a year, and his assets at the time he came to India were £90,000. This left the Parliamentary Enquiry Committee that went into his conduct, still in doubt as to where the remaining balances came from. The Madras Government's net revenues in 1779 were £941,711, and their net surplus £51,061.⁴ If so, how could an individual come to possess such a large fortune? Rumbold did not have any financial relations with the Nawab, who did not contribute to his fortune. In addition to private trade, the practice of renting out land to the *zamindars*, who gave *nazars* or free gifts to the Governors, helps us to account for the acquisition of large fortunes by the Company's servants. These *nazars* were arbitrary, and were not accounted for in the Company's records, but were regarded by the Governors as a "perquisite of their station."

✓In addition, Rumbold's policy in concluding an alliance with Basalat without the knowledge of the Nizam and without the permission of Bengal, in granting Guntur to the Nawab, in attempting to deny the tribute to the Nizam, and in remaining completely unprepared, could not exonerate him from the responsibility for the later events. The unfortunate thing is

¹ Ibid, p. 50

² *Second Report by the Com. of Secrecy*, 1781, pp. 481-3

³ Ibid

⁴ Parliamentary Debate, 29 Apl. 1782, *Journal of the House of Commons*, vol. 38, p. 956

⁵ Ibid

that Rumbold himself was conscious of the difficulties ahead, and still he did nothing to avert them. He had observed, "There is now a lull, a calm before the engines of war are thoroughly set in motion which points them out as the critical turn for taking measures, if after all it should appear in the sequel not to have been necessary."¹

The Court held Rumbold responsible for the war, dismissed him from the Company's service, and instituted a committee of enquiry to go into his conduct. Parliament brought a "Bill of Pains and Penalties" against him on the charges of corruption, oppression and incapacity, and passed several resolutions of severe censure on him.² Henry Dundas, the Chairman of the Enquiry Committee, made a speech which was highly critical of Rumbold's policy, and yet Dundas withdrew the bill. William Faulknor, a contemporary but not a well known figure, offers a possible clue why the bill was withdrawn, namely that Rumbold presented a book to Dundas "containing several Bank Notes of great value, which accounts for the indecent hurry with which the prosecution was closed."³ Dundas' recent historian, Professor Holden Furber, thinks that any criticism of Dundas' policy is without reason, as he was obliged to give up the prosecution because the evidence was untrustworthy.⁴

✓It must be admitted that Rumbold alone was not responsible for the war, and Hastings should also share a part of the blame, for he did not put forth before Rumbold any constructive plan to avert the danger. Hastings approved of and even urged the attack on Mahé. The retention of Mahé in French hands would not have had any material effect on the course of events. Hastings remained silent to the repeated requests of Madras for money. It was he who disapproved of a closer alliance with Haidar in July

¹ Rumbold's minute, cons. 14 Jan. 1779, M.S.C.P. Range C, vol. 65, p. 109

² *Journal of the House of Commons*, 29 Apl. 1782, vol. 38, pp. 956-63

³ William Faulknor, *Rights of Man Invaded*, p. VII

⁴ H. Furber, *Henry Dundas, First Viscount Melville*, pp. 18-9. Furber based his arguments on E.A. Rumbold's *Vindication of Sir Thomas Rumbold*.

1778. From February to August 1779 Hastings expressed no opinion on Mysore policy, although Rumbold sought his advice. Hastings then recommended a third of the effective European force at Madras, 701 in 2,000, to be sent to Surat against the Marathas. As late as 17 January 1780 Hastings observed, "That a peace may have taken place between Hyder Ally and the Marathas I do not doubt; my own advices confirm it. But no alliance between them can be of any long duration, as it is natural. I am convinced from the whole tenor of Hyder Aly's conduct and disposition that he will never molest us whilst we endeavour to preserve a good understanding with him....and I therefore object to this information being given to the Court of Directors in the General letter, as only tending to alarm them without sufficient cause." On Maratha policy Hastings offended the Nizam as much as Rumbold had done. The Home Government also had approved of the measure to support Raghunath Rao, and this had contributed much to foster unity among the Indian powers.

✓ A few general causes were also responsible for the Carnatic war. The frequent dissensions at Madras, the Nawab's differences with the Government, the reduction of Tanjore but its restoration, and the interest of individuals in the Nawab's debts created a poor impression of the Government in the eyes of the neighbours. Haidar resented an inordinate delay in either accepting or rejecting any of his proposals. Ever since Rumbold arrived in February 1778, Haidar had been pressing for an alliance, and yet the earliest the Governments at Bengal and Madras could take a decision on it was in August, by which time the political situation had enormously changed.

✓ Haidar's ambitions should also be taken as an important cause of the war. He had grown formidable, with an army as large as 100,000. His conquests in Malabar had given him treasures which were said to have been accumulated for

¹ Hastings' minute, cons. 17 Jan. 1780, B. S. C. P. Range A, vol. 54, pp. 3-4

centuries.¹ He would not miss an opportunity to advance his interests, as revealed by his past career, which was a consistent record of self-aggrandisement. He had been, of course, cautious not to provoke the Madras Government, but when he saw the prospects of their being involved in difficulties, when all the other major powers had arrayed their forces against the Company, and when his life-long rivals, the Marathas, were soliciting his aid in return for ceding him their territories usurped by him in the past, he would not hesitate to break with the English. Not to have done so would have been unwise on his part, for his Indian neighbours would have conspired to overthrow him the moment their troubles with the English were ended. To break with the English was certainly risky, but when the French were assuring him of speedy succour, he must have thought that his adventure might be successful.

✓Haidar was not provoked to fight the Second Mysore War in the way in which he had been to fight the first War, when the English in conjunction with the Nizam invaded his territories. Nor did Haidar have such grievances as the Marathas or the Nizam had against the Company. Mahé and Guntur did not belong to him. The border clashes were not unusual. He was not so cordial with the Marathas and the Nizam as to go to their support when they were in trouble. Although the French were his friends, they too knew that he would not go to war in order to substitute one European power for the other. The only powerful motive seems to be his ambitions, and his anxiety to take advantage of the English difficulties for advancing his own interests.

✓It should be remembered that all the ambitions of Haidar would not have been enough but for the Maratha war. Before that war there was a perpetual scene of warfare between Haidar and the Marathas, with the result that the Madras Government had enjoyed peace, and their friendship had been sought by both the parties. But the Bombay Government's policy of

¹ "L'Etat Politique de l'Inde dans l'année 1777", *Ind. Hist. Rec. Com.*, vol. XIII, p. 120

intervention in the Maratha affairs turned the Maratha attention from Haider to the Company. The Marathas withdrew all their troops from Mysore to defend themselves against Raghunath Rao and his new allies. Haider utilised the opportunity to strengthen himself, and the Marathas, seeing no relief from the prospect of war with the English, were forced to compose their differences with Haider. They surrendered to him their territories in the north of Mysore and entered into an alliance. The Marathas who had always been a nightmare to Haider suddenly appeared in a different role, and their attractive and voluntary recognition of his suzerainty over their territory forged an union between two irreconcilable powers. The failure of the Bombay Government in January 1779 to conduct Raghunath Rao encouraged the Indian powers to more ambitious designs.

Finally, there was general unrest and widespread discontent among the Indian powers against the Company's servants, whose intentional or unintentional acts gave an impression that the Company had aggressive designs. Hastings' despatch of a force across the peninsula, a rare phenomenon, and his proposed alliance with Mudaji, excited the jealousy of almost all the Maratha chieftains. The Nizam being provoked both by Hastings and Rumbold used all his arts and policy for his self-preservation. The French were active at every Indian court exciting trouble against the English, who had destroyed all their settlements in India. Several Indian powers got the impression that the Company regarded the Mughal Empire as dead, the Maratha greatness to be no more, and the Nizam to be weak, while Haider alone could do nothing.¹ When all these powers were provoked in some way or the other, a confederacy was inevitable. In the absence of such general unrest, it is highly doubtful that Haider would have gone to war against the English only for such causes as Mahé, Guntur, border disputes and the French influence.

¹ *Letter to a Lord on India Affairs*, 1780, Tracts, vol. 135, p. 38

CHAPTER VII

THE FIRST PHASE OF THE SECOND MYSORE WAR (July 1780 To June 1781)

[In July 1780 Haidar carried out his threat to attack the Carnatic.] It was the most critical period for the English all over India, as all the major powers of India were at war with them. But no where was the Company so much distressed as in the Carnatic, which was invaded by Haidar in July 1780 with a large army, nearly 80,000 fighting men, of whom the greatest part was cavalry.¹ The total Madras army, excluding the Nawab's troops, consisted of 26,065 men. If the Nawab's troops, who were 15,000 in number were also included, the Madras army was nearly half as great as that of Haidar.²

[Haidar's invasion took place at a time when Madras was completely unprepared. It caused such a great consternation among the inhabitants that most of them fled from the villages, and that the wealthy Armenians in the Black Town "lodged their women and effects in the fort godowns."³ Within a week Haidar destroyed Conjeevaram, a place 45 miles from Madras, penetrated as far as Porto Novo, a sea port to the south of Cuddalore, and dispersed his horse from the river Coleroon in the south to Nellore in the north.

The military unpreparedness at Madras was due to the financial difficulty which was so great that the Madras treasury had fallen at times incredibly low, as low as £291 in June 1779, and £444 in February 1780.⁴ When Lord Macleod, the

¹ Hughes' Despatches to England, 15 Oct. 1780, Home Misc. vol. 166, pp. 413-4. Coote estimated the army to be 100,000 men, but Hughes' estimate of 86,860 men in all seems more credible. (Coote to Hillsborough (Secretary of State for War), 1 Dec. 1780, Home Misc. vol. 150, p. 427)

² *First Report from the Com. of Secrecy*, 1781, pp. 49-59

³ Sadleir's minute, cons. 29 July 1780, M.P.C. Range 240, vol. 51, p. 567

⁴ *Minutes of Evidence*, pp. 414-15, 474

commander of the 73rd Regiment, asked Whitehill to oppose Haider. Whitehill replied, "What can we do? We have no money."¹ The reduction of Pondicherry and Mahé, the despatch of troops to Surat, the fortification of Madras and the maintenance of the French prisoners had enormously increased the expenditure of the Madras Government. Only the aid from Bengal, the loans at Madras and the bills drawn on England had helped them to carry on, but Haider's invasion completely upset their economy.

The disunity in the Madras Government was another cause of their unpreparedness. At no time was the Presidency ruled by so inefficient and corrupt a governor as Whitehill. Even eight days after the invasion he was thinking that Haider was in the neighbourhood of the passes.² The Committee had been split into two camps, Whitehill and Munro into one, Smith and Johnson, the other. As the Committee was a smaller and a more powerful body than the Council, the Governor, who had a casting vote in it, wielded greater influence in the former, for with the support of one more member in the total strength of four, he could carry any resolution in his favour. With Munro's vote almost taken for granted, Whitehill could easily ignore Smith and Johnson.

The first problem that arose on Haider's invasion was where and how to assemble the Madras troops, which were widely spread.³ Whitehill and Munro were in favour of a central place and a land route for the purpose, whereas Smith and Johnson were for Madras and a sea route.⁴ Ignoring the latter view, Whitehill and Munro ordered Braithwaite's detachment at Pondicherry to march to Wandiwash.⁵ Concerning Baillie's detachment at Guntur, Whitehill at first opposed the very idea of recalling it to Madras on the ground that it could distress Haider more in the Cuddapah region by invading

¹ *First Report*, 1781, Appendix No. 9, p. 204

² Johnson's minute, cons. 19 Oct. 1780, M. S. C. P. Range D, vol. 3, p. 1865

³ Smith's minute, cons. 25 July 1780, *Ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 1025

⁴ Madras to Braithwaite, cons. 1 Aug. 1780, *Ibid.*, p. 1139

his territories.¹ Smith and Johnson opposed the decision. Macleod also thought that the measure was unwise, for when the centre of a state was in danger, the troops from the extremities should be called in to defend "the most material part."² Thereupon the majority changed their mind, and asked Baillie to return to the Carnatic by taking the land route.³ Strangely enough Smith and Johnson opposed this decision as well, and proposed that Baillie should reduce some fort in Cuddapah.⁴ This gives us the impression that neither group was capable of rising to the occasion. Had Smith and Johnson stuck to their original proposal of recalling Baillie by sea, perhaps the majority might have accepted the proposal, thus averting the later disaster.

[The second dispute was with regard to who should command the army] Smith and Johnson wanted Munro to take the field, for he was the most experienced commander.⁵ But Whitehill wanted Munro to continue on the Committee in order to advise them on military matters. Munro himself was unwilling to assume the command until Haidar's intentions were fully known.⁶ Accordingly, the majority asked Macleod to take the charge, but he refused stating that the troops, 5209 in all, assembled at Poonamallee were too few to face the invader, and that the policy of assembling the army at a distant place from Madras was unwise.⁷ Munro differed from this view, and offered himself to effect the junction at a central place. [The Committee unanimously approved of the idea, and fixed Conjeevaram as the centre.⁸] One of the considerations for this decision was the Nawab's anxiety to protect his capital, Arcot.⁹ He was of further opinion that neither at the Mount nor at

¹ Madras to Baillie, cons. 29 July 1780, Ibid, p. 1080

² Macleod to Madras, cons. 31 July 1780, Ibid, p. 1121

³ Madras to Baillie, cons. 1 Aug. 1780, Ibid, p. 1137

⁴ Smith's and Johnson's minutes, cons. 30 July 1780, Ibid, p. 1101

⁵ Smith's and Johnson's minutes, cons. 30 July 1780, Ibid, p. 1093

⁶ Whitehill's and Munro's minutes, cons. 31 July 1780, Ibid, pp. 1102-3

⁷ Macleod to Madras, Ibid, p. 1103

⁸ Committee's minute, cons. 1 Aug. 1780, Ibid, pp. 1122-6

⁹ Nawab to Haidar, 1 Aug. 1780, *Minutes of Evidence*, p. 494

any place nearer than Wandiwash could a sufficient quantity of provisions be collected for the army.¹

[This decision was a blunder. All the subsequent difficulties could be traced to this initial mistake. Had both Baillie and Braithwaite been recalled to Madras by sea, not only would they have come quicker, but also the risk of their interception could have been minimised.] Munro would have been in a better position then to face Haidar, just as Smith had been in 1767. Johnson had warned, "I shall tremble for the main body when they are at any distance from Madras."²

Yet another mistake which Whitehill committed was the suspension of Sadleir, a member of the Council, from service. In his minute of 29 July 1780 Sadleir strongly criticised the policy of the Committee. There was much truth in what he observed, but his language was harsh.³ He characterised their choice of Conjeevaram as "the mad idea", and accused them of folly and stupidity in all their measures. The minute roused the severest resentment in Whitehill and Munro, who thought that its "every line breathes fire, pain and desolation," and that it was full of "disjointed arguments and angry invectives." They ignored the issues he had raised, and suspended him from office, thinking that he was attempting to "clog the wheels of government."⁴ Although Johnson and Smith opposed the measure, it was carried with Whitehill's casting vote.

Whitehill's action was unjust and irregular. Sadleir was needlessly punished for expressing true facts. He was only guilty of using harsh language. Even that was not a serious crime considering the grave mistakes the Government had committed. A sensitive mind such as that of Sadleir could not but take a strong impression of the situation, and warn his

¹ Whitehill's minute, cons. 1 Aug. 1780, M. P. C. Range 240, vol. 51, p. 598

² Johnson's minute, cons. 1 Aug. 1780, M. S. C. P. Range D, vol. 1, p. 1133

³ Sadleir's minute, cons. 29 July 1780, M. P. C. Range 240, vol. 51, pp. 558-76

⁴ Minutes of Whitehill and Munro, cons. 1 Aug. 1780, Ibid, pp. 592-602

colleagues in rather spirited terms of the dangers ahead. The majority set a bad precedent of not tolerating opposition. They misused the powers of suspension, which the Home Government had intended against misconduct, negligence of duty and disobedience of orders.¹ Sadleir was not guilty of these; he had merely expressed his opinion, which was his right. He was not given a chance to defend or clarify his position. A previously prepared resolution was hurriedly passed two days after the minute, and this was reminiscent of Pigot's action in 1776. Those who were accused of gross irregularities themselves became the judges, and passed the verdict of suspension. If Sadleir had not been removed, Whitehill would have lost his majority in the Council on Munro's departure to the field, and perhaps the new majority might have changed Baillie's route, thus averting an impending danger. Commenting on this policy as "weak or wicked," Sadleir said, "The majority have committed an outrage of the first magnitude."² Munro invited him to a duel, but Sadleir refused stating, "It is your conduct, not your courage, which you may have occasion to defend."³ Thus [the differences among the members of the Government had grown to an alarming degree.] Macartney rescinded the suspension in June 1781.

Whitehill and Munro conceived other equally inopportune schemes. Despite the protests of Smith and Johnson, they directed Captain Cosby at Trichinopoly to intercept Haidar's convoys.⁴ This decision was unwise, for small detachments could not distress Haidar's large army, which harassed Cosby so much that with great difficulty he joined Munro.⁵ Again, contrary to the Court's orders not to fill the place of the commander-in-chief whenever he was absent in the field, Whitehill took Davidson to the vacant seat of Munro on the

¹ Smith's minute, cons. 8 Sept. 1780, Ibid, pp. 731-4

² Sadleir to the Board, 16 Oct. 1780, Ibid, p. 901

³ Sadleir to Munro, 26 Oct. 1780, cons. 5 Dec. 1780, Ibid, p. 1095

⁴ Committee's minute, cons. 2 Aug. 1780, M. S. C. P. Range D, vol. 1, p. 1148

⁵ Cosby to Madras, 7 Sept. 1780, Ibid, vol. 2, p. 1446

Committee. Smith and Johnson opposed the measure, and proposed that Bengal should be consulted in the matter, but their plea was disregarded.¹

[Meanwhile, Haidar reduced a number of forts in North Arcot, such as Polur, Kalasipak, Arni, Kaveripak, Melpadi and Dhobigarh.] His horse had gone as near as the Company's Garden House at Madras, and penetrated as far as Madura. Not until Arcot was besieged by Haidar on 21 August did Munro move from Madras with 5,209 men, of whom 1,476 were Europeans. On 29 August Munro came to Conjeevaram, to which place Haidar also proceeded, raising the siege of Arcot. Until Baillie's junction with Munro, the latter was afraid of attacking Haidar.²

On 6 August Baillie set out from Venukonda in Guntur district with 2,606 men. On 24 August he was at Arani, not very far from Conjeevaram, but continuous rains prevented him from crossing a small river, Cotteliar. When he crossed it on 3 September, his march was again impeded by rains. On 6 September Haidar sent a detachment of 8,000 horse under Mir Sahib, who was further reinforced by Tipu with 18,000 horse and 6,000 infantry. Tipu attacked Baillie at Perambakam, a village 14 miles from Conjeevaram, but was beaten off.³ But Baillie exhausted his ammunition and provisions, both of which he sought from Munro, and further urged that the main army itself should move towards him. Until Munro received this letter, he had no information of Haidar's offensive.⁴

In a council of war Munro decided to send Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher of the 73rd Regiment with 1,007 men, of whom 301 were Europeans.⁵ It would have been better, had Munro himself moved to Baillie's aid. Munro wanted to send four six-pounders, but Fletcher refused to take them apprehending obstruction in the march. Fletcher set out on 8 September


¹ Minutes of Smith and Johnson, cons. 6 Sept. 1780, *Ibid*, p. 1391.

² Munro's Journal, cons. 21 Sept. 1780, *Ibid*, pp. 1536-8

³ Baillie to Madras, 6 Sept. 1780, cons. 7 Sept. 1780, *Ibid*, p. 1435

⁴ Munro's Journal, cons. 21 Sept. 1780, *Ibid*, p. 1541

⁵ H.J. Wilson, *History of the Madras Army*, vol. II, p. 6



with instruction to return the next day. He joined Baillie on the 9th. When they set out the same night, Tipu opposed the march, but not seriously. They could have continued the march, but Baillie decided to halt for the night, contrary to Munro's orders and Fletcher's advice. The army lay on their arms all night unmolested.

Having learnt of Fletcher's junction with Baillie, Haidar decamped and joined Tipu in the night of 9 September. Only on the next day after hearing a heavy fire [Munro marched to Polilur, where a battle had already taken place, and Baillie had been completely defeated.] The whole detachment was either cut up or taken prisoner. Of the 86 European officers, 36 were killed. In all there were 3,820 men of whom 508 were Europeans.¹ Baillie's defeat was the climax of the Madras Government's misguided policy, which culminated in the loss of the flower of their army and in utter confusion all over the Presidency. So great was the consternation at the Black Town that it was deserted by half of its population.²

What were the reasons for the disaster [Munro's inefficiency, Baillie's faults, the Nawab's misguided policy and the excessive rains seem to be the main reasons. First, Munro was

¹ Munro's minute, cons. 9 Oct. 1780, M.S.C.P. Range D, vol. 3, p. 1790. Most historians including Wilks (*Hist. of Mys.* I, pp. 458-9) and Prof. Sinha (*Haidar Ali*, p. 190) perhaps relying on *Memoirs of the War in Asia* (pp. 10-11) by an Officer of Baillie's detachment and *A Narrative of Military Operations* (p. 157) by Innes Munro, state that Haidar's French Officers stopped the indiscriminate slaughter of the Europeans. But James Grant wrote to Lord Shelburne, "It is said that Hyder himself or his son endeavoured to stop the wanton effusion of blood." (30 Nov. 1780, Add. Mss. 29, 209, p. 133). This fact is not corroborated by other sources. M. M. D. L. T., Haidar's French historian, is silent on this point. Between the evidence of those who credit the French for restraining the slaughter and James Grant who was at a distance, the former are relatively more reliable, but not for clearly establishing the fact, because they were in the opposite camp and suffered from the same disadvantage as Grant in knowing who was really behind the restraining order. It is only in this light that Grant's evidence deserves some notice.

² Madras to the Court, 12 Jan. 1781, Lett. Recd. vol. 10, para 41

wanting in that vigour which had made him the hero of Bazar. Although he lay encamped three days before Haider, Munro took no advantage of his position. In September 1767 in similar circumstances with only half the Madras army, Smith had defeated the combined armies of Haider and the Nizam. Munro's intelligence system was highly defective, as he remained uninformed of Haider's junction with Tipu until the battle had begun. Although Baillie had earnestly pleaded the movement of the main army, Munro placed too great a confidence in the detachment's ability to force a junction against every obstacle. The despatch of Fletcher was unwise, for it further splitted the already small English army. Munro argued that he did not move from Conjesavaram in order to prevent the provisions stored there from falling into Haider's hands. But this argument cannot be reconciled with his decision to move on 9 September, while Haider was still before him. It was undoubtedly a wise decision, but was soon revised.¹ Some officers urged Munro to move, but he decided to halt until the next day, when it was too late.² Above all, it was Munro who had fixed the land route for Baillie, and that was the greatest blunder of all.

✓ Secondly, Baillie committed the greatest military mistake in encamping himself without crossing the Cottaliar, while it was yet fordable. This he did in August, known to all to be the month of heavy rainfall. Moreover, after Fletcher's junction, it was Baillie who decided to halt in the night against Munro's instructions and Fletcher's inclinations, thus permitting Haider to join Tipu. Lastly, Baillie committed a tactical mistake in his attack on Haider. A prisoner of his detachment said that he wasted much time before making a vigorous charge, failed to occupy Polilur which Haider took, and "by running about and over-fatigue rendered himself incapable of deliberate thinking or cool action."³

¹ Macleod to the Secretary of War, 13 Oct. 1780, *First Report*, 1731, Appendix No. 9, p. 204

² Innes Munro, *Narrative of the Operations*, pp. 150-1

³ Quoted in Wilks, *History of Mysore*, vol. I, p. 457

Thirdly, the Nawab insisted that the army should be assembled at a central place in order to protect his capital, and it was this anxiety that made the Committee choose Conjeevaram for the junction. Added to these, the heavy rains from 26 August to 3 September, the blowing up of a few tumbrils in the midst of the battle, Haidar's excellent intelligence system and superiority of horse with his ability and dash to force the issue, the scarcity of provisions in the English camp and their want of cavalry were a few other factors that contributed to Baillie's defeat. A prisoner of Baillie's detachment says that a few sepoys disobeyed their orders to stay near a water course and rushed through the ranks of the Europeans causing great confusion, which Haidar took advantage of.¹ This is a new piece of information which deserves some notice.

The effect of Baillie's defeat on Munro's army was highly demoralizing.] Munro hurriedly retreated to Madras losing 500 men killed and wounded, throwing his guns into the Conjeevaram tank, and abandoning all his baggage.² [Sir Eyre Coote wrote to Bengal that if only Haidar had pursued the English army, he could have easily taken Madras.³ —

Why did Haidar lose such a fine opportunity? Professor Sinha thinks that Haidar was interested in conquest and plunder rather than in a decisive victory.⁴ Malleeson says that oldage stood in Haidar's way of taking full advantage of the panic in Munro's army.⁵ Both these views do not sufficiently explain Haidar's conduct. Nothing could have been more helpful for the designs of conquests and plunder than a decisive victory. Likewise, Haidar's subsequent campaigns disprove his age as the factor for his failure to take Madras. We think that Haidar knew how strong Madras was. Its reduction was

¹ *Hicky's Bengal Gazette*, 20 to 27 Oct. 1781

² The Madras records are silent about this terrible retreat. Innes Munro gives us full details, *Narrative of the Operations*, pp. 166-72

³ Coote to Bengal, 19 Nov. 1780, cons. 18 Dec. 1780, B. S. C. P. Range A, vol. 57, p. 91

⁴ Sinha, *Haidar Ali*, p. 193

⁵ G.B. Malleeson, *The Decisive Battles of India*, p. 248

not so simple as a chance victory over Baillie's detachment. The contemporary *Annual Register* says that Haidar was dismayed by Baillie's success on 6 September and by Fletcher's junction with the detachment.¹ If this were true, Haidar would have gained nothing either by besieging (the strongest English fort in the south, or by forcing Munro to a desperate battle, particularly when Cosby had joined the main army with 2,000 troops from Trichinopoly.

However, the consequences of Baillie's defeat and Munro's retreat were very harmful to the Company's interests. The defeat created an unfavourable impression on Indian powers. It affected adversely the morale of the Company's troops "which have been so long formed to the habits of conquest."² It prompted the French to send an expedition to India in January 1781 from Mauritius.³ Subsequently it was because of this defeat that the Company was about to lose Tellicherry, from where the Madras troops were recalled.

Haidar's success made him think that Madras would sue for peace.⁴ When he received no overtures from them, he besieged Arcot from 19 September to 31 October, when it fell. Its fall was an important event, because it was the capital of the Carnatic, and because it had plenty of provisions and military stores. It fell by capitulation, the articles of which were faithfully carried out by Haidar.⁵ He protected the person and property of the inhabitants, punished those who attempted to plunder or molest them, and sent troops to guard the houses of the bankers.⁶

¹ *Annual Register*, 1782, vol. 25, p. 68

² Hastings' minute, cons. 25 Sept. 1780, B.S.C.P. Range A, vol. 56, p. 345

³ Intelligence from Captain Verture, cons. 11 Oct. 1781, M.S.C.F. Range D, vol. 8, p. 2559

⁴ George Mackay to Madras, 17 Sept. 1780, cons. 25 Sept. 1780, Misc. Book, (M.S.C.P.) Range D, vol. 4, p. 396

⁵ Articles of Capitulation, 3 Nov. 1780, cons. 4 Dec. 1780, *Ibid*, vol. 3, pp. 2142-3

⁶ Coote to Hillsborough, 1 Dec. 1780, Home Misc. vol. 150, pp. 428-9

This rigid attention to the safety of the people was due to the fact that Haidar assumed the title of the Nawab of Arcot after taking the fort, and was anxious to win the loyalty of the people.¹ He gained the support of the *poligars* and high officers by confirming them in their previous posts. It was not difficult in those days to win the allegiance of the people, to whom it was immaterial whether Muhammad Ali or Haidar Ali ruled over them. There may well have been a preference for the latter, for he was efficient, strong and independent. It was said that Haidar enjoyed greater public sympathy in the Carnatic than any other invader. Prayers were offered up in mosques for his success.² The fall of Arcot encouraged Haidar to expect that he could occupy the Carnatic permanently. In order to further embarrass the Nawab, he sent the families of the Madras sepoys at Arcot to Seringapatam.³ Thus the fall of Arcot led politically to Haidar's assumption of the *Nawabship* of the Carnatic, and militarily to the acquisition of a strong fort with provisions and stores in it.

What led to the fall of Arcot cannot easily be ascertained. Although it seemed capable of a long siege having enough provisions and men, it fell quickly. Muhammad Najaf Khan, the Nawab's deputy at Arcot, held the Company's officers responsible for the loss. On the other hand, the latter held the Nawab's servants, especially Raja Birbar, whom Haidar made the Governor of Arcot, responsible for it.⁴ The *Annual Register* gives us a plausible reason, namely that Haidar treated the inhabitants of the town so well that it encouraged the sepoys in the fort to desert their posts and go over to his side.⁵ But the real reasons seem to be, as Coote thought, the size, good order, bravery and activity of Haidar's army. His artillery

¹ Coote to Bengal, 10 Nov. 1780, Ibid, p. 652

² H.C. Wylly, *Sir Eyre Coote*, p. 200

³ Coote to Bengal, 10 Nov. 1780, cons. 14 Dec. 1780, B.S.C.P. Range A, vol. 57, p. 35

⁴ Madras to the Court, 12 Jan. 1781, Letters Received, vol. 10, para 54. The relevant Govt. proceedings are silent on this issue.

⁵ *Annual Register*, 1782, vol. 25, p. 77

which was both numerous and skilful so well directed the fire at the fort "as repeatedly to have dismounted our guns on the batteries."¹ As Coote obtained this information from the released officers from Arcot, there is ground to think that Haidar's vigorous prosecution of the siege, Baillie's defeat, Munro's retreat and the inability of Madras to reinforce might have frightened the garrison to capitulate.

The fall of Arcot coincided with the fall of Whitehill, whom Hastings removed from office. Ever since the Nizam's dispute over the tribute, Madras was having uneasy relations with Bengal. Whitehill had upheld Rumbold's policy in dismissing Hollond and in delaying the restoration of Guntur, despite the explicit orders of the Supreme Government. After inordinate delay and great reluctance Guntur was restored to Basalat on 14 September.

Bengal resented greatly this vacillating policy of Madras, whose earnest appeal for aid to resist Haidar's invasion was completely ignored. On 4 September when Coote urged for the despatch of some assistance, Hastings opposed the measure, and said that unless Guntur was restored, no aid would be given to Madras.² Added to this, Hollond had informed Bengal that the Nizam looked upon them as incapable of implementing their orders.³ It must be remembered that the Nizam in his anxiety to recover Guntur was bringing pressure on Hollond, who in his turn being ill-disposed towards Madras for suspending him, was presenting the Nizam's case in such a way as to excite the Supreme Council's resentment at them.

On 22 September Bengal learnt of Baillie's defeat from Madras, who solicited earnestly their aid of about 4 or 500 Europeans, three battalions of sepoys, a company of artillery and a sum of money.⁴ Sir Edward Hughes strongly recommended the application, and urged Bengal to lay aside all other

¹ Coote to Bengal, 10 Nov. 1780, Home Misc. vol. 156, p. 651

² Hastings' minute, cons. 4 Sept. 1780, B. S. C. P. Range A, vol. 56, pp. 74-6

³ Hollond to Bengal, 12 Aug. 1780, cons. 11 Sept. 1780, Ibid, p. 131

⁴ Madras to Bengal, 14 Sept. 1780, cons. 22 Sept. 1780, Ibid, pp. 241-5,

measures including the war against the Marathas.¹ These letters were personally brought by Stephen Sullivan, the Military Secretary at Madras.

Nothing was discussed on the day these letters were received. On 25 September Hastings presented his plan, which was the immediate despatch of 15 lakhs of rupees and a detachment of Europeans and sepoys to Madras, the change of command from Munro to Coote, and the conclusion of a ceasefire with the Marathas to be followed by a definite treaty with them.²

Francis and Wheler strongly opposed these measures. Francis was supposed to have said that every soldier and every rupee sent to the Carnatic "would be uselessly expended."³ The utmost he would agree to was to permit Coote's going to Madras with half the sum proposed.⁴ But with Coote's support Hastings secured the approval of his plan in its entirety. The quota of troops that was proposed was 300 Europeans and four battalions of sepoys, if the sea route was preferred, but the sepoys were to be increased to eight battalions in case of a land route.⁵ But the proposed troops could be sent neither by land nor by sea, for the roads were bad and ships were wanting. Therefore, Hastings proposed that a smaller number should immediately be sent by sea, and a larger number later by land. Accordingly, 330 Europeans, 200 artillery and 630 lascars with six guns and 200 barrels of guns were sent to Madras, and eight battalions of sepoys were ordered to be ready to march through Cuttack.⁶

Hastings then proceeded to suspend Whitehill, on the ground that the latter had consulted neither the Nizam nor Bengal in his treaty with Basalat, that he had disregarded the

¹ Hughes to Bengal, Ibid, p. 249

² Hastings' minute, cons. 25 Sept. 1780, Ibid, pp. 341-56

³ Quoted in S.C. Grier, *Letters of Warren Hastings to his Wife*, p. 79

⁴ Francis' minute, cons. 26 Sept. 1780, B. S. C. P. Range A, vol. 56, pp. 358-69

⁵ Coote's minute, Ibid, pp. 384-92

⁶ Bengal to Madras, cons. 2 Oct. 1780, Ibid, p. 423

Bengal orders to restore Guntur, and that he had needlessly offended the Nizam by the demand for the remission of the tribute.¹ Therefore, in order to punish disobedience in a subordinate presidency, to maintain the supremacy of the Central Government, and to "give credit to its acts," Hastings suspended Whitehill.² Even Francis and Wheler, who had rarely agreed with Hastings on any important issue, supported the proposition. Coote said that it would be a dereliction of duty in the Supreme Council if Whitehill was not punished.³ Although Hastings learnt the restoration of Guntur before the despatch of suspension orders, that did not cause a revision in the decision.

This was a bold decision, which would at any other time have led to an unending controversy. Hastings' policy seems to have been motivated by two factors, to assert the central authority over a subordinate presidency, and to remove an inefficient administration. We find repeated references to the first motive in Hastings' minute, but the second is deliberately concealed, and an attempt is made even to remove any implication that the object was to get rid of an incapable governor. Hastings asserted that his act was not in response to "popular resentment under a plea of justice applied to a remote and obsolete charge."⁴ But there is enough ground to infer that the step was taken as much to improve affairs at Madras as to assert the central authority. Both Francis and Wheler referred less to Guntur and more to confusion at Madras. Hastings himself said that he rescued Madras from the hands of a man, "who if he had been allowed to retain it, would have completed its ruin."⁵ It is highly doubtful that Hastings would dismiss a governor simply for not surrendering a territory, which the

¹ Bengal to Madras, 10 Oct. 1780, cons. 13 Nov. 1780, M.S.C.P. Range D, vol. 3, p. 1967

² Hastings' minute, cons. 19 Oct. 1780, B. S. C. P. Range A, vol. 56, pp. 530-44

³ Coote's minute, Ibid, p. 551

⁴ Hastings' minute, Ibid, p. 531

⁵ Gleig, *Memoirs*, vol. II, p. 333

Company had acquired by the voluntary offer of Basalat. Moreover, Whitehill was not the author of the treaty, and he had not refused to restore the Sarkar. He had only delayed it, and that too under the exigency of foreign invasion. The Nizam's protests were also not a factor, because Hastings did not refer to them even once in his minute, although he inserted them in his letter to Madras in order to make the case strong. Therefore, Hastings' assertion that his policy centred only on Guntur explains but half the truth. However, the Guntur question formed the immediate cause for the action. The Nizam's alliance or at least his neutrality was essential, when the Company was at war with both Haidar and the Marathas. The Nizam was writing threatening letters to break with the English.¹

On 5 November Coote came to Madras with the troops and the suspension orders. Whitehill refused to lay down office. He argued that he alone could not be suspended for the acts of the whole committee, and that he had not disobeyed the orders of the Central Government, for Guntur had actually been restored.² Coote asserted that Bengal had every right to suspend a governor, and that if Whitehill remained in office, he would not assume the command.³ Johnson and Smith supported Coote. Davidson asked for time to think. Accordingly, the Board met on 8 November, when Davidson voted for the suspension. Only Munro dissented and proposed that another reference should be made to Bengal, who might rescind the orders on learning the actual surrender of Guntur.⁴ Whitehill made his last desperate attempt to retain office by threatening Coote that any attempt to remove him by force might lead to a civil war in the presidency.⁵ Coote declined to save him

¹ Nizam to Hastings, 13 Oct. 1780, cons. 26 Oct. 1780, B.S.C.P. Range A, vol. 56, pp. 591-5

² Whitehill's minute, cons. 7 Nov. 1780, M. P. C. Range 240, vol. 51, pp. 975-80

³ Coote's minute, Ibid, pp. 981-4

⁴ Munro's minute, cons. 8 Nov. 1780, Ibid, p. 987

⁵ Whitehill's minute, Ibid, pp. 988-90

he wrote to Bengal, "Determined as I was on the one hand to support the authority of your Board and threatened on the other with all the consequences of an illegal dismissal of Mr. Whitehill from this Government provided I carried your orders into execution. . . . I was not a little diffculted [sic] how to proceed."¹

Whatever the legality of the question, the suspension was justified on political grounds. Hastings rightly realised that it was unwise to support an inefficient government. He deserves credit for another point. Despite his weakness for power, and despite the risk of losing power, he sent away Coote, who was his only supporter against Francis' group. Once the military command was changed, it became inevitable that the civil administration should also be changed, for Hastings rightly thought that Coote's irritable temperament could hardly stand Whitehill's incapacity. The Home Government approved of Hastings' conduct.²

Although Coote arrived at Madras in November, the army could not march until January next. He had to complete a number of preparations for the campaign. Meanwhile, Davidson proposed that a person should be sent to Haidar in order to ascertain if an accommodation was possible. Davidson was hopeful of success, because he thought that Haidar might revise his ideas on knowing Coote's presence in Madras, and Hughes' in Malabar. It might at least help, Davidson argued, in the release of the prisoners of Baillie's detachment.³ But the Committee disagreed with this view of a change in Haidar at so early a stage of war.

On 27 November the Committee entrusted Coote with full military and political powers in order to facilitate the operations of the war.⁴ It was a dangerous step, because it let loose a

¹ Coote to Bengal, 10 Nov. 1780, cons. 14 Dec. 1780, *Ibid.*, vol. 57, p. 26

² *Journal of the House of Commons*, 29 Apl. 1782, vol. 38, p. 960

³ Davidson's minute, cons. 20 Nov. 1780, M. S. C. P. Range D, vol. 3, pp. 2065-7

⁴ Committee's minute, cons. 27 Nov. 1780, *Ibid.*, p. 2082

controversy for a long time between the civil and military authorities at Madras. It reduced the Government to a commissariat body supplying the needs of the army. Although the Committee voluntarily surrendered power, there was room to suspect that the object was mostly to gratify an individual's ambitions. Why was such a voluntary offer made to Coote? Smith owed office to the Bengal Government's intervention, and therefore he was not likely to displease Coote, who was quite influential both in the Supreme Council and in England. Smith was neither a well-known figure, nor had powerful supporters at home. Moreover, Baillie's defeat had placed Madras completely at the mercy of Bengal. Any assertion of the Madras authority over Coote in such circumstances would have been injurious to their own interests.

Meanwhile, Haidar was consolidating his position as the Nawab of Arcot.¹ He reduced a number of forts such as Satgarh, Kailasagarh, Karnatikgarh and Jinji.² He threatened more important forts of Vellore, Wandiwash and Permacoil. There was no English army any where in the Carnatic excepting at Madras, and even this army could not move, because the necessary preparations were not yet finished.

The English affairs fell into confusion on the western coast as well. In October 1780 Haidar's commander, Sardar Khan, besieged Tellicherry, which was not in a position to defend itself. Moreover, after Baillie's defeat the Madras troops, which had been lent to Tellicherry, were recalled. This decision alarmed the settlement, whose chief, Richard Church, appealed to Sir Edward Hughes, who was present on the coast, for aid. Church said that the settlement had been in the Company's hands since 1708, and that the ruin of its 30,000 people would be complete, if it fell to Haidar.³ Hughes immediately landed

¹ Coote to Bengal, 19 Nov. 1780, cons. 18 Dec. 1780, B.S.C.P. Range A, vol. 57, p. 97

² Lang to Madras, 3 Dec. 1780, cons. 11 Dec. 1780, M.S.C.P. Range D, vol. 3, p. 2197

³ Church to Hughes, 28 Nov. 1780, cons. 6 Jan. 1781, Ibid, vol. 5, pp. 43-4

two guns, 100 marines and sufficient provisions for two months. This saved Tellicherry, or else Baillie's defeat in the Carnatic would have synchronised with the loss of Tellicherry in Malabar. Hughes proceeded to Mangalore, where he destroyed Haidar's fleet, consisting of two grab ships, a large grab snow,¹ four ketch grabs,² and many gallivats at anchor close at shore.³

By January 1781 Coote collected an army of 6,885 effective men.⁴ On 17 January Coote moved from Madras in order to relieve Vellore, almost the last stronghold in the centre of the Carnatic. Madras was hopeful that Haidar would be defeated in a pitched battle, and would be soon driven away from the Carnatic.⁵ But no sooner did Coote leave the camp than he felt those difficulties for provisions and bullocks, which were not all removed during the war. The shortage of provisions was such that only two days after the march he was thinking of falling back to Madras. Fortunately for him, Karanguli, a fort, quickly fell, where he found a quantity of paddy. He was much impressed by the defence of the fort by Haidar's men.⁶

[Coote's march had the desired effect. All the three forts, Vellore, Permacoil and Wandiwash were relieved. The relief of Wandiwash was significant, for on the same date (22 January) he had relieved the same fort 20 years earlier. Despite these successes Coote could not continue long in the centre of the Carnatic. He followed Haidar to Pondicherry.] Coote lost a good deal of baggage in the pursuit, and returned to Cuddalore on 9 February, where he encamped almost till the end of June.⁷

¹ Snow—A two-masted square-rigged vessel closely resembling a brigantine.

² Ketch—A strongly built two-masted vessel.

³ Hughes to Madras, 23 Feb. 1781, cons. 1 Apl. 1781, M.S.C.P. Range D, vol. 6, pp. 731-3

⁴ Proceedings of a Council of War, 30 Dec. 1780, Home Misc. vol. 154, pp. 684-7

⁵ Madras to Hughes, 19 Jan. 1780, M. S. C. P. Range D, vol. 5, p. 91

⁶ Coote to Madras, 19 Jan. 1781, cons. 21 Jan. 1781, Ibid, pp. 110-2, 139-42

⁷ Coote to Madras, 11 Feb. 1781, cons. 17 Feb. 1781, Ibid, p. 393

The reason why Haidar moved with his whole army from Arcot to Pondicherry was the appearance of a French fleet off that place on 28 January 1781. De Souillac had sent seven sails of the line and five frigates with troops under D'Orves in order to study the situation in India. Haidar had been expecting for long the promised aid from the French. He regretted when he learnt that there were not many troops on board the ships.¹ However, he was anxious that at least those troops should immediately co-operate with him, for which purpose he sent his *vakil* to D'Orves.² But D'Orves refused to land any troops, stating that the object of his visit was merely to study the situation in India, and that Souillac wanted him back in the Isles, where he could be joined by more troops in order to enable the French and Haidar to face the English more successfully. Haidar tried his best to secure the French aid, but D'Orves argued that he had no orders to land the troops, that the force brought was insufficient to face the English, and that the ships needed repairs. Haidar went to the extent of offering some conquests, but even that failed to impress D'Orves, who pleaded that he had no men to take possession of them. With great difficulty he landed 250 men. Haidar asked him to come back soon with 25 ships and 10,000 troops, the expenses of which he would bear.³

On 12 February D'Orves sailed off for the Isles. The French lost a fine opportunity, because the English fleet was absent in the western coast, and Coote's army had been so much distressed for provisions that a delay of two more days in supplies by sea "would have forced our army to seek for subsistence under the greatest disadvantage in Hyder's camp."⁴ The presence of the French fleet had cut off the supplies from Bengal, almost the only source of subsistence. If only D'Orves had simply stayed on in Indian waters, "melancholy and fatal

¹ Journal des Affaires Politiques dans l'Inde suite du mois de Janvier 1781, Arch. Nat. vol. Colonies C2, 155, p. 74

² Journal D'Orves, 29 Jan. 1781, Arch. Nat. vol. B4, 196, p. 242

³ Ibid, pp. 242-53

⁴ Grant to Shelburne, 30 Apl. 1781, Add. Mss, 29, 209, p. 154

measures" would have followed the English army.¹ Perrot, a Frenchman whose letter was intercepted, observed, "...it makes my heart bleed to see such a favourable opportunity neglected as will not perhaps ever offer itself again. Is India then for ever destined to be the theatre of our bad conduct and disgrace?"² Haidar's reaction was more bitter. According to Major John Scott, Hastings' agent who was then at Madras on his way to England, Haidar ordered the French at Pondicherry to be plundered in rage "amounting almost to Madness in Revenge for their not having fired a shot, and for their Breach of Treaty, as they had engaged to land 1,200 men on the coast in the month of January."³ [D'Orves' inactivity certainly saved the English from utter ruin.]

[Why did D'Orves disappoint Haidar in his expectations? Two reasons suggest themselves. First, D'Orves was an utterly incapable officer. Secondly, the system under which he worked was so rigid that he dared not disobey his superiors. Sir Herbert Richmond emphasizes the second reason more than the first. He thinks that, although D'Orves was not a brilliant commander, he was not so stupid as not to see the advantages of his stay on the coast. Yet he left because he had been warned by Souillac, under whose direct orders he functioned, that he should neither land the troops, nor fight any naval battles, nor delay in returning to the Isles to be in time to co-operate with the expected reinforcements from France. Richmond further thinks that Souillac's object in sending the fleet was political and not military, merely to demonstrate to the Indian powers the French inclination to co-operate with them at a later stage. D'Orves took these orders literally, and missed almost the golden chance of distressing his rivals.]

The difficulty in accepting this explanation of Richmond is Souillac's own comment, "By this astonishing obstinacy of

¹ Coote to Goddard, 1 March 1781, cons. 19 March 1781, M. S. C. P. Range D, vol. 5, p. 565

² Perrot to a Doctor, cons. 19 March 1781, Ibid, p. 577

³ Scott to Hastings, 8 Feb. 1781, Add. Mss. 29, 147, pp. 349-50

⁴ H. Richmond, *The Navy in India*, pp. 108-10

M. d'Orves, which I reported to the Ministry at the time, we lost an opportunity such as will never recur, of becoming absolute masters of the Coromandel coast."¹ We think that both D'Orves and De Souillac should share the responsibility. D'Orves was certainly at fault, for the advantages of his stay were apparent even to the meanest intellect. That he was timid and incapable was quite certain, for he suggested to Suffren later that it was better to go to Ceylon than to the Coromandel coast. However rigid the French command might have been, we think that there was room for discretion. Dupleix in the past and Suffren in the subsequent period departed from their instructions, and no one punished them for it. Despite Haidar's consistent entreaties and persuasions, D'Orves failed to take advantage of the situation. Never had France come so close to success in India, and never had she been so badly let down by her own commanders. D'Orves' conduct can on no account be defended.

This does not mean that Souillac could escape blame. It was he who had raised Haidar's expectation by consistent promises of aid and yet it was he who instructed D'Orves not to co-operate with Haidar. If Souillac's aim in sending the expedition was political, and not military, how could it be achieved by actually sending the troops, and yet withholding their landing? It was something like dangling a packet of food before a hungry man without giving it to him. Not to have sent any expedition would have been wiser. Scott was certainly right in his remark that the appearance of the French fleet "has been equal to a decisive victory in our favour," because it made the Indian powers think that the French could do nothing.² As for the explanation that Souillac wrote to the Minister that D'Orves' obstinacy was at fault, it is quite probable that Souillac attempted to throw the blame on his subordinate, when he had to explain to his superiors the causes for the folly. It was by such conduct that the French laid the foundation for their later

¹ Quoted in G. B. Malleson, *Final French Struggle in India*, p. 9, (foot note)

² Scott to Hastings, 12 Feb. 1781, Add. Mss. 29, 147, p. 406

misunderstandings with Haidar. D'Orves' conduct cannot be explained without a reference to Souillac's policy.

Meanwhile, Hastings was taking every conceivable measure in order to relieve the distressed presidency. His attitude had been certainly cold while Whitehill remained in office, but after his dismissal it suddenly changed to active interest in the Carnatic. He wrote to Bombay that no efforts should be spared to expel Haidar from the Carnatic, and reduce his power.¹ We shall briefly trace the several measures he took to accomplish this object.

[Immediately on learning of Baillie's defeat, Hastings had proposed the conclusion of a treaty with the Marathas. The terms were the mutual restitution of conquests, the liberal provisions for Raghunath Rao, an offensive alliance against Haidar and the French, and the mediation of Mudaji Bhosle for the conclusion of this treaty.² The Marathas rejected these terms. Even Mudaji whose support Hastings was very hopeful of, declined to agree to an offensive alliance against Haidar, raised the question of the *chauth* from Bengal, and demanded the return of those territories which were ceded to Fateh Singh Gaekwad and Rana of Gohad.³ Nana opposed the measure more vehemently, and called the proposed treaty "impolitic" and "derogatory."⁴

Hastings was not discouraged by these unfavourable responses. On 14 January 1781 he sent his trusted assistant, David Anderson, to Chimnaji Bhosle at Cuttack soliciting the aid of 2,000 effective and chosen Maratha horse to accompany Colonel Pearse, who was under orders to march to the Carnatic with

¹ Bengal to Bombay, 7 Jan. 1781, cons. 9 Jan. 1781, B.S.C.P. Range A; vol. 59, p. 30

² Hastings' minute, cons. 25 Sept. 1780, B.S.C.P. Range A, vol. 56, pp. 346-53

³ Mudaji to Hastings, 14 Dec. 1780, cons. 14 Jan. 1781, Ibid, vol. 59, pp. 41-70

⁴ Nana to Coote, 14 Jan. 1781, cons. 23 Feb. 1781, Ibid, p. 539; also Bengal to Madras, 14 Jan. 1781, cons. 19 July 1781, M.S.C.P. Range D, vol. 7, p. 1702

the proposed battalions.¹ These negotiations resulted in a treaty of alliance between the Bengal Government and Mudaji in April 1781. According to it Chimnaji had to send 2,000 horse to the Carnatic, and Bengal was to pay a lakh of rupees per month for their maintenance. Besides, Bengal would assist Chimnaji in reducing Grahamandala, a central Indian *jagir* which Nana had given to Mudaji, but had taken it back subsequently.² In order to ensure further the faithful performance of this treaty, Hastings paid 10 lakhs of rupees to Chimnaji as a loan.³ This amount was payable in two years on the personal security of Raja Ram Pandit, Mudaji's deputy at Cuttack, who offered himself to go to Nagpur to promote a hostile alliance against Haidar. Added to these, Hastings would pay 16 lakhs of rupees to Mudaji as a gratuity if he were to bring about an Anglo-Maratha alliance against Haidar. Hastings actually paid three lakhs towards this gratuity.⁴ Despite these efforts Chimnaji refused to lend the aid of 2,000 horse under some pretext or the other. He sent an agent, Aba Pandit, to John Turing, the Chief of Ganjam, demanding a further sum of 25,000 rupees at Vizagapatam, and another 25,000 at Masulipatam. When Turing made no promise about these sums, no troops joined Pearse.⁵

Why did Mudaji disappoint Hastings? Mudaji was a confederate against the Company. Any effort to conclude a hostile alliance against Haidar would have excited the jealousy of the other confederates. Moreover, Haidar was active preventing an Anglo-Maratha understanding. Coote reported to Bengal that Haidar paid four lakhs of rupees to Nana soon after the Carnatic invasion.⁶ Coote wrote to Goddard that Haidar was using

¹ Instructions to David Anderson, cons. 14 Jan. 1781, B. S. C. P. Range A, vol. 59, pp. 115-20

² Board's minute, cons. 2 Apl. 1781, Ibid, vol. 60, pp. 889-94

³ Board's minute, cons. 14 Apl. 1781. Ibid, p. 953

⁴ Hastings to Scott, 28 Apl. 1781, Gleig, *Memoirs*, vol. II, pp. 360-1

⁵ Turing to Bengal, 10 July 1781, cons. 27 July 1781, M. S. C. P. Range D, vol. 7, pp. 1787-90

⁶ Coote to Bengal, 20 Dec. 1780, cons. 25 Jan. 1781, B.S.C.P. Range A, vol. 59, p. 284

every means in his power to defeat "our views with the Marathas."¹ But Goddard thought that Nana's friendship with Haidar did not depend on financial consideration, but on the hope that he would so much distress the English in the Carnatic as to force them to accommodate with the Marathas in the north.² Therefore, when there was close union and perfect understanding between Nana and Haidar, Mudaji's attempt to disrupt the confederacy would have been harmful to his own interests. But Hastings spared no efforts to use Mudaji's medium to bring about the disruption.

Hastings was active in other fields as well. When Coote wanted more troops, Hastings tried to raise volunteers from the Bengal battalions by inducing them with the advance of three months pay as gratuity.³ When this attempt failed, he sent his secretary, Peter Auriol, to Goa in order to secure a body of troops from the Portuguese.⁴ As ill-luck would have it, this measure also failed. Auriol learnt at Madras that Haidar had anticipated the English measure, and had concluded an offensive alliance with the Portuguese in August 1780. The Portuguese had agreed to supply Haidar with 500 Europeans and 50 engineers along with arms and stores. Besides, they would support him with a naval armament, if his ports were attacked, and in return he would protect their trade and establishments on the western coast, and would treat them on par with the French in his service.⁵ This put an end to any expectation of Portuguese aid against Haidar.

Hastings' resourcefulness prompted him to tap yet another source, the Dutch, for aid, whose factory at Porto Novo had been plundered by Haidar. In November 1780, Light, the paymaster of the Company at Palamcota, informed Smith about the

¹ Coote to Goddard, 1 March 1781, cons. 19 March 1781, M. S. C. P. Range D, vol. 5, p. 565

² Goddard to Coote, cons. 25 Apl. 1781, Ibid, pp. 914-5

³ Hastings' minute, cons. 18 Dec. 1781, B.S.C.P. Range A, vol. 57, p.113

⁴ Instructions to James Peter Auriol, 28 Dec. 1780, Ibid, pp. 165-6

⁵ Auriol to Bengal, 20 March 1781, cons. 27 Apl. 1781, Ibid, vol. 60, pp. 1125-32

Dutch willingness to conclude a hostile alliance against Haider.¹ Coote supported the idea, and said that Bengal was already in touch with the Dutch concerning the matter.² Thereupon, Madras enquired from the Dutch the particulars on which they were prepared to negotiate. Madras asked Huddleston, the chief at Nagore, to sound the Dutch at Nagapatam for an alliance.³ Huddleston informed Madras that the Cochin Governor, Falck, had empowered the Dutch agent at Tuticorm, Anglesbeck, to assist the English with 200 Europeans and 1,000 Malays, if the English were to take initiative in asking for the aid.⁴

There is some controversy as to who took the initiative in proposing the alliance. Dr. Dasgupta thinks that they were the Dutch, but in Dr. Louhizen's view they were the English.⁵ Dr. Dasgupta based his argument on the Madras records. Light had written to Madras, "Two days ago I wrote a letter to the Governor respecting the offers made by the Dutch."⁶ But in view of what Huddleston later wrote to Madras, namely the Dutch insistence on the English initiative, and Hastings' negotiations with the Dutch in Bengal, Dr. Louhizen's view seems to be correct. Long before Madras took any step, the matter had already agitated the Supreme Council.

In Bengal there was at this time an unprecedented understanding between the English and the Dutch. Hastings had lent a battalion of sepoys to the Dutch, when they needed aid.⁷ Knowing full well that they had troops at Cochin and Colombo,

¹ Smith's minute, cons. 20 Nov. 1781, M.S.C.P. Range D, vol. 3, p. 2038

² Coote's minute, Ibid, p. 2039

³ Madras to Huddleston, cons. 20 Nov. 1780, Ibid, pp. 2076-7

⁴ Huddleston to Madras, 22 Dec. 1780, cons. 4 Jan. 1781, Ibid, vol. 5, pp. 18-9

⁵ A.P. Dasgupta, *The Central Authority in British India*, pp. 141-5; J. Van Louhizen, "The Dutch East India Company and Mysore", unpublished Cambridge Ph. D. thesis, 1957, p. 183

⁶ Quoted in Smith's minute, cons. 20 Nov. 1780, M.S.C.P. Range D, vol. 3, p. 2038

⁷ Hastings to Ross, cons. 18 Dec. 1780, B. S. C. P. Range A, vol. 57, pp. 85-7

Hastings asked Ross, the Dutch Director at Chinsura, whether they could lend the English any aid. Hoping that his proposal would be accepted, Hastings drew up a treaty of alliance between the Nawab and the Dutch. The terms he offered were so attractive that no Government with any discretionary powers would ever refuse. The whole of the Tinnevely district together with the pearl fishery rights to the south of Rameshwaram was to be ceded permanently to the Dutch in return for their aid of 1,000 European infantry, 200 artillery and 1,000 Malays.¹ Hastings thought that these were sufficient inducements to secure the consent of the Dutch at Cochin, Colombo and Batavia. Accordingly, without reference either to the Dutch or to the Nawab, who was to lose the territory, Hastings signed and sealed the treaty, and appointed James Lucy Dighton, a Bengal civilian, to carry the treaty personally first to the Nawab, and then to Colombo and Cochin, to whom he wrote separate letters seeking their approval.² The Nawab was not consulted on the ground that he would not refuse his consent from motives of policy and necessity. If he did, he was to be warned that his very existence depended upon "the wealth of Bengal and the blood of the British subjects," and therefore he ought to be careful in his decision.³

To Hastings' surprise it was the Madras Government who strongly opposed the treaty. They said that Tinnevely was the only district which was yielding revenues to the Company, the other districts being occupied by Haidar. Its surrender would make the Indian powers draw unfair conclusions of the Company's power. Madras needed cavalry, and not infantry. There was no money in the treasury to pay for the Dutch troops. Finally Coote's arrival at Madras and the proposed march of the Bengal battalions to the Carnatic had removed the need for the Dutch aid.⁴ Dighton was sent back to Bengal

¹ Board's minute, cons. 4 Jan. 1781, B.S.C.P. Range A, vol. 59, pp. 1-9

² Bengal to Colombo and Batavia, Ibid, pp. 15-9

³ Bengal to Madras, Ibid, p. 19-23

⁴ Committee's minute, 12 Feb. 1781, M. S. C. P. Range D, vol. 5, pp. 362-3; also Madras to Bengal, cons. 16 Feb. 1781, Ibid, pp. 388-9

without allowing him to go to Cochin and Colombo.

Why did Madras oppose the treaty? Dr. Louhizen thinks that the Nawab and his creditors defeated the treaty.¹ We doubt very much the Nawab's part in it. There is no letter from the Nawab either to Madras or to Bengal refusing his consent. Only the Committee's minute states that he was unwilling to accept the treaty.² Scott, who was present at the time at Madras, met the Nawab several times, who never mentioned the treaty even once, although other political affairs such as a treaty with the Marathas, were long discussed.³ It was Smith who informed Scott of the Nawab's opposition to the treaty.⁴ Scott wrote to Hastings that the opposition was mostly from those who were deeply interested in the Nawab's revenues, and that the treaty would affect adversely "the Interests of many people of some consequence on the Indian World at Home."⁵ Moreover, the Nawab told Scott that he was sending a deputation to Bengal to settle his financial affairs.⁶ If so, the Nawab who was expecting Hastings' support would not have incurred his displeasure by rejecting the treaty. Even if the Nawab had opposed, Madras could have over-ruled him, just as they had done quite often in the past. Hastings had sufficiently warned the Nawab not to reject the treaty. Hastings would have strongly resented the opposition of Madras as well, for on a less important issue of Guntur, he had suspended Whitehill. But when it was a question of the Arcot interests in England, Hastings would think twice before incurring their displeasure. Scott wrote to Hastings, "I have seen Mr. Smith this morning. He tells me that the Nawab will never consent to be a Party in the Dutch Treaty, a circum-

¹ Louhizen, "The Dutch East India Company and Mysore", unpublished Cambridge Ph. D. thesis, 1957, p. 185

² Committee's minute, cons. 12 Feb. 1781, M. S. C. P. Range D, vol. 5, pp. 376-7

³ Scott to Hastings, 13 Feb. 1781, Add. Mss. 29, 147, pp. 436-8

⁴ Scott to Hastings, 8 Feb. 1781, Ibid, p. 350

⁵ Scott to Hastings, 12 Feb. 1781, Ibid, pp. 407-8

⁶ Scott to Hastings, 13 Feb. 1781, Ibid, p. 439

stance that will probably not be disagreeable to you, when you hear on what a very precarious situation we are now with their High Mightinesses in England.”¹ Therefore, in defeating the treaty we think that the influence of the creditors was more at work than the Nawab’s, who was to a certain extent an instrument in their hands. When Hastings came to know of the rejection of the treaty, far from being displeased, he approved of the Madras Government’s policy. However, the Madras Government’s stand was justified on one ground. The Dutch had declared war against the English in Europe, but Hastings was not aware of it.² As it were by some premonition Madras took the right step of rejecting the treaty, or else the Nawab would not only have lost his southern possessions but also have added one more enemy. Nevertheless, the Dutch treaty revealed Hastings’ anxiety to defeat Haidar by every conceivable means.

Hastings’ interest in the Carnatic did not cease with the unsuccessful Dutch treaty. If he had thought of it to secure the military aid, to solve the much more difficult problem of finance, he obtained the assignment of the Carnatic from the Nawab. Neither the Madras Government nor the Nawab had any money to prosecute the war. They depended entirely upon Bengal, who had sent from September 1780 to February 1781 a sum of 2,797,853 rupees.³ But the Bengal finances were also far from satisfactory, and they gave notice to Madras not to expect any more money.⁴ On 26 February 1781 they recommended to Madras to secure the complete assignment of the Carnatic revenues from the Nawab for the expenses of the war.⁵ This letter was much quoted later by Lord Macartney in his rigid policy of enforcing the assignment. The Nawab refused to assign his territories, and the matter was brought to a crisis.⁶

¹ Scott to Hastings, 8 Feb. 1781, Add. Mss. 29, 147, p. 350

² Court to Bengal, 8 Jan. 1781, Add. Mss. 29, 147, pp. 37-9

³ Statement of supplies to Madras, 26 Feb. 1781, B.S.C.P. Range A, vol. 59, p. 620

⁴ Bengal to Coote, 7 Jan. 1781, cons. 9 Jan. 1781, Ibid, pp. 28-9

⁵ Bengal to Madras, cons. 26 Feb. 1781, Ibid, p. 628

⁶ Madras to Bengal, cons. 1 Apr. 1781, M.S.C.P. Range D, vol. 6, p. 747

Meanwhile, the Nawab had sent to Bengal his *Diwan*, Syed Azam Khan, and the Military and Political Secretary to the Madras Government, Richard Sullivan, to negotiate a new treaty, which would put an end to his financial difficulties. The choice of Sullivan was remarkable, for the Nawab chose an Englishman to cause dissensions between Madras and Bengal. The terms of the proposed treaty were the recognition of the Nawab as the hereditary ruler of the Carnatic, the conquest of Tanjore for him, the restoration of the ceded districts to him near Madras, the liquidation of his debt of seven million pagodas both to the Company and the individuals, and the financial aid for the prosecution of the war.¹

Of these proposals Bengal rejected the conquest of Tanjore and the restoration of the ceded districts. Concerning the rest, it agreed to finance the war, provided he assigned the Carnatic revenues to the Company. All his private debt upto 1781 was consolidated into a new debt. A bond bearing interest was to be given to the private creditors. A treaty to this effect was signed on 2 April 1781.² The outcome of this treaty was happy neither to the Nawab nor to the Company. It led to a serious controversy when the occasion arose to enforce it. Hastings sent Sullivan as his agent to watch over the execution of the new treaty. When Sullivan came to Madras, Macartney was the Governor, who strongly objected to the policy of the Bengal Government.

In yet another way Hastings attempted to relieve Madras of its distress. He proposed to secure the Nizam's aid by ceding him the Northern Sarkars. As early as 9 April 1780 Hollond had informed Hastings that the Nizam was willing to conclude an alliance against Haidar, being apprehensive of Haidar's intentions on Guntur, but Hollond had replied that the English were not anxious to break with Haidar.³ But after Haidar's invasion and the Guntur restoration the Nizam remained silent, although while making the restoration Whitehill had indirectly sought his aid. Hollond considered this to be

¹ Requests of the Nawab, cons. 22 Aug. 1781, Ibid, vol. 7, pp. 1989-96

² Bengal to Madras, Ibid, pp. 1997-2002

³ Hollond to Hastings, 9 Apl. 1780, Add. Mss, 29, 145, pp. 10-12

an unwise step, for the restoration would lose all grace if followed by a demand. However, he was hopeful that the Nizam would finally join the English.¹ Subsequently, thinking that the situation was critical, Coote desired to secure the Nizam's aid.² Hollond reported that the Nizam was willing to lend it.³ Hastings approved of these steps.⁴ But Hyderabad was a peculiar court, where consistency was unknown, and intrigue was the order. Hollond wrote to Hastings that Haidar had taken more territories of the Marathas than of the Nizam, and therefore, "they might perhaps be prevailed on to join us on easier conditions, and being besides of a different Religion from the Moors they appear to be our safest allies."⁵ The negotiations with Mudaji having failed, Hastings must have conceived that the Nizam's aid alone was possible, and that it would not be forthcoming unless followed by some attractive offers.

Meanwhile, during the first five months of 1781, the financial difficulties became more acute at Madras. On 13 May in a letter to Bengal, Madras went to the extent of proposing an offensive and defensive alliance with the Nizam. He was to furnish 15 or 20,000 horse, for which the Company would conquer for him those territories in Mysore which once belonged to him, protect them from foreign attack, and settle the arrears of the tribute after the war.⁶ Hastings approved of these terms, and asked Hollond to conclude a treaty in accordance with them.⁷ But Hollond was of opinion that the terms were too extensive in scope, and that the Nizam would ask the Company to conquer the whole of Mysore for him, as they had acknow-

¹ Hollond to Hastings, 16 Oct. 1780, Add. Mss. 29, 146, pp. 144-5

² Coote to Hollond, 8 Jan. 1781, Add. Mss. 29, 148, p. 72

³ Hollond to Coote, 25 Feb. 1781, *Ibid.*, p. 74

⁴ Hastings to Coote, 10 Jan. 1781, *Ibid.*, vol. 29, 147, p. 48

⁵ Hollond to Hastings, 7 Apl. 1781, cons. 31 May 1781, B.S.C.P. Range A, vol. 60, p. 1475

⁶ Madras to Bengal, cons. 13 May 1781, M.S.C.P. Range D, vol. 6, pp. 1066-70

⁷ Bengal to Hollond, cons. 14 June 1781, B.S.C.P. Range A, vol. 60, pp. 1683-4

ledged his suzerainty over the entire state in the 1768 treaty. Therefore, Hollond suggested that the Nizam should assist the Company with 15 or 20,000 horse, and they would agree to a division of Haidar's territory on a previously agreed formula.¹ Hastings must also have thought that it was unwise to commit the Company to a later embarrassment of conquest for the Nizam, and that it was better to obtain his aid on more practicable terms, such as the retrocession of the Sarkars. This decision was taken by the Supreme Council on 2 July 1781, when a new Governor was at Madras.²

Thus during the first year of Haidar's invasion, innumerable difficulties confronted the English at Madras. The incapacity, inactivity and dissensions in the Government had brought their affairs almost to the verge of ruin. Baillie's defeat was the most disastrous event experienced by the Company ever since it became a territorial power in India. At least the Bombay Government's defeat was retrieved by the subsequent successes of Goddard and Popham, but the Company's credit was not redeemed in the Carnatic, although similar measures were taken of the despatch of men and money to Madras, together with the best military leader (Coote) available at the time. Haidar declared himself the Nawab of the Carnatic, and consolidated his position. Difficulties of finance, provisions and transport in the face of Haidar's vigorous conduct offered a stupendous task for the English. The Nawab was not co-operating with the Government. Every pagoda and every grain of food had to come from Bengal. In these circumstances Hastings alone cast a ray of hope to deliver goods for the English. In offering to end the Maratha war, in proposing an alliance with them, in attempting to secure Mudaji's aid, in trying to raise volunteers for the Carnatic, and in contacting the Portuguese, the Dutch and the Nizam to secure their aid, Hastings exhibited rare qualities of statesmanship. These efforts indicate his consciousness that Haidar was no ordinary

¹ Hollond to Hastings, 23 July 1781, Add. Mss. 29, 150, pp. 76-7

² Bengal to Madras, 2 July 1781, Home Misc. vol. 246, pp. 187-98

invader, and that the exertions of all the three presidencies were required to dislodge the formidable invader from the Carnatic. But the task was not all easy, and even the advent of a more energetic governor than Whitehill or Smith would not contribute much to the accomplishment of the object.

CHAPTER VIII
THE SECOND PHASE OF THE MYSORE WAR
(June 1781 to June 1782)

After Rumbold's return to England, the question of appointing a successor to his post agitated the Company. The appointment of a governor was always a difficult issue, for it set an intense political activity in all influential circles. The policies of Laurence Sullivan, the Deputy Chairman of the Company, had been opposed in the past by Lord North and his colleague, John Robinson. But in 1780 there was close understanding between Sullivan and North, both of whom were eager to keep Hastings in power.¹ The new governor had to satisfy the condition of working smoothly with Hastings, besides being acceptable both to the Direction and the Ministry. Lord Macartney satisfied these conditions, and therefore his selection for the post did not offer any great difficulty in the General Court.²

George Lord Macartney, whose administration was going to be eventful at Madras, had already made a name for himself in British political and social life, having filled such important posts as the Envoy Extraordinary to Russia, the Chief Secretary for Ireland and the Governor of Granada in West Indies. Twice a member of Parliament, holding an Irish peerage, a friend of Burke, Hume and Voltaire, a member of Dr. Johnson's Literary Club, and himself a man of high intellectual attainments, Macartney's rank and reputation were very high indeed. Besides, he had the support of both the Ministry and the Court. In fact the Madras governorship was Lord North's gift to

¹ L. S. Sutherland, *East India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics*, p. 346

² Court's minute, 15 Dec. 1780, vol. 89, p. 456

Macartney, who was a personal friend of Sullivan as well.¹ Therefore, the new governor was no ordinary person, but the very pick of the British public life. He was known for his integrity and ability, and was sent with great expectations that he would reform the abuses in the Madras Presidency, "the plague spot of India."²

But these expectations were not fulfilled. His administration proved to be most tumultuous in Madras, as he lacked tact and address. His ruthless execution of his bold plans excited opposition at every step, and he quarrelled with almost every important person (Hastings, Hughes, Coote, Stuart, Benfield and the Nawab) with whom he came in contact. His inexperience of Indian affairs and his anxiety to effect radical reforms caused much friction and unrest. He rightly remarked that a person "who has not been in India knows Mankind but by halves."³

The new post to which Macartney succeeded was not a bed of roses. A terrible war was raging in the Carnatic, nearly two-thirds of which was under Haidar's occupation. Coote had not gained a single victory, and had been tied down to the coast owing to the lack of supplies. Almost famine conditions prevailed in the presidency. Supplies from Bengal were interrupted by the presence of the French privateers. The troops were almost mutinous for want of pay. All resources including bills on England had been exhausted. The picture was gloomy, but Macartney set himself to face it boldly.

Macartney's first act was the decision to capture the Dutch settlements in the Carnatic. Coote opposed an attack on them; he said that they could not be captured without making a

¹ Sir Francis Sykes (Hastings' Attorney in England) to Hastings, 5 Jan. 1781, Add. Mss. 29, 147, p. 12; also Sullivan to Hastings, 9 Jan. 1781, Ibid, p. 44

² L. S. Sutherland, *East India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics*, p. 274

³ C. C. Davies, *The Private Correspondence of Lord Macartney* (hereinafter cited *P.C.M.*) p. 24

disgraceful treaty with Haider.¹ But Macartney took the responsibility upon himself, and was successful in the reduction of Sadras, Pulicat, Polikole and Jagannaikpur, all of them on the Carnatic coast.² The more important of them, Tuticora, Nagapatam, Osterburg and Trincomalee (the last two in Ceylon) were also taken, and the Dutch power was completely destroyed in India.

Macartney was fortunate that his advent coincided with a few victories over Haider, who had remained unbeaten since the war. Having been inactive since February, Coote moved to Porto Novo in June. Haider was near Chidambaram, which Coote attempted to take, but failed.³ The rebuff was too much for the old General, whose prestige seemed to suffer further by Tipu's siege of Wandiwash, which was on the verge of fall.⁴ Haider's troops had invested Permacoil; his horse had cut off Tanjore and Trichinopoly; and Cuddalore was in immediate danger. Coote had to fight a battle at all costs.

Coote was lucky that Haider was in a mood to fight. [On 1 July a battle took place at Porto Novo, where Haider was completely defeated.] It was a keenly contested battle lasting from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m.⁵ [It was an important victory for the English, because they had but one army in the whole presidency, and its defeat would have been disastrous to their interests. It retrieved the loss of prestige they had suffered at Polilur. It facilitated Hastings in his negotiations with the Marathas. Haider lost his able commander, Mir Sahib. The places that were threatened were relieved from danger.]

Although the Company's reputation was redeemed, no material advantage followed from the victory. Coote gained nothing but the battle-field, not even a gun. He lamented that

¹ Coote to Macartney, 26 Jan. 1781. *P.C.M.* No. 105, p. 159

² Macartney to the Court, 29 Oct. 1781, *Home Misc.* vol. 246, p. 406

³ Coote to Madras, 26 June 1781, cons. 29 June 1781, *M.S.C.P.* Range D, vol. 7, p. 1411

⁴ Flint to Madras, 30 June 1781, cons. 3 July 1781, *Ibid.* p. 1442

⁵ Coote to Madras, 2 July 1781, cons. 5 July 1781. *Ibid.* pp. 1498-500. also, cons. 11 July 1781, p. 1605

Haidar's strong and fine cattle drew off the guns, which could not be prevented due to want of cavalry on the English side. Coote's movements were so slow that he covered three miles in 11 hours.¹ He observed, "We are more like beaten than victorious troops."² He had a good load of artillery, but not enough number of cattle to drag it. He had a fine army, but not enough provisions to feed it. In anger he declared that he would relinquish the command, if his distress was not removed.³ He returned to Cuddalore for more supplies.

The inefficiency and corruption in the Nawab's government were responsible for the want of supplies to the English army. Moreover, Coote's special powers prevented Macartney from removing those abuses in the administration. Nevertheless, Macartney procured some supplies from the Northern Sarkars, engaged 1,200 coolies for want of bullocks to carry them, raised a loan of five lakhs of pagodas from the city of Madras, and created a separate army in the south by assembling troops from several garrisons.⁴

But Macartney's policy in another direction was highly objectionable. Soon after the victory at Porto Novo he opened negotiations with Haidar for peace, a presumption which Hastings resented.⁵ Macartney defended his conduct under the plea that he acted on the advice of Hughes and Coote, both of whom agreed that the Company's position in the Carnatic had been reduced "to that state of imminent necessity which removed the restraint laid by law on this presidency in treating or contacting with Indian Powers."⁶ It is difficult to agree with Macartney on this issue, because the situation had improved by 5 July, when a victory was won at Porto Novo, when the Dutch settlements had been captured, and when some resources had been found. He

¹ Coote to Madras, 28 June 1781, Add. Mss. 22, 439, p. 4

² Coote to Macartney, 4 July 1781, Home Misc. vol. 245, p. 13

³ Coote to Macartney, 4 July 1781, *P.C.M.* pp. 160-1

⁴ Macartney's address to the inhabitants of Madras, 2 July 1781, Home Misc. vol. 246, pp. 49-54

⁵ Hastings to Scott, 13 Apl. 1782, Add. Mss. 29, 154, pp. 92-4

⁶ Macartney to the Court, 31 July 1781, Home Misc. vol. 161, p. 34

wrote to Haider that the Company was anxious for peace, that it had disapproved of the conduct of the previous governors who had offended him, and that if this peace offer was rejected, serious action would be taken. Coote and Hughes also wrote separately to Haider to the same effect.¹

[Haider rejected the peace offer.] He expressed doubts as to the ability of Macartney to make amends for the past offences.² But he indicated that he might accommodate if some advantages were shown to him. Such a response being unfavourable, Macartney dropped all negotiations. Haider's conduct was not surprising, as he was in an advantageous position. Nothing remained but to prosecute the war.

On learning that the Bengal detachment under Pearse was arriving from the north, Coote himself moved to effect the junction, and thus avoided the mistake which Munro had committed, namely of placing too much confidence in the detachment to force its way. Haider as expected tried to prevent the junction, but was not successful. Pearse joined Coote on 1 August near Pulicat. Thinking that Coote's reinforced army might attack Arcot, Haider took every precaution to defend it.³ When Coote did not threaten Arcot, Haider decided to try his fortune once again on the same lucky ground of Polilur, where he had beaten Baillie, and where he had built a city called Fatehpur.⁴ But this time he was beaten on 27 August. However, his loss was not great as he returned before the action was closed. Coote's loss was unusually great, 83 Europeans and 370 sepoy killed and wounded, because Haider's fire was well-directed and the battle was fought for a long time, from nine in the morning until sunset. General Stuart lost a leg, and Coote's Aid-de-camp was killed. Coote could not pursue Haider, as

¹ Macartney to Haider, 5 July 1781, Home Misc. vol. 246, pp. 69-72, 91-2

² Haider to Macartney, 28 July 1781, *Ibid.*, pp. 95-101

³ Coote to Madras, 25 Aug. 1781, cons. 27 Aug. 1781, M.S.C.P. Raza: D, vol. 8, p. 2054

⁴ Pearse to Hastings, 31 Aug. 1781, Add. Mss. 29, 150, p. 215

some of his men had had no rice for two days.¹ The victory had no other effect than to establish once again that Haidar could not stand a straight fight. The victory was won only by Coote's tactical ability, as the duration of the battle and the number of casualties proved that it was by no means an easy one.

Meanwhile, Macartney's relations with Hastings were growing uneasy. It was Sullivan's desire that these two should remain on the most friendly terms, and in confidence he had stated to Hastings that much good might result from this union, as Macartney was supported at home "by interests of the first and most permanent magnitude."² On arrival Macartney also had assured Hastings of his consistent co-operation with him. But these expectations were frustrated, and serious differences arose between them over the retrocession of the Sarkars, the assignment of the Carnatic and the grant of special powers to Coote.

The first dispute was over the Northern Sarkars. Hastings had decided to surrender them in order to secure the Nizam's aid.³ Bengal was of the opinion that in view of the Company's critical situation all over India the Nizam's aid had become essential, and this aid could not be obtained without the retrocession of the Sarkars. The Bengal Government further argued that as the Company would be receiving the aid in exchange for the Sarkars, there was no room for others to think that the surrender was made either under threat or weakness. Therefore, Hastings proposed a treaty by which the Nizam would send a body of horse in return for the Sarkars and the full settlement of the arrears of the tribute.⁴

Macartney disagreed with this policy. He thought it disgraceful to surrender territories in order to secure foreign aid. He further argued that the victory at Porto Novo, the arrival of Pearse's detachment, the insincerity of the Nizam, the

¹ Coote to Madras, 2 Sept. 1781, M.S.C.P. Range D, vol. 8, p. 2163

² Sullivan to Hastings, 3 Feb. 1781, Add. Mss. 29, 147, p. 302

³ See back pp. 254-6

⁴ Bengal to Madras, 2 July 1781, Home Misc. vol. 246. pp. 187-98

strategic situation of the Sarkars, and the elimination of a chance to accommodate with Haidar would make the policy unwise. It was thought that Haidar would quit the Carnatic for much less concessions, and that the Indian powers would certainly draw unfair conclusions of the Company's inconsistency and inability to defend themselves, without giving the English any credit either for justice or moderation.¹

Macartney was certainly right in this case. It is surprising that Hastings should have thought of giving up the coastal strips, which were really useful to a naval power like the British.² The Nizam's aid was doubtful, as his attempt to break the Confederacy would have invited an attack both from the Marathas and Haidar. The utility of the Nizam's aid was also doubtful, for his aid had served no purpose in the first Mysore war. Although Hastings revised his decision for the time being, he was still thinking in March 1782 that it was desirable to restore the Sarkars and obtain the Nizam's aid.³ However, in justice to Hastings it must be mentioned that he had suggested the measure on the repeated reports of distress in the Carnatic, and that he never pressed the point when Macartney disapproved of it. Although Macartney was right, he treated the subject with such emphasis on facts and figures as to create an impression that Hastings was needlessly dismembering the Presidency, and that it needed Macartney's best efforts to prevent it.

Macartney's policy towards the Nizam was to conclude a defensive alliance, and therefore he asked Hollond to negotiate a treaty by which the Nizam was to send a body of force to Madras, and the Company would likewise assist him if his dominions were invaded. If the Nizam was not agreeable to this condition, Macartney would restore him all such conquests in Mysore as were once under the Nizam's rule.⁴ He thought

¹ Macartney to Hastings, 10 Aug. 1781, *P.C.M.* p. 111

² C. C. Davies, *Ibid.*, p. xiii

³ Staunton to Macartney, 2 March 1782, *Ibid.*, p. 151

⁴ Madras to Hollond, 29 Sept. 1781, *M. S. C. P. Range D*, vol. 8, pp. 2442-3

that the Nizam's anxiety for an offensive alliance was due to nothing but "ambition without limits."¹

Hollond was already negotiating for an offensive alliance when Macartney's instructions reached him. Hollond wrote back that the Nizam was anxious for an offensive alliance, which alone had prompted him to mediate for peace between the Company and the Marathas. Moreover, if the Nizam was disappointed, he might join Haidar, who was offering large sums of money to him. Hollond was hopeful that it was possible to secure the Nizam's aid even before a general peace was concluded with the Marathas.²

These arguments did not bring about a change in Macartney. He continued to think that Madras could not make conquests for the Nizam, when it was incapable of recovering its own territories from the invader, that an offensive alliance would impede an accommodation with Haidar, if he was so disposed after his defeats, and that the insincerity of the Nizam might disappoint the English, just as Chimnaji had done after receiving money.³ But Hollond thought that the policy of restraint and moderation would not work in India, where the princes were motivated only by a zeal to extend their own power, and therefore an offensive alliance was essential.⁴

On the other hand Bengal was urging Hollond to conclude an offensive alliance with the Nizam. It wrote to Hollond, "What a field for His Highness's ambition and ability ! What a crisis must the seizure or neglect of so glorious an opportunity mark in his Reign ! Permit us to add, what a field does the situation offer to the abilities of a Negotiator."⁵ These varying orders of two masters caused not a little confusion in Hollond.

¹ Macartney to the Court, 28 Sept. 1781, Home Misc. vol. 161, p. 51

² Hollond to Madras, 21 Aug. 1781, Add. Mss. 29, 150, pp. 60-2; also pp. 129-30

³ Madras to Hollond, cons. 17 Sept. 1781, M. S. C. P. Range D, vol. 8, pp. 2252-3

⁴ Hollond to Madras, 3 Nov. 1781, cons. 18 Nov. 1781, Ibid, vol. 9, p. 2950

⁵ Bengal to Hollond, 11 Oct. 1781, Add. Mss. 29, 151, p. 94 v

Fortunately Bengal did not press its point, and left it to Macartney to secure the aid or not. Subsequently when the French appeared in India, Macartney revised his policy and sought the Nizam's aid. In this controversy Macartney judged the Nizam's vacillating policy better than Hastings, who was prepared to secure the aid even on disadvantageous terms such as the surrender of the Sarkars and the conclusion of an offensive alliance. Macartney thought that necessity alone should determine whether the aid be secured at all costs or not. Before the French advent, he did not judge the necessity to be so imminent as to ask for foreign aid, but after their advent, he certainly thought that the situation called for such a request.

But Macartney was not right in another controversy, namely his advances to the Marathas without a reference to Bengal. Early in September 1781 when Macpherson (a member of the Supreme Council) arrived at Madras, Macartney addressed a joint letter from himself, Macpherson, Coote and Hughes to the Peshwa stating that special orders had come from home to make peace with the Marathas. The letter pledged the faith of the four authors together with that of the Supreme Council, the Company, the King and the British nation for giving the Marathas every just satisfaction.¹ This meant the restoration of Gujarat, Salsette and Bassein, and the surrender of Raghubath Rao. It was an extraordinary document, which was unauthorized by the Supreme Council, and sent at a time when they were negotiating for a separate peace with Sindhia. Although the authors made the expected French junction with Haidar an excuse for their conduct, still it was a definite breach of the Regulating Act. But for Hastings' quarrel with Chait Singh who had shut him up at Chunar, a major clash between the two presidencies would have been inevitable. Macartney wrote to Sullivan, "Your system of peace with all the Country Powers you will observe by my letters is perfectly my own Idea."² Hastings would never have suffered such a

¹ Macartney, Coote, Hughes and Macpherson to the Peshwa, 11, Sept. 1781, Home Misc. vol. 246, pp. 347-9

² Macartney to Sullivan, 28 Jan. 1782, *P.C.M.* p. 182

presumption on Macartney's part. Fortunately, the letter did not reach Poona in time, or else Nana would not have missed so fair a chance. He openly confessed this to the Nawab's *rakil* at Poona.¹ Besides, Macartney caused similar joint letters to be addressed to Bombay and to Goddard to cease hostilities immediately, and forwarded these through Nana to impress upon him how desirous the Company was for peace. Only Hastings' own preoccupations with Chait Singh averted a clash between Bengal and Madras.

Meanwhile, on 27 September Coote gained another victory over Haidar at Solinghur. Haidar suffered great loss, almost twice as much as in the two previous battles.² But soon he retaliated by intercepting the entire detachment under Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Owen, and by taking all his baggage and 1,500 bullocks.³ Tipu surprised another detachment under Captain Temple, and took four guns and baggage.⁴ Vellore stood in the immediate necessity of supplies, and Coote proceeded to its relief in November. On his way back, he took Chittur, an important fort. The monsoons drawing near, Coote's army went into cantonment, and with it another campaign of the war came to an end.

The campaign from July to November appeared favourable to the Company, for they gained three victories. But in reality the distress was more on their side, for the lack of supplies, finance and cavalry had robbed them of all their victories. Coote could not march a mile from the sea-shore for fear of starvation.] He wrote to Madras that never since he became a soldier, he had seen such distress in any army.⁵ Polur was abandoned for want of provisions. Four 18-pounder guns were destroyed for want of bullocks. Horses dropped dead for

¹ Macartney to the Court, 26 Jan. 1782, Home Misc. vol. 246, p. 561

² Madras to Bombay, cons. 8 Oct. 1781, M. S. C. P. Range D, vol. 8, p. 2540

³ Coote to Madras, 29 Oct. 1781, cons. 6 Nov. 1781, Ibid, vol. 9, pp. 2831-5

⁴ Temple to Coote, 10 Nov. 1781, cons. 16 Nov. 1781, Ibid, p. 2934

⁵ Coote to Madras, 29 Oct. 1781, cons. 6 Nov. 1781, Ibid, p. 2831

want of grain. Owen saw 100 camp followers falling dead for want of food.¹ It was a difficult campaign indeed. As these difficulties were not removed, Haidar could not be dislodged even after his defeats. He retreated on such occasions to places of safety rather than evacuated the Carnatic. The English could only defeat him, but not distress him, for their army was ever turned to the coast for supplies. They could neither force a battle on him, nor chase him after a battle, nor carry off even the prizes gained in a battle. Excepting a few battles, the rest of the campaign witnessed a desultory warfare, which was more suited to Haidar than to Coote. Haidar was interested in exhausting the Madras Government in order to force them to grant the concessions he demanded, and the campaign seemed to advance this object.

[In October 1781 Macartney decided to capture Nagapatam, an important Dutch settlement on the Coromandel coast] At first Coote supported the idea, but later changed his mind and thought it to be a grave military error, which might result in disgrace and in the loss of Tanjore.² Macartney disagreed from this view, and considered that the capture of Nagapatam was essential for the safety of the southern districts, and for procuring supplies from there. Whereas Coote desired to expel Haidar first from the Carnatic, Macartney wanted to crush the Dutch first before they could join the French.³ Macartney was right on this point, for Haidar had already concluded an offensive alliance with the Dutch on 29 July 1781, which was ratified on 4 September and sent to Batavia for approval.⁴ According to this treaty in return for military supplies and 2,000 Dutch troops, Haidar had promised them his support if Nagapatam was attacked.⁵ Accordingly a Dutch detachment of

¹ Coote to Madras, 20 Nov. 1781, cons. 22 Nov. 1781, Ibid, pp. 2973-4

² Coote to Macartney, 31 Oct. 1781, Home Misc. vol. 245, pp. 130-5

³ H. Richmond, *The Navy in India*, pp. 154-6

⁴ J. Van Loubizen, "The Dutch East India Company and Mysore," unpublished Ph.D. thesis of Cambridge University, 1957, p. 192

⁵ Agreement between Haidar and the Dutch, cons. 30 Dec. 1781, M.S.C.P. Range D, vol. 9, pp. 3238-41

600 men was co-operating with Haidar. Therefore, Macartney was anxious to reduce the Dutch, before they received any reinforcement from Batavia or from Europe, or they were joined by their allies, the French, who might find Nagapatam a convenient place to land their troops.

Ignoring the advice of Coote, Macartney collected an army from the southern districts, and captured Nagapatam on 12 November. The Dutch had 6,550 men in the fort, besides 1,500 men who were sent by Haidar.¹ The fall of Nagapatam was an important event, as it destroyed the Dutch power on the Coromandel coast, and gave the English the essential supplies they needed, 537 bars of silver, 14,000 pagodas, 5,000 stand of arms, 200 pieces of artillery and 1,000 horse.² It also revealed differences between Coote and Macartney. Macartney thought that Coote's opposition to the measure was due to his ambition to gain "fame and fortune" for himself.³

Why was Coote quarrelling with Macartney? Coote was old, peevish and ambitious. Accidents and disappointments irritated him, and he threw the blame on Macartney. Coote was surrounded by advisers who were inimical to Macartney. Chief among them were Thomas Graham, his Persian Secretary, and Paul Benfield, the bullock contractor. Graham had concerted as far reaching a scheme as obtaining for himself the sole control of the Nawab's revenues. He asked the Nawab to appoint him Amildar-General, or the chief controller of the Nawab's revenues.⁴ Benfield was anxious to make quick profits, but Macartney would not let him do it easily. Therefore, Benfield made common cause with Graham. Both must have told Coote that Macartney's rigid economy was responsible for the difficulties of procuring both bullocks and provisions, for whenever Graham was absent from Madras, Macartney's relations would improve with Coote.⁵ However, despite the frictions the

¹ Munro to Madras, cons. 30 Nov. 1781, *Ibid*, p. 3249

² Munro to Madras, 17 Nov. 1781, cons. 27 Nov. 1781, *Ibid*, p. 3019

³ Macartney to the Court, 26 Nov. 1781, *Home Misc.* vol. 246, p. 475

⁴ Macartney to Macpherson, 20 Jan. 1782, *P.C.M.* p. 23

⁵ Macartney to Macpherson, 26 Feb. 1782, *Ibid*, p. 30

relations between the two in 1781 did not reach the breaking point, which they did in 1782 after Graham's return from Bengal. In November Macartney observed, "I have courted him like a Mistress, and humoured him like a Child....and nothing will alter my Conduct in these respects towards him."¹

At this time Hastings was trying in Bengal to end the war by making peace with the Marathas, whose exclusion from the Confederacy would force Haidar either to accommodate with the English or face a hostile alliance of the Company and the Marathas. Besides, Hastings was pressed from every direction to make peace. Coote from Madras, Sullivan from England, and his other friends all joined in a common cry for peace with the Marathas on any terms.² Mudaji's mediation having failed Hastings asked Goddard to contact Nana and conclude a treaty on the basis of the terms of 25 September 1780 with one important modification, namely that the proposed offensive alliance against Haidar was waived, but the Marathas were to permit Goddard to cross their territories to attack Mysore.³

Before Nana's reaction to these proposals was known, Sindhia expressed his desire for a separate peace. The capture of Gwalior and Bassein by the English, their alliances with Fateh Singh Gaekwad and the Rana of Gohad, the successes of Colonel Muir and Major Popham and Sindhia's own defeat on 16 February 1781 made him sue for peace.⁴ The terms Sindhia proposed were his mediation to conclude a general peace between the Company and the Confederates, the surrender of certain districts to him by the Company on the bank of the Jamuna, and the grant of their assistance to him "at all times."⁵ Hastings accepted these terms with the

¹ Macartney to Macpherson, 24 Nov. 1781, Ibid, p. 5

² Coote to Bengal, 27 Apl. 1781, cons. 14 June 1781, B.S.C.P. Range A, vol. 60, p. 1715; Sullivan to Hastings, 21 Aug. 1781, Add. Mss. 29, 150, p. 143, 192

³ Bengal to Goddard, cons. 11 June 1781, B. S. C. P. Range A, vol. 60, pp. 1641-53

⁴ Muir to Hastings, 10 Aug. 1781, Add. Mss. 29, 150, p. 54

⁵ Sindhia's Proposals, 27 Aug. 1781, Ibid, pp. 173-6

modification that aid would be given to Sindhia, if it did not complicate the Company's affairs, and if Sindhia was ready to join the English against Haidar.¹ [Muir successfully concluded the treaty on 20 October 1781.²

This treaty marks the advent of a significant turn in events, for with it the Company's war with the Marathas practically came to an end. Besides, Sindhia became the Company's friend at a time when their affairs were at the lowest ebb with Hastings himself being shut up as a prisoner at Chunar by Chaith Singh. The treaty paved the way for a closer understanding between the two powers in the subsequent years. Although Hastings wrote to Scott that Muir was mostly responsible for this treaty, it was Hastings' policy which brought about its conclusion.³ He planned a diversion on Sindhia's possessions in the teeth of opposition from Francis. It was this policy that distressed Sindhia most, and left Goddard at full liberty to prosecute the war in Gujarat.⁴

But Hastings' policy concerning the assignment of the Carnatic revenues was not successful. Madras reacted very adversely to the Bengal treaty of 2 April 1781.⁵ Johnson thought that it was disgraceful.⁶ But it brought full satisfaction to the Nawab, who fired even a salute in its honour.⁷ Macartney's response was quite different. He opposed it strongly, criticised its every clause, questioned its very legality, and called it unjust, unauthorised and provocative. The point that irritated him most was the appointment of Sullivan, a Madras civilian, to supervise the execution of the treaty.⁸ Although Hastings had explained in a personal letter to

¹ Hastings to Muir, 11 Sept. 1781, Ibid, pp. 299-301

² Muir to Hastings, 20 Oct. 1781, cons. 12 Nov. 1781, B. S. C. P. Range, A, vol. 61, p. 592

³ Hastings to Scott, 1 Jan. 1782, Add. Mss. 29, 129, p. 9

⁴ Hastings to Hughes, 28 Apl. 1782, Add. Mss. 29, 154, p. 217

⁵ See back pp. 253-4

⁶ Johnson to Coote, 13 May 1781, Home Misc. vol. 246, p. 275

⁷ Sullivan to Hastings, 23 Aug. 1781, Add. Mss. 29, 150, p. 161

⁸ Madras to Bengal, 18 Sept. 1781, Ibid, pp. 362-75

Macartney that only the extreme financial distress at Madras had prompted him to take the step, Macartney was not convinced, and wrote a very provoking letter to Hastings.¹ In fact Macartney had no reason to oppose the policy so fiercely, for there was nothing derogatory to Madras except for Sullivan's appointment, but Hastings had removed that objection as well by asking Sullivan to resign, if Macartney so desired.² The core of the treaty was the assignment of the Carnatic, which was to form the cardinal principle of Macartney's policy despite all his wrath at Hastings. If the Nawab's intention in agreeing to the treaty was to cause dissensions between the two presidencies, no other plan could have been more effective.

At first Macartney drew up his plan by which the Nawab was to pay all his revenues, over 30 lakhs of pagodas per year, to the Company for 12 years. Of this sum 12 lakhs were to be spent on war, four lakhs for the Nawab's personal use, and the balance for liquidating his debt. By this method Macartney hoped to build not only a reserve of 3,750,000 pagodas at the end of the plan period, but also to make Madras a city of "honourable commerce" and of "real resource."³ The only defect in this plan was the assumption that money would easily flow from the Nawab's hands into the Company's treasury.

Very soon Macartney was disillusioned. He forced the Nawab to assign the revenues on the threat that if he did not voluntarily assign them, they would be forcibly acquired as per the Bengal letter of 26 February.⁴ This made the Nawab declare that if a sixth part of the revenues were set apart for his personal use, he was prepared to assign the Carnatic not only during the war but also after it in order to liquidate his debt and to maintain a body of cavalry.⁵ Macartney won a major point, and to his surprise the assignment was for an

¹ Macartney to Hastings, 28, Sept. 1781, *P.C.M.* p. 118

² Richard Sullivan to Stephen Sullivan, 28 Sept. 1781, Add. Mss. 29, 150, p. 443

³ Macartney to Hastings, 21 Sept. 1781, Add. Mss. 29, 150, pp. 287-95

⁴ Macartney to the Nawab, 20 Sept. 1781. Ibid, p. 359

⁵ Nawab to Macartney, 1 Oct. 1781, Ibid, 29, 151, pp. 3-4

indefinite period. The Nawab's share together with the expenses on civil administration would not exceed a third of the revenues, and the Company would have two-thirds for military use.¹ A Committee of six persons with Paul Benfield as its Chairman was appointed to work out the details of the take-over.

But these arrangements proved unsatisfactory. The Nawab continued to collect "every farthing in his power for his own Use."² Yet he complained of undue interference by Europeans in his internal administration. He considered it less derogatory to his dignity in investing Macartney with full powers to manage the revenues. Accordingly, on 2 December the Nawab gave their full management to Macartney, with powers to appoint all renters and *Amildars*, but they were to be confirmed by the Nawab with the usual *sanads* called *kauls*.³ Bengal was greatly surprised that the Nawab yielded so easily so material a point.⁴

What brought about a change in the Nawab deserves notice, as the names of Haidar and Tipu figure therein. Macartney thought that Coote's differences with the Nawab's second son, Amir-ul-Umra, were responsible for it.⁵ Coote had recommended the appropriation of the entire revenues, but Amir-ul-Umra had opposed it. Coote wrote to Hastings, "So mysterious has been the conduct of the Nabob's second son ever since my arrival that it confirmed me in my suspicion of his being a traitor to our interests, and that he holds private correspondence with Hyder Ally, I can believe from the mention that he has himself made of him to me in conversation. To get a sufficient proof is all I want to check the further progress of intrigues w[hic]h strike at the very root of our

¹ Sullivan to Hastings, 7 Oct. 1781, *Ibid*, p. 62

² Macartney to the Court, 15 Dec. 1781, *Home Misc.* vol. 246, pp. 516-7

³ Instrument of the Nawab's Assignment of the Revenues, 2 Dec. 1781, *Ibid*, pp. 529-30

⁴ Bengal to Madras, 5 Apl. 782, *Ibid*, vol. 247, p. 79

⁵ Macartney to Macpherson, 27 Nov. 781, *P.C.M.* p. 6

existence."¹ Coote suspected that Amir-ul-Umra was in touch with Tipu as well.² In his private talk with Macartney, Coote had revealed his personal inclinations to depose the Nawab, and set up Tipu in his place.³ Pearse wrote a long letter to Hastings enumerating the advantages of making Tipu the Nawab of Arcot.⁴ Thus the hostility of the military leaders at Madras, the adverse reaction of Macartney to Hastings' policy, and the sanction from Bengal to secure the assignment brought about a change in the Nawab.⁵

These controversies at Madras offered a chance to Haidar for prosecuting the war vigorously. [He took Chittur and Chandragiri, and besieged Vellore, which was on the verge of fall. Therefore, Coote himself, although in bad health, moved to its relief. But he was seriously struck with a fit of apoplexy.⁶ However, after recovery he relieved the fort successfully, and returned to Madras on 18 January 1782.

It was only on the western coast that the English were able to distress Haidar a little.] After Sindhia concluded a separate peace with the Company⁷ and Hastings sent Anderson to his court to negotiate a general peace, Madras thought of inviting Goddard to attack Mangalore.⁸ In response to this Bombay sent two battalions of sepoy under Major Abington to Telli-cherry. On 8 January 1782 Abington attacked Sardar Khan, defeated his army, and took him prisoner.⁹ Calicut was also quickly reduced. Colonel Mackenzie Humberston, who had newly arrived from England with 400 troops of the King's army,

¹ Coote to Hastings, 24 Nov. 1780, Add. Mss. 29, 146, p. 303

² Macartney to Hastings, 23 Apl. 1782, *P.C.M.* No. 80, p. 125

³ H. Dodwell, "Hastings and the Assignment of the Carnatic", *Eng. Hist. Rev.* 1925, vol. XL, p. 386

⁴ Pearse to Hastings, 12 Sept. 1781, Add. Mss. 29, 150, pp. 302-12

⁵ Bengal to Madras, 5 Apl. 1782, Home Misc. vol. 247, pp. 73-4

⁶ Owen to Madras, 5 Jan. 1782, *Ibid.*, vol. 245, p. 149

⁷ Madras to Bombay, 24 Nov. 1781, M. S. C. P. Range D, vol. 9, pp. 2993-4

⁸ Abington to Macartney, 9 Jan. 1782, cons. 30 Jan. 1782, *Ibid.*, vol. 11, pp. 248-57

offered to attack Mangalore or Cochin. But Bombay thought that it was too late in the season to undertake the project.¹ The difficulties of finance and supplies together with the uncertain footing with the Marathas forced Bombay not only to inform Humberston to stop his offensive and join the Madras army, but also to recall the troops under Abington, who was asked to restore Calicut to the Zamorin.² This policy helped Haidar to prolong the war, for if Bombay had launched a vigorous diversion on the western coast, he would have been forced either to evacuate the Carnatic or to accommodate with the English. Hastings had urged such an offensive, but Bombay took his advice only towards the end of 1782.

[Perhaps owing to this apprehension of an English offensive from the western coast, Haidar decided to quit the Carnatic in February 1782. He laid mines under the rampart of the Arcot fort, destroyed the forts of Chittur, Chitapet and Satgarh and sent back his principal men, stores and guns to Mysore.³ It was at this time that an event of great importance took place, namely the arrival of a French force.] A brief recapitulation of the events that brought about their arrival may be necessary.

Haidar had been in touch with the French for aid ever since the war began. In October 1780 he sent a vessel to Mauritius in order to inform De Souillac of his success over Baillie.³ Although the despatch of D'Orves to India had exhibited D'Souillac's willingness to assist Haidar, the French unpreparedness to enter the contest in all seriousness prompted the expedition to be recalled. In July 1781 Haidar urged Souillac again to fulfil the promise of aid, or at least to prevail on Batavia for sending troops to the Dutch settlements in India.⁴ In August 1781 Haidar learnt of the arrival at the Isle

¹ Bombay to Humberston and Abington, cons. 16 May 1782, *Ibid*, vol. 13, pp. 1550-3

² John Cuppage to Madras, cons. 14 Feb. 1782, *Ibid*, vol. 11, pp. 524-5

³ Intelligence from Captain Verture, cons. 11 Oct. 1781, *Ibid*, vol. 8, p. 2559

⁴ Haidar to Souillac, 29 July 1781, *Arch. Nat.* vol. Colonies C2, 155, p. 65

of French force, which might be sent to India.¹ Piveron told Haidar that France would send a powerful expedition under an able commander with a fine artillery and proper equipment of war.²

The reason for the despatch of troops to the East was not so much in response to Haidar's appeal for aid as the French anxiety to assist their allies, the Dutch, in the defence of the Cape of Good Hope, which had been threatened by the English expeditionary force under General Medows. In March 1781 the French sent a fleet of five ships of the line with 1,000 marine and 1,200 troops under the command of Pierre Andre de Suffren, who was one of the greatest French admirals. These troops along with 2,300 men from the Isles were to form an army in order to recover the French territories lost in India. The land force was placed under the command of D'Orves, who was urged this time to exert his utmost to make the campaign a success.³ Sailing from France in March 1781, Suffren came to the Isles in October, where Souillac had kept ready a force of 2,868 men for India.⁴

In November 1781 France sent another expedition to the east under Marquis de Bussy, an able soldier and a politician. This was in response to an interesting memoir submitted by Bussy himself on the advantages of a well-concerted expedition to India.⁵ He stated that the time was opportune for the reduction of British power in India, as all the native princes were against the Company. The object was to capture Bombay and Surat, to co-operate with Najaf Khan, Shah Alam's minister, and assist Haidar in taking Madras. Bussy was hopeful of success because of the French alliance with the Dutch and the Spaniards, the Indian Confederacy against the

¹ D'Orves to Haidar, 10 Aug. 1781, Bib. Nat. N.A. 9422, p. 154

² Instructions to Piveron, 10 Aug. 1781, Arch. Nat. vol. Colonies C2 155, pp. 96-7

³ Instructions to Vicomte de Souillac and Comte d'Orves, H. Richmond, *The Navy in India*, Appendix IV, pp. 406-9

⁴ A. Martineau, *Bussy et l'Inde Francaise*, p. 330

⁵ *Journal de Bussy*, pp. 1-9

Company, and the English difficulties in America. He suggested the raising of a loan if the treasury could not afford the cost, which was estimated at 20 million livres.¹ The French accepted these proposals, and agreed to send an expedition of 8,000 troops with a naval force, which Bussy could put to any use he liked.²

Although Bussy left France in December 1781, he did not arrive in India until March 1783, by which time Haidar had passed away. But the expedition under Suffren arrived near the Coromandel coast in February 1782. The French arrival materially altered the policies of several powers in India. First, Haidar changed his earlier decision to quit the Carnatic. The French had so long delayed in coming that he had almost despaired of their arrival. Suffren's appearance revived Haidar's expectation that he might still gain some advantage. Secondly, the Nizam, Nana and Bhosle were affected by the French advent, for all these three powers obstructed greatly the ratification of the Salbai treaty, which Hastings had concluded. Lastly, the French gave a new turn to the Company's struggle in India. Hitherto the latter were opposing only an Indian confederacy, which Hastings had rendered so ineffective that all but Haidar had been disengaged. But the arrival of a French fleet superior to the English, with 3,000 Europeans, and with the prospects of more under Bussy, disturbed the Company's affairs enormously. The Company's naval supremacy had never been challenged before in India, but it was given such a rude shock in the five naval battles which Suffren fought that the English failed to maintain their previous record.

The French arrived in India at the right time, the campaign season of the year. Besides, Tipu had defeated the Madras army in the south under Braithwaite on 18 February at Annagudi. The entire detachment of 100 Europeans, 300 cavalry, 1,400 sepoy and 10 field pieces was defeated and taken prisoners.³ The

¹ Richmond, *The Navy in India*, Appendix, No. II, pp. 389-94

² Ibid, pp. 395-413

³ Fallofield to Madras, cons. 21 Feb. 1782, M.S.C.P. Range D, vol. 11, pp. 513-4

French landed their troops on 11 March, but soon entered into a fruitless controversy with Haider concerning the conclusion of a treaty with regard to the plan of operations, the division of conquests, the question of command and the supply of finance.¹ D'Orves died on 9 February 1789, and the command fell to an incapable officer, Pierre Duchemin, who made the conclusion of a treaty an essential condition for the French co-operation with Haider. But Haider disagreed with its terms, and refused to sign it.² The French asked for a lakh of rupees per month, besides 5,000 bullocks, 3,000 sheep and other provisions, but he would not give them anything more than a lakh of rupees. They wished to retain Madras, Cuddalore, Anjengo and Northern Sarkars for themselves after the conquests, together with a *jagir* of 323,000 pagodas in the Carnatic, which had been already conquered by him, but he said that he would concede the places yet to be conquered but not the *jagir* they demanded. Lastly, they wanted the liberty to conclude a separate peace with the English, if hostilities ceased in Europe, but he wanted them to co-operate until he finished his war with the Company.³ Much time was lost in these negotiations, and in the visits of *rakits* from one camp to the other. [The best season of the campaign was wasted. De Canaple, one of the French officers, thought that Duchemin's insistence on a treaty was the cause of all the later misunderstandings between Haider and the French.⁴

This resulted in inactivity from February to May, when nothing was accomplished excepting the capture of Cuddalore which in no way impressed Haider.⁵ Suffren suggested the capture of Nagapatam, but Duchemin preferred an easier place like Cuddalore.⁶ Haider wanted the French to join him in

¹ Souillac's Proposals for a treaty, 15 Nov. 1781, Arch. Nat. Colonies C2, 155, pp. 36-45

² Articles of the Proposed treaty with Haider, 15 April 1782, *Ibid.*, pp. 47-56

³ Memoirs de Canaple, *Journal de Bussy*, p. 117

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 115

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 118

⁶ J. S. Reux, *Le Bâillon de Suffren*, p. 11

attacking Tanjore and Trichinopoly, but Duchemin rejected the proposal.¹

One of the causes for this inactivity was the disaffection among the French officers.² There is enough evidence to infer that the French officers "inspired the supreme contempt" in Haidar "by their shameful cupidity."³ Moreover, the choice of an incapable commander like Duchemin, who was so ill that he could not stand a journey to Ceylon to recoup his health, was unfortunate.⁴ Bussy accused Duchemin of two faults, cupidity and inaction. He received from Haidar 30,000 rupees for himself, 10,000 for his brother, de Chenneville, and 2,000 for Canaple, who was his agent. His inaction was evident as he turned down every proposal of Haidar to attack the English while they were still in consternation at the arrival of the French.⁵

[On the other hand Haidar's rigid policy in respect of supplies and money rendered the co-operation difficult.] His offer to pay a lakh of rupees for 3,000 troops was inadequate.⁶ Coote needed seven lakhs of rupees for 2,000 Europeans and 5,000 sepoys.⁷ Being distressed for money the French raised a loan of a lakh of rupees at 36 percent interest.⁸ De Canaple says that Haidar ill-treated Duchemin, invited him twice to a meeting, and disappointed him every time.⁹

Why were the allies quarrelling? They had nothing in common except their hostility towards the English. Both had their own interests to serve. As early as 1778 Bussy had observed, "Ayder-Ali-Khan could be made our principal

¹ Coote to Madras, cons. 12 Apl. 1782, M.S.C.P. Range D, vol. 12 p. 1033

² *Journal de Bussy*, pp. 107-13 ; 287

³ *Ibid*, p. 107

⁴ *Ibid*, p. 149

⁵ *Ibid*, pp. 113-6

⁶ *Ibid*, p. 117

⁷ Madras to Bengal, cons. 20 Sept. 1781, M.S.C.P. Range D, vol. 8 p. 2292

⁸ *Journal de Bussy*, pp. 121-2

⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 122-4

resource because of his riches and the position of his dominions, if one could count on this Mohametan, who more than all others loves money, and only thinks of his interests, to which he sacrifices all... As it would be dangerous to have him against us, and as he wishes to aggrandise himself in the north of the Kingdom of Travancore, it is good to hold forth the hope of assisting his views on this subject... and of assuring him the peaceful possession of his conquests under the condition of some aid of men and money which he would give us.”¹ In 1781 Bussy’s object in despatching troops to India was to increase the English difficulties in the east and thereby change the state of affairs in the west. He was more interested in exciting a revolution in India, where all the princes “from the heights of the Ganges to the Carnatic” had some grievance or other against the English than in advancing Haidar’s interests.² Suffren asked Bussy to land the troops on the western coast in order to disengage the Marathas from the English.³ Bussy was also thinking of arriving on the western coast.⁴ In other words the expected reinforcement was not sure to co-operate with Haidar. Infact the French troops under Duchemin were intended only to prevent the Indian powers from accommodating with the English, and not for any serious campaign until Bussy arrived in India. This is conclusively established by Souillac’s instructions to Duchemin, “Your corps, Sir, shall be so much reduced that it will not be possible to hazard any considerable operations, and in that you will conform to the intentions of H. M. who wishes that we should compromise nothing before the period when all the forces which he is determined to send, shall arrive.”⁵ Duchemin’s Secretary, Robillard, thought that these instructions were the principal

¹ Reflexions de Bussy sur l’Etat des Affaires dans l’Inde 1778, *Journal de Bussy*, p. 159

² Correspondance de Bussy, 1781-2, Bib. Nat. N.A. 9372, p. 18

³ Suffren to Bussy, 30 July 1782, *Journal de Bussy*, p. 97

⁴ Ibid, p. 151

⁵ Souillac to Duchemin, 18 Jan. 1782, Quoted in *Journal de Bussy*, (foot note) p. 289

reasons for Duchemin's inactivity.¹ Being alarmed lest Haidar should make peace with the English, Bussy sent de Launay to induce him to remain in the Carnatic, and not for urging Duchemin to any bold design.

[Haidar was shrewd enough to understand the French policy. Their insistence for a treaty and inactivity enhanced his suspicions. He would not spend money on troops which did not obey his orders.² He had his own policy which was different from theirs. A French memoir mentions that his policy was not to encourage the Europeans in India.³ Another memoir declared, "...let us not flatter ourselves that he will put down the power of the English to make that of the French succeed it. He likes neither the one nor the other to more than a moderate extent."⁴ Haidar wanted to use the French to defeat Hastings' negotiations with the Marathas for peace. For this purpose Haidar made Canaple and Chenville declare in the presence of the Maratha envoys that the object of the French expedition was to remove the oppressive yoke of the English over the Indian princes, and "to render to their legitimate sovereigns the countries which they had conquered."⁵ When Bussy's agent, de Launay visited Haidar, the latter made him explain to the Maratha *rakils* all about the French policy. De Launay wrote to Bussy, "I have not left them ignorant that you are bringing with you large means and much money."⁶ Thus both Haidar and the French were insincere, and had conflicting views.

It is difficult to ascertain as to who was more insincere, Haidar or the French. The policy of the latter indicates that they were more insincere.] In instructing Duchemin not to

¹ Robillard to Souillac, 18 Aug. 1782, Ibid, pp. 288-9

² Haidar to Boudouin, 5 June 1782, Arch. Nat. Colonies C2, 155, pp. 66-7

³ Memoirs Sur l'Inde, undated, Ibid, vol. 165, pp. 56-9

⁴ "Etat Politique de l'Inde au annee 1777", *Ind. Hist. Rec. Com.* vol. XIII, p. 120

⁵ Memoir de Canaple, *Journal de Bussy*, p. 115

⁶ De Launay to Bussy, 2 Aug. 1782, Ibid, pp. 146-7

hazard much, in sending troops without funds, and in planning to land their troops on the western coast, they treated Haidar more as a pawn than as an ally. Four years after their promise of aid, a French force appeared in India, ill-equipped and ill-commanded, but even that would not co-operate with him. Their inactivity, cupidity and the demand for more territories even before the conquests were made alarmed Haidar. It is true that he was not liberal in his supplies to him, but they took no steps to deserve his liberality. Still when he stopped paying them money, he continued to supply them provisions.¹ Dr. S.P. Sen thinks that Haidar was at fault, for he stopped financial aid.² But we think that the French provoked him to adopt such a policy. It should be remembered that he broke with the English on the Mahé issue, and was consistent in his policy of supporting the French ever since that period. They promised to send aid, which they delayed so long that he had given up all hopes of securing any. When it came, it never co-operated with him either in 1781 or in 1782. When peace was made in Europe in 1783 the French hastened to cease hostilities with the English in India, disregarding the interests of their ally. Therefore, in view of their insincerity and self-centred policy, Haidar was not far wrong in stopping financial aid.

[While Haidar and the French were thus quarrelling, Madras received reinforcements of about 400 Europeans from England.] The deficiency of bullocks was also partly removed after Macartney secured the assignment of the revenues.³ Still Coote's army remained inactive from February to May, owing to the loss of over 3,000 bullocks, which Haidar intercepted.⁴ Moreover, serious differences arose at this time between Coote and Macartney over the questions of military command, the assignment of the Carnatic and the strategy to be adopted in order to defeat Haidar. Macartney was for keeping the army ever engaged in the reduction of either big or small forts, but

¹ Hofflize to Souillac, 17 Oct. 1782, *Ibid*, p. 290

² S.P. Sen, *The French in India*, pp. 283-7

³ Macartney to Macpherson, 21 Jan. 1782, *P.C.M.* p. 25

⁴ Coote to Macartney, 27 Feb. 1782, *Home Misc.* vol. 245, p. 371

Coote wanted to collect first enough provisions and then march against Haidar.¹

A bitter quarrel raged between the civil and military authorities at Madras over Coote's special powers to direct the operations of the war. Macartney had never been reconciled to the transfer of those powers by Smith's Government to Coote in the past.² Still being conscious of Coote's abilities, Macartney had remained quiet. But Coote irritated him by frequent complaints about trivial affairs, such as the appointment of an officer to a garrison, or his recall.³ Coote's old age, ill health and bad temper made him a difficult man to deal with. In February 1782 the differences reached a new height, when Coote sent Graham to Hastings seeking more powers.⁴ This resulted in the Bengal despatch of 11 March 1782 to Madras by which Coote was given "an entire and unparticipated command" over all the troops in the Carnatic. Besides, he was empowered to transact all political powers, which did not expressly fall within the military command.⁵ Madras reluctantly acquiesced in the measure, for it was from those "who have the power to command, and who inform us that they have that power."⁶ But it did not forget the cause for this Bengal order, namely Coote's complaint that Madras was interfering in his general command.⁷ It led to a constitutional dispute of the rights of one presidency to intervene in the affairs of another.⁸

Besides the question of command, the controversy over the assignment of the Carnatic further strained Macartney's

¹ Madras to Bengal, 1 Feb. 1782, M.S.C.P. Range D, vol. 11, p. 116.

² See back pp. 241-2

³ Coote to Macartney, 20 Oct. 1781, P.C.M., p. 165

⁴ Coote to Bengal, 3 Feb. 1782, cons. 25 Feb. 1782, M.S.C.P. Range D, vol. 63, p. 399

⁵ Bengal to Madras, 11 March 1782, Home Misc., vol. 145, pp. 464.

⁶ Committee's minute, cons. 6 Apr. 1782, M.S.C.P. Range D, vol. 11, p. 953

⁷ Ibid, p. 947

⁸ A. P. Dasgupta, *Central Authority in British India*, p. 116.

relations with Coote. The arrangements of 2 December did not work well. The Nawab once again desired to recover the management of the revenues from Macartney by giving good security for payments to the Company.¹ Macartney refused to do this, and it excited the jealousy of all those who were opposed to the assignment, including Benfield. At first Benfield was on good terms with Macartney, but later he fell out with him, because Macartney refused either to give him the bullock contract, or to make him the Resident at Tanjore, or permit him to go to Bengal in order to plead his case with Hastings.² Added to these grievances the deep interest Benfield had in the Nawab's revenues made him bitterly oppose Macartney.

When Macartney tried to appoint new renters, the Nawab refused to confirm them. Thereupon Macartney signed the papers himself. This step brought the matter to a crisis. The Nawab protested that Macartney was guilty of breaking the Paris Treaty which had made him the lawful Nawab of the Carnatic.³ Macartney explained that Bengal had given him full authority to manage the revenues of the whole of the Carnatic.⁴ This gave a clue to the Nawab that he could expect no assistance from Bengal, and that he should conceive other plans to defeat Macartney, who was declaring that the assignment was permanent.⁵

Coote appears at this time in the picture. Although he was not on good terms with the Nawab for long, suddenly his relations were enormously improved with the latter owing to the intrigues of Graham and Benfield, who concerted a new scheme by which the Nawab was to transfer the assignment to

¹ Nawab to Macartney, 7 March 1782, Add. Mss. 29, 153, pp. 296-314; also pp. 228-31

² *P.C.M.* pp. 45, 85, 190, 195

³ Nawab to the Council, 18 Apl. 1782, Add. Mss. 29, 154, pp. 161-5, also 159-60

⁴ Macartney to the Nawab, 20 Apl. 1782, *Ibid*, pp. 168-9

⁵ Macartney to Macpherson, 11 July 1782, *P.C.M.* pp. 50-1

Coote.¹ Dodwell thinks that Graham and Benfield might have convinced Coote of the propriety of the measure by telling him that it would lead to procuring both provisions and bullocks for the army.² Moreover, both Graham and Benfield had great interest in the Nawab's revenues, and the scheme would have benefited them most, for Coote's bad health and military duties would have given them the management of revenues.

Coote formally accepted the assignment on 15 May. The Nawab appointed his servant, Muhammad Najaf Khan, as Coote's deputy to assist in the management of the revenues.³ Marcartney was greatly surprised, and he tried his utmost to defeat the design. He wrote to Macpherson, "If you destroy the Fabric which we have taken such pains to build, remember, it will fall on your own heads."⁴ To Hastings he appealed, "Perhaps at this moment the foundation of our Empire in India may be loosened to the bottom or rivetted for ever by the motion of a finger of your Government."⁵ Hastings decided to support Macartney, and asked Coote not to accept the offer, as it might lead to more confusion in the Carnatic.⁶ Besides, the special powers granted to Coote on 11 March were also revoked, and Madras once again continued to exercise those powers.⁷

Coote was greatly disappointed. The breach between him and Macartney was complete. Mill says that Coote rejected the offer because he was conscious of the confusion in the Nawab's affairs.⁸ This is not borne out by Coote's conduct either before or after the offer. He wrote a long letter to

¹ Macartney to Hastings, 22 May 1782, *P.C.M.* p. 128

² H. Dodwell, "Transport and the Second Mysore War," *Jou.Soc.Army Hist. Res.* vol. III, No. 14, p. 272

³ Nawab's Circular, 18 May 1782, Home Misc. vol. 170, pp. 223-4 and 231-4

⁴ Macartney to Macpherson, 11 July 1782, *P.C.M.* p. 51

⁵ Macartney to Hastings, 22 May 1782, *Ibid.* p. 129

⁶ Bengal to Coote, 4 July 1782, B.S.C.P. Range A, vol. 65, p. 324-8

⁷ Bengal to Madras, 4 July 1782, Home Misc. vol. 170, p. 347

⁸ J. Mill, *History of British India*, vol. IV, p. 514

Hillsborough strongly criticising Macartney's conduct, and adding that the Nawab's complaints had "strong presumptive marks of truth."¹ Coote went to the extent of urging Macartney's suspension from office over this dispute of the assignment. Coote thought that Macartney was responsible for the Bengal letter of 4 July which withdrew the special powers.²

The significance of this controversy on the Mysore war was that Haidar was left at full liberty to occupy the Carnatic. At a time when the French had joined the Europeans, Madras was preoccupied in fruitless controversies. But for the differences in the allies' camp as well, the position of Madras would have been critical indeed. Being involved in the dispute of the assignment, Coote did not permit any large-scale operations either in the south or in the west. Not a single fort was recovered from Haidar, nor was any battle fought. The campaign of the year 1782 must be viewed against this background of differences both in Haidar's and in the English camps.

[When the French took Cuddalore on 3 April, Coote moved from the Mount on 10 April, but he learnt that Haidar had designs on Permacoil and Wandiwash.] Haidar had detached a force under his younger son, Karim Sahib, to threaten Madras. Coote fell back hurriedly in order to intercept Karim, who had been meanwhile driven away by Amir-ul-Umra.³ Haidar besieged Permacoil on 10 May, but Coote did not move to its relief until 17 May, for he was busy at this time taking-over the assignment of the Carnatic. Meanwhile, Haidar took Permacoil on 17 May. The French also joined after long altercations on the condition that he should spare 8,000 troops to them and supply provisions.⁴ The allies besieged Wandiwash. Coote proceeded to relieve it, and was successful in the attempt. Duchemin precipitately fell back to

¹ Coote to Hillsborough, 31 Aug. 1782, Home Misc. vol. 1170, pp. 349-64

² Coote to Hastings, 26 Aug. 1782, Add. Mss. 29, 155, pp. 480-1

³ Madras to Coote, 7 May 1782, M.S.C.P. Range D, vol. 12, p. 1373

⁴ Coote to Madras, 19 May 1782, cons. 20 May 1782, Ibid, pp. 1593-4

Red Hills, near Pondicherry, and Haidar withdrew to Killenur, near Wandiwash. Although Coote was in a fighting mood, and waited for the allies from 24 May to June, they took no initiative.¹ It was at this stage that an interesting development took place, which increased Haidar's differences with the French.

There is some controversy as to Duchemin's conduct before Wandiwash. Whereas Malleson thinks that he was responsible for not attacking Coote, Dr. S. P. Sen holds Haidar responsible for it.² Malleson is so critical of Duchemin's conduct as to remark that he "was less than the least of her warrior children" and that Wandiwash would have proved the grave yard of the English. The basis for Dr. Sen's counter argument of throwing the blame on Haidar is Canaple's memoir which is the only French source on the subject.³ Coote wrote to Madras that a report prevailed in

until Bussy's arrival. Immediately after the French left Wandiwash, Haidar invited Duchemin to witness how the Mysore army would intercept the Madras army going to the relief of Vellore.¹ Therefore, it is difficult to agree with Dr. Sen that Haidar ordered the French to fall back. On the other hand Malleson also missed his mark when he said that Wandiwash would have proved the grave yard of the English. Coote's army would certainly have been distressed, but not destroyed if the allies had attacked it. Coote at the worst might have been forced to fall back. However, the incident strained much the relations between Haidar and the French. It was Duchemin's incapacity, lack of imagination and enterprise that disappointed Haidar, who never co-operated with the French again. It was again Duchemin's rigid application of Suillac's instructions that resulted in the loss of a fine opportunity to distress the English. Suffren refused later to leave the Indian waters to escort Bussy's troops, and none punished him for the refusal. A more daring commander would certainly have won Haidar's confidence.

[When Coote would not draw the allies to an action, he marched on 30 May to Arni where Haidar had stocked his main provisions. The threat to Arni brought a general battle on 2 June between Haidar and Coote. Haidar lost the action, but Coote could not take advantage of it. Coote wrote to Madras, "The idea of returning for fresh supplies stings to the very soul."² On 8 June Haidar retaliated his defeat by cutting up a part of Coote's army called "The Grand Guard" of which 166 men were killed and two guns were lost.³ This brought to an end the campaign for a time, because on 22 June peace negotiations were begun between Haidar and Coote.

Thus many events of great importance took place after Macartney's advent in India. The appearance of the French fleet complicated the issues. Differences between the civil and

¹ Ibid, p. 124

² Coote to Madras, 3 June 1782, cons. 11 June 1782, M.S.C.P. Range D, vol. 13, p. 1820

³ Coote to Madras, 13 June 1782, cons. 15 June 1782, Ibid, pp. 1872-4

military authorities at Madras made the English almost inactive from September 1781 to June 1782. Despite his defeats Haidar did not lose an inch of territory he had occupied. Far from it he added a few forts to it. However, the battle of Arni fought in June 1782 proved to be the last important battle of both Haidar and Coote, the two veterans who were not destined to live long. It also ended the campaign for a time giving place to peace negotiations between the parties. Thereafter the emphasis was shifted from military to political field.

THE LAST PHASE OF HAIDAR'S STRUGGLE

(June 1782 to December 1782)

[The year 1782 proved momentous in many respects. The conclusion and ratification of the Treaty of Salbai, the secret negotiations between Madras and the Rani of Mysore in order to overthrow Haidar, the news of Bussy's coming to India with more French troops, the end of the war in Europe and America, and the death of Haidar, all took place in that eventful year.

On 17 May 1782 Hastings concluded the Treaty of Salbai. The dissolution of the Confederacy had engaged his attention ever since it was formed. By the end of 1781 he had disengaged all but Nana and Haidar. The Nizam was won over by the restoration of Guntur, Mudaji by the payment of a few lakhs, and Sindhia by the conclusion of a separate peace in October 1781. In that peace Sindhia had agreed to mediate for a general peace between the Confederates and the Company. Accordingly, Hastings sent David Anderson, his "prodigious favourite", to Sindhia for the purpose. At the same time Hastings sent another agent, Charles Chapman, to Mudaji to obviate any adverse step he might take against Sindhia's mediation, as also to hasten the conclusion of peace with the Maratha State "by making an object of competition to the two most powerful members of it."¹ Anderson was instructed to induce the Marathas to invade Haidar's territories.²

Anderson left Benares on 5 November 1781 with his brother, James Anderson, and Taffaz-ul-Hussain Khan, "a Native of the first abilities."³ [Sindhia proposed that the parties for the

¹ Hastings to Bengal, 28 Nov. 1781, cons. 10 Dec. 1781, B.S.C.P. Range A, vol. 16, pp. 748-9

² Hastings to Anderson, 4 Nov. 1781, cons. 10 Dec. 1781, Ibid, pp. 753-6

³ Hastings to Bengal, 28 Nov. 1781, cons. 10 Dec. 1781, Ibid, p. 750

treaty should be himself, the Peshwa, the Nizam, Bhosle and Haidar on one side, and the Company and their allies on the other. Anderson agreed to the inclusion of all excepting Haidar, on the ground that the English would not make peace with any one "unless they were decidedly the conquerors."¹ Bhao Bakshi, Sindhia's agent, replied that the Marathas also were by no means pleased with Haidar, and that "if the English shed tears for the injuries they had sustained, the Marathas might with equal reason weep blood for what they had suffered from him."² Still "for the sake of appearances" Haidar's inclusion was insisted. Anderson wrote to Hastings that Sindhia was not anxious for any peace between the Company and Haidar, and that the Marathas would themselves find a pretext later to join the English against him.³ Anderson suggested a device "the real effect of which would be the very reverse of its apparent intention."⁴ It was to stipulate an extravagant demand on Haidar, who was sure to refuse it, and his refusal would give the Marathas a pretext to join the Company. But Sindhia assured Anderson that as soon as peace was made, the Marathas would ask Haidar to cede the territories he had conquered. His refusal, which was certain, would offer the Marathas the necessary pretext.⁵ This prompted Anderson to suggest that Sindhia should execute a private article binding the Peshwa to assist the Company if Haidar did not evacuate the Carnatic within a specified period. Anderson made this point a condition for the restoration of Bassein, which Sindhia was eager to secure. Sindhia agreed to it, and Anderson consented to include Haidar.

When Sindhia claimed some rights over the Vazir of Oudh on the basis of Siraj-ud-daula's treaty with the Marathas, Anderson was so much shocked as to observe, "There are perhaps no set of men in the world whose counsels are so secret

¹ Anderson's Diary, 1 Feb. 1782, Add. Mss. 29,153, p. 12

² Ibid

³ Anderson to Hastings, 2 Feb. 1782, Ibid, pp. 7-8

⁴ Ibid

⁵ Anderson to Hastings, 12 March 1782, Ibid, pp. 364-5

or unfathomable as the Marathas."¹ Anderson flatly rejected these claims, but so far as other conquests were concerned, the Company did not retain any except for Salsette and the two little islands near Bombay. Sindhia demanded the *chauth* for the Carnatic, but it was refused.² He was afraid of the other mediators in the field. Goddard had sent Watherston to Poona. Hastings had sent Chapman to Nagpur. The Nizam claimed an equal authority to mediate. Mudaji was more active than others. He proposed a congress at Nagpur, and sent for *vakils* from Poona and Hyderabad to attend it.³ He told Chapman that Sindhia was the person who negotiated the alliance between Haidar and the Marathas, that Haidar had sent his *vakil*, Narsing Rao, to Sindhia with six lakhs of rupees, and that Sindhia would never form an offensive alliance against Haidar.⁴ But these persuasions failed to have any effect.

[Added to these difficulties Haidar tried to prevent the treaty.] He sent another *vakil* to Poona with seven lakhs of rupees and with a promise of three more lakhs.⁵ The Nizam urged Sindhia not to break the Confederacy, and informed him his intentions to attack the Sarkars. Tukoji Holkar and Hari Pant were dissuading Nana from trusting Sindhia.⁶ But all these forces proved ineffective. All points being settled, the treaty was ready to be signed by 9 April. The sudden death of Sindhia's wife at Ujjain postponed it to 17 May.

[The treaty of Salbai is one of the most important documents of Indo-British history. It included almost all the important powers of India. If Sindhia were to be regarded as a member of the Maratha confederacy, the treaty recognised only two principal powers in India, the Marathas and the Company, all the rest being grouped as the allies of one or the other of these two. The treaty brought much relief to the

¹ Anderson to Hastings, 15 March 1782, Ibid, pp. 408-10

² Anderson to Hastings, 18 March 1782, Ibid, p. 421

³ Chapman to Hastings, 12 Feb. 1782, Ibid, p. 144

⁴ Chapman to Hastings, 29 May 1782, Add. Mss. 29, 154, p. 313

⁵ Watherston to Hastings, 9 March 1782, Add. Mss. 29, 153, p. 356

⁶ Anderson to Hastings, 9 April 1782, Add. Mss. 29, 154, pp. 47-8

Company, which was in need of a speedy peace. Hastings confessed that he would have "purchased it with the sacrifice of every foot of ground that we have acquired from the Mahrattas."¹ The principle on which the treaty was drawn up was of putting the Marathas, the Company, Haidar and Fateh Singh on their previous footing at the beginning of the war.² Although Sindhia did not openly declare against Haidar, he secretly promised to join the Company, if Haidar were to reject the treaty. Anderson expected that the Maratha anxiety to obtain compensations for their expenses in the war and to recover their lost territories in Mysore would induce them to join the Company.³ Haidar was greatly disappointed at the turn of events.

The ninth article stated that Haidar should relinquish his conquests within six months after the ratification of the treaty. This brings us to the question of Haidar's ideas on peace, and his reaction to the treaty. In the beginning of 1782 he was inclined for peace, had made up his mind to quit the Carnatic, and had sounded both Madras and Coote for peace by making Vinaji write to a Company's servant. Coote did not encourage the advances hoping that the expected reinforcements from England would give him an advantage. He made the exchange of prisoners or a general release on parole a necessary condition for negotiations. Haidar rejected these proposals.⁴ The arrival of the French made Haidar less anxious thereafter.

After the Salbai treaty was concluded Haidar once again renewed his advances to Coote. On 19 June he sent his agent, Muhammad Usman, to Coote to know the conditions for a separate peace.⁵ [Coote made Haidar's evacuation of the Carnatic, his disengagement from the French, and the acceptance of the Salbai treaty the basis for accommodation] Usman said

¹ Gleig, II, 531

² Anderson to Madras, 20 May 1782, cons. 26 June 1782, M.S.C.P., Range D, vol. 13, p. 1961

³ Ibid

⁴ Coote to Bengal, 13 Feb. 1782, Home Misc. vol. 170, pp. 92-3

⁵ Coote to Bengal, 21 June 1782, Ibid, pp. 306-7

that Haidar would accept these terms, if Madras were to honour its previous treaty, and recognise his claim over Trichinopoly. Coote rejected the demand, but wrote to Bengal that in view of Haidar's alliance with the French, it was a point for serious consideration whether the loss of a fort "should prove an obstacle to an object of such national importance."¹

Coote wrote back to Haidar that he would send Graham to adjust terms settled for Haidar in the Salbai treaty.² But Haidar wanted to know first the precise terms of the treaty, for which purpose he asked for a copy of it through Srinivasa Rao, a Company's servant.³ Coote informed Haidar that Anderson had settled a treaty with Sindhia by which hostilities should cease between Haidar and the Company.⁴ Coote moved himself secretly from Madras on 1 July towards Haidar. He explained his conduct of not informing these steps to Madras as owing to the secret instructions from Bengal of April to act independently of Madras in negotiating with Haidar. Besides, he had received secret reports that Haidar would not negotiate with any one except Coote.⁵

[Haidar did not respond favourably.] He said that he had nothing to do with the Maratha treaty, which had been concluded without his consent. He added that his intelligence from Poona was quite different. Nevertheless, in order to know the terms of the treaty, he wanted a copy of it through Srinivasa Rao. Haidar sent Usman again with two papers, one was the treaty of 1751 between the Mysore Raja and Muhammad Ali for the surrender of Trichinopoly with its dependencies in return for 10 lakhs of rupees, and the other was also between the same parties for the surrender of the same forts.⁶ Haidar desired that these places should be ceded to him.⁷

¹ Ibid, p. 307

² Coote to Haidar, 22 June 1782, Ibid, p. 585

³ Haidar to Coote, 1 July 1782, Ibid, p. 586

⁴ Coote to Haidar, 5 July 1782, Ibid, p. 587

⁵ Coote to Bengal, 29 June 1782, Ibid, p. 334

⁶ Copy of Agreements, 27 Sept. 1751 & 9 July 1752 Ibid, pp. 619-24

⁷ Haidar to Coote, 19 July 1782, Ibid, pp. 590-1; 588

Coote was disappointed. He wrote to Haidar that these demands were inadmissible, for they had not been pressed in the earlier treaties. Meanwhile, Coote sent Srinivasa Rao to Haidar, who had a very frank talk with him on 14 and 15 July near Dhobigarh. In these Haidar repeated his reasons for the invasion of the Carnatic, namely the breach of the 1769 treaty, the attack on Mahé, and the border disturbances. He said that despite his conquests in the Carnatic, he would make peace.

When Srinivasa Rao said in reply that a peace had already been made for Haidar by Sindhia, Haidar violently reacted, expressed his great resentment at it, questioned the very powers of Sindhia to conclude it, and dismissed the whole affair as an illegal act. He said, "Mr. Anderson, an European, comes to Sindhia, gives him gratifications, obtains from him a false writing."¹ Haidar added that the Peshwa was not a party to it, and that the letters he received from Poona asserted that the Confederates were firm on prosecuting the war. Notwithstanding, he would make peace with the Company, provided the Nawab restored Trichinopoly to him as per the previous treaties. The Company had agreed to restore the Marathas their territories. Why should they not do the same to him? He would wait for two or three months, if Coote would have to hear from Bengal. To the request that he should treat the English prisoners better, he replied, "I give a sheep a day to ten men. When with you, they were very thin. Now I say they are very fat."² The conversations revealed that Haidar was anxious for a separate peace, that he resented the mediations of others, and that the Poona ministers were hesitating to ratify the treaty.

Coote was not prepared to relinquish Trichinopoly on any plea of right or compensation.³ The papers Haidar had sent claimed territories on either side of the Cauvery, including

¹ Haidar-Srinivasa Rao Conversations, 14 & 15 July 1782, Home Misc. vol. 250, pp. 35-6, 25-55

² Ibid

³ Coote to Bengal, 5 Aug. 1782, Home Misc. vol. 170, p. 426

Madura, Tinnevely, Palamcota, Srirangam and Trichinopoly. Haidar might have come down in his demands, and might have been satisfied with Trichinopoly alone, but Coote did not encourage him. [The negotiations failed.¹]

[Haidar had initiated these negotiations because of his disappointment with the French and the apprehension of a Maratha attack as a result of the Salbai treaty. Besides, the arrival of troops from England, Abington's successes in the west, Humberston's in the south, the designs of Bombay on Mangalore, and the fatigues of a long war must have induced him to peace. But why did the negotiations fail? Coote refused to give him an inch of territory. Haidar learnt of the despatch of Bussy with troops to India. Suffren's naval combats of 17 February, 12 April and 6 July further encouraged Haidar to persist in his demands. With the possibility of more French troops under an able commander, and the presence of the French fleet in India Haidar was yet hopeful of gaining some advantage. The Nizam wrote to Mudaji that Haidar had proposed a new alliance in which he had included the French.² Finally, Haidar must have inferred from his correspondence with Poona that Nana was not inclined to ratify the Salbai treaty within the stipulated time. Later events proved that Haidar was right in his inference.]

Only a week after the failure of the negotiations Haidar met Suffren on 25 July. Haidar had heard of Suffren's combats with great delight, and had expressed his desire several times to meet him. When they met Haidar showed every courtesy, fired a salute of 21 guns, and gave him presents worth 10,000 rupees.³

¹ On the basis of Haidar Nama, a Kannada contemporary work of 1784, (extracts in *Mys. Arch. Rep.* 1932) Hayavadana Rao says that Coote offered Haidar Karnatakgarh and Satgarh besides expenses of the war, but Haidar demanded Trichinopoly, Vellore and other places under his occupation. This brought about the failure of the negotiations. (*His. of Mys.* III, p. 385) This is not supported by any other evidence, and does not seem to be the fact.

² Chapman to Hastings, 29 July 1782, Add. Mss. 29,155, p. 287

³ Journal du Heros, 25 July 1782, Arch. Nat. B4-197, p. 99

While parting Haidar said to him, "I have seen you, I am satisfied, and be well assured that I esteem you, because even your enemies esteem you."¹ But Haidar did not appear satisfied with Duchemin. Suffren wrote to Bussy that he had great difficulty in keeping Haidar steady on the French side.² Suffren thought that only the news of Bussy's coming prevented Haidar from evacuating the Carnatic to defend his Malabar possessions against the expected attack from Bombay.³ On 31 July Haidar met De Launay, whom Bussy had sent. Haidar complained to him about Duchemin's inactivity, and added that he would not co-operate with the French until Bussy arrived.⁴ When De Launay said that Bussy was well on his way and that he would come in September or October, Haidar replied that having waited so long for effective French aid, he would wait for two more months.⁵ This line of thought explains why his negotiations with Coote had failed.

We must divert here a little to study the Nizam's policy vis-à-vis the Company's after Hollond had dropped his negotiations for an offensive alliance.⁶ When the French junction with Haidar seemed imminent, Macartney asked Hollond to negotiate an offensive alliance with the Nizam for attacking Haidar.⁷ The Nizam was not keen now. He evaded the issue saying that the Marathas would be offended for disrupting the Confederacy.⁸ With the arrival of Suffren the Nizam grew still more rigid. When Hollond pressed him to join the English, the Nizam rose in his demands, and asked for the whole of Mysore for himself and the Marathas.⁹ When Hastings

¹ Haidar's interview with Suffren, 25 July 1782, Bib. Nat. N. A. 9370, p.6

² Suffren to Bussy, 30 July 1782, *Journal de Bussy*, pp. 97-8

³ Journal du Heros, 29 July 1782, Arch. Nat. B4-197, p. 100

⁴ De Launay to Bussy, 2 Aug. 1782, *Journal de Bussy*, pp. 143-4

⁵ Ibid, p. 147

⁶ See back, pp. 265-6

⁷ Madras to Hollond, cons. 30 Nov. 1781, M.S.C.P. Range D, vol. 9, pp. 3034-5

⁸ Madras to the Court, 26 Jan. 1782, Lett. Recd. vol. 10, para 93

⁹ Hollond to Hastings, 8 March 1782, cons. 20 Mar. 1782, M.S.C.P. Range D, vol. 12, pp. 824-8; also cons. 5 Apl. 1782, pp. 937-41 and 1074-6

against Haidar, and the desperate situation in the Carnatic brought about an urgent necessity to agree to the loss of the Sarkars. The same Hastings who had earlier offered Tinnevely in exchange for the Dutch aid, who had sought the Portuguese aid, who had relinquished all the conquests to secure Maratha aid, and who had been willing to go to Allahabad or Cawnpore to meet Sindhia, was now willing to surrender the Sarkars, and go to the Canatic to meet the Nizam. This only suggests the gravity of the situation, the sensivity of the English to the French menace, and the type of trouble Haidar was causing in the Carnatic. But for the impolitic measures of the French and Anderson's success in Sindhia's camp, perhaps Hastings' visit to the Carnatic would have become inevitable. One more reason suggests itself for Hollond's willingness to go to Bengal. He had consistently urged for an offensive alliance with the Nizam, but Macartney had turned it down. Now that an occasion arose to conclude it, Hollond might have been eager to finalise it soon. Besides, the Nizam must have promised some gratifications to Hollond for his labours, because in one of the letters to Hastings Hollond acknowledged that the Nizam was personally very kind to him.¹ Hollond was suspended in 1790 on a charge of corruption. If so, it may not be wrong to infer that such servants of the Company as Sullivan and Hollond were accepting commissions from Indian powers to compromise Company's interests.

James Grant² succeeded Hollond at Hyderabad. He held different views from Hollond, and thought that the Nizam was secretly hostile to the Company, and that he was not openly declaring so only because of the knowledge of his own weakness and of the Company's strength. He spoke in utter contempt of the Nizam's army.³ Moreover, the treaty of Salbai was

¹ Hollond to Hastings, 10 July 1782, Add. Mss. 29, 155, p. 49

² James Grant was well informed on the Deccan politics and wrote a series of letters giving Hastings an insight into political affairs of the Deccan. He was an authority on Indian revenues, and the author of "An Analysis of the Finances of Bengal."

³ Grant to Madras, 22 Oct. 1782, cons. 14 Nov. 1782, M.S.C.P. Range D, vol. 16, pp. 3541-3

concluded in the meanwhile, and Sindhia promised secretly to support the English. These factors precluded any necessity either for Hastings' visit to the Carnatic or for an application for the Nizam's aid.

Apart from the question of lending aid, the Nizam raised the English expectations in respect of terminating the war by offering to act as the mediator between the Marathas and the Company. In July 1781 he invited *vakils* to his court from Poona and Nagpur in order to make peace on the basis of Hastings' proposals of October 1780.¹ When Hastings preferred Sindhia's mediation, the Nizam was greatly disappointed. He attempted to defeat the peace negotiations by suggesting that Sindhia was incapable of securing the Maratha aid for the English, but he, the Nizam, could bring about an alliance of the Indian powers for "the entire conquest of Hyder Ally's country."² As the negotiations at Sindhia's court were still on uncertain footing, Bengal asked Hollond to keep the Nizam's mediation open.³ When the Poona *vakil*, Krishna Rao Ballal, came to Hyderabad in October 1781, the outcome of the Nizam's conference with him seemed to be more in the direction of protracting the war than terminating it. The Nizam told Hollond that the Marathas were meditating a fresh offensive, to which he was also compelled to join.⁴ When the Nizam's mediation was rejected, he obstructed the negotiations at Sindhia's court through Mudaji.⁵ Mudaji sent a paper to Hastings, alleged to be the Peshwa's conditions of peace with the Company, in which the fifth condition stipulated the surrender of Ellore, one of the Northern Sarkars, to the Nizam, besides the immediate payment of the tribute to him.⁶ But the Nizam was disappointed in this respect also, and Anderson successfully concluded

¹ Hollond to Madras, 26 July 1781, cons. 12 Sept. 1781, Ibid, vol. 18, p. 2147

² Hollond to Hastings, 6 Sept. 1781, Add. Mss. 29, 150, p. 260

³ Bengal to Hollond, 11 Oct. 1781, Ibid, 29, 151, p. 95

⁴ Hollond to Bengal, 8 Oct. 1781, Ibid, pp. 75-8

⁵ Chapman to Hastings, 16 May 1781, Add. Mss. 29, 154, p. 277

⁶ Peshwa's conditions of Peace, 16 May 1781, Ibid, pp. 279-80

the treaty at Salbai.

[Coote's negotiations having failed the campaign was resumed in August. On 12 August after being ill for long Duchemin died. Coote decided to take advantage of the situation by a sudden attack on Cuddalore. Haidar rose to the occasion and immediately despatched Tipu to rescue the French. This together with the news of the capture of Trincomalee by the French forced Coote to restrain himself from attacking Cuddalore. Although Haidar sent relief to the French, he was not interested in active co-operation with them after his experience with Duchemin. Duchemin was succeeded by Comte d' Hofflize, a more energetic commander, who urged Haidar to attack Coote's army, when it was marching towards Cuddalore. But it was Haidar who refused this time to take the offensive. Hofflize urged Haidar at least to make Tipu join the French, which action would have obliged Coote "to attack us at a disadvantage or to lay down his arms." But nothing could force Haidar. Hofflize sent his agent, Boissieux, to Haidar, but the latter firmly refused to co-operate until Bussy's arrival.² The result was inactivity on both Haidar's and Coote's sides. On 8 September Coote was taken ill, and was obliged to entrust the command to Stuart.³ The army returned to Madras.

The position worsened under Stuart. Despite his poor health and bad temper, Coote had undoubted ability. Stuart had none. He quarrelled with Macartney more bitterly than Coote. Stuart proposed an attack on Cuddalore, but Macartney wanted the troops for the defence of Madras. With Coote's support, the proposal to attack Cuddalore was carried, but Hughes refused to land the stores and provisions without which the siege was impossible. In the naval action of 3 September the English fleet had been so badly damaged that Hughes insisted on going to Bombay for its repairs.⁴ Macartney's quarrel with

¹ Hofflize to Souillac, 17 Oct. 1782, *Journal de Bussy*, pp. 289-90

² Ibid

³ Stuart to Madras, cons. 20 Sept. 1782, M. S. C. P. Range D, vol. 15, pp. 2951-4

⁴ Minutes of Stuart and Macartney, Ibid, pp. 2953-4

Stuart took a different turn. Stuart who had earlier urged the siege of Cuddalore, now supported Hughes, and said that the repairs were more important than the siege. But Macartney held the view that the safety of the Presidency depended upon the squadron's remaining on the coast.¹ Then came the news that Suffren had designs on Nagapatam. Macartney became more anxious to prevent Hughes' departure. In vain did Macartney plead every argument to retain him. Hughes sailed for Bombay on 15 October. Admiral Herbert Richmond supports Hughes' conduct on the ground that the repairs of the fleet were more important than the siege of Cuddalore or the defence of Nagapatam.² However, these differences in the English camp helped the French when Haidar was unhelpful to them. Macartney's further differences with Stuart did not permit the Madras army to prosecute the war effectively after Coote left for Bengal in the last week of September.³

Meanwhile, Bengal was urging Bombay to launch an expedition on Mangalore. But the latter pleaded its inability either to spare the necessary troops, 8,500 Europeans and 6,000 sepoys, or the requisite sum of money, nearly three lakhs of rupees.⁴ Bombay was of further opinion that unless Nana ratified the Salbai treaty and Bengal supplied both men and money, no expedition could be undertaken.⁵ Bengal disapproved of this policy. It urged Bombay with every conceivable argument to take the offensive which might result in the gain of Haidar's western possessions which were rich in commercial commodities. Bengal further warned Bombay that an offensive alone would prevent the loss of the Carnatic by the possible junction of Bussy with Haidar.⁶ These arguments together with

¹ Macartney's minute, cons. 22 September 1782, Ibid, pp. 2967-71; and Stuart's minute, cons. 4 Oct. 1782, Ibid, p. 3103

² H. Richmond, *The Navy in India*, pp. 289-90

³ Macartney to John Sullivan, 27 Nov. 1782, "Add. Mss. 22, 458, p. 114

⁴ Goddard's Memorandum, 2 July 1782, Home Misc. vol. 175, pp. 407-11

⁵ Madras to the Court, 5 Sept. 1782, Lett. Recd. vol. 11, para 40

⁶ Bengal to Bombay (copy sent to Madras), 14 Oct. 1782, cons. 5 Nov. 1782, M.S.C.P. Range D, vol. 16, pp. 3421-9

the supply of a considerable sum of money to Bombay resulted in the despatch of an expeditionary force in December 1782 under Brigadier-General Richard Mathews, whose campaign began after Haidar's death.

John Sullivan,¹ the Resident at Tanjore, conceived a scheme to distress Haidar. It was to overthrow the latter with the help of the Rani of Mysore, Lakshamam Manniyavaru, the wife of Krishnaraja Wodiyar II, whom Haidar had dispossessed of power. For this purpose Sullivan negotiated with the two agents of the Rani, Tirumala Rao and Narayana Rao, who were brothers. As early as 1778 the Rani had employed Tirumala Rao on a secret mission to Lord Pigot against Haidar, but the revolution at Madras had disappointed the Rani. Being apprehensive lest this mission be leaked out, Tirumala Rao fled to Tanjore, where Swartz introduced him to Sullivan, whom he successfully convinced of the Rani's intentions to overthrow Haidar.²

[In April 1782 Sullivan informed Madras of the Rani's anxiety to conclude a treaty with the Company,] by which in return for their support in removing Haidar, she would pay them in all five lakhs of pagodas in instalments, three on the fall of Coimbatore, one on entering Mysore, and another on the capture of Seringapatam. She would pay, besides, two lakhs monthly for the expenses of the army.³ Sullivan wrote to Bombay that the Rani had secretly concealed hoards of money which could be made more "productive the moment we have possessed ourselves of any fort in Coimbatore or Mysore."⁴ Sullivan wanted Humberston to attack Coimbatore, Goddard to take Mangalore, and Coote to reduce Kolar and Bangalore. The extirpation of Haidar seemed quite feasible to Sullivan.

¹ John Sullivan; Writer, 1765; Factor, 1771; Junior Merchant, 1774; Senior Merchant, 1776; Resident at Tanjore, 1782

² Wilks, *History of Mysore*, vol. II, p. 76

³ Sullivan to Madras, 29 Apl. 1782, cons. 9 May 1782, M.S.O.P. ~~RECEIVED~~ D, vol. 13, pp. 1428-9

⁴ Sullivan to Bombay, 22 May 1782, cons. 11 June 1782, M.S.O.P. ~~RECEIVED~~ D, vol. 13, p. 1810

because of the Rani's riches, the expected reinforcements from home, and the Bombay offensive on Mangalore. In his further negotiations with the agents, Sullivan found out that the Rani was prepared to entrust the defence of the whole of Mysore to the Company, pay them five lakhs annually for the purpose, grant them an additional *jagir* of six lakhs, waive her claims over those territories in Mysore which once belonged to the Nizam and the Marathas, and discharge punctually the *peshkash* and the *chauth* to those powers.¹ He urged Bombay to hasten the expedition against Mangalore, for the prospects of gain were brighter in Mysore than in the Maratha empire.² A little later he informed them that the Rani would cede Sunda and Honavar permanently to Bombay as a *jagir*, which was rich in pepper and sandal wood.³

The Madras Government immediately approved of Sullivan's scheme, but Coote did not. He thought that its disclosure might spell disaster to the Raja's family, and retard an accommodation with Haidar, who seemed inclined for it after the Salbai treaty. Coote called the scheme "a mischievous impediment to more important arrangements."⁴ He thought it impracticable owing to the presence of Haidar's troops at Karur, the distresses of the Madras army, and the rebellious mood of the *zamindars*. Coote thought that no other step should be taken than merely informing the whole scheme to Bengal.⁵

Meanwhile, in her anxiety to conclude the treaty soon the Rani sent Tirumala Rao to Madras, but Madras hesitated at this stage, because Coote was negotiating with Haidar in July. The agents demanded that the war should not be discontinued, but Macartney was of the view that if Haidar did not accede to the Salbai treaty within the stipulated period, Sullivan's scheme

¹ Sullivan to Coote, 31 May 1782, cons. 11 June 1782, Ibid, pp. 1816-7

² Sullivan to Bombay, 22 May 1782, cons. 11 June 1782, Ibid, p. 1810

³ Sullivan to Bombay, 17 Nov. 1782, cons. 12 Dec. 1782, Ibid, vol. 17, p. 3840

⁴ Coote to Bengal, 21 June 1782, Home Misc. vol. 170, p. 305

⁵ Coote to Madras, 26 Aug. 1782 and 20 Sept. 1782, M.S.C.P. Range D, vol. 15, pp. 2599 and 2952 respectively.

would be considered.¹ This did not please the Rani. Sullivan pressed the matter on her behalf with Madras, which finally empowered him to conclude the treaty but on conditions of its acceptance by Bengal, and of its cancellation if Haidar were to make peace with the Company.²

Accordingly, Sullivan drew up a treaty which was authenticated by Swartz and interchanged with Tirumala Rao. The treaty stipulated that the Rani would pay the Company 10 lakhs of rupees at different intervals, as and when the Madras army would capture Coimbatore, Mysore and Seringapatam. The Company would maintain an army in Mysore at the Rani's expense. She would pay *chauth* to the Marathas and *peshkash* to the Nizam through the Company. If the Company were to secure exemption from these payments, she was nevertheless to pay the same amount to the Company.³ Besides this treaty, another document called the *Kaul* was drawn up. It stipulated that the Company would conquer Mysore for the Rani, that they would not retain any territory for themselves, that they would demand no more than the agreed sum from her, that in case of peace with Haidar they would refund her the amount paid to them, and that they would not deliver her up to him.⁴ The agents further agreed to put the Company in possession of a magazine of 40,000 rupees near Dindigal and to pay one lakh of rupees immediately on its fall.⁵

As Madras was distressed at the time for money and provisions, it favoured greatly Sullivan's scheme. Only one member of the Select Committee, Stuart, opposed the measure, and said that it was unwise to rely on the Rani's agents, and that she might have conceived the design with

¹ Macartney to Sullivan, 18 Aug. 1782, Add. Mss. 22, 457, p. 183

² Madras to Sullivan, cons. 27 Sept. 1782, M.S.C.P. Range D, vol. 15, pp. 3025-6

³ C.U. Aitchison, *Treat. Eng. & Sanads*, vol. IX, pp. 200-6

⁴ *Kaul* to the Rana of Mysore, (The Rani is referred to as Rana in the records), cons. 27 Nov. 1782, M.S.C.P. Range D, vol. 16, pp. 3625-8

⁵ Sullivan to Madras, 23 Oct. 1782, cons. 17 Dec. 1782, *Ibid*, vol. 17, pp. 3907-9

Haidar's approval to distress the English. Referring to Macartney's arguments Stuart observed, "The President moves much quicker in his Minute from Mangalore to Bangalore than our armies can do in practice."¹ With the support of the other two members of the Committee, Davidson and Sadleir, the scheme was approved of, and the *Kaul* was despatched.²

It was next discussed whether the attack should be from the west or the south. Macartney wanted it to be from the south by the capture of Karur and Dindigal under Lang's command. Davidson opposed this view and proposed the offensive to be from the west. Stuart was not at all in favour of any offensive. He went to the extent of remarking that he would not allow any of the King's or the Company's troops to be used for the scheme.³ But with Sadleir's support Macartney's proposition was carried. The Rani was informed by Madras that if she were to afford the promised aid, the English would remove Haidar at an early date.⁴ The scheme was put into practice. Colonel Fullarton advanced from the south, and took a few forts. With Haidar's death in December 1782 the scheme was more vigorously pursued. But Tipu found out the plot, and punished those who had countenanced it at his capital. Thus an important scheme was conceived to distress Haidar and his son.

Meanwhile, the prosecution of the war in the Carnatic was slackened by the old controversy over the assignment of the revenues. The Nawab was making the most damaging allegations against Macartney such as oppression, corruption, and tyranny. Macartney further provoked him by ordering the seizure of Amir-ul-Umara's coach and by bringing to sale the mortgaged jewels of the Nawab.⁵ The Nawab appealed to Bengal for redress of his grievances. Although the Supreme Council

¹ Stuart's minute, cons. 17 Nov. 1782, *Ibid.*, pp. 3592-4

² Committee's minute, *Ibid.*, p. 3606 and p. 3672

³ Stuart's minute, cons. 26 Nov. 1782, *Ibid.*, p. 3672 and pp. 3593-5

⁴ Madras to the Rani, cons. 23 Nov. 1782, *Ibid.*, pp. 3594-5

⁵ Macartney to Macpherson, 1 Oct. 1782, *P.C.M.* p. 61

had supported Macartney till August 1782, they changed their policy from that time being guided by personal factors. Macpherson was Benfield's friend, and had been the Nawab's agent in England. Macpherson wrote to Macartney that "No Prince ever deserved so much of Britain" as the Nawab, and that even if any act of severity in the Carnatic were to result in the gain of a few lakhs of pagodas, it might cost the Company much more in Bengal.¹ Moreover, Macpherson had estranged Macartney's relations with Hastings over the delicate issue of succession to the governor-generalship in India. On the rumours from home that Hastings might be recalled, and that Macartney might succeed him, Macartney asked Macpherson to assure Hastings that he had no design to accept that office.² Macpherson withheld this information from Hastings, and wrote to Madras deprecating the possibility of Macartney's elevation, for "Absent friends are not always in view."³ This was a serious lapse on the part of Macpherson, because Hastings was really under the impression that Macartney was trying for the post. Hastings wrote to Scott, "I trust to you and Mr. Sullivan to ward off the Blow, if it has been aimed at me though I know not how."⁴

The fall of North's ministry in England, the succession of Rockingham's party to power, which was inimical to Hastings, the publication of the causes of the Maratha war fixing the blame on the governor-general, and the offer of Benfield's party to support him in England brought about a change in Hastings towards the assignment of the Carnatic.⁵ Scott wrote to Hastings that Benfield's party had consistently supported Hastings' cause both at the India House and at Westminster, and therefore it was highly desirable that Benfield should also be supported in the Carnatic, "a circumstance that will be

¹ Macpherson to Macartney, 31 Aug. 1782, Ibid, p. 93

² Macartney to Macpherson, 26 July 1782, Ibid, pp. 55-6

³ Macpherson to Macartney, 31 Aug. 1782, Ibid, p. 94

⁴ Hastings to Scott, 13 April 1782, Add. Mss. 29, 154, p. 94

⁵ Scott to Hastings, 1 April 1782, Ibid, pp. 29-41

highly pleasing to a very powerful party in this country." These events in England must have made Hastings think that his interests would be better served by keeping the Arcot group on his side.

Coote returned to Bengal in October with a very unfavourable opinion of Macartney, and almost with the intention of undoing the assignment. The two other members of the Supreme Council, Edward Wheeler and John Stables, were quite friendly to Hastings. Thus the whole Supreme Council was hostile to Macartney. By October 1782 Hastings made up his mind to rescind the Carnatic.² By January 1783 political and personal interests had sufficiently crystallised to result in the official decision in the Supreme Council restoring the assignment to the Nawab.³

It may not be out of place here to point out that Macpherson's behaviour was very strange at this time. He was at first anxious to support the Nawab against Macartney. Hastings held many conferences with Macpherson in which the latter wholly endorsed the policy of the former. But when the crucial resolution of rescinding the assignment was about to be introduced, Macpherson refused to support it on the ground that corrupt motives would be attributed to his conduct in such a case, for he had been the Nawab's agent in England in the past.⁴ But the real reason for the change in Macpherson was the fall of North, and the formation of Rockingham's ministry, which was opposed both to the Nawab and Benfield.⁵ Macpherson, whom Macartney accused of "fluctuating Intelligence" was not slow to infer that Hastings' falling interests were not worthy of support.

A long dispute thus ended as unhappily for Macartney as it had begun. In this dispute Hastings did not act with disinterestedness. At first he gave Macartney full liberty to

¹ Scott to Hastings, 5 Nov. 1783, *Ibid.*, vol. 29, 161, p. 75

² Bengal to Madras, 19 Oct. 1782, B.S.C.P. Range A, vol. 67, pp. 52-5

³ Board's minute, cons. 8 Jan. 1782, *Ibid.*, vol. 69, pp. 155-61

⁴ Hastings to Scott, 7 Feb. 1783, Add. Mss. 29, 129, pp. 53-52

⁵ H. Dodwell, "Hastings and the Assignment of the Carnatic". *Eng. Hist. Rev.* 1925, vol. XL, pp. 391-2

reduce the Nawab, but later withdrew this support, and went to the other extreme of removing Macartney altogether from office, just as he had removed Whitehill and Chait Singh. Macartney also did not handle the situation with tact and address. He opposed the Bengal treaty, but borrowed its main principle of the assignment. Again, he failed to understand that the Nawab was an independent prince, and that he could not be dispossessed of all power, however urgent the necessity might be. In the midst of a war started on the alleged excesses of the Company on the Indian powers, it would have been a political mistake to pension off the Nawab. There was some truth in what Hastings wrote to Scott, "Nizam Ally Cawn detests the Nawab, yet exclaims against our Treatment of him, & Hyder has used it as an Argument to deter others from a connection with us." Finally, the Regulating Act should also share a part of the blame for the confusion. It gave the Supreme Council just enough power to tempt interference but not sufficient to ensure obedience.¹ It made the other presidencies neither dependent nor independent of Bengal. It gave powers to the latter to punish the former for concluding a new treaty, but not for breaking one already concluded. Hastings was right when he said that the Act was at fault, and that he would exert his utmost to bring "the Law before the notice of Parliament and exacting from it a more effectual or better defined provision."²

Meanwhile, Hastings was experiencing great difficulty in securing the Poona Court's ratification of the Salbai treaty. It was soon ratified by Bengal, but not by Poona. The latter delayed it so long that all hopes of its ratification were despaired of. Haider was certainly right in his expectation that it would not be ratified, and it was not done during his life-time.

Various factors contributed to the delay. The Indian confederates were jealous of Sindhia's mediation. Mudaji, the

¹ Hastings to Scott, 1 Feb. 1783, Add. Mss. 29, 129, p. 113 v

² Dodwell, "Hastings and the Assignment of the Carnatic," *Eng. Hist. Rev.* 1925, vol. XL, p. 395

³ Hastings to Scott, 6 Feb. 1783, Add. Mss. 29, 129, p. 123

Nizam, Nana and Haidar, all opposed it. Mudaji was disappointed, because he had been so long influential with Hastings, and this position was taken up by Sindhia. He told Chapman that Sindhia was not to be trusted, and that he would not only conclude a new treaty on the same terms as Sindhia's, but also secure its ratification very soon.¹ Chapman wrote to Hastings, "I made use of every argument I was master of to prevail on him to accede to what had been done. . . He said it could not be. . . It was constantly declared that Scindia alone would not be permitted to conclude so important a Business. Hints were thrown out that it was in contemplation to deprive Nana Furnavese, his abetter, of power, and towards the end of my visit the Peshwa's Vackeel was called in and declared that everything depended upon the Maha Raja who had power, if he pleased to cause the treaty formerly entrusted to him to be executed, and to render abortive the agreements between Mr. Anderson and Scindia, even though they should be signed at Poona." In another interview Mudaji declared to Chapman, "Now if a separate peace be made with the Peshwa thro' Scindia, then the Peshwa, Scindia and the English will range themselves on one side, and the Nizam, Hyder Naic, the French and myself being left on the other, will not be wanting on our part."²

The Nizam opposed the ratification, because it was to his advantage to protract the war. Having everything to dread from the Marathas the moment their disputes with the English ended, he did his utmost to defeat the treaty. He wrote to Hastings that it was invalid and unauthorized, for there could be no peace without the concurrence of all parties.³ Chapman wrote to Hastings that the Nizam was bringing great pressure on Mudaji to prevent the ratification.⁴

¹ Chapman to Hastings, 29 July 1782, Add. Mss. 29, 155, pp. 287 ; also p. 514

² Chapman to Hastings, 5 Nov. 1782, Add. Mss. 29, 156, pp. 411-4

³ Chapman to Hastings, 15 Nov. 1782, Add. Mss. 29, 157, p. 40

⁴ Hastings to Anderson, 23 Aug. 1782, Gleig, II, pp. 541-2

⁵ Chapman to Hastings, 29 July 1782, Add. Mss. 29, 155, p. 287

Nana himself was opposed to the ratification, for he desired to wait for some more time to see the outcome of Haidar's alliance with the French. Nana informed Mudaji that no final decision had been taken in the matter, and that no decision would be taken without Mudaji's consent.¹ Nana was supposed to have declared to Balvant Rao Bishnu, Nagpur *vakil* at Poona, "When this important Business shall be settled through Scindia, and a close connection shall have taken place between him and the English, to support our Dignity will be difficult."² Hastings received from the Nizam a copy of the alleged treaty among Nana, Haidar and the French in order to reduce the Company's power, and to conquer their possessions as far as Bengal, for which purpose Haidar and the Peshwa were to assist the French each with 10,000 horse.³ Although such a treaty had not been concluded, Nana knew that the French Ministry had sent Bussy with reinforcements, for de Launay had informed him about it.⁴ The presence of a French force with Haidar, Suffren's naval combats, and Bussy's expected arrival might have made Nana change his policy towards the Company. After the Salbai treaty when Goddard sought his permission for the march of English troops through Maratha territory, Nana refused to give the permission and said that when peace had not yet been established between the parties "where is the necessity or advantage of communicating these circumstances to me?"⁵ In one of the conferences with Bishnu Nana was supposed to have declared, "The Raja and Madajee Scindia both press a Peace with the English, and we to satisfy them are labouring to that end; but I foresee that either by means of peace or war the Deccan will ultimately fall under the English Dominion."⁶

¹ Chapman to Hastings, 30 Aug. 1782, *Ibid*, p. 513

² Chapman to Hastings, 5 Dec. 1782, Add. Mss. 29, 157, p. 87

³ Hastings to Anderson, 23 Aug. 1782, Gleig, II, pp. 541-3

⁴ *Journal de Bussy*, p. 142

⁵ Quoted in Anderson to Hastings, 1 Aug. 1782, Add. Mss. 29, 155, p. 305

⁶ Quoted in Chapman to Hastings, 5 Dec. 1782, Add. Mss. 29, 157, p. 88

Not only did Nana express such sentiments, but also took positive steps to defeat the treaty. He sent his *vakil*, Naru Shiv Deo, to Sindhia with new proposals, which would have completely abrogated the treaty. They were the restoration of Salsette to the Marathas; the amendment of XIII article which excluded other Europeans from the Maratha Empire, as it would be derogatory to the dignity of the Peshwa "not to pay civility to others"; the removal of the clause which made Sindhia a common guarantee, for it was inconsistent with his relations with the Peshwa; the acknowledgement of the Peshwa's claim to the *chauths* of Bengal and the Carnatic; the payment of the arrears of the tribute to the Nizam; and lastly, the cession of a territory of 15 or 16 lakhs to Haidar in order that the fault might be clearly on his side, if he refused to quit the Carnatic in spite of the offer.¹ Anderson was shocked to know these conditions, and refused flatly to receive the paper containing the proposals. He thought that Nana's object was to discredit Sindhia, and to find an excuse in order to execute his secret plan, namely to wait until the issue was decided in the Carnatic. Anderson told Bhao, "If Nana preferred the Alliance of the French to that of the English, he certainly was at liberty to chuse, but he ought in prudence to chuse with Caution."² Nana must have thought that he could obtain at any time the same terms which Sindhia had obtained for him, and that in the meantime he could draw more money from Haidar, and more concessions from Hastings. Nana must have known the Company's distress all over India.³

[Haidar was also active. In was partly his valour and money that made Nana waver in the decision. Haidar sent Narsing Rao to Sindhia with six lakhs of rupees to disengage him from the Company.⁴ Narsing Rao reached Sindhia's camp in November, and held a series of conferences with him.⁵

¹ Anderson to Hastings, 10 Oct. 1782, Add. Mss. 29, 156, pp. 222-8

² Ibid, pp. 227-8

³ Anderson to Hastings, 27 Oct. 1782, Add. Mss. 29, 156, p. 279

⁴ Anderson to Hastings, 19 Dec. 1782, Add. Mss. 29, 157, p. 188

⁵ Anderson to Hastings, 2 Dec. 1782, Ibid, pp. 69-71

Reports prevailed in Sindhia's camp that he might break with the Company.¹

Thus Hastings lost all hopes of securing the ratification. Anderson advised him to adopt "some new system of conduct."² Hastings sought Mudaji's intervention. The latter at first refused to intervene, but later revised his stand and agreed to support the Company, if his two conditions were satisfied. First, Hastings should write to Sindhia that it was Mudaji who had at first recommended Sindhia to be the mediator. Secondly, Mudaji's seal and signature should be affixed to the treaty. These conditions were acceptable to Hastings, if Sindhia had no objection to them.³ If this measure were also to fail, Hastings would make a separate peace with Haidar. He wrote to Anderson, "It is certainly my wish to prosecute the war against Hyder to his destruction; but if the Marathas will not assist us, our forces and resources in the Carnatic are not equal to a war with him and his allies, the French, and it will be more for our interest and even credit to make peace with him. This alternative I have therefore resolved to adopt for myself. The old General, I believe, inclines to a peace, and would be pleased to be the instrument of effecting it. These are my own sentiments."⁴

Thus the treaty of Salbai had reached the stage where it would have been either amended or abrogated. Only a new development saved it from both. Haidar died on 7 December and Nana ratified it 13 days later. If Haidar had lived longer, perhaps the scare of Bussy's arrival might have forced Hastings to accommodate with him by conceding a few advantages, but satisfying Haidar's long desire to gain such advantages at the Company's expense. But his death, an important factor in Nana's decision to ratify the treaty, removed an awkward situation for Hastings.

¹ Anderson to Hastings, 24 Nov. 1782, *Ibid*, pp. 34-5

² Anderson to Hastings, 27 Oct. 1782, *Add. Mss.* 29, 156, p. 280

³ Hastings to Anderson, 17 Dec. 1782, *Ibid*, 29, 157, p. 180

⁴ Hastings to Anderson, 4 Dec. 1782, *Gleig*, II, p. 548

With the ratification of the treaty, the Indian Confederacy was dissolved. Haidar's part in it was glorious, though not in its formation, at least in its execution. Others were insincere, weak and vacillating, but he was steadfast. None distressed the Company more than he did. Sindhia was forced to sue for peace. It was at Haidar's expense that he obtained those favourable terms for the Marathas. But for the Company's distress in the Carnatic, Hastings would never have relinquished his all to the Peshwa. Haidar displayed great vigour in the campaigns as Baillie's defeat, Munro's retreat, and Braithwaite's surrender would indicate. The war revealed both Haidar's financial stability, when others were reduced to extremities, and his diplomacy which delayed the dissolution of the Confederacy.

The Nizam's part in the Confederacy was the most inglorious. Another inactive confederate, Mudaji had at least made a pretension of co-operation by sending troops to Cuttack, but the Nizam not only refused to move a single soldier, but also contemplated the destruction of Haidar. Whereas Anderson's main difficulty in negotiating with the Marathas was their refusal to any treaty in which Haidar was not included, the Nizam asserted that he could bring about an offensive alliance of the Marathas, the Company and himself against Haidar. The same Nizam who had written to Najaf Khan, Shah Alam's minister, "The World is now involved in calamities through the turbulence of the English; the Deceits of this wicked nation are spread over the whole Empire.... a handful of people without a head or foundation have possessed themselves of the three richest Provinces in the Empire, every one of which is equal to a Kingdom, a set of merchants without a name and scarcely known have engrossed and disposed of as they please," did nothing to realise the objectives of the Confederacy, which he claimed to have organised.¹ He adopted an ever shifting policy to serve his own interests. He was too weak to openly declare against the Company, and too ambitious to give up his pretensions. He had many chances to

¹ Nizam to Najaf Khan, 25 Sept. 1780, Add. Mss. 38, 405, pp. 30-4

join one side or the other, but he regarded the temporizing policy to be the best of all. Merely an offer of Guntur drew him off from the Confederacy, and thereafter he employed all his arts and policy to gain more advantages by raising hopes and suspicions in the different parties. Whereas all others including the Company gained nothing in the war, it was he who obtained at least Guntur without either incurring the expenses of a war, or undergoing the fatigues of a campaign.

Nana and Sindhia played a significant part both in the formation and in the execution of the Confederacy. Until a few days before the ratification of the Salbai treaty, Nana had such strong views against the Company as are revealed by his remark to Bishnu. "Witness the Possessions of the late Nabob Shuja Dowlah and other chiefs of Hindostan, whose families have been driven from their homes and are distressed for a subsistence. In Process of time such will be the condition of the Deccan and such would it have been now had not Haidar opposed them with a Bravery equal to their own. If you alledge that the exaltation of Hyder is not for the Interest of the Maratha State, I agree with you. Yet, he is a native of this Country, and will not expel us from our homes or deprive us of our lives or Honor, which has never been the custom of the former chiefs of this country. I myself am therefore clearly of the opinion that the original plan for carrying on the war should be prosecuted. Whatever is to be will happen." In fact it was due to three persons alone, Nana, Sindhia and Haidar, that the Confederates were able to fight for so long, and conclude their fight so honourably. It was because of these powers that Bengal was compelled to write to the Court, "If the contests in which we are engaged with the country powers have not been successful, they have opened to us a perfect knowledge of the Dominion's policy, faculties, force, and views of those respective powers."² The Confederacy was not without its result, for the Company thereafter adopted atleast for a

¹ Quoted in Chapman to Hastings, 5 Dec. 1782, Add. Mss. 29, 157, pp. 88-9

² Bengal to the Court, 16 Oct. 1781, Add. Mss. 29, 151, p. 125

short period a policy of peace, moderation and justice.

The Confederacy failed in its main purpose of reducing the Company's power. It did so for two reasons, political and military. Politically, it was difficult for the members to subordinate their personal interests to any principle of unity and co-operation. Personal grievances rather than a common goal had brought them together against the Company. The moment those grievances were removed, they reverted to their old jealousies and self-interests. The Nizam, who claimed the credit for organising the Confederacy, was the first to be disengaged by the mere offer of Guntur. Mudaji was bought off by a few lakhs. A few blows made Sindhia sue for peace. Besides, he looked forward in Hastings' friendship to a new field for his personal advancement in Indian politics. Nor were Nana and Haidar free from similar motives of self-interest, which dominated the policy of every confederate. The Confederacy would have had some success, if the French had arrived a year earlier.

Militarily, the confederates were weak, despite their large number of troops. Their main reliance was on cavalry, which was unhelpful in a pitched battle. At best it could cut off supplies, and surprise detachments, but not decide the fate of an action. Their infantry lacked the discipline of the Company's. Their commanders were no match for the Company's. Goddard, Popham, Carmac, Muir and Palmer effected blows on the Marathas. Sindhia himself, the ablest of the Maratha commanders, was beaten. Goddard never allowed the Marathas to take any offensive. Haidar was the only person, who caused some distress to the Company, but he too could not stand a straight fight. Coote's army of 7,000 defeated his army of over a lakh at Porto Novo. Nor was the result any better at Polilur, Solinghur, Melpadi and Arni. The Indian armies did not lack courage, but certainly were lacking in tactical ability. This deficiency could have been made up by the French, but they arrived when all but Haidar had been disengaged from the contest.]

On the Company's side Bombay and Madras should share the blame for provoking the Indian powers, and for raising a

storm which they were unable to avert. Only Bengal saved those presidencies from utter ruin. In Bengal itself Hastings alone deserves the credit, for his colleagues, far from strengthening his hands, threw every obstacle in his way. It was he who removed Whitehill, sent Coote to Madras, urged Bombay to attack Mangalore, poured the resources of Bengal into the other presidencies, disengaged the Nizam and Bhosle from the Confederacy, formed alliances with Fateh Singh and the Rana of Gohad, and dissolved the Confederacy by a separate peace with Sindhia. Considering these achievements Hastings' boast to Shelburne is justified, namely, "Forgive me for the Boast when I add that I have been the Instrument for rescuing one Presidency from Infamy, and both from Annihilation."¹

In the Carnatic war, the Company's troops suffered more than Haidar's. Despite their best efforts, the Madras army could not dislodge him from the Carnatic. An Indian power was able to cause them much distress by occupying their territories, by cutting off their supplies, and by defeating their detachments. Never had they suffered so much or for so long. Let us enquire into the causes that put them to this embarrassment.⁽¹⁾

The first cause was the scarcity of the provisions, which distressed them all during the war. Munro would rather protect the supply depot of Conjeevaram than march to Baillie's relief lest the whole army should starve to death. Coote was tied to the coast for want of provisions. For the first half of 1781 the army required 450,000 bags of rice, but the supplies did not exceed 125,000 bags.² The position worsened in the second half of the year, when the stock was reduced to 90,000 bags.³ Haidar's horse cut off the supplies from the southern districts, and the French privateers, from

¹ Hastings to Shelburne, 12 Dec. 1782, Add. Mss. 29, 129, p. 103

² Madras to Bengal, cons. 1 Apl. 1781, M.S.C.P. Range D, vol. 6, p. 746

³ Madras to Bengal, cons. 20 Sèpt. 1781, Ibid, vol. 8, p. 2293

Bengal. There was no stock in any of the principal forts, which stood periodically in need of relief, and which disturbed Coote's plans, for to prevent the interception of small detachments, he himself had to move for their relief. The system of collecting the provisions was defective. It was entrusted to the Nawab, whose servants mismanaged the affair at every stage. But for the supplies from Bengal, which sent provisions alone of the order of 1,053,063 pagodas, and total assistance of 6,473,723 pagodas from May 1780 to April 1784, the war could never have been prosecuted.¹

② The second great difficulty was of transport. It was aggravated both by the want of required number of bullocks, and by the poor quality of those available. They were so few that the troops had to carry their rations on their backs. When exhausted, they had to return to the coast for more. The quality was so poor that 20 yokes of bullocks could not drag a twelve-pounder through the streets of St. Thomas' Mount; if so, much less was expected of them in the rugged terrain during a campaign.² In fact Madras had never solved the question of transport even in the previous war, for similar difficulties existed in 1768-69 as well. The English had merely appointed an agent to hire bullocks and their drivers for the army. Bullocks were not easily available, for Haidar had occupied a good portion of the Carnatic, and had ravaged the territory around Madras. Out of the 2,290 villages in the immediate neighbourhood of Madras, 2,000 had been destroyed.³ To carry enough stores to besiege Arot, Coote wanted 35,000 bullocks.⁴ No one would offer to supply so many. The bullock contractors, Paul Benfield in particular, were extremely unscrupulous. His removal did not improve

¹ A. P. Dasgupta, *The Central Authority in British India*, Appendix B, p. 355

² Coote to Bengal, 19 Nov. 1780, cons. 18 Dec. 1780, B.S.C.P. Range A, vol. 57, p. 94

³ Dodwell, "Transport and the Second Mysore War", *Journal of the Society of Army Historical Research*, Oct. 1924, vol. III, p. 266-72

⁴ Madras to the Court, 26 Jan. 1782, Letters Received, vol. 10, para 66

the position, for the contract system itself was bad. When convoys were sent from one place to the other, the contractors managed with the connivance of their agents in the army to detach considerable number of bullocks secretly to be sold again to the army. Speaking of such a loss of bullocks which were stolen between the Mount and Madras, Graham wrote to Hastings that they "will no doubt be again sold to the agent by which means the Company may in the Course of a Campaign pay half a dozen times for the same bullock.... They are marked but those who are better informed on these subjects than I pretend to be say [that] the advantage in the Collusion supersedes all checks."¹ Macartney desired to supplant the contract system by direct procurement through the Company's servants, but Coote opposed it.² The negligence of the commanders also had a hand. On one night Major Byrne lost 3,000 bullocks, although his escort party exceeded 3,000 men, while Haidar had no more than 200 horse.³

Certain defects in the military organisation aggravated the difficulties of provisions and bullocks. The worst among them was the presence of a large number of camp followers. They were so numerous as to form three to every fighting man, 30,000 in an army of 11,000 in 1781.⁴ They were increased to 40,000 in 1782. They were a drain both on the provisions and finances. The transport difficulties would not have been so great, if only the effective force had had to be supplied. Coote had nearly one bullock to every fighting man, but still he wanted three times as many merely to carry food for the camp followers. The servants of a field officer were as many as 100. When some reform was introduced, the number came down to 50, and a subaltern was given only 12. To drive out Haidar, Coote wanted 500 bullock-loads of grain a day for six weeks. He had to carry grain for bullocks as well, and in six weeks

¹ Graham to Hastings, 2 May 1782, *Add. Mss.* 29, 154, p. 236

² Macartney to the Court, 26 Jan. 1782, *Home Misc.* vol. 246, p. 553

³ Coote to Madras, 25 Feb. 1782, *M.S.C.P. Range A*, vol. 11, p. 553

⁴ Macartney to Coote, 26 Nov. 1781, *Home Misc.* vol. 246, p. 451

each bullock would consume four-fifths of its own load. Neither were so many bullocks available, nor could so much provision be found. Even if both were available, the question of finance would yet remain unsolved.

The inefficiency that prevailed in every department of the army was yet another serious defect. Coote was highly sensitive to Macartney's least interference in those affairs. He was too old and poor in health to look himself into them, too fond of power to let Macartney improve them, and too irritable by temperament to put up with the consequent inconveniences. Pearse wrote to Hastings, "I will next say positively that the head is not equal to the task of carrying on the war; the confusion of his orders in the late action [Polilur] plainly tells me he is utterly past the time of military service."¹ Coote should have taken Macartney's advice in the administrative affairs of the army rather than Graham's and Benfield's. These two persons being engrossed themselves in the politics of the Nawab's court, saddled Coote with administrative duties as well. Coote's refusal to permit an attack on Nagapatam, his preference of Benfield for bullock contract, his attempts to secure special powers for himself, his interest in the assignment of the Carnatic, and his constant differences with Macartney diverted the commander from his main task.

③ Thirdly, the financial difficulties caused no less worry. Within a fortnight of Coote's march in January 1781, Madras found its treasury empty to pay for the army. By March 1781 the army was more than a month in arrears.² The Nawab was not contributing anything to the war. All the resources of the Madras Government including bills on home had been exhausted. By December 1781, the arrears of 400,000 pagodas to the Madras army and 247,800 pagodas to the Bengal army

¹ Dodwell, "Transport and the Second Mysore War", *Jour. of the Soc. of Army Hist. Research*, vol. III, pp. 268-9

² Pearse to Hastings, 12 Sept. 1781, Add. Mss. 29, 150, p. 303

³ Coote to Madras, 16 March 1781, cons. 19 March 1781, M. S. C. P. Range D, vol. 5, p. 602

had to be paid.¹ A deputation to Tanjore returned empty handed after seven months.² Coote required 200,000 pagodas per month for the troops and another one lakh for the bullocks.³ The troops in the southern districts were mutinous for want of pay. The attempts to remove the financial difficulties by securing assignment of revenues resulted in serious controversies and far reaching repercussions both in India and England. But for the aid from Bengal, 2,222, 248 pagodas in treasure and 2,172,645 in bills, the war could never have been prosecuted.⁴ Coote was right when he said that "Every Cowrie . . . must come from Bengal as I find there are no resources here from whence a pagoda is to be expected."⁵

The want of enough cavalry was the fourth difficulty. The Company had depended on the Nawab's cavalry, which had either deserted or had been disbanded. In January 1781 Coote had only 800 of them.⁶ Haidar's large cavalry, between 40 and 50,000, always hung upon Coote's flanks and harassed his march. The want of cavalry made Coote neither force a battle on Haidar nor take advantage of a battle, if the latter chose to fight one. The baggage was always a weak point with the Madras army, for Coote had to detach a good part of his army to its protection both during a march and a battle. The lack of cavalry compelled Coote to take more guns than necessary. In January 1781 he had 44 of them, and in April 1781, as many as 60.⁷ This heavy artillery required more bullocks at a time when bullocks were scarce, but without that artillery Haidar's horse could not be kept away. Although the need for cavalry

¹ Macartney's minutes, cons. 18 and 21 Dec. 1781, Ibid, vol. 9, p. 3110 and 3139

² Davidson to Sullivan, 13 Oct. 1781, Add. Mss. 29, 151, p. 103

³ Macartney to Macpherson, 3 Jan. 1782, *P.C.M.* p. 13

⁴ A. P. Dasgupta, *The Central Authority in British India*, Appendix B, p. 355

⁵ Coote to Bengal, 10 Nov. 1780, cons. 14 Dec. 1780, B.S.C.P. Range A, vol. 57, pp. 34-5

⁶ Wylly, *Life of Sir Eyre Coote*, p. 201

⁷ Ibid, p. 204 ; also Gleig II, p. 381

which were laden with rice.¹ A famine was raging in the Presidency. The list of difficulties was full indeed. Coote's army was too small and too ill-equipped to risk bold adventure, and Haidar was too cautious, despite his large army, to hazard much without necessity. Consequently, the Madras army either remained inactive or adopted a defensive plan.]

Haidar's difficulties were either not many or were less known. Apparently, they were not many, because of his precaution to secure constant supplies from his own dominions. He did not suffer from those difficulties of finance, cavalry, bullocks, provisions, sickness and desertion which were common in the English camp. Although he too had a large number of camp followers, as many as six to every fighting man, he was not so much distressed on their account as Coote was. This was because his camp followers were *Pindaris*, a group of people who formed an irregular horse. They served an useful purpose of falling on the English baggage, and plundering their territory. Their profession in fact was so lucrative that instead of paying these *Pindaris*, Haidar was said to have taxed each of them half a crown a day. He decreased this tax in proportion to the desolation of the plundering area.² But it must be mentioned that he permitted these ravages only in the neighbourhood of Madras and Vellore. Dr. Davies rightly reminds us that the view of Haidar having ravaged the whole of the Carnatic is inaccurate, and has gained currency from "Burke's exaggerated rhetoric in his speech on the Nabob of Arcot's Debts."³ Major Sydenham, whom Macartney employed to write the Narrative of the War in order to send it to the Court of Directors, observed, "The Country between Wandewash and Arnee, through which the Army passed, wore the appearance of cultivation and the villages were tolerably well peopled, which contradicts the common place assertion that Hyder had sent

¹ Madras to Hughes, cons. 17 Oct. 1782, Ibid, vol. 16, p. 3235

² State of the Carnatic in 1782 by an officer on board Hughes' Squadron, Feb. 1782, Home Misc. vol. 84, pp. 933-4

³ C. C. Davies, *The Private Correspondence of Lord Macartney*, p. IX

the inhabitants to Mysore; on the contrary he seems to have encouraged in every part of the country adjacent to the forts in his possession."¹ Finally, there was unity of command on Haidar's side, and there was no such friction as between Coote and Macartney. Although Haidar was beaten five times during the war, he could not be expelled from the Carnatic, for he only fled to a safer place on those occasions. They could only defeat him, but not distress him. By cutting off their lines of supplies, he was successful in confining their army to the coast. Had Duchemin heartily co-operated with him, perhaps the Company would have suffered fatal consequences. Alternatively, had Haidar lived until Bussy's arrival and hostilities had not ceased in Europe, the Second Mysore War would have taken a still more adverse turn for the English.

[Haidar died in the midst of the war. His death removed from the scene of action an important person. A new set of actors were introduced on the stage. A change of interests and political connections soon followed. The Marathas became anxious to recover their territories in Mysore. James Anderson concluded an offensive alliance with them against Tipu on 13 October 1783. Haidar had anticipated such an event, and had tried to avert it by lavish promises of money to Nana, by separate negotiations with Coote, and by keeping the French on his side. Haidar had created an impression on the Indian powers that his alliance with the French could still decide the contest in his favour. Tipu was incapable of such diplomacy. Haidar had displayed remarkable courage and bold design in the war.] At his age, about 62, quite advanced by Indian standards, he withstood well the fatigues of the campaigns for over two years. His ability in choosing a good ground for a battle, his disposition for making or receiving an attack, his desire to make the Europeans the main target of his fire, and his rapidity in movement, made his army suffer much less than any other Indian army would have.² His death

¹ Major Sydenham? Narrative of the Second War with Hyder Ali, Home Misc. vol. 243, p. 208

² Haidar's Military System, Feb. 1782, Home Misc. vol. 84, pp. 61-62

coincided with the end of difficulties both for the Company and for Great Britain. Not only was the Salbai treaty ratified, but also the provisional articles of peace were signed between England and America on 30 November 1782, and between England and France on 20 January 1783. Haidar died disappointed in his dream that he could permanently occupy the Carnatic.

After the death of Haidar the unfinished war continued for another 15 months. His death offered Madras a fine opportunity to end it, but the opportunity was missed. Dissensions in the Madras Government, which had characterized their conduct all during the war, prevented them again from surprising the Mysore army which had become leaderless with Tipu's absence on the western coast at the time. Macartney urged speedy action, but Stuart dissented, "The President supposes an instance of criminal inaction on the part of Government; I may also suppose a case of criminal action when military operations are directed to commanders without sufficient local knowledge and from mistaken judgement and information."¹ Disappointing Macartney's expectations that the death of a prince in India would result in a war of succession, the spirited and youthful Tipu prosecuted the war more vigorously, and proved more formidable than his father. He developed closer relations with the French, and took advantage of Bussy's arrival in India in March 1783. On the other side, neither did Madras remove its difficulties of transport and supplies, nor compose its differences with the Nawab, with the Supreme Government and with the Madras commanders. Tipu was aware of these difficulties at Madras, for he was hopeful of occupying the Carnatic permanently.² Even the Bombay Government's diversion on Mangalore, the arrival of reinforcements from England, and the conclusion of peace with the French both in Europe and in India did not materially change the course of the war. Only Hastings' diplomacy in concluding an offensive

¹ Stuart's minute, cons. 16 Dec. 1782, M.S. C.P. Paper D. 10, p. 3902

² Macartney to the Court, 21 Feb. 1783, *Home Misc.* vol. 25, p. 10

alliance in October 1783 with the Marathas against Tipu had a profound effect. Tipu's consciousness of the impending danger and Macartney's irreconcilable differences with Hastings brought about the treaty of Mangalore in March 1784, which ended the Mysore war by providing for a mutual restoration of conquests and prisoners.

CONCLUSIONS

The stage for English relations with Haidar was set at a time when the disintegrating Mughal Empire had created a political vacuum in India, and until that vacuum was removed by the decided superiority of some one power over the rest, contention was inevitable. Haidar and Tipu actively participated in this struggle for power over a part of India, with the result that the regime of these two began with wars against the Company, and ended in wars against them. From 1760, when Haidar allied himself with the French against them, to 1799 when Wellesley destroyed Tipu, Mysore had become "the terror of Leadenhall Street." The existence of Mysore as a strong neighbour, rich in resources, extensive in territories and formidable in power was considered by the Company a threat to the security of the Carnatic. Haidar's possession of a long sea coast, a navy, his quick reduction of a number of neighbouring principalities, the discipline and training of his troops on the western lines, the presence of a French party with him, and the control of a chain of strong forts on the Carnatic frontier cast a doubt as to his intentions on the Company's possessions, and never let Madras remain self-complacent towards him.

Haidar's relations with the English suggest that everything did not go well with the Company, after they became a territorial power. They had yet to undergo many difficulties before they reached their final goal of supremacy in India. Having learnt the western technique of warfare, Haidar was not slow in making full use of it. Under his leadership the Mysore army "proved a school of military science to Indostan." The dread of an European army no longer wrought

¹ *Address to the Proprietors on the Political State of Indostan. Tracts, No. 133, p. 16*

² *Ibid, p. 17*

any magic on him.¹ With Haider as the neighbour other powers learnt to unite on the threat of attack from the Company, as it happened when the Northern Sarkars were acquired, and when Bombay concluded an alliance with Raghunath Rao. The more the Company fought the better it was for Indian powers, for it would give them training in western warfare. Haider's successes in the first and the second Mysore wars did much to damage the Company's reputation as an invincible power. Grant wrote to Shelburne, "An English army much superior to one which under a Lawrence, or a Clive, five and twenty years ago made Hindoostan, nay some of the powers of Europe tremble at the bare recital of its victories, now for the first time was retreating in the face of an Indian enemy."² We read in Dow's history, "We were alarmed, as if his horses had wings to fly over our walls."³ [Historical comparisons may be inaccurate, but a contemporary declared, "He is in Hindustan, what Zingis Khan, Timur or Nadir Shah were, or would have been, under the same circumstances south of the Krishna."⁴

There was some justification for the English to adopt such a policy prior to 1769, because they were not legally bound to respond to his advances. The key-note of their policy at this time was non-intervention, defence of their own territories, and allowing other powers to exist as a check upon one another. Alliance with one would have involved them in difficulties with others. The experience of the Carnatic wars was too fresh in their minds to risk alignment. Having acquired the territories newly, the Company was anxious to consolidate its position first. The Courts' instructions to their servants were as cautious as those of a stock-broker to his agent at times of fluctuating prices, and not of any ambitious military or political leader at times of confusion in the ranks of his rivals. Being a set of merchants, the Court were concerned more with profits than with politics, more in retaining and enjoying their existing patronage and power than in risking their all by adopting an ambitious expansionist policy. [Therefore, until the nineteenth century, the Court never sanctioned any deliberate or consistent policy of expansion. Between 1757 and 1799 not many territorial gains were made, although the zone of influence had increased. This period was one of consolidation and preservation rather than of expansion. An alliance with Haidar would have meant war with the Marathas, for which the Court were not prepared.

The nature of the co-operation which Haidar desired was the main difficulty. He wanted sufficient aid to solve his defence problem—the frequent Maratha invasions of his State. Lending a small force would have risked their reputation without rendering Haidar any service. A larger force they could not spare, because of the Courts' orders and their own inability. Lending aid to him would mean incurring Maratha hostility, who bordered all the three presidencies of the Company. This policy was quite sound so long as the Madras Government were not obliged to lend aid, but after 1769, when they were treaty bound to give aid, their position was greatly changed. To honour the treaty meant inviting a blow from the Marathas, and not to honour meant a breach of faith.

Moreover, from the Company's standpoint, to support Haidar was undesirable, for he would become more powerful. He was not weak enough to remain a dependant on the receipt of their aid. The idea of a subsidiary alliance was ever present in India since Salabat Jang had ceded the Northern Sarkars to Bussy, but subsidiary alliances would work only when the recipient was a Salbat or a Shuja-ud-daula, but not a Haidar or a Tipu. The difficulty was that the Company was not anxious to lend aid to any one who was likely to grow formidable. Dr. Davies tell us that like the Romans the British in India refused to recognise their neighbours as equals, and were desirous of keeping them as a chain of protectorates and buffer states.¹ Haidar, who had "the best established Black army that has ever been seen in India," would have grown too formidable, had his rivals, the Marathas, been subdued.²

But what makes the English relations with Haidar interesting and complicated was that not to support him was more dangerous in their own interest. The Marathas would have come to their doors. The existence of a strong buffer state was a necessity. Clive had urged that the only threat that existed to the Company was from the Marathas. The extent of their power, the frequent invasions they made on their neighbours and their claims to the *chauth* on the Nawab and even on Bengal required that the Company should support those who could oppose the Marathas. Such a staunch supporter of a forward policy in Mysore as Call was conscious of this necessity when he wrote to Palk, "The Reduction then of Hydre, you may regard as certain, but by his ruin we shall raise another more formidable enemy to our increasing influence. I mean the Marathas, who cannot behold our extension of territories with more indifference than we show apprehension of theirs. The truth is the power of the Mussalman is going fast to ruin partly by our encroachments and partly by the Marathas. The question is

¹ C. C. Davies, *Warren Hastings and Oudh*, p. 241

² *Letter to a Lord on India Affairs*, 27 May 1774, Tract, No. 135, p. 40

whether we shall sink with them or we shall strive to save ourselves with the remains of Moorish empire....we must either divide Indostan with the Marathas or form a ballance and Barrier against them with the remains of the Mogull Government."¹ [A balance and a barrier to the Maratha power was essential, and none was more suitable to serve the purpose than Haidar. The first Mysore war was a comedy of errors, for the Madras Government set out to prevent the Maratha aggression, but landed in a morass to realize that they were destroying the very power, which was a check against the Marathas. That was the result of an accident rather than of any considered policy. During the rest of the English contact with Haidar, they realised the necessity of his remaining as a power.] Like the Normans the Marathas were constantly invading their neighbours, and Haidar performed not a little service to the Carnatic in acting as a barrier. Therefore, the Company treated him on a different footing from others. He could not be included within the zone of their influence, like Muhammad Ali and Shuja-ud-daula, because his power was not so weak. He should not be actively supported, because he would become too strong. He should not be reduced, or they would be the next target. The best policy, therefore, was to temporise with him.

The constitutional structure of the Company's government at Madras had something to do with this vacillating and temporising policy. From 1760 to 1773 Madras was not prevented from making an alliance with an Indian neighbour, but in practice it had to obey the Courts' orders which never sanctioned any intervention in the disputes of the Indian powers. That was precisely what happened to the defensive treaty of 1769. The Court advised Madras not to honour the treaty. A succeeding government was not equally interested in honouring the commitments of its predecessor. Bouchier concluded the treaty of 1769, but Du Pré evaded its defensive clause, which alone would have promoted harmony between Haidar and the English. The position was entirely different

¹ Call to Palk, 5 Aug. 1768, Add. Mss. 34, 686, pp. 37-8

after 1773, when the Regulating Act was enforced. Madras lost its powers to make treaties with Indian states. These powers were vested with Bengal, which was at a distance, and which could not see so clearly the necessity for a flexible policy in the Carnatic. In 1775 and 1778 it was Bengal which disapproved of a closer co-operation with Haidar.

The succession to power of a series of inefficient governors at Madras was another obstacle in the way of improving relations with Haidar. Excepting Pigot, Palk and Macartney, the rest were either incompetent or unimaginative. Bouchier, Du Pré, Stratton, Whitehill and Smith were mediocrities. Even Rumbold added to the confusion. In dealing with Haidar, whose military and political abilities were great, they displayed neither foresight nor tact. A Clive, a Hastings, a Wellesley or even a Cornwallis would have either secured Haidar as a friend or destroyed him as an enemy. The Madras governors were incapable of doing either. They unnecessarily provoked him when he was friendly, and they remained self-complacent when he was hostile. The commencement, prosecution and conclusion of the First Mysore War, the reduction and then restoration of Tanjore, the scandal of the Nawab's debts, the arrest of Lord Pigot, and the dissensions that followed it, did much to damage the Company's reputation in the eyes of the Indian powers, who had earlier thought that the Company's governments were far different from their own.

The want of harmony between the Ministry and the Company in England had its repercussion at least once on English relations with Haidar. The Ministry appointed Sir John Lindsay and Sir Robert Haftland as plenipotentiaries, who being in league with the Nawab brought pressure on Madras to join the Marathas against Haidar. By the treaty Madras was obliged to support Haidar, but the plenipotentiaries urged a diametrically opposite policy. In a way the Court were also not adopting a consistent policy towards the Indian powers. Their instructions to Madras not to support Haidar against the Marathas, their disapproval of Hastings' policy towards Chait Singh, and their first approval and then rejection of the Carnatic assignment, caused not a little embarrassment to their

servants in India, to whom every new packet brought conflicting orders from home. As the Court had fully endorsed Du Pré's policy of neutrality in the Maratha war against Mysore, they should also share a part of the responsibility for what followed. The Indian powers got an impression that so long as the Company's servants were adding territories without expenses, and without embarrassment, they had the fullest support of their masters in England. The servants were brought to account only for the losses. Had the first Mysore War turned out to be a success, we do not think that the Court's condemnation of it would have been so severe.

The complicated and delicate relations of Madras with the Nawab contributed greatly to estrange the relations between Haidar and the Company. The Nawab commanded the resources of the Carnatic, without which resources Madras could not assist Haidar. Although the Nawab and the Company were independent of each other, they were not so in practice. The defence of the Carnatic was in their hands, giving them extensive powers in his affairs. The finances of the Carnatic were in his hands, making them depend on him for money. As the Nawab was not well-disposed towards Haidar, the former would withhold the supply of money and provisions to the Madras Government, if they were inclined to support the latter. The Nawab openly declared that he would not spare a rupee if the Government were to adopt such a policy. On the other hand he exerted his utmost to bring about an offensive-alliance between the Company and the Marathas against Haidar. In fact the Nawab was the most disturbing element in English relations with Haidar. The Nawab and Madras never agreed on Mysore policy. The English were for a temporising policy, but the Nawab stood for rigidity and firmness. There existed a bitter rivalry among the four Indian powers of the south, the Marathas, the Nizam, the Nawab and Haidar. Each one of these was anxious to reduce the other, but no one was capable of effecting it all alone. Each sought the support of the third. The Marathas wanted the Nawa The Nawab was willing to ..

many Frenchmen in its service as Haidar had. He was the strongest and the nearest power to their major settlements. He received his military supplies from them, and had established direct contact with them in the Isles through his western coast. One of the reasons Bouchier advanced for Haidar's reduction in 1768 was that he was constantly in touch with the French, whose force in the Islands was expected to be raised to 3,000 Europeans. If these were to join Haidar, they would be a real threat to the Coromandel coast. From 1777 the French intensified their propaganda in the several courts. St. Lubin, Montigny, Piveron and several others were active in creating trouble for the Company. In 1780 the French Court resolved to distress the English as much in the east as they had done in the west. Whereas the French had nothing to lose in India if they were to be defeated, the English had everything to lose. The loss of Pondicherry, Mahé and their other settlements had offered the French an excuse to deprive the English of their possessions as well. The despatch of D'Orves in 1781, of Suffren and Duchemin in 1782 and of Bussy in 1783 was all for the same purpose. The loss of Mahé and Guntur through which Haidar received his military supplies made him willing to support them, and thus they found a very helpful ally to distress their rivals. From Haidar's point of view the English refusal to supply him with arms, and their closing of all centres from where he could obtain them, was as bad as declaring war against him, for his army trained on western lines would have been useless without western arms.

But it must be remembered that Haidar was not anxious to reduce the English in order to establish the French in India. To him the French and the English were just the same. His policy was to promote his own interests, for which he would favour any one who would help him in his designs. He tried the English, but found them wanting in the will to help him. The Court had even stopped the supply of a few paltry arms from Bombay. His experience of the Madras Government was much worse. Whether the French would have behaved better in India cannot be known, for they never established their supremacy for any long time, and an occasion did not

arise to test their policy. But in his relations with the French Haidar offers us ample evidence to infer that he was neither firmly attached to them, nor was he interested in the rise of their power. Had the Madras Government fulfilled his basic demands for the supply of arms in peace time and for military aid in exigencies, he would never have bothered himself with the French. Consistent advances on the part of one and evasion on the other created a situation wherein a third party was bound to take advantage.

Thus several factors contributed to widen the gulf between Haidar and the English. The nature of the Company's government at Madras, the unimaginative governors that succeeded to power, the want of harmony between the Ministry and the Company in England, the Nawab's delicate relations with the English and his rivalry with Haidar, and the association of Mysore with the French never brought Haidar and the English closer together. At a critical hour in 1767 when the Marathas were invading his territories the English joined his enemies and proved themselves to be unmindful of their own interests. His diplomacy and resourcefulness extricated him from his difficulties and offered him an opportunity to obtain what he had much desired for. He forced an alliance on the Madras Government, and he considered it to be a great achievement, almost the sheet-anchor of his defence policy. He invoked it when the occasion arose. His disappointment remains to be imagined when he found it wanting in efficacy. His confidence shaken, his hopes destroyed and his bitterness increased, he is said to have declared, "If the great George does not hear the friendly submissions of my words, he must listen to the noise of my cannon." Madhava Rao's third invasion of Mysore had been undertaken with the definite object of supplanting Haidar. When no aid was forth coming from Madras he and his son must have received such strong impressions as to pave the way for the subsequent events, which finally culminated in the tragic death of Tipu. To the previous experience of the

¹ Quoted in *Address to the Proprietors on the Political State of Indostan*, Tract No. 133, p. 18

Trichinopoly affair, a fresh instance of a similar nature was added. Haidar could understand the Nawab's duplicity, but he had high hopes from the English. The wound was never healed. The Confederacy of 1780 must be viewed against this background.

The Confederacy of 1780 must also be viewed in the light of what had preceded it. Several Indian powers began to feel that in attempting to punish the cruelty of one individual, Siraj-ud-daula, the Company had come to possess the whole of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. In order to protect these possessions they had subdued the Kingdom of Oudh to their entire satisfaction. In order to complete their independence they had discontinued paying the agreed tribute to Shah Alam. In order to establish their exclusive supremacy they had removed the French from the scene, whom the Indians had regarded as a likely check to the English expansion. They had reduced their allies such as Muhammad Ali and the Tanjore Raja to a degree of subjection which forced others to guard their interests and prevent a similar fate. They had violated their solemn treaties with the Indian powers by their failure to assist Haidar, by their demand for remission of the tribute from the Nizam, by their capture of Guntur from Basalat, and by their support of Raghunath Rao. Although the Company's conduct may not have been different from that of other powers, the effect of the former's policy brought about a rare phenomenon, namely that unity among the Indian powers which became a necessity. Although the British Empire in India had been at first the result of accident rather than of a considered policy, the conduct of the Company's servants, both intentional and un-intentional, made it appear that the Company had aggressive designs. To some real grievances many imaginary ones were added. The Indian powers forgot for a time their mutual differences, and entered into a league in order to check the Company's expansion. It must be remembered that there was nothing more than power politics in the conduct of those who participated in the confederacy. The Company's rapid territorial expansion, financial stability and administrative efficiency excited the jealousy of the Indian powers, who

realised that their power would steadily decrease, if effective measures were not taken to circumscribe the Company's activity.

Why did Haider participate in it? He had of course a grievance, namely that they did not come to his rescue when he was in difficulties. But he was not a man to mix past politics with later issues. We find in him dispassionate thinking of vital problems that affected his interests. Sentiments and prejudice did not gain an upper hand in him. Swartz writes, "Hyder is quite unconcerned as to religion. He has none himself, and leaves every one else to his choice."¹ When Lally demanded 5,000 rupees instead of 2,000 for his troops, Haider said, "Be quiet, and be grateful for getting so much; you have not fulfilled your stipulation, and I have overpaid in proportion to your numbers. I do not give an officer 5,000 rupees a month for the beauty of his single nose."² The point is whether in relation to the French or others Haider judged each issue on its merits. Pondicherry's fall, or Mahé's capture, or the Company's alliance with Basalat would not have affected his decision, if they had not something to do with his interests. How Haider judged affairs could be inferred from the Company's Maratha policy. He did not oppose Bombay, when it supported Raghunath Rao. Far from it he offered to send his own troops to conduct Raghunath Rao to Poona, and until July 1780 he was actually pressing for an alliance both with Madras and Bombay. He was not the author of the Confederacy, and was the last to join it. The Madras Government's French policy irritated him more than the Company's Maratha policy. Therefore, the major reason for his participation in the Confederacy was the capture of his supply centres, Mahé, Pondicherry and Guntur, and not the Bombay attack on the Marathas. He joined for certain other reasons as well. A fine opportunity presented itself to advance his interests. When all the presidencies were involved in troubles, when the principal Indian powers had arrayed their forces

¹ Quoted in Pearson, *Memoirs of the Rev. C. F. Swartz*, vol. I, p. 312.

² Quoted in *East India Military Calendar*, vol. I, p. 251 (first note).

against them, and when he knew how ill-prepared Madras was, his ambitions received a new fillip. When other powers had joined against the Company his alliance with Madras, or even his neutrality, would have been an excuse for his neighbours to destroy him later. If such an exigency were to arise, he could rely on none, for his experience of the English policy was too fresh to expect any succour from them. On the other hand, if he supported the Indian powers he would gain both their favour and possibly some advantage in the Carnatic. As for his ability to overpower the English army he trusted in the French support whose intrigue in every court, whose success in America, and whose promises of the speedy despatch of an expedition to India, removed all doubts, if he had any, of a discomfiture. Moreover, his Indian colleagues had promised to engage the English attention in other sectors of the war. The Confederacy at first roused tremendous national sentiments, and Haidar's letter to Basalat Jang's minister betrayed the same sentiments. But knowing Haidar's character as we do, it is too much to expect that any sentiment but that of self interest would have prompted him to undertake a venture of that magnitude. In short Haidar's desire to become the Nawab of Carnatic was one of the main causes for his joining the Confederacy.

Haidar's military adventures had for reaching impacts on the Company's administration. India affairs received great interest in England. Parliament appointed secret and select committees to enquire into India affairs. Pitt's India Act was passed, by which all effective powers excepting commercial were acquired by the ministry. With these reforms which made defence the responsibility of the centre, Lord Cornwallis felt it difficult to beat Tipu, although he commanded the resources of all the three presidencies together with the support and alliance of two other major powers, the Marathas and the Nizam. After two and a half years of active campaigns in some of which Cornwallis himself was present, Tipu was beaten and that too in a surprise night attack. This suggests how powerful Mysore had become under Haidar and Tipu. The maimed tiger of Mysore even after its claws were clipped was considered by

Wellesley a source of potent danger to the Company.

Nevertheless, there was a bright aspect in Haidar's relations with the English. He had profound respect for them. He admired Colonel Smith and Sir Eyre Coote. He regarded Pigot and Palk as able governors. He conferred frankly with Brooke, Andrews and Du Pré on problems affecting the common interests. His relations with Bombay were cordial, and he offered them all the privileges they demanded. Despite the restrictions on the supply of arms to Haidar, Maistre tells us that seven-eighths of his arms were of English make.¹ As his meeting with Srinivasa Rao indicates Haidar had no personal animosity against the English, but merely his political differences had led to the invasion of the Carnatic. Wilks says that Haidar regretted having gone to war against the English, and that he advised Tipu to make peace with them.² Although the validity of Wilks' view cannot be substantiated by other sources, Haidar was a realist, and his general policy seems to be to strengthen his own position, and not to discriminate against any power on the score of its nationality. It was Tipu who adopted such a discriminating policy. Whereas Tipu adopted a consistently hostile policy towards the English, Haidar had not. Haidar desired to make use of them for his own purpose but Tipu desired to destroy them in order to enhance his own power. Haidar was more far-sighted and a better soldier than Tipu, whose merits were personal courage and consistent opposition to the foreigners. Haidar had been almost bred in an European camp, admired their system of government, and borrowed much from it. Tipu was unlike his father in these respects, and introduced his own changes in every department. The inference from such a comparison is that relations could have been improved with Haidar, but not with Tipu. The unfortunate aspect of the English relations with Mysore was that Madras pursued a wrong policy towards Haidar, who bequeathed to Tipu, already a prejudiced mind, bitter experiences of his contact with the English.

¹ M. M. D. L. T. History of Hydr Shah, p. 133

² Wilks, *History of Mysore*, vol. II, (1859 edn.) p. 10

Haidar and Tipu are interesting figures, because they elevated a small principality to the position of an important kingdom, and because they brought that kingdom into contact with the bigger world. Haidar sent his agents as far as Iran.¹ He had contacts with Shah Alam at Delhi, and with the French in the Isles and in France. Tipu went a step further, and built close connections with Afghanistan. Turkey and France at the risk of making these contacts the main factor for his downfall. It was difficult for men of such calibre to submit themselves to the paramountcy of a foreign power. The underlying principle in English relations with Mysore was the contest for power and to fill the void that had been created by the disappearance of a central authority in India. During Haidar's time the Company were imperceptibly building up their system of subsidiary alliances by which an Indian power either acknowledged the Company's suzerainty, or paid the price for its contumacy. As long as persons like Haidar and Tipu were alive such a policy of supremacy could never strike roots in India, and hence the Company's relations with Mysore were never smooth before 1799.

¹ Memoirs of the life of Hyder Naik, Mackenzie Collection, vol. XL1, pp. 36-40

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into the Company's protection here as a thing done before my arrival....and I consider this protecting first privately, afterwards publicly these people as the sole cause of all the ill-will shewn to the Honble Company on this coast by Hyder."¹ Haidar wrote to the settlement, "The country of the Nairs is become my possession these five years past, since which the Resident of Tellicherry has protected them and their Families, and supplied them with powder, Balls and Musquets and disturbs my country, by which my country of Twenty Lacks of Rupees Revenue is entirely ruined." But more than Haidar and the settlement, the Nair chiefs were responsible. There were numerous chieftains in Malabar, whose ambitions to profit at one another's expense, and whose playing off Haidar against the English, were chiefly responsible for the trouble.

The third main cause of difference between Haidar and the English was the question of the Guntur Sarkar. According to the treaties of 1766 and 1768 Guntur was to be retained by Basalat Jang during his life-time, but was to revert to the Company at his death. If, however, he supported any of the Company's enemies, the Company had a right to acquire it even before his death.² In 1775 on hearing that the French were active in Basalat's court, the Bengal Government immediately asked Madras to check the French influence, and if necessary to occupy the whole of Guntur by sending a body of troops from Madras, should Basalat oppose the removal of the French.³

Accordingly the Madras Government assembled a force, but discussed what other possibilities were open. Three alternatives suggested themselves to them, to occupy Guntur forcibly, to apply to Basalat for the French removal, or to ask the Nizam to intervene. The Government rejected the first two, and adopted the last one. Their reasons for their policy were that

¹ Braithwaite to Tellicherry, 17 Dec. 1779, Ibid, p. 317

² Haidar to Tellicherry, 11 Feb. 1780, Ibid, p. 26

³ Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements and Sanads*, vol. IX, p. 29

⁴ Bengal to Madras, 5 July 1775, cons. 31 July 1775, M.M.S.P. Range 151, vol. 78, pp. 1001-2

the first alternative would disturb the peace in the Deccan, and that the second was ineffective, for Basalat might be unwilling to oblige them, and might seek either the Maratha or Haidar's aid. Moreover, the Nizam would be offended, for he was the guarantee in the treaty for his brother's good conduct.¹ Therefore, the Government wrote to the Nizam in order to force Basalat either to let Guntur to the English for an annual rent, or to dismiss the French from his service, and trust the English for his protection.²

This was a sound policy justified by the success that followed by its adoption in 1775, and still more by the failure that resulted from its abandonment in 1779. In 1775 the Nawab had differed from the Government, and had advocated direct negotiation with Basalat, on the ground that the Nizam in private was hostile to the Company, and that Basalat being weak would be willing to supplant the French for the English at his court.³ But the Government had ignored the Nawab's advice.⁴ On 16 November 1775 the Nizam's reply was received intimating that he had asked Basalat to remove all the French from Guntur.⁵ The Bengal Government approved of this policy.⁶ The crisis seemed to pass over, and the influx of the French was temporarily stopped.

When hostilities broke out in Europe in June 1778, the Guntur question again began to loom large. Rumbold accused Basalat of having made Guntur "a nursery of French and other foreign troops."⁷ It was reported that Lally, the French commander, had 500 Europeans and 2,700 sepoys.⁸ Rumbold

¹ Board's minute, cons. 14 Aug. 1775, Ibid, pp. 1059-63

² Madras to the Nizam, 18 Aug. 1775, *Minutes of Evidence*, p. 344

³ Nawab to Madras, 27 Aug. 1775, Ibid, pp. 78-80

⁴ Board's minute, cons. 4 Sept. 1775, Ibid, p. 82

⁵ Nizam to Madras, 16 Nov. 1775, Ibid, pp. 84-5

⁶ Bengal to Madras, 11 Dec. 1775, Ibid, pp. 357-8

⁷ Rumbold's minute, cons. 10 July 1778, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 88, p. 1209

⁸ Rumbold's minute, cons. 26 July 1778, M. S. C. P. Range C, vol. 63, p. 33

proposed that without further delay Guntur should be occupied forcibly, for Basalat had forfeited his right to it by his unfriendly act, and that no fresh sanction of power, apart from the orders of 1775 from the Bengal Government was necessary for these steps.¹ As the Madras Government was engaged in reducing Pondicherry at this period, they took no step against Guntur. When Pondicherry fell, Basalat must have thought that it was unwise to maintain a French force under his service. He dismissed Lally's party, and opened negotiations with Madras for a new treaty, by which he would surrender Guntur to them in return for their military aid, and for an annual rent of 1,92,000 Madras pagodas. Out of this sum he would pay them a lakh of pagodas towards the cost of the military aid. If his territories were to be invaded, they should assist him with more troops. These proposals were accepted by Madras, and accordingly a treaty was drawn up in November 1778.²

The Nizam objected to these proceedings, which were transacted without reference to him. Earlier he had informed the Government that he had made Basalat dismiss all the French from his service, and that he would punish Basalat, if he were to cause any embarrassment to the English.³ When the Madras Government ignored the Nizam, and concluded an alliance with Basalat, the Nizam was highly incensed. He might not have reacted so adversely, had not the Guntur affair coincided with the Bombay Government's decision to conduct Raghunath Rao to Poona.

The Madras Government were more adversely affected by Haidar's reaction to their policy. He did not like the idea of their permanently maintaining a force in Guntur, for he had been active in its neighbourhood, Gutti, Bellary, Cuddapah and Karnul, for some time past. When he learnt that Basalat had

¹ Rumbold's minute, cons. 10 July 1778, M.M.S.P. Range 251, vol. 88, pp. 1212-3

² Articles of a Treaty with Basalat, cons. 30 Nov. 1778, M.S.C.P. Range C, vol. 64, pp. 687-90

³ The Nizam to Madras, 31 Oct. 1778, *Minutes of Evidence*, pp. 366-7

ceded Guntur to them in return for their aid, Haidar threatened Adoni, Basalat's capital. Basalat applied for aid to Madras, who decided to send three battalions of sepoy, a company of artillery, and six field pieces under Lieutenant Colonel Humphry Harper.¹ The route they approved of for the march of their troops passed through Haidar's territories in the Cuddapah district, where he had a force of 3,000 men.² Although this route was quicker, and Basalat was anxious for speedy succour, the Madras Government should have considered how Haidar would look at it, especially as his hostility was known ever since Mahé fell. There was another route, through the Nizam's dominions, which would have been preferable, for, although the Nizam was also opposed to the march of the troops, he could not have so successfully prevented it as Haidar, because he had no force there.

Harper set out for Adoni on 10 June. He marched through Haidar's territories without taking his permission, although Mir Raza, his commander, warned Harper that serious consequences would follow from such a conduct.³ Madras approved of Harper's action, and thought that Haidar would not seriously impede the march.⁴ On 12 August hardly had Harper advanced a few miles, when Haidar's whole army obstructed his march, and forced him to fall back to Venukonda, from where he had started. Harper had not yet arrived there when he received permission to march from Mir Raza. This was only to deceive Harper, who was again attacked on trying to advance.⁵ Mir Raza so behaved perhaps to retaliate for Harper's earlier disregard of the notice not to advance. However, the incident was the first armed clash between them.

The Madras Government demanded an explanation from Haidar for his unfriendly act. Far from realising that they had

¹ Committee's minute, cons. 19 Apl. 1779, M.S.C.P. Range C, vol. 66, p. 84

² Harper to Madras, 4 June 1779, cons. 14 June 1779, Ibid, p. 448

³ Harper to Madras, 30 July 1779, cons. 3 Aug. 1779, Ibid, p. 700

⁴ Committee's minute, cons. 3 Aug. 1779, Ibid, p. 702

⁵ Harper to Madras, 14 Aug. 1779, cons. 23 Aug. 1779, Ibid, pp. 771-2

first violated his rights, they wrote to the Court that his ambitions had exceeded all limits, and that he should be reduced.¹ They decided to reinforce Harper's detachment, which was to march again soon after.² Meanwhile, Haidar adopted other tactics, and brought pressure on Basalat to break with the English. He insisted that Basalat should rent Guntur to him, and decline to take the English aid.³ Haidar's letter to Iftekar Khan, Basalat's minister, reveals strong anti-English sentiments, which were perhaps excited for political purposes. Haidar said that wherever the English had established their influence they had reduced the Indian powers to complete servility. He added, "What are the English whose name gives so much alarm to the people of this country? How did I encounter them when I was at war with them? . . . It is not in my power to consent to His Excellency's giving up the Guntur Circar to my old and bitter enemies, for it joins to my country." The Nizam also asked Basalat to revoke his treaty with the Madras Government, and rent Guntur to Haidar. By way of inducement the Nizam paid a lakh of rupees to Basalat, and demanded a peremptory break with them.⁵

Owing to these developments, Basalat asked Madras to revoke their treaty, to stop the march of their troops, and to restore Guntur to him.⁶ Accordingly they directed Harper not to advance, but they decided to retain Guntur, on the ground that the restoration would exhibit the Company's weakness to the threats of Indian powers, and that it would enhance Haidar's power.⁷

¹ Committee to the Court, 14 Oct. 1779, Letters Received, vol. 9, Para 13, p. 431

² Committee to Harper, cons. 27 Sept. 1779, M. S. C. P. Range C, vol. 66, pp. 903-4

³ Basalat to his *rakil*, 26 Aug. 1779, Home Misc. vol. 249, p. 192

⁴ Haidar to Iftekar Khan, cons. 30 Dec. 1779, M.S.C.P. Range C, vol. 67, p. 333

⁵ Basalat to his *rakil*, 13 Nov. 1779, cons. 20 Nov. 1779, Ibid, p. 170-3

⁶ Basalat to Rumbold, 5 Dec. 1779, Home Misc. vol. 249, pp. 438-9

⁷ Committee's minute, cons. 20 Nov. 1779, M.S.C.P. Range C, vol. 67, pp. 174-5

The Madras Government took one more step, which was unwise. They rented Guntur to the Nawab for 10 years. They did so apparently because the Court had sanctioned such a renting in their orders of 4 March 1767, but in reality some corrupt motives could be inferred from the hasty manner with which the matter was disposed of. Smith desired the question to be deferred at least till the next meeting, but Munro, Whitehill and Rumbold insisted that there should be no delay.¹ Remarking about the Nawab's letter which stipulated his term of renting, the Parliamentary Committee of Enquiry observed, "The Nabob's letter was above a fortnight in the President's possession, and when brought to light, a majority appeared ripe for decision, that the question was forthright put, and carried for a 10 years lease, with as little ceremony as if it had been for the purchase of a bale of cloth."² This decision was unwise, for Haidar and the Nizam were more ill-disposed towards the Nawab than towards the Company, and there was now room for them to infer that he was at the root of the whole trouble.

[Thus the Guntur question increased the differences between Haidar and the English.] It brought Haidar and the Nizam closer, who were until then not on friendly terms, owing to Haidar's aggressive policy in Cuddapah and Karnul, and the Nizam's despatch of a force to Mysore in conjunction with the Marathas in 1777. [In deciding to support Basalat, the Madras Government took no notice of the likely reaction of both Haidar and the Nizam.] Moreover, without obtaining the previous sanction of the Supreme Government, Madras proceeded to conclude the defensive alliance. The Bengal letter of 5 July 1775 had sanctioned powers to acquire Guntur forcibly, only if Basalat were to refuse to dismiss the French. The Madras Government concluded the treaty after Basalat had dismissed the French under Lally, who went to the Nizam. Even supposing there was room for trouble from Lally, Rumbold's remedy of sending a detachment to Basalat was not

¹ Committee's minute, cons. 4 Oct. 1779, *Minutes of Evidence*, p. 111

² *Second Report by the Committee of Secrecy of the House of Commons, 1781*, p. 489

effective, because Lally was not present with him. Rumbold took no notice of where Lally actually was. Thus [the Madras Government's policy neither removed the French menace, nor assisted Basalat Jang, nor kept the Nizam friendly, nor checked Haidar's ambitions.]

Having concluded a defensive treaty with Basalat the way Madras proceeded to execute it was highly improper. They knew that Lally's force had been dismissed, that there was a political vacuum at Basalat's court, and that Haidar's force was pressing towards Adoni, yet the earliest they thought of despatching a force was in April 1779, although Basalat had become their ally ever since November 1778. It was not until June 1779 that the force actually moved to his aid, and that even in August it was not anywhere near his capital. When they sent a force it was so short of the requisite strength to force its way, that Harper was apprehensive of its being cut up by Haidar's army, and that a necessity arose to reinforce it.¹ The failure of the Madras Government to take the previous permission of Haidar, the disregard of Harper to Mir Raza's warning, and the want of judgment in Harper to detect insincerity in Mir Raza in alluring him back to the narrow pass, created a difficult situation for the Government, who failed to realise that they could ill-afford to quarrel with Haidar and the Nizam, when the English were at war with the Marathas. The House of Commons were certainly right in their remark that, "Sir Thomas Rumbold, Baronet, in treating with Basalat Jang without the participation of the Nizam, in marching troops into the country of Hyder Ally Cawn without having obtained his consent, and in granting a ten years lease of the Guntur Circar to the Nabob of Arcot disregarding the true interests of the Company, by a gross breach of solemn treaties with the Nizam, strained the National Honour, and was thereby guilty of a high crime and misdemeanor."²

¹ Harper to Madras, 14 Aug. 1779, cons. 23 Aug. 1779, M.S.C.P. Range C, vol. 66, p. 771

² Parliamentary Debate, 29 Apl. 1782, *Journal of the House of Commons*, vol. 38, p. 960